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Amit A, Venzhik E. Morality, Social Inclusion, and In-Group Superiority: The Differential Role of Individualizing and Binding Foundations in Perceptions of the Social Identity of In-Group and Out-Group Members. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024:1461672241262367. [PMID: 39078019 DOI: 10.1177/01461672241262367] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/31/2024]
Abstract
Research into social identity and morality judgments typically focuses on how the former influences the latter. We approach this theme from the opposite direction, establishing the influence of morality on perceptions of social identity. In three studies, conducted in two cultures, we show that in-group members acting immorally are excluded from the group. Extending this investigation to the overlooked study of out-group-on-out-group behavior, in Studies 2 and 3, we compare perceptions of social inclusion for in-group members following (im)moral behavior toward the in-group with perceptions of out-group members following (im)moral behavior toward the out-group. We show that people treat in-group and out-group members alike with respect to binding morals, which concern preservation and protection of the group, but not individualizing morals, which concern preservation and protection of individual rights. Finally, in Study 3, we confirm the underlying motivating mechanism of reasserting in-group superiority by affirming the positive distinctiveness of one's own group.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adi Amit
- The Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel
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2
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Rehren P, Blunden C. Let's not get ahead of ourselves: we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND ACTION 2024; 27:351-369. [PMID: 39140007 PMCID: PMC11318506 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2363876] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/18/2023] [Accepted: 05/13/2024] [Indexed: 08/15/2024]
Abstract
An important question about moral progress is what causes it. One of the most popular proposed mechanisms is moral reasoning: moral progress often happens because lots of people reason their way to improved moral beliefs. Authors who defend moral reasoning as a cause of moral progress have relied on two broad lines of argument: the general and the specific line. The general line presents evidence that moral reasoning is in general a powerful mechanism of moral belief change, while the specific line tries to establish that moral reasoning can explain specific historical examples of moral progress. In this paper, we examine these lines in detail, using Kumar and Campbell's (2022, A Better Ape: The Evolution of the Moral Mind and How It Made Us Human. Oxford University Press) model of rational moral progress to sharpen our focus. For each line, we explain the empirical assumptions it makes; we then argue that the available evidence supports none of these assumptions. We conclude that at this point, we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paul Rehren
- Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Ethics Institute, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
| | - Charlie Blunden
- Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Ethics Institute, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
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3
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Sun J, Smillie LD. Why moral psychology needs personality psychology. J Pers 2024; 92:653-665. [PMID: 38450583 DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12919] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/22/2023] [Revised: 01/27/2024] [Accepted: 01/29/2024] [Indexed: 03/08/2024]
Abstract
People vary in how they perceive, think about, and respond to moral issues. Clearly, we cannot fully understand the psychology of morality without accounting for individual differences in moral functioning. But decades of neglect of and explicit skepticism toward such individual differences has resulted in a lack of integration between moral psychology and personality psychology-the study of psychological differences between people. In recent years, these barriers to progress have started to break down. This special issue aims to celebrate and further increase the visibility of the personality psychology of morality. Here, we introduce the articles in this special issue by highlighting some important contributions a personality-based perspective has to offer moral psychology-particularly in comparison to the currently prominent social psychological approach. We show that personality psychology is well-placed to (a) contribute toward a rigorous empirical foundation for moral psychology, (b) tackle the conceptualization and assessment of stable moral tendencies, (c) assess the predictive validity of moral traits in relation to consequential outcomes, (d) uncover the mechanisms underlying individual differences in moral judgments and behavior, and (e) provide insights into moral development. For these reasons, we believe that moral psychology needs personality psychology to reach its full scholarly potential.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jessie Sun
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
| | - Luke D Smillie
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
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4
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Berry Z, Lucas BJ. How Much Is Enough? The Relationship Between Prosocial Effort and Moral Character Judgments. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024; 50:659-678. [PMID: 36575959 DOI: 10.1177/01461672221135954] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/29/2022]
Abstract
The amount of effort required to bring about a prosocial outcome can vary from low-handing a stranger the wallet she just dropped-to high-spending days tracking down the owner of a lost wallet. The goal of the current research is to characterize the relationship between prosocial effort and moral character judgments. Does more prosocial effort always lead to rosier moral character judgments? Across four studies (N = 1,658), we find that moral character judgments increase with prosocial effort to a point and then plateau. We find evidence that this pattern is produced, in part, by descriptive and prescriptive norms: exceeding descriptive norms increases moral character judgments, but exceeding prescriptive norms has the opposite effect, which leads to a tapering off of moral character judgments at higher levels of effort.
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5
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Weber R, Hopp FR, Eden A, Fisher JT, Lee HE. Vicarious punishment of moral violations in naturalistic drama narratives predicts cortical synchronization. Neuroimage 2024; 292:120613. [PMID: 38631616 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2024.120613] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2023] [Revised: 04/13/2024] [Accepted: 04/15/2024] [Indexed: 04/19/2024] Open
Abstract
Punishment of moral norm violators is instrumental for human cooperation. Yet, social and affective neuroscience research has primarily focused on second- and third-party norm enforcement, neglecting the neural architecture underlying observed (vicarious) punishment of moral wrongdoers. We used naturalistic television drama as a sampling space for observing outcomes of morally-relevant behaviors to assess how individuals cognitively process dynamically evolving moral actions and their consequences. Drawing on Affective Disposition Theory, we derived hypotheses linking character morality with viewers' neural processing of characters' rewards and punishments. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine neural responses of 28 female participants while free-viewing 15 short story summary video clips of episodes from a popular US television soap opera. Each summary included a complete narrative structure, fully crossing main character behaviors (moral/immoral) and the consequences (reward/punishment) characters faced for their actions. Narrative engagement was examined via intersubject correlation and representational similarity analysis. Highest cortical synchronization in 9 specifically selected regions previously implicated in processing moral information was observed when characters who act immorally are punished for their actions with participants' empathy as an important moderator. The results advance our understanding of the moral brain and the role of normative considerations and character outcomes in viewers' engagement with popular narratives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rene Weber
- University of California, Santa Barbara, Department of Communication - Media Neuroscience Lab; University of California, Santa Barbara, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences; Ewha Womans University, Department of Communication and Media.
| | - Frederic R Hopp
- University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam School of Communication Research
| | - Allison Eden
- Michigan State University, Department of Communication
| | | | - Hye-Eun Lee
- Ewha Womans University, Department of Communication and Media
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6
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Gawronski B, Ng NL. Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 2024:10888683241234114. [PMID: 38477027 DOI: 10.1177/10888683241234114] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/14/2024]
Abstract
PUBLIC ABSTRACT How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Nyx L Ng
- The University of Texas at Austin, USA
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7
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Ingram GPD, Chuquichambi EG, Jimenez-Leal W, Rosa AOL. In masks we trust: explicit and implicit reactions to masked faces vary by political orientation. BMC Psychol 2024; 12:68. [PMID: 38347648 PMCID: PMC10863087 DOI: 10.1186/s40359-024-01556-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/24/2023] [Accepted: 01/25/2024] [Indexed: 02/15/2024] Open
Abstract
Previous studies in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic indicated that wearing a medical-style mask affects whether a stranger's face is judged as more trustworthy, socially desirable, or likely to be ill. However, given political controversies around mask use, these effects might vary by political orientation. In a pre-registered online experiment, we measured evaluations of trustworthiness, social desirability and perceived illness in masked and unmasked faces by 1241 British and US participants. We included questions on political orientation, along with the implicit online-VAAST approach/avoid task to test reaction times to masked/unmasked faces. There was a medium-sized effect of masks on trustworthiness and a significant interaction with political orientation, in that conservatives found masked faces less trustworthy than did liberals. Participants were quicker to approach masked than unmasked faces, but conservatives were relatively slower than liberals. The effects on trustworthiness suggest that differential moralization of novel social norms can affect how their adherents are evaluated in terms of their suitability for social interactions. Furthermore, the congruence between implicit and explicit methods implies that such differences can have deep-seated effects on reactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gordon P D Ingram
- Departamento de Psicología, Universidad de los Andes, Carrera 1 # 18A-12, 111711, Bogotá, Colombia.
| | - Erick G Chuquichambi
- Human Cognition and Evolution (EvoCog) Research Group, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma, Spain
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8
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Jaeger B, Wilks M. The Relative Importance of Target and Judge Characteristics in Shaping the Moral Circle. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13362. [PMID: 37807673 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13362] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2023] [Revised: 07/14/2023] [Accepted: 09/22/2023] [Indexed: 10/10/2023]
Abstract
People's treatment of others (humans, nonhuman animals, or other entities) often depends on whether they think the entity is worthy of moral concern. Recent work has begun to investigate which entities are included in a person's moral circle, examining how certain target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) shape moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of target and judge characteristics in predicting moral inclusion remains unclear. When predicting whether a person will deem an entity worthy of moral consideration, how important is it to know who is making the judgment (i.e., characteristics of the judge), who is being judged (i.e., characteristics of the target), and potential interactions between the two factors? Here, we address this foundational question by conducting a variance component analysis of the moral circle. In two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (N = 836), we test how much variance in judgments of moral concern is explained by between-target differences, between-judge differences, and by the interaction between the two factors. We consistently find that all three components explain substantial amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. Our findings provide two important insights. First, an increased focus on interactions between target and judge characteristics is needed, as these interactions explain as much variance as target and judge characteristics separately. Second, any theoretical account that aims to provide an accurate description of moral inclusion needs to consider target characteristics, judge characteristics, and their interaction.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Matti Wilks
- Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh
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9
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Körner A, Deutsch R. Deontology and Utilitarianism in Real Life: A Set of Moral Dilemmas Based on Historic Events. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2023; 49:1511-1528. [PMID: 35751175 PMCID: PMC10478346 DOI: 10.1177/01461672221103058] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/27/2021] [Accepted: 05/07/2022] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Moral dilemmas are frequently used to examine psychological processes that drive decisions between adhering to deontological norms and optimizing the outcome. However, commonly used dilemmas are generally unrealistic and confound moral principle and (in)action so that results obtained with these dilemmas might not generalize to other situations. In the present research, we introduce new dilemmas that are based on real-life events. In two studies (a European student sample and a North American MTurk sample, total N = 789), we show that the new factual dilemmas were perceived to be more realistic and less absurd than commonly used dilemmas. In addition, factual dilemmas induced higher participant engagement. From this, we draw the preliminary conclusion that factual dilemmas are more suitable for investigating moral cognition. Moreover, factual dilemmas can be used to examine the generalizability of previous results concerning action (vs. inaction) and concerning a wider range of deontological norms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anita Körner
- University of Kassel, Germany
- University of Wuerzburg, Germany
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Gray K, DiMaggio N, Schein C, Kachanoff F. The Problem of Purity in Moral Psychology. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 2023; 27:272-308. [PMID: 36314693 PMCID: PMC10391698 DOI: 10.1177/10888683221124741] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/22/2023]
Abstract
Academic AbstractThe idea of "purity" transformed moral psychology. Here, we provide the first systematic review of this concept. Although often discussed as one construct, we reveal ~9 understandings of purity, ranging from respecting God to not eating gross things. This striking heterogeneity arises because purity-unlike other moral constructs-is not understood by what it is but what it isn't: obvious interpersonal harm. This poses many problems for moral psychology and explains why purity lacks convergent and divergent validity and why purity is confounded with politics, religion, weirdness, and perceived harm. Because purity is not a coherent construct, it cannot be a distinct basis of moral judgment or specially tied to disgust. Rather than a specific moral domain, purity is best understood as a loose set of themes in moral rhetoric. These themes are scaffolded on cultural understandings of harm-the broad, pluralistic harm outlined by the Theory of Dyadic Morality.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kurt Gray
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
| | | | - Chelsea Schein
- The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
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11
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Zapata J, Deroy O. Ordinary citizens are more severe towards verbal than nonverbal hate-motivated incidents with identical consequences. Sci Rep 2023; 13:7126. [PMID: 37130915 PMCID: PMC10154298 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-33892-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/24/2021] [Accepted: 04/19/2023] [Indexed: 05/04/2023] Open
Abstract
Do we judge hate incidents similarly when they are performed using words or bodily actions? Hate speech incidents are rarely reported by bystanders, and whether or how much they should be punished remains a matter of legal, theoretical and social disagreement. In a pre-registered study (N = 1309), participants read about verbal and nonverbal attacks stemming from identical hateful intent, which created the same consequences for the victims. We asked them how much punishment the perpetrator should receive, how likely they would be to denounce such an incident and how much harm they judged the victim suffered. The results contradicted our pre-registered hypotheses and the predictions of dual moral theories, which hold that intention and harmful consequences are the sole psychological determinants of punishment. Instead, participants consistently rated verbal hate attacks as more deserving of punishment, denunciation and being more harmful to the victim than nonverbal attacks. This difference is explained by the concept of action aversion, suggesting that lay observers have different intrinsic associations with interactions involving words compared to bodily actions, regardless of consequences. This explanation has implications for social psychology, moral theories, and legislative efforts to sanction hate speech, which are considered. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 29/06/2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/Z86TV .
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Affiliation(s)
- Jimena Zapata
- Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Studies Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich, Germany.
- Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada, Granada, Spain.
| | - Ophelia Deroy
- Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Studies Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich, Germany
- Munich Center for Neuroscience, Munich, Germany
- Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, UK
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12
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Koo HJ, Piff PK, Shariff AF. If I Could Do It, So Can They: Among the Rich, Those With Humbler Origins are Less Sensitive to the Difficulties of the Poor. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY SCIENCE 2023; 14:333-341. [PMID: 36844784 PMCID: PMC9947719 DOI: 10.1177/19485506221098921] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
Americans venerate rags-to-riches stories. Here we show that people view those who became rich more positively than those born rich and expect the Became Rich to be more sympathetic toward social welfare (Studies 1a and b). However, we also find that these intuitions are misguided. Surveys of wealthy individuals (Studies 2a and b) reveal that, compared with the Born Rich, the Became Rich perceive improving one's socioeconomic conditions as less difficult, which, in turn, predicts less empathy for the poor, less perceived sacrifices by the poor, more internal attributions for poverty, and less support for redistribution. Corroborating this, imagining having experienced upward mobility (vs. beginning and staying at the top) causes people to view such mobility as less difficult, reducing empathy and support for those failing to move up (Study 3). These findings suggest that becoming rich may shift views about the poor in ways that run counter to common intuitions and cultural assumptions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hyunjin J. Koo
- University of California, Irvine,
USA,Hyunjin J. Koo, Department of Psychological
Science, University of California, Irvine, 4201 Social & Behavioral Sciences
Gateway, Irvine, CA 92697, USA.
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13
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Niemi L, Doris JM, Graham J. Who attributes what to whom? Moral values and relational context shape causal attribution to the person or the situation. Cognition 2023; 232:105332. [PMID: 36508991 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105332] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/22/2022] [Revised: 11/16/2022] [Accepted: 11/17/2022] [Indexed: 12/13/2022]
Abstract
Eight preregistered studies (total N = 3,758) investigate the role of values and relational context in attributions for moral violations, focusing on the following questions: (1) Do people's values influence their attributions? (2) Do people's relationships with the violator (self, close other, distant other) influence their attributions? (3) Do the principles intrinsic to the violated values (e.g., loyalty to close others) further influence their attributions? We found that participants were more likely to attribute violations by distant others to the person committing the violation, rather than the situation in which the violation occurred, when participants endorsed the violated values themselves. The tendency to make dispositional attributions did not obtain for violations of participants' less highly endorsed moral values or non-moral values. Relationship with the violator also influenced participants' attributions-participants were more likely to attribute their own and close others' moral violations to situational factors, relative to distant others' violations. This relational pattern was pronounced for violations of "binding" moral values, in which protection of personal relationships and groups is primary. Collectively, these results support a relational-values account of causal attribution for moral violations, whereby attributions systematically vary based on (1) the relevance of the violated values to the attributor's moral values, (2) the attributor's personal relationship to the violator, and (3) an interaction between (1) and (2) such that the principles intrinsic to the violated values influence the effects of one's relationship to the violator.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laura Niemi
- Department of Psychology, Cornell University, United States of America; Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University, United States of America.
| | - John M Doris
- Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University, United States of America; Department of Philosophy, Cornell University, United States of America
| | - Jesse Graham
- Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, United States of America
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14
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Park J, Shin Y, Kim S, Maeng S, Ihm J. Effects of perspective switching and utilitarian thinking on moral judgments in a sacrificial dilemma among healthcare and non-healthcare students. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2023; 43:1-13. [PMID: 36820198 PMCID: PMC9932409 DOI: 10.1007/s12144-023-04380-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/06/2023] [Indexed: 02/18/2023]
Abstract
During the COVID-19 pandemic, healthcare professionals have often faced moral challenges, which required them to choose between endorsing self- or other-sacrifice for the greater good. Drawing on the altruistic rationalization hypothesis and trait-activation theory, this study investigates (a) whether healthcare students' endorsement of utilitarian solutions to sacrificial moral dilemmas varies when they are confronted with the minority group, majority group, or third-person perspective on the given dilemma and (b) whether individual differences in utilitarian thinking, as measured by the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (both instrumental harm and impartial beneficence), predict endorsement of utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas. The study population was divided into a group of healthcare students and a group of non-healthcare students. It was found that the members of both groups expressed a stronger pro-utilitarian position when making moral dilemma judgments from a majority perspective than from the two other perspectives. However, a difference was observed with healthcare students being more reluctant to endorse the utilitarian action than their non-healthcare counterparts in the self-in-majority context. The instrumental harm component was a significant predictor of utilitarian judgments in the healthcare group, but impartial beneficence significantly predicted utilitarian judgments in the non-healthcare group in the self-in-majority context. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04380-z.
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Affiliation(s)
- Junsu Park
- Department of Social Entrepreneurship and Humanistic Future Studies, SungKyunKwan University, 25-2 Sungkyunkwan-Ro, Jongno-Gu, Seoul, 03063 South Korea
| | - Yongmin Shin
- Dental Research Institute, Seoul National University School of Dentistry, 101 Daehak-Ro, Jongno-Gu, Seoul, 03080 South Korea
| | - Seungmin Kim
- Dental Research Institute, Seoul National University School of Dentistry, 101 Daehak-Ro, Jongno-Gu, Seoul, 03080 South Korea
| | - Seho Maeng
- Graduate School of Counseling, The Catholic University of Korea, 43 Jibong-Ro, Bucheon, 14662 South Korea
| | - Jungjoon Ihm
- Dental Research Institute, Seoul National University School of Dentistry, 101 Daehak-Ro, Jongno-Gu, Seoul, 03080 South Korea
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15
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Graso M, Aquino K, Chen FX, Camps J, Strah N, van den Bos K. When Do Observers Deprioritize Due Process for the Perpetrator and Prioritize Safety for the Victim in Response to Information-Poor Allegations of Harm? Psychol Sci 2023; 34:186-200. [PMID: 36442252 DOI: 10.1177/09567976221128203] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
We examined how observers assess information-poor allegations of harm (e.g., "my word against yours" cases), in which the outcomes of procedurally fair investigations may favor the alleged perpetrator because the evidentiary standards are unmet. Yet this lack of evidence does not mean no harm occurred, and some observers may be charged with deciding whether the allegation is actionable within a collective. On the basis of theories of moral typecasting, procedural justice, and uncertainty management, we hypothesized that observers would be more likely to prioritize the victim's safety (vs. to prioritize due process for the perpetrator) and view the allegation as actionable when the victim-alleged perpetrator dyad members exhibit features that align with stereotypes of victims and perpetrators. We supported our hypothesis with four studies using various contexts, sources of perceived prototypicality, due-process prioritization, and samples (students from New Zealand, Ns = 137 and 114; Mechanical Turk workers from the United States; Ns = 260 and 336).
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Affiliation(s)
- Maja Graso
- Department of Management, University of Otago Business School
| | - Karl Aquino
- Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia
| | - Fan Xuan Chen
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
| | - Jeroen Camps
- Department of Applied Psychology, Thomas More University of Applied Sciences.,Department of Work and Organisation Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
| | - Nicole Strah
- Department of Management, University of North Carolina at Charlotte
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16
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Morally questionable actors' meta-perceptions are accurate but overly positive. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104371] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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17
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Maffly-Kipp J, Flanagan PN, Schlegel RJ, Vess M. True self-attributions shape judgments of blame in the context of addiction-relevant crime. Addict Behav 2022; 130:107287. [PMID: 35220152 DOI: 10.1016/j.addbeh.2022.107287] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/20/2020] [Revised: 07/17/2021] [Accepted: 02/16/2022] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
In three studies, we examined how attributing the criminal actions of a drug-addicted offender to their "true self" influences perceptions of their blameworthiness. Study 1 revealed that attributing a drug-addicted offender's crime (theft) to his true self positively predicted judgments of the offender's blameworthiness for the crime. Study 2 employed an experimental design and revealed that information connecting a crime (vs. not connecting) to an addicted offender's true self led to greater judgments of blame, whereas learning that the offender had (vs. did not have) a genetic predisposition to addiction mitigated blame. In Study 3, participants read a vignette about a drug-addicted thief whose addiction began with a doctor's prescription, a drug-addicted thief whose addiction began with recreational drug use, or a thief with no mention of addiction. Participants in the prescription condition, but not the recreational use condition, attributed theft to the offender's true self less and ascribed less blame for the crime, relative to the no addiction condition. Furthermore, participants attributed the addiction less to the offender's true self and assigned less blame to the offender for his addiction in the prescription (vs. recreation) condition. Overall, our studies suggest that lay intuitions about true selves robustly guide people's judgments about blame in the context of crimes involving drug-addicted offenders.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joseph Maffly-Kipp
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Texas A&M University, United States
| | - Patricia N Flanagan
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Texas A&M University, United States
| | - Rebecca J Schlegel
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Texas A&M University, United States
| | - Matthew Vess
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Texas A&M University, United States.
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18
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White CJ, Schaller M, Abraham EG, Rottman J. Navigating between punishment, avoidance, and instruction: The form and function of responses to moral violations varies across adult and child transgressors. Cognition 2022; 223:105048. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105048] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/04/2021] [Revised: 01/22/2022] [Accepted: 01/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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19
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Shin Y, Kim S, Kim DH, Lee S, Cho M, Ihm J. The effect of deliberative process on the self-sacrificial decisions of utilitarian healthcare students. BMC Med Ethics 2022; 23:28. [PMID: 35305638 PMCID: PMC8933755 DOI: 10.1186/s12910-022-00769-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/24/2021] [Accepted: 03/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted prosocial behavior as a professional healthcare core competency. Although medical students are expected to work in the best interests of their patients, in the pandemic context, there is a greater need for ethical attention to be paid to the way medical students deal with moral dilemmas that may conflict with their obligations. METHODS This study was conducted in the spring semester of 2019 on 271 students majoring in health professions: medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine. All participants provided informed consent and completed measures that assessed utilitarian moral views, cognitive reflections, cognitive reappraisal, and moral judgment. RESULTS The healthcare-affiliated students who scored higher on the instrumental harm subscale in the measurement of utilitarian moral views were more likely to endorse not only other-sacrificial actions but also self-sacrificial ones for the greater good in moral dilemma scenarios. In particular, those engaged in deliberative processes tended to make more self-sacrificial judgments. The mediation analysis also revealed that the effect of deliberative processes on self-sacrificial judgments was mediated by cognitive reappraisal. CONCLUSIONS These findings suggested that cognitive reappraisal through deliberative processes is involved when the students with utilitarian inclination make prosocial decisions, that it is necessary to consider both moral views and emotional regulation when admitting candidates, and that moral education programs are needed in the healthcare field.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yongmin Shin
- Dental Research Institute, School of Dentistry, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea
| | - Seungmin Kim
- Dental Research Institute, School of Dentistry, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea
| | - Do-Hwan Kim
- Department of Medical Education, College of Medicine, Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea
| | - Seunghee Lee
- Department of Medical Education, College of Medicine, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea
| | - Minhae Cho
- School of Social Work, University of Memphis, Memphis, USA
| | - Jungjoon Ihm
- Dental Research Institute, School of Dentistry, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea.
- Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea.
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20
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Rosenfeld DL, Balcetis E, Bastian B, Berkman ET, Bosson JK, Brannon TN, Burrow AL, Cameron CD, Chen S, Cook JE, Crandall C, Davidai S, Dhont K, Eastwick PW, Gaither SE, Gangestad SW, Gilovich T, Gray K, Haines EL, Haselton MG, Haslam N, Hodson G, Hogg MA, Hornsey MJ, Huo YJ, Joel S, Kachanoff FJ, Kraft-Todd G, Leary MR, Ledgerwood A, Lee RT, Loughnan S, MacInnis CC, Mann T, Murray DR, Parkinson C, Pérez EO, Pyszczynski T, Ratner K, Rothgerber H, Rounds JD, Schaller M, Silver RC, Spellman BA, Strohminger N, Swim JK, Thoemmes F, Urganci B, Vandello JA, Volz S, Zayas V, Tomiyama AJ. Psychological Science in the Wake of COVID-19: Social, Methodological, and Metascientific Considerations. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2022; 17:311-333. [PMID: 34597198 PMCID: PMC8901450 DOI: 10.1177/1745691621999374] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has extensively changed the state of psychological science from what research questions psychologists can ask to which methodologies psychologists can use to investigate them. In this article, we offer a perspective on how to optimize new research in the pandemic's wake. Because this pandemic is inherently a social phenomenon-an event that hinges on human-to-human contact-we focus on socially relevant subfields of psychology. We highlight specific psychological phenomena that have likely shifted as a result of the pandemic and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations of conducting research on these phenomena. After this discussion, we evaluate metascientific issues that have been amplified by the pandemic. We aim to demonstrate how theoretically grounded views on the COVID-19 pandemic can help make psychological science stronger-not weaker-in its wake.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Brock Bastian
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne
| | - Elliot T. Berkman
- Department of Psychology, University of Oregon
- Center for Translational Neuroscience, University of Oregon
| | | | | | | | - C. Daryl Cameron
- Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University
- Rock Ethics Institute, The Pennsylvania State University
| | - Serena Chen
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Kurt Gray
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
| | | | - Martie G. Haselton
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles
- Department of Communication, University of California, Los Angeles
- Institute for Society and Genetics, University of California, Los Angeles
| | - Nick Haslam
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne
| | | | | | | | - Yuen J. Huo
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles
| | | | - Frank J. Kachanoff
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
| | | | - Mark R. Leary
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University
| | | | | | - Steve Loughnan
- School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh
| | | | - Traci Mann
- Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota
| | | | | | - Efrén O. Pérez
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles
- Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
| | - Tom Pyszczynski
- Department of Psychology, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs
| | | | | | | | - Mark Schaller
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia
| | - Roxane Cohen Silver
- Department of Psychological Science, University of California, Irvine
- Department of Medicine, University of California, Irvine
- Program in Public Health, University of California, Irvine
| | | | - Nina Strohminger
- Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania
- Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania
| | - Janet K. Swim
- Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University
| | - Felix Thoemmes
- Department of Human Development, Cornell University
- Department of Psychology, Cornell University
| | | | | | - Sarah Volz
- Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota
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21
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The role of generalizability in moral and political psychology. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e19. [PMID: 35139956 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x2100042x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
The aim of the social and behavioral sciences is to understand human behavior across a wide array of contexts. Our theories often make sweeping claims about human nature, assuming that our ancestors or offspring will be prone to the same biases and preferences. Yet we gloss over the fact that our research is often based in a single temporal context with a limited set of stimuli. Political and moral psychology are domains in which the context and stimuli are likely to matter a great deal (Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 2016). In response to Yarkoni (see BBS issue), we delve into topics related to political and moral psychology that likely depend on features of the research. These topics include understanding differences between liberals and conservatives, when people are willing to sacrifice someone to save others, the behavior of political leaders, and the dynamics of intergroup conflict.
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22
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What drives opposition to suicide? Two exploratory studies of normative
judgments. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2022. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009062] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
Abstract
The act of suicide is commonly viewed as wrong in some sense, but it is
not clear why this is. Based on past empirical research and philosophical
theorizing, we test ten different explanations for why suicide is opposed on
normative grounds. Using a within-subjects design, Study 1 showed that seven
out of ten manipulations had significant effects on normative judgments of
suicide: time left to live, lack of close social relationships, a history of
prior immoral behavior, the manner in which the suicide is committed,
painful, incurable medical issues, impulsive decision-making, and the
actor’s own moral-religious background. However, in all cases, the act of
suicide was still considered wrong, overall. Using a between-subjects
design, Study 2 tested the combined effect of the seven significant
manipulations from Study 1. In combination, the seven manipulations
eliminated opposition to suicide, on average. Implications for moral
psychology and suicide prevention are discussed.
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23
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Abstract
Observed variability and complexity of judgments of "right" and "wrong" cannot be readily accounted for within extant approaches to understanding moral judgment. In response to this challenge, we present a novel perspective on categorization in moral judgment. Moral judgment as categorization (MJAC) incorporates principles of category formation research while addressing key challenges of existing approaches to moral judgment. People develop skills in making context-relevant categorizations. They learn that various objects (events, behaviors, people, etc.) can be categorized as morally right or wrong. Repetition and rehearsal result in reliable, habitualized categorizations. According to this skill-formation account of moral categorization, the learning and the habitualization of the forming of moral categories occur within goal-directed activity that is sensitive to various contextual influences. By allowing for the complexity of moral judgments, MJAC offers greater explanatory power than existing approaches while also providing opportunities for a diverse range of new research questions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cillian McHugh
- Department of Psychology, University of Limerick
- Social Psychology & Cognition Lab, University of Limerick (SOCOUL)
- Centre for Social Issues Research, University of Limerick
| | - Marek McGann
- Department of Psychology, Mary Immaculate College
| | - Eric R. Igou
- Department of Psychology, University of Limerick
- Social Psychology & Cognition Lab, University of Limerick (SOCOUL)
- Health Research Institute, University of Limerick
| | - Elaine L. Kinsella
- Department of Psychology, University of Limerick
- Centre for Social Issues Research, University of Limerick
- Health Research Institute, University of Limerick
- Research on Influence, Social Networks, & Ethics (RISE) Lab
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24
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Bostyn D, Roets A. Sequential decision-making impacts moral judgment: How iterative dilemmas can expand our perspective on sacrificial harm. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104244] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
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25
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Luttrell A, Sacchi S, Brambilla M. Changing impressions in competence-oriented domains: The primacy of morality endures. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104246] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
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26
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Goranson A, O’Fallon C, Gray K. The moral identity picture scale (MIPS): Measuring the full scope of moral identity. SELF AND IDENTITY 2021. [DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2021.1990118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Amelia Goranson
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, United States
| | - Connor O’Fallon
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, United States
| | - Kurt Gray
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, United States
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27
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Neurocomputational mechanisms engaged in moral choices and moral learning. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 132:50-60. [PMID: 34826508 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.11.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2021] [Revised: 11/15/2021] [Accepted: 11/16/2021] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
The neural circuitry involved in moral decisions has been studied since the early days of cognitive neuroscience, mainly using moral dilemma. However, the neurocomputational mechanisms describing how the human brain makes moral decisions and learns in various moral contexts are only starting to be established. Here we review recent results from an emerging field using model-based fMRI, which describes moral choices at a mechanistic level. These findings unify the field of moral decision making, extend a conceptual framework previously developed for value-based decision making and characterize how moral processes are computed in the brain. Moral dilemma can be modeled as value-based decisions that weigh self-interests against moral costs/harm to others and different types of prediction errors can be distinguished in different aspects of moral learning. These key computational signals help to describe moral choices and moral learning at an algorithmic level and to reveal how these cognitive operations are implemented in the brain. This researches provide a foundation to account for the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying moral decision making.
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29
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Earp BD, McLoughlin KL, Monrad JT, Clark MS, Crockett MJ. How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments. Nat Commun 2021; 12:5776. [PMID: 34599174 PMCID: PMC8486868 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-021-26067-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/10/2020] [Accepted: 09/10/2021] [Indexed: 02/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and the nature of their relationship. But how, when, and why social relationships shape moral judgments is not well understood. We provide evidence to address these questions, measuring cooperative expectations and moral wrongness judgments in the context of common social relationships such as romantic partners, housemates, and siblings. In a pre-registered study of 423 U.S. participants nationally representative for age, race, and gender, we show that people normatively expect different relationships to serve cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, reciprocity, and mating to varying degrees. In a second pre-registered study of 1,320 U.S. participants, these relationship-specific cooperative expectations (i.e., relational norms) enable highly precise out-of-sample predictions about the perceived moral wrongness of actions in the context of particular relationships. In this work, we show that this 'relational norms' model better predicts patterns of moral wrongness judgments across relationships than alternative models based on genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence, demonstrating how the perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on the relational context in which those actions occur.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brian D Earp
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
| | | | - Joshua T Monrad
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
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30
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Sasse J, Li M, Baumert A. How prosocial is moral courage? Curr Opin Psychol 2021; 44:146-150. [PMID: 34634716 DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.09.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/02/2021] [Revised: 08/31/2021] [Accepted: 09/02/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Moral courage, that is, defending moral beliefs despite personal risks, is often seen as a hallmark of prosocial behavior. We argue that prosociality in moral courage is, however, complex. While its prosociality is often evident at a higher societal level, it can be contested in some aspects of morally courageous acts. We review the literature on two such aspects and highlight that differences and conflicts in moral beliefs, as well as the confrontational nature of many morally courageous acts, call into question prosociality. We recommend that future research takes the complexity of prosociality in moral courage into account to obtain a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the psychological underpinnings of moral courage and its contributions to the functioning of societies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julia Sasse
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany.
| | - Mengyao Li
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany
| | - Anna Baumert
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany; Department of Social and Personality Psychology, University of Wuppertal, Germany
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31
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McManus RM, Mason JE, Young L. Re-examining the role of family relationships in structuring perceived helping obligations, and their impact on moral evaluation. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104182] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
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32
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Sabik NJ, Matsick JL, McCormick-Huhn K, Cole ER. Bringing an Intersectional Lens to “Open” Science: An Analysis of Representation in the Reproducibility Project. PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN QUARTERLY 2021. [DOI: 10.1177/03616843211035678] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/26/2022]
Abstract
Feminist psychologists have called for researchers to consider the social and historical context and the multidimensionality of participants in research studies. The Reproducibility Project documents the degree to which the findings from mainstream psychological studies are reproduced. Drawing on intersectionality theory, we question the value of reproducing findings while ignoring who is represented, intersecting social and group identities, sociohistorical context, and the power and privilege that likely influence participants’ responses in psychology experiments. To critically examine the Reproducibility Project in psychology, we analyzed the 100 replication reports produced between 2011 and 2014 (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). We developed an intersectional analytic framework to investigate (a) representation, (b) whether demographic and identity factors were considered through a multidimensional or intersectional lens, (c) explanations of non-replication, and (d) whether socio-cultural context was considered. Results show that reports predominantly include WEIRD samples (people from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic countries). Context and identity were rarely considered, even when study design relied on these factors, and intersectional identities and structures (considering power, structural issues, discrimination, and historical context) were absent from nearly all reports. Online slides for instructors who want to use this article for teaching are available on PWQ's website at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/03616843211035678
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Affiliation(s)
- Natalie J. Sabik
- Department of Health Studies, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, USA
| | - Jes L. Matsick
- Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA
- Department of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA
| | | | - Elizabeth R. Cole
- Departments of Psychology, Women's and Gender Studies, and Afroamerican and African Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
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33
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Hartman R, Blakey W, Gray K. Deconstructing moral character judgments. Curr Opin Psychol 2021; 43:205-212. [PMID: 34418790 DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2021] [Revised: 07/09/2021] [Accepted: 07/13/2021] [Indexed: 12/20/2022]
Abstract
People often make judgments of others' moral character - an inferred moral essence that presumably predicts moral behavior. We first define moral character and explore why people make character judgments before outlining three key elements that drive character judgments: behavior (good vs. bad, norm violations, and deliberation), mind (intentions, explanations, capacities), and identity (appearance, social groups, and warmth). We also provide taxonomy of moral character that goes beyond simply good vs. evil. Drawing from the theory of dyadic morality, we outline a two-dimensional triangular space of character judgments (valence and strength/agency), with three key corners - heroes, villains, and victims. Varieties of perceived moral character include saints and demons, strivers/sinners and opportunists, the nonmoral, virtuous, and culpable victims, and pure victims.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rachel Hartman
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, USA
| | - Will Blakey
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, USA
| | - Kurt Gray
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, USA.
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34
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Rosenfeld DL, Tomiyama AJ. Moral Judgments of COVID-19 Social Distancing Violations: The Roles of Perceived Harm and Impurity. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2021; 48:766-781. [PMID: 34247528 DOI: 10.1177/01461672211025433] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Can perceptions of impurity uniquely explain moral judgment? Or is moral judgment reducible to perceptions of harm? Whereas some perspectives posit that purity violations may drive moral judgment distinctly from harm violations, other perspectives contend that perceived harm is an essential precursor of moral condemnation. We tested these competing hypotheses through five preregistered experiments (total N = 2,944) investigating U.S. adults' perceptions of social distancing violations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Perceived harm was more strongly related to moral judgment than was perceived impurity. Nevertheless, over and above perceived harm, perceived impurity reliably explained unique variance in moral judgment. Effects of perceived harm and impurity were significant among both liberal and conservative participants but were larger among liberals. Results suggest that appraisals of both harm and impurity provide valuable insights into moral cognition. We discuss implications of these findings for dyadic morality, moral foundations, act versus character judgments, and political ideology.
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35
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Maffly-Kipp J, Rivera GN, Schlegel RJ, Vess M. The Effect of True Self-Attributions on the Endorsement of Retributive and Restorative Justice. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2021; 48:1284-1297. [PMID: 34210213 DOI: 10.1177/01461672211027473] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
We examined how the attribution of criminal behavior to an individual's "true" self influences justice preferences. In Study 1 (N = 521), the extent to which undergraduates attributed a crime to a target's true self positively predicted their endorsement of a retributive form of punishment and negatively predicted their endorsement of a restorative form of punishment. Study 2 (N = 404) was preregistered and replicated these associations, even when controlling for other perceived causes (e.g., personality, environment). In Study 3 (N = 282), undergraduates rated retributive punishment more favorably and restorative punishment less favorably when induced to think that the crime was (vs. was not) reflective of the target's true self. Study 4 (N = 935) was preregistered and replicated these experimental effects across different types of crime vignettes in an online sample. These results highlight the ways that intuitions about "true" selves shape punishment preferences.
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36
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Binding moral values gain importance in the presence of close others. Nat Commun 2021; 12:2718. [PMID: 33976160 PMCID: PMC8113481 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-021-22566-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/08/2019] [Accepted: 03/05/2021] [Indexed: 02/03/2023] Open
Abstract
A key function of morality is to regulate social behavior. Research suggests moral values may be divided into two types: binding values, which govern behavior in groups, and individualizing values, which promote personal rights and freedoms. Because people tend to mentally activate concepts in situations in which they may prove useful, the importance they afford moral values may vary according to whom they are with in the moment. In particular, because binding values help regulate communal behavior, people may afford these values more importance when in the presence of close (versus distant) others. Five studies test and support this hypothesis. First, we use a custom smartphone application to repeatedly record participants' (n = 1166) current social context and the importance they afforded moral values. Results show people rate moral values as more important when in the presence of close others, and this effect is stronger for binding than individualizing values-an effect that replicates in a large preregistered online sample (n = 2016). A lab study (n = 390) and two preregistered online experiments (n = 580 and n = 752) provide convergent evidence that people afford binding, but not individualizing, values more importance when in the real or imagined presence of close others. Our results suggest people selectively activate different moral values according to the demands of the situation, and show how the mere presence of others can affect moral thinking.
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37
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Speaking my truth: Why personal experiences can bridge divides but mislead. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2021; 118:2100280118. [PMID: 33547255 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2100280118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
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38
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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic points to the need for scientists to pool their efforts in order to understand this disease and respond to the ensuing crisis. Other global challenges also require such scientific cooperation. Yet in academic institutions, reward structures and incentives are based on systems that primarily fuel the competition between (groups of) scientific researchers. Competition between individual researchers, research groups, research approaches, and scientific disciplines is seen as an important selection mechanism and driver of academic excellence. These expected benefits of competition have come to define the organizational culture in academia. There are clear indications that the overreliance on competitive models undermines cooperative exchanges that might lead to higher quality insights. This damages the well-being and productivity of individual researchers and impedes efforts towards collaborative knowledge generation. Insights from social and organizational psychology on the side effects of relying on performance targets, prioritizing the achievement of success over the avoidance of failure, and emphasizing self-interest and efficiency, clarify implicit mechanisms that may spoil valid attempts at transformation. The analysis presented here elucidates that a broader change in the academic culture is needed to truly benefit from current attempts to create more open and collaborative practices for cumulative knowledge generation.
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39
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Wilks M, Caviola L, Kahane G, Bloom P. Children Prioritize Humans Over Animals Less Than Adults Do. Psychol Sci 2020; 32:27-38. [PMID: 33320783 DOI: 10.1177/0956797620960398] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Is the tendency to morally prioritize humans over animals weaker in children than adults? In two preregistered studies (total N = 622), 5- to 9-year-old children and adults were presented with moral dilemmas pitting varying numbers of humans against varying numbers of either dogs or pigs and were asked who should be saved. In both studies, children had a weaker tendency than adults to prioritize humans over animals. They often chose to save multiple dogs over one human, and many valued the life of a dog as much as the life of a human. Although they valued pigs less, the majority still prioritized 10 pigs over one human. By contrast, almost all adults chose to save one human over even 100 dogs or pigs. Our findings suggest that the common view that humans are far more morally important than animals appears late in development and is likely socially acquired.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Guy Kahane
- Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
| | - Paul Bloom
- Department of Psychology, Yale University
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40
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Abstract
Neuroscience has cast new light on the nature of human morality by exploiting simplified paradigms. To enhance our understanding of everyday moral decisions, the field should complement computational approaches with naturalistic paradigms and a focus on narratives and stories.
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Affiliation(s)
- Clare Kelly
- Trinity College Institute of Neuroscience & School of Psychology, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland; Department of Psychiatry at the School of Medicine, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
| | - Redmond O'Connell
- Trinity College Institute of Neuroscience & School of Psychology, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
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Ellemers N, van Nunspeet F. Neuroscience and the Social Origins of Moral Behavior: How Neural Underpinnings of Social Categorization and Conformity Affect Everyday Moral and Immoral Behavior. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2020. [DOI: 10.1177/0963721420951584] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Neuroscientific evidence identifies the brain networks and cognitive processes involved in people’s thoughts and feelings about their behavior. This helps individuals understand the judgments and decisions they make with regard to their own and others’ moral and immoral behavior. This article complements prior reviews by focusing on the social origins of everyday moral and immoral behavior and reviewing neuroscientific research findings related to social conformity, categorization, and identification to demonstrate (a) when people are motivated by social norms of others to follow particular moral guidelines, (b) what prevents people from considering the moral implications of their actions for others, and (c) how people process feedback they receive from others about the appropriateness of their behavior. Revealing the neural mechanisms involved in the social processes that influence the moral and immoral behaviors people display helps researchers understand why and when different types of interventions aiming to regulate moral behavior are likely to be successful or unsuccessful.
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Kurdi B, Krosch AR, Ferguson MJ. Implicit evaluations of moral agents reflect intent and outcome. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2020.103990] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
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Roets A, Bostyn DH, De Keersmaecker J, Haesevoets T, Van Assche J, Van Hiel A. Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial. Sci Rep 2020; 10:13373. [PMID: 32770106 PMCID: PMC7414217 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-70199-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/29/2020] [Accepted: 07/20/2020] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
In the study of utilitarian morality, the sacrificial dilemma paradigm has been the dominant approach for years. However, to address some of the most pressing issues in the current research literature, the present studies adopt an alternative approach by using a minimal group paradigm in which participants have to make decisions about the allocation of resources. This approach allows not only to pit utilitarianism against equality-based morality, but also to study these modes of morality for both harm and benefit, and to directly address the role of group identity affecting the (im)partial nature of ‘utilitarian’ (i.e., outcome maximizing) decisions. In our experiments, across four different samples (total N = 946), we demonstrate that although participants generally prefer equality-based allocations over maximizing distributions, outcome maximizing choices become more prevalent when they served to minimize harm compared to maximizing benefit. Furthermore, reducing the objective value of the equal distribution outcomes further prompts participants to adopt a more utilitarian approach in situations involving harm, but has little effect in situations where benefits have to be distributed. Finally, the introduction of (minimal) group identity consistently demonstrates that decisions that maximize the overall outcome are more likely if they also serve the ingroup compared to when they rather serve the outgroup. We discuss how these findings have meaningful implications that may be especially relevant for recent movements that advocate a utilitarian approach to charity, and for our understanding of (im)partiality in lay people’s ‘utilitarian’ decision making.
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Affiliation(s)
- Arne Roets
- Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium.
| | - Dries H Bostyn
- Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
| | - Jonas De Keersmaecker
- Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
| | - Tessa Haesevoets
- Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
| | - Jasper Van Assche
- Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
| | - Alain Van Hiel
- Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
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Sundararajan L. Strong-Ties and Weak-Ties Rationalities: Toward an Expanded Network Theory. REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 2020. [DOI: 10.1177/1089268020916438] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
This article introduces the expanded network theory and demonstrates the heuristic value of its construct of strong-ties and weak-ties rationalities. This construct is derived from the network theory of Granovetter and corroborated with evolutionary biology and psychological studies on group processes. This construct has wide-ranging implications and applications for cultural and cross-cultural psychology. It informs our efforts toward cultural sensitivity in theory and research design and offers a new tool for cultural analysis. In particular, it can serve as a useful framework to investigate cultures in transition in the globalizing era. Insights into strong-ties and weak-ties rationalities may even contribute to shaping the future of the human society.
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Abstract
There is a gap between morality as experienced and morality as studied. In our personal and professional lives, moral judgments are embedded within a specific context. We know the who, what, where, and when and often can infer the why; we know the broader context of actions; and we may have a specific relationship with the actors. However, scholarly theorizing is often built on inferences from participants’ responses to decontextualized, impoverished stimuli. In our quest for uncovering general psychological truths, moral psychologists have examined evaluations of poorly guarded trolleys, strangers with odd sexual proclivities, and endorsement of abstract principles. The four articles included in this section demonstrate the power of contextualizing morality. In the current article, I place these papers within a broader framework for how scholars can contextualize morality research. I then argue why contextualizing morality matters: not only do contextualized questions better reflect the nuances of reality but also contextualized judgments might be key for improving predictions of moral behavior and understanding moral change.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chelsea Schein
- Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania
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