Effects of asymmetric medical insurance subsidy on hospitals competition under non-price regulation

Does hospital competition improve the quality of outpatient care? - empirical evidence from a quasi-experiment in a Chinese city

BACKGROUND

Although countries worldwide have launched a series of pro-competition reforms, the literature on the impacts of hospital competition has produced a complex and contradictory picture. This study examined whether hospital competition contributed to an increase in the quality of outpatient care.

METHODS

The dataset comprises encounter data on 406,664 outpatients with influenza between 2015 and 2019 in China. Competition was measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Whether patients had 14-day follow-up encounter for influenza at any healthcare facility, outpatient facility, and hospital outpatient department were the three quality outcomes assessed. Binary regression models with crossed random intercepts were constructed to estimate the impacts of the HHI on the quality of outpatient care. The intensity of nighttime lights was employed as an instrumental variable to address the endogenous relationship between the HHI and the quality of outpatient care.

RESULTS

We demonstrated that an increase in the degree of hospital competition was associated with improved quality of outpatient care. For each 1% increase in the degree of hospital competition, an individual's risk of having a 14-day follow-up encounter for influenza at any healthcare facility, outpatient facility, and hospital outpatient department fell by 34.9%, 18.3%, and 20.8%, respectively. The impacts of hospital competition on improving the quality of outpatient care were more substantial among females, individuals who used the Urban and Rural Residents Basic Medical Insurance to pay for their medical costs, individuals who visited accredited hospitals, and adults aged 25 to 64 years when compared with their counterparts.

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrated that hospital competition contributed to better quality of outpatient care under a regime with a regulated ceiling price. Competition is suggested to be promoted in the outpatient care market where hospitals have control over quality and government sets a limit on the prices that hospitals may charge.

The economic effect of financial compensation in China's healthcare system: comprehensive insights regarding supply and demand factors

OBJECTIVES

We aim to analyse the effects of government subsidies on residents' health and healthcare expenditure from the perspectives of supply and demand.

DATA AND METHODS

According to the regional division adopted in the data query system of the National Bureau of Statistics, this study divides 31 provinces and cities into three regions: eastern, central, and western. The data used are from public databases, such as the "China Statistical Yearbook," "China Health Statistical Yearbook," and "Government Final Account Report". In this study, mathematical model derivation is used to construct a fixed effects model, and an empirical study based on cross-sectional data and general linear regression is conducted. To prevent endogeneity issues, this study introduces instrumental variables and uses 2SLS regression to further analyse the output results.

RESULTS

For every 1% increase in supplementary funding on the supply side, the perinatal mortality rate decreases by 1.765%, while for every 1% increase in financial compensation on the demand side, per capita outpatient expenses increase by 0.225% and per capita hospitalization expenses increase by 0.196%. Regarding medical resources, for every 1% increase in the number of beds per 1,000 people, per capita hospitalization expenses decrease by 0.099%. In the central and eastern regions, where economic levels are higher, supply-side government funding is more effective than demand-side funding. In contrast, demand-side funding is more effective in the western region.

CONCLUSIONS

The roles of multiple influencing factors and significant regional heterogeneity are clarified. Increasing financial compensation to providers positively impacts perinatal mortality but leads to higher per capita outpatient and hospital expenditures. Finally, this study provides targeted policy recommendations and solid theoretical support for policymakers.

How Can China's New Health Care Reform Promote the Balance of Interest Game?-Based on Game Evolution and Simulation Analysis

Purpose

The new round of medical reform is a significant exploration of reform in the public service sector in China. Health insurance regulatory departments, medical institutions, and patients, as critical stakeholders in China's medical reform, play a crucial role in the success of the reform through their strategic interactions.

Patients and Methods

Starting from the perspective of bounded rationality, applies evolutionary game theory to establish an evolutionary game model for the collaborative governance of health insurance regulatory departments, medical institutions, and patients and analyzes the stability of each party's strategy and the sensitivity of parameters in the tripartite game system.

Results

The study shows that an equilibrium point will be formed when medical institutions provide reasonable treatment, patients choose to accept treatment, and health insurance regulatory departments adopt a lenient regulatory strategy, maximizing the interests of all parties involved in the game. Factors such as the benefits of unreasonable treatment by medical institutions, fines, and regulatory costs impact the decision-making of health insurance regulatory departments. To maximize social welfare, health insurance regulatory departments should reform payment methods, adjust medical service behaviors of medical institutions, and guide the rational allocation of medical resources; the government should increase subsidies for the operation of medical institutions and the intensity of penalties; regulatory departments should reduce regulatory costs and introduce third-party forces to strengthen health insurance supervision further.

Conclusion

The research findings of this paper will provide valuable insights into some countries' medical and health reform.

Success of Big Infectious Disease Reimbursement Policy in China

Big infectious diseases do harm to the whole society, and it is highly crucial to control them on time. The major purpose of this article is to theoretically demonstrate that the Chinese government’s intervention in large-scale infectious diseases is successful and efficient. Two potential strategies were considered: strategy 1 was infectious disease without government intervention, and strategy 2 was infectious disease with government intervention. By evolution model, this article illustrates the efficiency of big infectious disease reimbursement policy in China. Without government reimbursement, this article finds that high expenditures accelerate the disease infection. The number of infected persons decreases under big infectious disease reimbursement policy in China. The higher the treatment costs, the more important the government intervention. Big infectious disease reimbursement policy in China can serve as an efficient example to cope with big infectious diseases.

Evaluation of resource utilization efficiency in obstetrics and gynecology units in China: A three-stage data envelopment analysis of the Shanxi province

In China, health care resources for expectant mothers and children are still not utilized to full efficiency, with health requirements still not being met. The purpose of this study is to critically examine the efficiency of gynecology and obstetrics hospital (OB/GYN) units in Shanxi province of China, with the overarching objective of exploring methods for improving their efficiency. We employ the three-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to measure the efficiency of 134 OB/GYN units in Shanxi. The results show that the technical efficiency and scale efficiency scores of the sample units were low (0.48 and 0.54, respectively). The efficiency of the OB/GYN units varies by region, city, and county and by type of unit. We conclude that the main reason for the low efficiency of OB/GYN units in Shanxi province lies in the unreasonable scale. The government should, therefore, allocate health resources more reasonably, improving the efficiency of different regions, cities, and counties, as well as different types of OB/GYN units.