Empirical evidence for unique hues?

Unique yellow shifts for small and brief stimuli in the central retina

The spectral locus of unique yellow was determined for flashes of different sizes (<11 arcmin) and durations (<500 ms) presented in and near the fovea. An adaptive optics scanning laser ophthalmoscope was used to minimize the effects of higher-order aberrations during simultaneous stimulus delivery and retinal imaging. In certain subjects, parafoveal cones were classified as L, M, or S, which permitted the comparison of unique yellow measurements with variations in local L/M ratios within and between observers. Unique yellow shifted to longer wavelengths as stimulus size or duration was reduced. This effect is most pronounced for changes in size and more apparent in the fovea than in the parafovea. The observed variations in unique yellow are not entirely predicted from variations in L/M ratio and therefore implicate neural processes beyond photoreception.

Color appearance and the end of Hering's Opponent-Colors Theory

Hering's Opponent-Colors Theory has been central to understanding color appearance for 150 years. It aims to explain the phenomenology of colors with two linked propositions. First, a psychological hypothesis stipulates that any color is described necessarily and sufficiently by the extent to which it appears reddish-versus-greenish, bluish-versus-yellowish, and blackish-versus-whitish. Second, a physiological hypothesis stipulates that these perceptual mechanisms are encoded by three innate brain mechanisms. We review the evidence and conclude that neither side of the linking proposition is accurate: the theory is wrong. We sketch out an alternative, Utility-Based Coding, by which the known retinal cone-opponent mechanisms represent optimal encoding of spectral information given competing selective pressure to extract high-acuity spatial information; and phenomenological color categories represent an adaptive, efficient, output of the brain governed by behavioral demands.

Perception of color in primates: A conceptual color neurons hypothesis

Perception of color by humans and other primates is a complex problem, studied by neurophysiology, psychophysiology, psycholinguistics, and even philosophy. Being mostly trichromats, simian primates have three types of opsin proteins, expressed in cone neurons in the eye, which allow for the sensing of color as the physical wavelength of light. Further, in neural networks of the retina, the coding principle changes from three types of sensor proteins to two opponent channels: activity of one type of neuron encode the evolutionarily ancient blue-yellow axis of color stimuli, and another more recent evolutionary channel, encoding the axis of red-green color stimuli. Both color channels are distinctive in neural organization at all levels from the eye to the neocortex, where it is thought that the perception of color (as philosophical qualia) emerges from the activity of some neuron ensembles. Here, using data from neurophysiology as a starting point, we propose a hypothesis on how the perception of color can be encoded in the activity of certain neurons in the neocortex. These conceptual neurons, herein referred to as 'color neurons', code only the hue of the color of visual stimulus, similar to place cells and number neurons, already described in primate brains. A case study with preliminary, but direct, evidence for existing conceptual color neurons in the human brain was published in 2008. We predict that the upcoming studies in non-human primates will be more extensive and provide a more detailed description of conceptual color neurons.

From cones to color vision: a neurobiological model that explains the unique hues

The irreducible unique hues-red, green, blue, and yellow-remain one of the great mysteries of vision science. Attempts to create a physiologically parsimonious model that can predict the spectral locations of the unique hues all rely on at least one post hoc adjustment to produce appropriate loci for unique green and unique red, and struggle to explain the non-linearity of the Blue/Yellow system. We propose a neurobiological color vision model that overcomes these challenges by using physiological cone ratios, cone-opponent normalization to equal-energy white, and a simple adaptation mechanism to produce color-opponent mechanisms that accurately predict the spectral locations and variability of the unique hues.

Estimating the perceived dimension of psychophysical stimuli using triplet accuracy and hypothesis testing

Vision researchers are interested in mapping complex physical stimuli to perceptual dimensions. Such a mapping can be constructed using multidimensional psychophysical scaling or ordinal embedding methods. Both methods infer coordinates that agree as much as possible with the observer's judgments so that perceived similarity corresponds with distance in the inferred space. However, a fundamental problem of all methods that construct scalings in multiple dimensions is that the inferred representation can only reflect perception if the scale has the correct dimension. Here we propose a statistical procedure to overcome this limitation. The critical elements of our procedure are i) measuring the scale's quality by the number of correctly predicted triplets and ii) performing a statistical test to assess if adding another dimension to the scale improves triplet accuracy significantly. We validate our procedure through extensive simulations. In addition, we study the properties and limitations of our procedure using "real" data from various behavioral datasets from psychophysical experiments. We conclude that our procedure can reliably identify (a lower bound on) the number of perceptual dimensions for a given dataset.

Do You See What I See? Diversity in Human Color Perception

In our tendency to discuss the objective properties of the external world, we may fail to notice that our subjective perceptions of those properties differ between individuals. Variability at all levels of the color vision system creates diversity in color perception, from discrimination to color matching, appearance, and subjective experience, such that each of us lives in a unique perceptual world. In this review, I discuss what is known about individual differences in color perception and its determinants, particularly considering genetically mediated variability in cone photopigments and the paradoxical effects of visual environments in both contributing to and counteracting individual differences. I make the case that, as well as being of interest in their own right and crucial for a complete account of color vision, individual differences can be used as a methodological tool in color science for the insights that they offer about the underlying mechanisms of perception. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Vision Science, Volume 8 is September 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

Colors

Bevil Conway introduces colors.

Appearance of special colors in deuteranomalous trichromacy

Deuteranomalous color matching behavior is different from normal because the middle-wavelength sensitive cones contain an abnormal L' pigment instead of the M pigment of the normal observer. However, there is growing evidence that deuteranomalous color experience is not very different from that of normal trichromats. Here, normal and deuteranomalous observers chose monochromatic unique yellow lights. They also chose broadband lights, displayed on a computer monitor, that corresponded to eight special colors: the Hering unique hues (red, yellow, green, blue), and binary colors perceptually midway between them (orange, lime, cyan, purple). Deuteranomalous monochromatic unique yellow was shifted towards red, but all the broadband special color selections were physically similar for normal and deuteranomalous observers. Deuteranomalous special colors, including monochromatic unique yellow, were similar to those of normal observers when expressed in a color-opponent chromaticity diagram based on their own visual pigments, but only if (1) color-opponent responses were normalized to white, and (2) the deuteranomalous diagram was expanded along the r - g dimension to compensate for the reduced difference between deuteranomalous L- and L'-cone photopigments. Particularly, deuteranomalous observers did not choose binary colors with extra r - g impact to overcome their insensitivity along the r - g dimension. This result can only be compatible with the known abnormality of the deuteranomalous L' photopigment if deuteranomalous observers adjust their perceptual representation of colors to compensate for their color vision deficiency.

Plasticity in perception: insights from color vision deficiencies

Inherited color vision deficiencies typically result from a loss or alteration of the visual photopigments absorbing light and thus impact the very first step of seeing. There is growing interest in how subsequent steps in the visual pathway might be calibrated to compensate for the altered receptor signals, with the possibility that color coding and color percepts might be less severely impacted than the receptor differences predict. These compensatory adjustments provide important insights into general questions about sensory plasticity and the sensory and cognitive processes underlying how we experience color.

Testing the Cross-Cultural Generality of Hering's Theory of Color Appearance

This study examines the cross-cultural generality of Hering's (1878/1964) color-opponent theory of color appearance. English-speaking and Somali-speaking observers performed variants of two paradigms classically used to study color-opponency. First, both groups identified similar red, green, blue, and yellow unique hues. Second, 25 English-speaking and 34 Somali-speaking observers decomposed the colors present in 135 Munsell color samples into their component Hering elemental sensations-red,green,blue, yellow, white, and black-or else responded "no term." Both groups responded no term for many samples, notably purples. Somali terms for yellow were often used to name colors all around the color circle, including colors that are bluish according to Hering's theory. Four Somali Grue speakers named both green and blue elicitation samples by their term for green. However, that term did not name the union of all samples called blue or green by English speakers. A similar pattern was found among three Somali Achromatic speakers, who called the blue elicitation sample black or white. Thus, color decomposition by these Somali-speaking observers suggests a lexically influenced re-dimensionalization of color appearance space, rather than a simple reduction of the one proposed by Hering. Even some Somali Green-Blue speakers, whose data were otherwise similar to English, showed similar trends in yellow and blue usage. World Color Survey data mirror these results. These within- and cross-cultural violations of Hering's theory do not challenge the long-standing view that universal sensory processes mediate color appearance. However, they do demonstrate an important contribution of language in the human understanding of color.

Coherence of achromatic, primary and basic classes of colour categories

A range of explanations have been advanced for the systems of colour names found in different languages. Some explanations give special, fundamental status to a subset of colour categories. We argue that a subset of colour categories, if fundamental, will be coherent - meaning that a non-trivial criterion distinguishes them from the other colour categories. We test the coherence of subsets of achromatic (white, black and grey), primary (white, black, red, green, yellow, blue) and basic (primaries plus brown, orange, purple, pink and grey) colour categories in English. Criteria for defining colour categories were expressed in terms of behavioural, linguistic and geometric features derived from colour naming and linguistic usage data; and were discovered using machine learning methods. We find that achromatic and basic colour categories are coherent subsets but not primaries. These results support claims that the basic colour categories have special status, and undermine claims about the fundamental role of primaries in colour naming systems.

Comparison of two methods of hue scaling

Hue-scaling functions are designed to characterize color appearance by assessing the relative strength of the red versus green and blue versus yellow opponent sensations comprising different hues. However, these judgments can be non-intuitive and may pose difficulties for measurement and analysis. We explored an alternative scaling method based on positioning a dial to represent the relative similarity or distance of each hue from the labeled positions for the opponent categories. The hue-scaling and hue-similarity rating methods were compared for 28 observers. Settings on both tasks were comparable though the similarity ratings showed less inter-observer variability and weaker categorical bias, suggesting that these categorical biases may reflect properties of the task rather than the percepts. Alternatively, properties that are concordant for the two paradigms provide evidence for characteristics that do reflect color appearance. Individual differences on both tasks suggest that color appearance depends on multiple, narrowly tuned color processes, which are inconsistent with conventional color-opponent theory.

The Verriest Lecture: Adventures in blue and yellow

Conventional models of color vision assume that blue and yellow (along with red and green) are the fundamental building blocks of color appearance, yet how these hues are represented in the brain and whether and why they might be special are questions that remain shrouded in mystery. Many studies have explored the visual encoding of color categories, from the statistics of the environment to neural processing to perceptual experience. Blue and yellow are tied to salient features of the natural color world, and these features have likely shaped several important aspects of color vision. However, it remains less certain that these dimensions are encoded as primary or "unique" in the visual representation of color. There are also striking differences between blue and yellow percepts that may reflect high-level inferences about the world, specifically about the colors of light and surfaces. Moreover, while the stimuli labeled as blue or yellow or other basic categories show a remarkable degree of constancy within the observer, they all vary independently of one another across observers. This pattern of variation again suggests that blue and yellow and red and green are not a primary or unitary dimension of color appearance, and instead suggests a representation in which different hues reflect qualitatively different categories rather than quantitative differences within an underlying low-dimensional "color space."

A neural signature of the unique hues

Since at least the 17^th century there has been the idea that there are four simple and perceptually pure “unique” hues: red, yellow, green, and blue, and that all other hues are perceived as mixtures of these four hues. However, sustained scientific investigation has not yet provided solid evidence for a neural representation that separates the unique hues from other colors. We measured event-related potentials elicited from unique hues and the ‘intermediate’ hues in between them. We find a neural signature of the unique hues 230 ms after stimulus onset at a post-perceptual stage of visual processing. Specifically, the posterior P2 component over the parieto-occipital lobe peaked significantly earlier for the unique than for the intermediate hues (Z = −2.9, p = 0.004). Having identified a neural marker for unique hues, fundamental questions about the contribution of neural hardwiring, language and environment to the unique hues can now be addressed.

Variations in normal color vision. VI. Factors underlying individual differences in hue scaling and their implications for models of color appearance

Observers with normal color vision vary widely in their judgments of color appearance, such as the specific spectral stimuli they perceive as pure or unique hues. We examined the basis of these individual differences by using factor analysis to examine the variations in hue-scaling functions from both new and previously published data. Observers reported the perceived proportion of red, green, blue or yellow in chromatic stimuli sampling angles at fixed intervals within the LM and S cone-opponent plane. These proportions were converted to hue angles in a perceptual-opponent space defined by red vs. green and blue vs. yellow axes. Factors were then extracted from the correlation matrix using PCA and Varimax rotation. These analyses revealed that inter-observer differences depend on seven or more narrowly-tuned factors. Moreover, although the task required observers to decompose the stimuli into four primary colors, there was no evidence for factors corresponding to these four primaries, or for opponent relationships between primaries. Perceptions of "redness" in orange, red, and purple, for instance, involved separate factors rather than one shared process for red. This pattern was compared to factor analyses of Monte Carlo simulations of the individual differences in scaling predicted by variations in standard opponent mechanisms, such as their spectral tuning or relative sensitivity. The observed factor pattern is inconsistent with these models and thus with conventional accounts of color appearance based on the Hering primaries. Instead, our analysis points to a perceptual representation of color in terms of multiple mechanisms or decision rules that each influence the perception of only a relatively narrow range of hues, potentially consistent with a population code for color suggested by cortical physiology.

Salience of unique hues and implications for color theory

The unique hues--blue, green, yellow, red--form the fundamental dimensions of opponent-color theories, are considered universal across languages, and provide useful mental representations for structuring color percepts. However, there is no neural evidence for them from neurophysiology or low-level psychophysics. Tapping a higher prelinguistic perceptual level, we tested whether unique hues are particularly salient in search tasks. We found no advantage for unique hues over their nonunique complementary colors. However, yellowish targets were detected faster, more accurately, and with fewer saccades than their complementary bluish targets (including unique blue), while reddish-greenish pairs were not significantly different in salience. Similarly, local field potentials in primate V1 exhibited larger amplitudes and shorter latencies for yellowish versus bluish stimuli, whereas this effect was weaker for reddish versus greenish stimuli. Consequently, color salience is affected more by early neural response asymmetries than by any possible mental or neural representation of unique hues.

Learning to integrate contradictory multisensory self-motion cue pairings

Humans integrate multisensory information to reduce perceptual uncertainty when perceiving the world and self. Integration fails, however, if a common causality is not attributed to the sensory signals, as would occur in conditions of spatiotemporal discrepancies. In the case of passive self-motion, visual and vestibular cues are integrated according to statistical optimality, yet the extent of cue conflicts that do not compromise this optimality is currently underexplored. Here, we investigate whether human subjects can learn to integrate two arbitrary, but co-occurring, visual and vestibular cues of self-motion. Participants made size comparisons between two successive whole-body rotations using only visual, only vestibular, and both modalities together. The vestibular stimulus provided a yaw self-rotation cue, the visual a roll (Experiment 1) or pitch (Experiment 2) rotation cue. Experimentally measured thresholds in the bimodal condition were compared with theoretical predictions derived from the single-cue thresholds. Our results show that human subjects combine and optimally integrate vestibular and visual information, each signaling self-motion around a different rotation axis (yaw vs. roll and yaw vs. pitch). This finding suggests that the experience of two temporally co-occurring but spatially unrelated self-motion cues leads to inferring a common cause for these two initially unrelated sources of information about self-motion. We discuss our results in terms of specific task demands, cross-modal adaptation, and spatial compatibility. The importance of these results for the understanding of bodily illusions is also discussed.