Resonating with others: the effects of self-construal type on motor cortical output

On the neural networks of self and other bias and their role in emergent social interactions

Extensive research has documented the brain networks that play an integral role in bias, or the alteration and filtration of information processing in a manner that fundamentally favors an individual. The roots of bias, whether self- or other-oriented, are a complex constellation of neural and psychological processes that start at the most fundamental levels of sensory processing. From the millisecond information is received in the brain it is filtered at various levels and through various brain networks in relation to extant intrinsic activity to provide individuals with a perception of reality that complements and satisfies the conscious perceptions they have for themselves and the cultures in which they were reared. The products of these interactions, in turn, are dynamically altered by the introduction of others, be they friends or strangers who are similar or different in socially meaningful ways. While much is known about the various ways that basic biases alter specific aspects of neural function to support various forms of bias, the breadth and scope of the phenomenon remains entirely unclear. The purpose of this review is to examine the brain networks that shape (i.e., bias) the self-concept and how interactions with similar (ingroup) compared to dissimilar (outgroup) others alter these network (and subsequent interpersonal) interactions in fundamental ways. Throughout, focus is placed on an emerging understanding of the brain as a complex system, which suggests that many of these network interactions likely occur on a non-linear scale that blurs the lines between network hierarchies.

Does the threat of COVID-19 modulate automatic imitation?

The tendency to involuntarily imitate the actions of others (automatic imitation) can be modulated by social affiliative cues. Here, we explored whether the disruption to our social lives caused by the COVID-19 pandemic may subsequently influence automatic imitation. Three groups were initially presented a sentence comprehension task that featured either neutral (control), safe or unsafe primes to COVID-19 infection. They then completed an automatic imitation task, where a numeric cue was presented alongside apparent motion of an index or middle finger, which was either compatible or incompatible with the required response. Reaction times were longer for the incompatible compared to compatible trials, and thus demonstrated automatic imitation. However, there was no influence of the primes indicating that automatic imitation was unaffected by the risk of COVID-19. The potential theoretical explanations and practical implications of pathogen avoidance and social bonding incentives are discussed with reference to pandemic events.

A neural signature for combined action observation and motor imagery? An fNIRS study into prefrontal activation, automatic imitation, and self-other perceptions

INTRODUCTION

Research indicates that both observed and imagined actions can be represented in the brain as two parallel sensorimotor representations. One proposal is that higher order cognitive processes would align these two hypothetical action simulations.

METHODS

We investigated this hypothesis using an automatic imitation paradigm, with functional near-infrared spectroscopy recordings over the prefrontal cortex during different motor simulation states. On each trial, participants (n = 14) observed a picture of a rhythmical action (instructed action) followed by a distractor movie showing the same or different action. Participants then executed the instructed action. Distractor actions were manipulated to be fast or slow, and instructions were manipulated during distractor presentation: action observation (AO), combined action observation and motor imagery (AO+MI) and observe to imitate (intentional imitation). A pure motor imagery (MI) condition was also included.

RESULTS

Kinematic analyses showed that although distractor speed effects were significant under all instructions (shorter mean cycle times in execution for fast compared to slow trials), this imitation bias was significantly stronger for combined AO+MI than both AO and MI, and stronger for intentional imitation than the other three automatic imitation conditions. In the left prefrontal cortex, cerebral oxygenation was significantly greater for combined AO+MI than all other instructions. Participants reported that their representation of the self overlapped with the observed model significantly more during AO+MI than AO.

CONCLUSION

Left prefrontal activation may therefore be a neural signature of AO+MI, supporting attentional switching between concurrent representations of self (MI, top-down) and other (AO, bottom-up) to increase imitation and perceived closeness.

What modulates the Mirror Neuron System during action observation?: Multiple factors involving the action, the actor, the observer, the relationship between actor and observer, and the context

Seeing an agent perform an action typically triggers a motor simulation of that action in the observer's Mirror Neuron System (MNS). Over the past few years, it has become increasingly clear that during action observation the patterns and strengths of responses in the MNS are modulated by multiple factors. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide the most comprehensive survey to date of these factors. To that end, 22 distinct factors are described, broken down into the following sets: six involving the action; two involving the actor; nine involving the observer; four involving the relationship between actor and observer; and one involving the context. The second aim is to consider the implications of these findings for four prominent theoretical models of the MNS: the Direct Matching Model; the Predictive Coding Model; the Value-Driven Model; and the Associative Model. These assessments suggest that although each model is supported by a wide range of findings, each one is also challenged by other findings and relatively unaffected by still others. Hence, there is now a pressing need for a richer, more inclusive model that is better able to account for all of the modulatory factors that have been identified so far.

Dispositional Self-Construal Modulates the Empathy for Others' Pain: An ERP Study

Previous studies have shown that temporal self-construal priming can modulate the empathic neural responses to others' pain. However, little is known about the influences of the dispositional self-construal on empathic neural responses to others' pain. The present study aimed to investigate neural correlates that underlie the modulation effect of dispositional self-construal on perception of others' pain. Event-related potentials were recorded for pictures depicting the hands of strangers in painful or no-painful situations while subjects performed a pain judgment task. The regression analysis on behavioral data showed that the level of interdependent self-construal could positively predict behavioral ratings of perceived pain, but not the self-unpleasantness. The ERP results showed painful stimuli elicited decreased N2 amplitudes and larger P3 amplitudes than those by no-painful stimuli. Moreover, the level of interdependent self-construal (interdependence minus independence scores) could predict the amplitude differences on the P3 component (painful minus neutral stimulus conditions), but not the N2 component: the higher the level of the interdependent self-construal, the larger amplitude differences of P3 to painful stimuli (vs. no-painful stimuli). These findings extended previous studies by showing a clear modulation effect of the dispositional self-construal on empathic neural responses to others' pain, and that this modulation effect occurred at the late cognitive evaluation stage indexed by the P3 component.

The influence of self-construals on the ERP response to the rewards for self and friend

Temporary self-construal (independent vs. interdependent) priming can modulate the neural response to the reward for an individual. Our previous event-related potential (ERP) studies have indicated that people experience the rewards for a friend less strongly than they experience the same amount rewards for themselves. However, an issue remaining unclear is whether the ERP responses to rewards for a friend vary according to the way in which the self is construed. In the present study, we manipulated participants' self-construal (independent vs. interdependent) and found that independent self-construal priming resulted in a greater feedback-related negativity (FRN) in response to outcome feedback for oneself than for a friend during a monetary gambling task. In contrast, interdependent self-construal priming resulted in a comparable FRN in response to outcome feedback for oneself and for a friend. The P3 amplitude was insensitive to the self-construal manipulation. Our findings suggest that interdependent priming may result in comparable motivation elicited by rewards for participants themselves and for their friends. This study provides novel evidence that the neural response to rewards for friend varies according to the way in which the self is construed.

The influence of self-construals on the ERP response to the rewards for self and mother

Individual self-construal (independent vs. interdependent) could be temporarily modulated by the priming effect. Our previous studies have found that when Chinese participants gambled for mother and for self, outcome feedback evoked comparable neural responses between two conditions. However, it remains unclear if the response to rewards for mother and for self would differ after independence self-construal priming. In this study, we manipulated participants' self-construal (independent vs. interdependent) before a simple gambling task. The event-related potential (ERP) results reveal that when an interdependent self-construal was primed, the participants exhibited a comparable feedback-related negativity (FRN) elicited by outcome feedback for self and for mother. In contrast, independent self-construal priming resulted in a greater FRN elicited by outcome feedback for self than for mother. Meanwhile, the P3 component was insensitive to self-construal manipulation. These findings indicate the modulation effect of self-construal priming on the response to rewards for others.

Differential Motor Facilitation During Action Observation in Followers and Leaders on Instagram

High power and high socioeconomic status individuals have been found to exhibit less motor system activity during observation of another individual’s behavior. In the modern world, the use of online social networks for social interaction is increasing, and these social networks afford new forms of social status hierarchy. An important question is whether social status in an online setting affects social information processing in a way that resembles the known effects of real-world status on such processing. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we examined differences in motor cortical output during action observation between Instagram “leaders” and “followers.” Instagram Leaders were defined as individuals who have more followers than they are following, while Instagram Followers were defined as individuals who have fewer followers than they follow. We found that Followers exhibited increased Motor-evoked Potential (MEP) facilitation during action observation compared to Leaders. Correlational analyses also revealed a positive association between an individual’s Instagram follower/following ratio and their perceived sense of online status. Overall, the findings of this study provide some evidence in favor of the idea that our online sense of status and offline sense of status might be concordant in terms of their effect on motor cortical output during action observation.

Statement of Significance: This study highlights the importance of examining the effects of online status on motor cortical output during action observation, and more generally alludes to the importance of understanding online and offline status effects on social information processing.

A critical analysis of cultural metaphors and static cultural frameworks with insight from cultural neuroscience and evolutionary biology

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to conduct a critical analysis to address cultural metaphors – a much overlooked aspect of cross-cultural studies. Mainstream cultural metaphors (e.g. the iceberg, the software of the mind, the onion, and the distance) are not only limited in number, but are also overwhelmingly based on the static paradigm – as opposed to the dynamic paradigm that is often sidelined in academic discourse.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper introduces the Diagram of Diversity Pathways – an interdisciplinary framework that sheds some light on how the inherent meaning and heuristic orientation of static cultural metaphors may stand at odds with evidence from the newly emerged field of neurobiology.

Findings

The implications of these metaphors are called into question, namely, culture is all about differences; values are stable; values guide behaviors; and values are seen as binaries.

Research limitations/implications

The paper suggests that theorists and practitioners should pay more attention to the contribution and scholarly work of the dynamic paradigm since there appears to be substantial compatibility between them.

Originality/value

The matching of neurobiology and dynamic paradigm brings into focus alternative metaphors which not only offer insightful perspectives but also may open doors to perceive culture in a new way. Furthermore, cultural metaphors deserve more academic scrutiny because metaphors and theory development can have a symbiotic existence.

The influence of intrapersonal sensorimotor experiences on the corticospinal responses during action-observation

The coupling of perception and action has been strongly indicated by evidence that the observation of an action primes a response in the observer. It has been proposed that these primed responses may be inhibited when the observer is able to more closely distinguish between self- and other-generated actions - the greater the distinction, then the greater the inhibition of the primed response. This self-other distinction is shown to be enhanced following a period of visual feedback of self-generated action. The present study was designed to examine how sensorimotor experiences pertaining to self-generated action affect primed responses from observed actions. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was used to investigate corticospinal activity elicited during the observation of index- and little-finger actions before and after training (self-generated action). For sensorimotor training, participants executed finger movements with or without visual feedback of their own movement. Results showed that the increases in muscle-specific corticospinal activity elicited from action-observation persisted after training without visual feedback, but did not emerge following training with visual feedback. This inhibition in corticospinal activity during action-observation following training with vision could have resulted from the refining of internal models of self-generated action, which then led to a greater distinction between "self" and "other" actions.

The influence of self-construal type on outcome evaluation: Evidence from event-related potentials

Recent studies have revealed a close relationship between the self and reward networks. One of our previous studies has found that outcome evaluation (including the processing of reward and punishment) is modulated by self-reflection. A question remaining unclear is how different types of self-construal influence outcome evaluation. Self-construal refers to the way in which people perceive themselves to be linked (or not) with other people. Two subtypes of self-construal have been identified: independent self and interdependent self. In the present study, 27 normal adults read essays that contained independent or interdependent pronouns (i.e., I or we) and then performed a gambling task while brain event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. The ERP analysis focused on the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and the P3 component. Outcome feedback evoked a larger FRN in the independent self-priming condition than in the interdependent self-priming condition. In contrast, the P3 amplitude was insensitive to self-construal manipulation. The present findings suggest that different types of transient self-construal manifest differently in outcome evaluation processes, supporting the existence of a close link between the self and reward networks.

Stimulation over primary motor cortex during action observation impairs effector recognition

Recent work suggests that motor cortical processing during action observation plays a role in later recognition of the object involved in the action. Here, we investigated whether recognition of the effector making an action is also impaired when transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) - thought to interfere with normal cortical activity - is applied over the primary motor cortex (M1) during action observation. In two experiments, single-pulse TMS was delivered over the hand area of M1 while participants watched short clips of hand actions. Participants were then asked whether an image (experiment 1) or a video (experiment 2) of a hand presented later in the trial was the same or different to the hand in the preceding video. In Experiment 1, we found that participants' ability to recognise static images of hands was significantly impaired when TMS was delivered over M1 during action observation, compared to when no TMS was delivered, or when stimulation was applied over the vertex. Conversely, stimulation over M1 did not affect recognition of dot configurations, or recognition of hands that were previously presented as static images (rather than action movie clips) with no object. In Experiment 2, we found that effector recognition was impaired when stimulation was applied part way through (300ms) and at the end (500ms) of the action observation period, indicating that 200ms of action-viewing following stimulation was not long enough to form a new representation that could be used for later recognition. The findings of both experiments suggest that interfering with cortical motor activity during action observation impairs subsequent recognition of the effector involved in the action, which complements previous findings of motor system involvement in object memory. This work provides some of the first evidence that motor processing during action observation is involved in forming representations of the effector that are useful beyond the action observation period.

Social class affects Mu-suppression during action observation

Socioeconomic status (SES) has been linked to differences in the degree to which people are attuned to others. Those who are lower in SES also tend to be more interpersonally attuned. However, to date, this work has not been demonstrated using neural measures. In the present electroencephalogram study, we found evidence that lower SES was linked to stronger Mu-suppression during action observation. This finding adds to the growing literature on factors that affect Mu-suppression and suggests that the mirror neuron system may be influenced by one's social class.

Top-down social modulation of interpersonal observation-execution

Cyclical upper limb movement can involuntarily deviate from its primary movement axis when the performer concurrently observes incongruent biological motion (i.e. interpersonal observation-execution). The current study examined the social modulation of such involuntary motor interference using a protocol that reflected everyday social interactions encountered in a naturalistic social setting. Eighteen participants executed cyclical horizontal arm movements during the observation of horizontal (congruent) or curvilinear (incongruent) biological motion. Both prior to, and during the interpersonal observation-execution task, participants also received a series of social words designed to prime a pro-social or anti-social attitude. The results showed greater orthogonal movement deviation, and thus interference, for the curvilinear compared to horizontal stimuli. Importantly, and opposite to most of the previous findings from work on automatic imitation and mimicry, there was a greater interference effect for the anti-social compared to pro-social prime condition. These findings demonstrate the importance of interpreting the context of social primes, and strongly support predictions of a comparison between the prime construct and the self-concept/-schema and the top-down response modulation of social incentives.

Challenging emotional prejudice by changing self-concept: priming independent self-construal reduces racial in-group bias in neural responses to other's pain

Humans show stronger empathy for in-group compared with out-group members' suffering and help in-group members more than out-group members. Moreover, the in-group bias in empathy and parochial altruism tend to be more salient in collectivistic than individualistic cultures. This work tested the hypothesis that modifying self-construals, which differentiate between collectivistic and individualistic cultural orientations, affects in-group bias in empathy for perceived own-race vs other-race pain. By scanning adults using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found stronger neural activities in the mid-cingulate, left insula and supplementary motor area (SMA) in response to racial in-group compared with out-group members' pain after participants had been primed with interdependent self-construals. However, the racial in-group bias in neural responses to others' pain in the left SMA, mid-cingulate cortex and insula was significantly reduced by priming independent self-construals. Our findings suggest that shifting an individual's self-construal leads to changes of his/her racial in-group bias in neural responses to others' suffering.

Culture and cognition

There is increasing interest in the nature and both environmental and cognitive origins of culturally associated differences in a range of behaviors. This special issue of Cognitive Neuroscience presents six empirical papers investigating diverse categories of potential culturally related effects as well as a review article, all of which provide timely updates of the current state of knowledge in this area.

On social neuroscience methodologies and their applicability to group processes and intergroup relations

Group processes and intergroup relations are one of the most important topics examined by social psychologists. Recent advancements in social neuroscience methodologies provide valuable insight into these processes by allowing researchers to examine different psychological phenomena via neural processes that instantiate them while individuals interact with ingroup and outgroup members. This includes responses that occur outside conscious awareness or are deemed undesirable to overtly express. The purpose of this review is to provide an overview of the different social neuroscience methodologies that afford these possibilities. Specifically, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and genetic approaches will be discussed. Each section includes a discussion of what the methodology is and how it is used to assess neural function. A secondary goal of the review is to highlight recent studies that have utilized the aforementioned tools to better understand intergroup processes and interactions. Throughout, advantages and limitations of each approach are discussed, particularly with respect to the study of group processes and intergroup relations.

When mirroring is both simple and "smart": how mimicry can be embodied, adaptive, and non-representational

The concept of mirroring has become rather ubiquitous. One of the most fundamental empirical and theoretical debates within research on mirroring concerns the role of mental representations: while some models argue that higher-order representational mechanisms underpin most cases of mirroring, other models argue that they only moderate a primarily non-representational process. As such, even though research on mirroring—along with its neural substrates, including the putative mirror neuron system—has grown tremendously, so too has confusion about what it actually means to “mirror”. Using recent research on spontaneous imitation, we argue that flexible mirroring effects can be fully embodied and dynamic—even in the absence of higher-order mental representations. We propose that mirroring can simply reflect an adaptive integration and utilization of cues obtained from the brain, body, and environment, which is especially evident within the social context. Such a view offers reconciliation among both representational and non-representational frameworks in cognitive neuroscience, which will facilitate revised interpretations of modern (and seemingly divergent) findings on when and how these embodied mirroring responses are employed.

Cultural differences in human brain activity: a quantitative meta-analysis

Psychologists have been trying to understand differences in cognition and behavior between East Asian and Western cultures within a single cognitive framework such as holistic versus analytic or interdependent versus independent processes. However, it remains unclear whether cultural differences in multiple psychological processes correspond to the same or different neural networks. We conducted a quantitative meta-analysis of 35 functional MRI studies to examine cultural differences in brain activity engaged in social and non-social processes. We showed that social cognitive processes are characterized by stronger activity in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, lateral frontal cortex and temporoparietal junction in East Asians but stronger activity in the anterior cingulate, ventral medial prefrontal cortex and bilateral insula in Westerners. Social affective processes are associated with stronger activity in the right dorsal lateral frontal cortex in East Asians but greater activity in the left insula and right temporal pole in Westerners. Non-social processes induce stronger activity in the left inferior parietal cortex, left middle occipital and left superior parietal cortex in East Asians but greater activations in the right lingual gyrus, right inferior parietal cortex and precuneus in Westerners. The results suggest that cultural differences in social and non-social processes are mediated by distinct neural networks. Moreover, East Asian cultures are associated with increased neural activity in the brain regions related to inference of others' mind and emotion regulation whereas Western cultures are associated with enhanced neural activity in the brain areas related to self-relevance encoding and emotional responses during social cognitive/affective processes.

Harm avoiders suppress motor resonance to observed immoral actions

Motor resonance (MR) contingent upon action observation is thought to occur largely automatically. Although recent studies suggest that this process is not completely impervious to top-down modulations, much less is known on the possible role of the moral connotation of observed action goal in modulating MR. Here, we explored whether observing actions with different moral connotations modulates MR and whether any modulation depends on the onlookers' personality. To this aim, we recorded motor potentials evoked by single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation from hand muscles of participants who were watching images of a model performing hand actions with the same postures and low-level goals (i.e. grasping an object) but with different moral connotations ('stealing a wallet' vs 'picking up a notepaper'). Participants' personality traits were measured using the temperament and character inventory. Results show a selective suppression of corticospinal excitability during observation of immoral actions in individuals with high scores in harm avoidance, a personality trait characterized by excessive worrying and fearfulness. Thus, a combination of dispositional (personality traits) and situational (morality of an action) variables appears to influence MR with the observed actions.

Motor cortical processing is causally involved in object recognition

Background

Motor activity during vicarious experience of actions is a widely reported and studied phenomenon, and motor system activity also accompanies observation of graspable objects in the absence of any actions. Such motor activity is thought to reflect simulation of the observed action, or preparation to interact with the object, respectively.

Results

Here, in an initial exploratory study, we ask whether motor activity during observation of object directed actions is involved in processes related to recognition of the object after initial exposure. Single pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) was applied over the thumb representation of the motor cortex, or over the vertex, during observation of a model thumb typing on a cell-phone, and performance on a phone recognition task at the end of the trial was assessed. Disrupting motor processing over the thumb representation 100 ms after the onset of the typing video impaired the ability to recognize the phone in the recognition test, whereas there was no such effect for TMS applied over the vertex and no TMS trials. Furthermore, this effect only manifested for videos observed from the first person perspective. In an additional control condition, there was no evidence for any effects of TMS to the thumb representation or vertex when observing and recognizing non-action related shape stimuli.

Conclusion

Overall, these data provide evidence that motor cortical processing during observation of object-directed actions from a first person perspective is causally linked to the formation of enduring representations of objects-of-action.

Gaze, goals and growing up: Effects on imitative grasping

Developmental differences in the use of social-attention cues to imitation were examined among children aged 3 and 6 years old (n = 58) and adults (n = 29). In each of 20 trials, participants watched a model grasp two objects simultaneously and move them together. On every trial, the model directed her gaze towards only one of the objects. Some object pairs were related and had a clear functional relationship (e.g., flower, vase), while others were functionally unrelated (e.g., cardboard square, ladybug). Owing to attentional effects of eye gaze, it was expected that all participants would more faithfully imitate the grasp on the gazed-at object than the object not gazed-at. Children were expected to imitate less faithfully on trials with functionally related objects than those without, due to goal-hierarchy effects. Results support effects of eye gaze on imitation of grasping. Children's grasping accuracy on functionally related and functionally unrelated trials was similar, but they were more likely to only use one hand on trials where the object pairs were functionally related than unrelated. Implications for theories of imitation are discussed.

Controlling automatic imitative tendencies: interactions between mirror neuron and cognitive control systems

Humans have an automatic tendency to imitate others. Although several regions commonly observed in social tasks have been shown to be involved in imitation control, there is little work exploring how these regions interact with one another. We used fMRI and dynamic causal modeling to identify imitation-specific control mechanisms and examine functional interactions between regions. Participants performed a pre-specified action (lifting their index or middle finger) in response to videos depicting the same two actions (biological cues) or dots moving with similar trajectories (non-biological cues). On congruent trials, the stimulus and response were similar (e.g. index finger response to index finger or left side dot stimulus), while on incongruent trials the stimulus and response were dissimilar (e.g. index finger response to middle finger or right side dot stimulus). Reaction times were slower on incongruent compared to congruent trials for both biological and non-biological stimuli, replicating previous findings that suggest the automatic imitative or spatially compatible (congruent) response must be controlled on incongruent trials. Neural correlates of the congruency effects were different depending on the cue type. The medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis (IFGpo) and the left anterior insula were involved specifically in controlling imitation. In addition, the IFGpo was also more active for biological compared to non-biological stimuli, suggesting that the region represents the frontal node of the human mirror neuron system (MNS). Effective connectivity analysis exploring the interactions between these regions, suggests a role for the mPFC and ACC in imitative conflict detection and the anterior insula in conflict resolution processes, which may occur through interactions with the frontal node of the MNS. We suggest an extension of the previous models of imitation control involving interactions between imitation-specific and general cognitive control mechanisms.

Understanding the role of the 'self' in the social priming of mimicry

People have a tendency to unconsciously mimic other's actions. This mimicry has been regarded as a prosocial response which increases social affiliation. Previous research on social priming of mimicry demonstrated an assimilative relationship between mimicry and prosociality of the primed construct: prosocial primes elicit stronger mimicry whereas antisocial primes decrease mimicry. The present research extends these findings by showing that assimilative and contrasting prime-to-behavior effect can both happen on mimicry. Specifically, experiment 1 showed a robust contrast priming effect where priming antisocial behaviors induces stronger mimicry than priming prosocial behaviors. In experiment 2, we manipulated the self-relatedness of the pro/antisocial primes and further revealed that prosocial primes increase mimicry only when the social primes are self-related whereas antisocial primes increase mimicry only when the social primes are self-unrelated. In experiment 3, we used a novel cartoon movie paradigm to prime pro/antisocial behaviors and manipulated the perspective-taking when participants were watching these movies. Again, we found that prosocial primes increase mimicry only when participants took a first-person point of view whereas antisocial primes increase mimicry only when participants took a third-person point of view, which replicated the findings in experiment 2. We suggest that these three studies can be best explained by the active-self theory, which claims that the direction of prime-to-behavior effects depends on how primes are processed in relation to the ‘self’.

Accessible cultural mind-set modulates default mode activity: evidence for the culturally situated brain

Self-construal priming modulates human behavior and associated neural activity. However, the neural activity associated with the self-construal priming procedure itself remains unknown. It is also unclear whether and how self-construal priming affects neural activity prior to engaging in a particular task. To address this gap, we scanned Chinese adults, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, during self-construal priming and a following resting state. We found that, relative to a calculation task, both interdependent and independent self-construal priming activated the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). The contrast of interdependent vs. independent self-construal priming also revealed increased activity in the dorsal MPFC and left middle frontal cortex. The regional homogeneity analysis of the resting-state activity revealed increased local synchronization of spontaneous activity in the dorsal MPFC but decreased local synchronization of spontaneous activity in the PCC when contrasting interdependent vs. independent self-construal priming. The functional connectivity analysis of the resting-state activity, however, did not show significant difference in synchronization of activities in remote brain regions between different priming conditions. Our findings suggest that accessible collectivistic/individualistic mind-set induced by self-construal priming is associated with modulations of both task-related and resting-state activity in the default mode network.

Effects of context on visuomotor interference depends on the perspective of observed actions

Visuomotor interference occurs when the execution of an action is facilitated by the concurrent observation of the same action and hindered by the concurrent observation of a different action. There is evidence that visuomotor interference can be modulated top-down by higher cognitive functions, depending on whether own performed actions or observed actions are selectively attended. Here, we studied whether these effects of cognitive context on visuomotor interference are also dependent on the point-of-view of the observed action. We employed a delayed go/no-go task known to induce visuomotor interference. Static images of hand gestures in either egocentric or allocentric perspective were presented as “go” stimuli after participants were pre-cued to prepare either a matching (congruent) or non-matching (incongruent) action. Participants performed this task in two different cognitive contexts: In one, they focused on the visual image of the hand gesture shown as the go stimulus (image context), whereas in the other they focused on the hand gesture they performed (action context). We analyzed reaction times to initiate the prepared action upon presentation of the gesture image and found evidence of visuomotor interference in both contexts and for both perspectives. Strikingly, results show that the effect of cognitive context on visuomotor interference also depends on the perspective of observed actions. When focusing on own-actions, visuomotor interference was significantly less for gesture images in allocentric perspective than in egocentric perspective; when focusing on observed actions, visuomotor interference was present regardless of the perspective of the gesture image. Overall these data suggest that visuomotor interference may be modulated by higher cognitive processes, so that when we are specifically attending to our own actions, images depicting others’ actions (allocentric perspective) have much less interference on our own actions.

The antecedents and consequences of human behavioral mimicry

Behavioral mimicry--the automatic imitation of gestures, postures, mannerisms, and other motor movements--is pervasive in human interactions. The current review focuses on two recent themes in the mimicry literature. First, an analysis of the moderators of mimicry uncovers the various motivational, social, emotional, and personality factors that lead to more or less mimicry of an interaction partner in a given situation. Second, a significant amount of recent research has identified important downstream consequences of mimicking or being mimicked by another person. These include not only increased prosociality between interactants, but also unexpected effects on the individual, such as cognitive processing style, attitudes, consumer preferences, self-regulatory ability, and academic performance. Behavioral mimicry is also placed in its broader context: a form of interpersonal coordination. It is compared to interactional synchrony and other social contagion effects, including verbal, goal, and emotional contagion and attitudinal convergence.

Social interaction enhances motor resonance for observed human actions

Understanding the neural basis of social behavior has become an important goal for cognitive neuroscience and a key aim is to link neural processes observed in the laboratory to more naturalistic social behaviors in real-world contexts. Although it is accepted that mirror mechanisms contribute to the occurrence of motor resonance (MR) and are common to action execution, observation, and imitation, questions remain about mirror (and MR) involvement in real social behavior and in processing nonhuman actions. To determine whether social interaction primes the MR system, groups of participants engaged or did not engage in a social interaction before observing human or robotic actions. During observation, MR was assessed via motor-evoked potentials elicited with transcranial magnetic stimulation. Compared with participants who did not engage in a prior social interaction, participants who engaged in the social interaction showed a significant increase in MR for human actions. In contrast, social interaction did not increase MR for robot actions. Thus, naturalistic social interaction and laboratory action observation tasks appear to involve common MR mechanisms, and recent experience tunes the system to particular agent types.

Social top-down response modulation (STORM): a model of the control of mimicry in social interaction

As a distinct feature of human social interactions, spontaneous mimicry has been widely investigated in the past decade. Research suggests that mimicry is a subtle and flexible social behavior which plays an important role for communication and affiliation. However, fundamental questions like why and how people mimic still remain unclear. In this paper, we evaluate past theories of why people mimic and the brain systems that implement mimicry in social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. By reviewing recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies on the control of mimicry by social signals, we conclude that the subtlety and sophistication of mimicry in social contexts reflect a social top-down response modulation (STORM) which increases one's social advantage and this mechanism is most likely implemented by medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). We suggest that this STORM account of mimicry is important for our understanding of social behavior and social cognition, and provides implications for future research in autism.

Distinguishing self and other in joint action. Evidence from a musical paradigm

The capacity to distinguish between one's own and others' behavior is a cognitive prerequisite for successful joint action. We employed a musical joint action task to investigate how the brain achieves this distinction. Pianists performed the right-hand part of piano pieces, previously learned bimanually, while the complementary left-hand part either was not executed or was (believed to be) played by a co-performer. This experimental setting served to induce a co-representation of the left-hand part reflecting either the self or the co-performer. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied to the right primary motor cortex and motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) were recorded from the resting left forearm. Results show that corticospinal excitability was modulated by whether the representation of the left hand was associated with the self or the other, with the MEP amplitude being low and high, respectively. This result remained unchanged in a separate session where participants could neither see nor hear the other but still infer his presence by means of contextual information. Furthermore, the amplitude of MEPs associated with co-performer presence increased with pianists' self-reported empathy. Thus, the sociality of the context modulates action attribution at the level of the motor control system.