Binocular rivalry: frontal activity relates to introspection and action but not to perception

Intracranial neural representation of phenomenal and access consciousness in the human brain

After more than 30 years of extensive investigation, impressive progress has been made in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). However, the functional role of spatiotemporally distinct consciousness-related neural activity in conscious perception is debated. An influential framework proposed that consciousness-related neural activities could be dissociated into two distinct processes: phenomenal and access consciousness. However, though hotly debated, its authenticity has not been examined in a single paradigm with more informative intracranial recordings. In the present study, we employed a visual awareness task and recorded the local field potential (LFP) of patients with electrodes implanted in cortical and subcortical regions. Overall, we found that the latency of visual awareness-related activity exhibited a bimodal distribution, and the recording sites with short and long latencies were largely separated in location, except in the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC). The mixture of short and long latencies in the lPFC indicates that it plays a critical role in linking phenomenal and access consciousness. However, the division between the two is not as simple as the central sulcus, as proposed previously. Moreover, in 4 patients with electrodes implanted in the bilateral prefrontal cortex, early awareness-related activity was confined to the contralateral side, while late awareness-related activity appeared on both sides. Finally, Granger causality analysis showed that awareness-related information flowed from the early sites to the late sites. These results provide the first LFP evidence of neural correlates of phenomenal and access consciousness, which sheds light on the spatiotemporal dynamics of NCC in the human brain.

Perception-action Dissociations as a Window into Consciousness

Understanding the neural correlates of unconscious perception stands as a primary goal of experimental research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In this Perspectives paper, we explain why experimental protocols probing qualitative dissociations between perception and action provide valuable insights into conscious and unconscious processing, along with their corresponding neural correlates. We present research that utilizes human eye movements as a sensitive indicator of unconscious visual processing. Given the increasing reliance on oculomotor and pupillary responses in consciousness research, these dissociations also provide a cautionary tale about inferring conscious perception solely based on no-report protocols.

Pupillometry indexes ocular dominance plasticity

Short-term monocular deprivation in normally sighted adult humans produces a transient shift of ocular dominance, boosting the deprived eye. This effect has been documented with both perceptual tests and through physiological recordings, but no previous study simultaneously measured physiological responses and the perceptual effects of deprivation. Here we propose an integrated experimental paradigm that combines binocular rivalry with pupillometry, to introduce an objective physiological index of ocular dominance plasticity, acquired concurrently with perceptual testing. Ten participants reported the perceptual dynamics of binocular rivalry, while we measured pupil diameter. Stimuli were a white and a black disk, each presented monocularly. Rivalry dynamics and pupil-size traces were compared before and after 2 h of monocular deprivation, achieved by applying a translucent patch over the dominant eye. Consistent with prior research, we observed that monocular deprivation boosts the deprived-eye signal and consequently increases ocular dominance. In line with previous studies, we also observed subtle but systematic modulations of pupil size that tracked alternations between exclusive dominance phases of the black or white disk. Following monocular deprivation, the amplitude of these pupil-size modulations increased, which is consistent with the post-deprivation boost of the deprived eye and the increase of ocular dominance. This provides evidence that deprivation impacts the effective strength of monocular visual stimuli, coherently affecting perceptual reports and the automatic and unconscious regulation of pupil diameter. Our results show that a combined paradigm of binocular rivalry and pupillometry gives new insights into the physiological mechanisms underlying deprivation effects.

Tracking rivalry with neural rhythms: multivariate SSVEPs reveal perception during binocular rivalry

The contents of awareness can substantially change without any modification to the external world. Such effects are exemplified in binocular rivalry, where a different stimulus is presented to each eye causing instability in perception. This phenomenon has made binocular rivalry a quintessential method for studying consciousness and the necessary neural correlates for awareness. However, to conduct research on binocular rivalry usually requires self-reports of changes in percept, which can produce confounds and exclude states and contexts where self-reports are undesirable or unreliable. Here, we use a novel multivariate spatial filter dubbed 'Rhythmic Entrainment Source Separation' to extract steady state visual evoked potentials from electroencephalography data. We show that this method can be used to quantify the perceptual switch-rate of participants during binocular rivalry and therefore may be valuable in experimental contexts where self-reports are methodologically problematic or impossible, particularly as an adjunct. Our analyses also reveal that 'no-report' conditions may affect the deployment of attention and thereby neural correlates, another important consideration for consciousness research.

Taking consciousness for real: Increasing the ecological validity of the study of conscious vs. unconscious processes

The study of consciousness has developed well-controlled, rigorous methods for manipulating and measuring consciousness. Yet, in the process, experimental paradigms grew farther away from everyday conscious and unconscious processes, which raises the concern of ecological validity. In this review, we suggest that the field can benefit from adopting a more ecological approach, akin to other fields of cognitive science. There, this approach challenged some existing hypotheses, yielded stronger effects, and enabled new research questions. We argue that such a move is critical for studying consciousness, where experimental paradigms tend to be artificial and small effect sizes are relatively prevalent. We identify three paths for doing so-changing the stimuli and experimental settings, changing the measures, and changing the research questions themselves-and review works that have already started implementing such approaches. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, we call for increasing ecological validity in consciousness studies.

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

Thalamic contributions to the state and contents of consciousness

Consciousness can be conceptualized as varying along at least two dimensions: the global state of consciousness and the content of conscious experience. Here, we highlight the cellular and systems-level contributions of the thalamus to conscious state and then argue for thalamic contributions to conscious content, including the integrated, segregated, and continuous nature of our experience. We underscore vital, yet distinct roles for core- and matrix-type thalamic neurons. Through reciprocal interactions with deep-layer cortical neurons, matrix neurons support wakefulness and determine perceptual thresholds, whereas the cortical interactions of core neurons maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. We further propose that conscious integration, segregation, and continuity depend on the convergent nature of corticothalamic projections enabling dimensionality reduction, a thalamic reticular nucleus-mediated divisive normalization-like process, and sustained coherent activity in thalamocortical loops, respectively. Overall, we conclude that the thalamus plays a central topological role in brain structures controlling conscious experience.

Late Positivity Correlates with Subjective Reports: Evidence from the Low-frequency and High-frequency Reporting Tasks

Identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is an important way to understand the fundamental nature of consciousness. By recording event-related potentials (ERPs) using EEG, researchers have found three potential electrophysiological NCCs: early positive correlate of consciousness (enhanced P1), visual awareness negativity (VAN), and late positivity (LP). However, LP may reflect post-perceptual processing associated with subjective reports rather than consciousness per se. The present experiment investigated the relationship between LP and subjective reports. We adopted two subjective reporting tasks that differed in the requirement for subjective reports. In the low-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in 25% of trials, whereas in the high-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in each trial. Behavioral results showed that the hit rates were lower and false alarm rates were higher on reporting trials in low-frequency reporting tasks than on reporting trials in high-frequency reporting tasks. Unexpectedly, VAN was larger on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task. Importantly, our ERP results showed that LP was larger on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task. Thus, our findings indicated that when the frequency of reports was increased, the task relevance of the stimuli increased, which led to larger LP amplitudes. These findings suggest that LP correlates with subjective reports.

Bimodal moment-by-moment coupling in perceptual multistability

Multistable perception occurs in all sensory modalities, and there is ongoing theoretical debate about whether there are overarching mechanisms driving multistability across modalities. Here we study whether multistable percepts are coupled across vision and audition on a moment-by-moment basis. To assess perception simultaneously for both modalities without provoking a dual-task situation, we query auditory perception by direct report, while measuring visual perception indirectly via eye movements. A support-vector-machine (SVM)-based classifier allows us to decode visual perception from the eye-tracking data on a moment-by-moment basis. For each timepoint, we compare visual percept (SVM output) and auditory percept (report) and quantify the co-occurrence of integrated (one-object) or segregated (two-objects) interpretations in the two modalities. Our results show an above-chance coupling of auditory and visual perceptual interpretations. By titrating stimulus parameters toward an approximately symmetric distribution of integrated and segregated percepts for each modality and individual, we minimize the amount of coupling expected by chance. Because of the nature of our task, we can rule out that the coupling stems from postperceptual levels (i.e., decision or response interference). Our results thus indicate moment-by-moment perceptual coupling in the resolution of visual and auditory multistability, lending support to theories that postulate joint mechanisms for multistable perception across the senses.

Quantifying empirical support for theories of consciousness: a tentative methodological framework

Understanding consciousness is central to understanding human nature. We have competing theories of consciousness. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies most believe that consciousness can be naturalized (i.e., consciousness depends in some substantial way on processes in - or states of - the brain). For roughly two decades, proponents of almost every theory have focused on collecting empirical support for their preferred theory, on the tacit assumption that empirical evidence will resolve the debates. Yet, it remains unclear how empirical evidence can do this in practice. Here I address this issue by offering (a sketch of) a methodology to quantify the divergent sets of empirical support proposed in favor of extant theories of consciousness. This in turn forms the foundation for a process of inference to the best explanation inspired by Bayesian confirmation theory. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies we are blessed with an abundance of theories, but we have reached a point where, going forward, it would be beneficial to focus on the most promising ones. Methods for assessment and comparison are necessary to identify which those are. While future refinement is likely, the methodology for assessment and comparison proposed here is a first step toward a novel way of approaching this through a quantification of empirical support for theories of consciousness.

Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses

How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.

The perceptual timescape: Perceptual history on the sub-second scale

There is a high-capacity store of brief time span (∼1000 ms) which information enters from perceptual processing, often called iconic memory or sensory memory. It is proposed that a main function of this store is to hold recent perceptual information in a temporally segregated representation, named the perceptual timescape. The perceptual timescape is a continually active representation of change and continuity over time that endows the perceived present with a perceived history. This is accomplished primarily by two kinds of time marking information: time distance information, which marks all items of information in the perceptual timescape according to how far in the past they occurred, and ordinal temporal information, which organises items of information in terms of their temporal order. Added to that is information about connectivity of perceptual objects over time. These kinds of information connect individual items over a brief span of time so as to represent change, persistence, and continuity over time. It is argued that there is a one-way street of information flow from perceptual processing either to the perceived present or directly into the perceptual timescape, and thence to working memory. Consistent with that, the information structure of the perceptual timescape supports postdictive reinterpretations of recent perceptual information. Temporal integration on a time scale of hundreds of milliseconds takes place in perceptual processing and does not draw on information in the perceptual timescape, which is concerned with temporal segregation, not integration.

Feedforward connectivity patterns from visual areas to the front of the brain contain information about sensory stimuli regardless of awareness or report

Current theories of consciousness can be categorized to some extent by their predictions about the putative role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception. One family of the theories proposes that the PFC is necessary for conscious perception. The other postulates that the PFC is not necessary and that other areas (e.g., posterior cortical areas) are more important for conscious perception. No-report paradigms could potentially arbitrate the debate as they disentangle task reporting from conscious perception. While previous no-report paradigms tend to point to a reduction in PFC activity, they have not examined the critical role of the PFC in "monitoring" or "reading out" the patterns of activity in the sensory cortex to generate conscious perception. To address this, we reanalysed electroencephalography (EEG) data from a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm (Shafto & Pitts, 2015). We examined the role of feedforward input patterns to the PFC from sensory cortices. We employed nonparametric spectral Granger causality and quantified the amount of information that reflected the contents of consciousness using multivariate classifiers. Unexpectedly, regardless of whether the stimulus was consciously seen or not, we found that information relating to the current sensory stimulus was present in the pattern of inputs from visual areas to the PFC. In light of these findings, we suggest various theories of consciousness need to be revised to accommodate the fact that the contents of consciousness are decodable from the input patterns from posterior sensory regions to the PFC, regardless of awareness (or report).

The involvement of the human prefrontal cortex in the emergence of visual awareness

Exploring the neural mechanisms of awareness is a fundamental task of cognitive neuroscience. There is an ongoing dispute regarding the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the emergence of awareness, which is partially raised by the confound between report- and awareness-related activity. To address this problem, we designed a visual awareness task that can minimize report-related motor confounding. Our results show that saccadic latency is significantly shorter in the aware trials than in the unaware trials. Local field potential (LFP) data from six patients consistently show early (200-300ms) awareness-related activity in the PFC, including event-related potential and high-gamma activity. Moreover, the awareness state can be reliably decoded by the neural activity in the PFC since the early stage, and the neural pattern is dynamically changed rather than being stable during the representation of awareness. Furthermore, the enhancement of dynamic functional connectivity, through the phase modulation at low frequency, between the PFC and other brain regions in the early stage of the awareness trials may explain the mechanism of conscious access. These results indicate that the PFC is critically involved in the emergence of awareness.

A human cortical adaptive mutual inhibition circuit underlying competition for perceptual decision and repetition suppression reversal

A model based on inhibitory coupling has been proposed to explain perceptual oscillations. This 'adapting reciprocal inhibition' model postulates that it is the strength of inhibitory coupling that determines the fate of competition between percepts. Here, we used an fMRI-based adaptation technique to reveal the influence of neighboring neuronal populations, such as reciprocal inhibition, in motion-selective hMT+/V5. If reciprocal inhibition exists in this region, the following predictions should hold: 1. stimulus-driven response would not simply decrease, as predicted by simple repetition-suppression of neuronal populations, but instead, increase due to the activity from adjacent populations; 2. perceptual decision involving competing representations, should reflect decreased reciprocal inhibition by adaptation; 3. neural activity for the competing percept should also later on increase upon adaptation. Our results confirm these three predictions, showing that a model of perceptual decision based on adapting reciprocal inhibition holds true. Finally, they also show that the net effect of the well-known repetition suppression phenomenon can be reversed by this mechanism.

An Accumulating Neural Signal Underlying Binocular Rivalry Dynamics

During binocular rivalry, conflicting images are presented one to each eye and perception alternates stochastically between them. Despite stable percepts between alternations, modeling suggests that neural signals representing the two images change gradually, and that the duration of stable percepts are determined by the time required for these signals to reach a threshold that triggers an alternation. However, direct physiological evidence for such signals has been lacking. Here, we identify a neural signal in the human visual cortex that shows these predicted properties. We measured steady-state visual evoked potentials (SSVEPs) in 84 human participants (62 females, 22 males) who were presented with orthogonal gratings, one to each eye, flickering at different frequencies. Participants indicated their percept while EEG data were collected. The time courses of the SSVEP amplitudes at the two frequencies were then compared across different percept durations, within participants. For all durations, the amplitude of signals corresponding to the suppressed stimulus increased and the amplitude corresponding to the dominant stimulus decreased throughout the percept. Critically, longer percepts were characterized by more gradual increases in the suppressed signal and more gradual decreases of the dominant signal. Changes in signals were similar and rapid at the end of all percepts, presumably reflecting perceptual transitions. These features of the SSVEP time courses are well predicted by a model in which perceptual transitions are produced by the accumulation of noisy signals. Identification of this signal underlying binocular rivalry should allow strong tests of neural models of rivalry, bistable perception, and neural suppression.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT During binocular rivalry, two conflicting images are presented to the two eyes and perception alternates between them, with switches occurring at seemingly random times. Rivalry is an important and longstanding model system in neuroscience, used for understanding neural suppression, intrinsic neural dynamics, and even the neural correlates of consciousness. All models of rivalry propose that it depends on gradually changing neural activity that on reaching some threshold triggers the perceptual switches. This manuscript reports the first physiological measurement of neural signals with that set of properties in human participants. The signals, measured with EEG in human observers, closely match the predictions of recent models of rivalry, and should pave the way for much future work.

The exclusionary approach to consciousness

The standard approach in the field of consciousness research involves identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) by comparing neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials. However, this method has been met with criticism due to the lack of consensus on how to operationalize and measure consciousness. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach: the exclusionary approach. Rather than utilizing near-threshold conditions to contrast conscious and unconscious trials, this approach leverages the widely accepted notion that subjective reports are reliable under normal conditions. I propose that this can be done by assessing whether consciousness remains stable across trials while manipulating other factors such as reports, tasks, stimulation, or attention. We can use the resulting contrast to exclude certain kinds of neural activity as candidate NCCs. This method produces results that are less contentious, allowing for the establishment of hard criteria for theories of consciousness. Additionally, this approach does not require the development of new research paradigms, but can incorporate existing studies, particularly those aimed at identifying confounding factors in the standard approach. It is important to note, however, that the proposed exclusionary approach does not negate the value of the identification approach. Rather, they should be considered as complementary methods.

The claustrum and consciousness: An update

The seminal paper of Crick and Koch (2005) proposed that the claustrum, an enigmatic and thin grey matter structure that lies beside the insular cortex, may be involved in the processing of consciousness. As a result, this otherwise obscure structure has received ever-increasing interest in the search for neural correlates of consciousness. Here we review theories of consciousness and discuss the possible relationship between the claustrum and consciousness. We review relevant experimental evidence collected since the Crick and Koch (2005) paper and consider whether these findings support or contradict their hypothesis. We also explore how future experimental work can be designed to clarify how consciousness emerges from neural activity and to understand the role of the claustrum in consciousness.

The role of conflict processing in multisensory perception: behavioural and electroencephalography evidence

To form coherent multisensory perceptual representations, the brain must solve a causal inference problem: to decide if two sensory cues originated from the same event and should be combined, or if they came from different events and should be processed independently. According to current models of multisensory integration, during this process, the integrated (common cause) and segregated (different causes) internal perceptual models are entertained. In the present study, we propose that the causal inference process involves competition between these alternative perceptual models that engages the brain mechanisms of conflict processing. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two experiments, measuring reaction times (RTs) and electroencephalography, using an audiovisual ventriloquist illusion paradigm with varying degrees of intersensory disparities. Consistent with our hypotheses, incongruent trials led to slower RTs and higher fronto-medial theta power, both indicative of conflict. We also predicted that intermediate disparities would yield slower RTs and higher theta power when compared to congruent stimuli and to large disparities, owing to the steeper competition between causal models. Although this prediction was only validated in the RT study, both experiments displayed the anticipated trend. In conclusion, our findings suggest a potential involvement of the conflict mechanisms in multisensory integration of spatial information. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Distinct ventral stream and prefrontal cortex representational dynamics during sustained conscious visual perception

Instances of sustained stationary sensory input are ubiquitous. However, previous work focused almost exclusively on transient onset responses. This presents a critical challenge for neural theories of consciousness, which should account for the full temporal extent of experience. To address this question, we use intracranial recordings from ten human patients with epilepsy to view diverse images of multiple durations. We reveal that, in sensory regions, despite dramatic changes in activation magnitude, the distributed representation of categories and exemplars remains sustained and stable. In contrast, in frontoparietal regions, we find transient content representation at stimulus onset. Our results highlight the connection between the anatomical and temporal correlates of experience. To the extent perception is sustained, it may rely on sensory representations and to the extent perception is discrete, centered on perceptual updating, it may rely on frontoparietal representations.

INs and OUTs of faces in consciousness: a study of the temporal evolution of consciousness of faces during binocular rivalry

Contents of consciousness change over time. However, the study of dynamics in consciousness has been largely neglected. Aru and Bachmann have recently brought to the attention of scientists dealing with consciousness the relevance of making inquiries about its temporal evolution. Importantly, they also pointed out several experimental questions as guidelines for researchers interested in studying the temporal evolution of consciousness, including the phases of formation and dissolution of content. They also suggested that these two phases could be characterized by asymmetric inertia. The main objective of the present investigation was to approximate the dynamics of these two phases in the context of conscious face perception. To this aim, we tested the time course of content transitions during a binocular rivalry task using face stimuli and asked participants to map their subjective experience of transitions from one content to the other through a joystick. We then computed metrics of joystick velocity linked to content transitions as proxies of the formation and dissolution phases. We found a general phase effect such that the formation phase was slower than the dissolution phase. Furthermore, we observed an effect specific to happy facial expressions, such that their contents were slower to form and dissolve than that of neutral expressions. We further propose to include a third phase of stabilization of conscious content between formation and dissolution.

Feedback information sharing in the human brain reflects bistable perception in the absence of report

In the search for the neural basis of conscious experience, perception and the cognitive processes associated with reporting perception are typically confounded as neural activity is recorded while participants explicitly report what they experience. Here, we present a novel way to disentangle perception from report using eye movement analysis techniques based on convolutional neural networks and neurodynamical analyses based on information theory. We use a bistable visual stimulus that instantiates two well-known properties of conscious perception: integration and differentiation. At any given moment, observers either perceive the stimulus as one integrated unitary object or as two differentiated objects that are clearly distinct from each other. Using electroencephalography, we show that measures of integration and differentiation based on information theory closely follow participants' perceptual experience of those contents when switches were reported. We observed increased information integration between anterior to posterior electrodes (front to back) prior to a switch to the integrated percept, and higher information differentiation of anterior signals leading up to reporting the differentiated percept. Crucially, information integration was closely linked to perception and even observed in a no-report condition when perceptual transitions were inferred from eye movements alone. In contrast, the link between neural differentiation and perception was observed solely in the active report condition. Our results, therefore, suggest that perception and the processes associated with report require distinct amounts of anterior-posterior network communication and anterior information differentiation. While front-to-back directed information is associated with changes in the content of perception when viewing bistable visual stimuli, regardless of report, frontal information differentiation was absent in the no-report condition and therefore is not directly linked to perception per se.

Complex of global functional network as the core of consciousness

Finding the neural basis of consciousness is challenging, and the distribution location of the core of consciousness remains inconclusive. Integrated information theory (IIT) argues that the posterior part of the brain is the hot zone of consciousness, especially phenological consciousness. The IIT has proposed a "main complex", a set of elements determined such that the information loss in a hierarchical partition approach is the largest among those of any other supersets and subsets, as the core of consciousness in a dynamic system. This approach may be applicable not only to phenomenal but also to access-consciousness. This study estimated the main complex of brain dynamics using functional magnetic resonance imaging in Human Connectome Project (HCP) and sleep datasets. The complex analyses revealed the common networks across various tasks and rest-state in HCP, composed of executive control, salience, and dorsal/ventral attention networks. The set of networks of the main complex was maintained during sleep. However, compared with the wakefulness stage, the amount of information of these networks and the default mode network, was reduced for the hypnagogic stage. The global interconnected structure composed of major functional networks can comprise the core of consciousness.

Towards causal mechanisms of consciousness through focused transcranial brain stimulation

Conscious experience represents one of the most elusive problems of empirical science, namely neuroscience. The main objective of empirical studies of consciousness has been to describe the minimal sets of neural events necessary for a specific neuronal state to become consciously experienced. The current state of the art still does not meet this objective but rather consists of highly speculative theories based on correlates of consciousness and an ever-growing list of knowledge gaps. The current state of the art is defined by the limitations of past stimulation techniques and the emphasis on the observational approach. However, looking at the current stimulation technologies that are becoming more accurate, it is time to consider an alternative approach to studying consciousness, which builds on the methodology of causal explanations via causal alterations. The aim of this methodology is to move beyond the correlates of consciousness and focus directly on the mechanisms of consciousness with the help of the currently focused brain stimulation techniques, such as geodesic transcranial electric neuromodulation. This approach not only overcomes the limitations of the correlational methodology but will also become another firm step in the following science of consciousness.

Revealing robust neural correlates of conscious and unconscious visual processing: activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses

Our ability to consciously perceive information from the visual scene relies on a myriad of intrinsic neural mechanisms. Functional neuroimaging studies have sought to identify the neural correlates of conscious visual processing and to further dissociate from those pertaining to preconscious and unconscious visual processing. However, delineating what core brain regions are involved in eliciting a conscious percept remains a challenge, particularly regarding the role of prefrontal-parietal regions. We performed a systematic search of the literature that yielded a total of 54 functional neuroimaging studies. We conducted two quantitative meta-analyses using activation likelihood estimation to identify reliable patterns of activation engaged by i. conscious (n = 45 studies, comprising 704 participants) and ii. unconscious (n = 16 studies, comprising 262 participants) visual processing during various task performances. Results of the meta-analysis specific to conscious percepts quantitatively revealed reliable activations across a constellation of regions comprising the bilateral inferior frontal junction, intraparietal sulcus, dorsal anterior cingulate, angular gyrus, temporo-occipital cortex and anterior insula. Neurosynth reverse inference revealed conscious visual processing to be intertwined with cognitive terms related to attention, cognitive control and working memory. Results of the meta-analysis on unconscious percepts revealed consistent activations in the lateral occipital complex, intraparietal sulcus and precuneus. These findings highlight the notion that conscious visual processing readily engages higher-level regions including the inferior frontal junction and unconscious processing reliably recruits posterior regions, mainly the lateral occipital complex.

Bistability of prefrontal states gates access to consciousness

Access of sensory information to consciousness has been linked to the ignition of content-specific representations in association cortices. How does ignition interact with intrinsic cortical state fluctuations to give rise to conscious perception? We addressed this question in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) by combining multi-electrode recordings with a binocular rivalry (BR) paradigm inducing spontaneously driven changes in the content of consciousness, inferred from the reflexive optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) pattern. We find that fluctuations between low-frequency (LF, 1-9 Hz) and beta (∼20-40 Hz) local field potentials (LFPs) reflect competition between spontaneous updates and stability of conscious contents, respectively. Both LF and beta events were locally modulated. The phase of the former locked differentially to the competing populations just before a spontaneous transition while the latter synchronized the neuronal ensemble coding the consciously perceived content. These results suggest that prefrontal state fluctuations gate conscious perception by mediating internal states that facilitate perceptual update and stability.

Illusory object recognition is either perceptual or cognitive in origin depending on decision confidence

We occasionally misinterpret ambiguous sensory input or report a stimulus when none is presented. It is unknown whether such errors have a sensory origin and reflect true perceptual illusions, or whether they have a more cognitive origin (e.g., are due to guessing), or both. When participants performed an error-prone and challenging face/house discrimination task, multivariate electroencephalography (EEG) analyses revealed that during decision errors (e.g., mistaking a face for a house), sensory stages of visual information processing initially represent the presented stimulus category. Crucially however, when participants were confident in their erroneous decision, so when the illusion was strongest, this neural representation flipped later in time and reflected the incorrectly reported percept. This flip in neural pattern was absent for decisions that were made with low confidence. This work demonstrates that decision confidence arbitrates between perceptual decision errors, which reflect true illusions of perception, and cognitive decision errors, which do not.

Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation to the left anterior medial prefrontal cortex influences metacognitive efficiency

The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.

An adversarial collaboration protocol for testing contrasting predictions of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory

The relationship between conscious experience and brain activity has intrigued scientists and philosophers for centuries. In the last decades, several theories have suggested different accounts for these relationships. These theories have developed in parallel, with little to no cross-talk among them. To advance research on consciousness, we established an adversarial collaboration between proponents of two of the major theories in the field, Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory. Together, we devised and preregistered two experiments that test contrasting predictions of these theories concerning the location and timing of correlates of visual consciousness, which have been endorsed by the theories' proponents. Predicted outcomes should either support, refute, or challenge these theories. Six theory-impartial laboratories will follow the study protocol specified here, using three complementary methods: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Magneto-Electroencephalography (M-EEG), and intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG). The study protocol will include built-in replications, both between labs and within datasets. Through this ambitious undertaking, we hope to provide decisive evidence in favor or against the two theories and clarify the footprints of conscious visual perception in the human brain, while also providing an innovative model of large-scale, collaborative, and open science practice.

Conscious interpretation: A distinct aspect for the neural markers of the contents of consciousness

Progress in the science of consciousness depends on the experimental paradigms and varieties of contrastive analysis available to researchers. Here we highlight paradigms where the object is represented in consciousness as a set of its features but the interpretation of this set alternates in consciousness. We group experimental paradigms with this property under the label "conscious interpretation". We compare the paradigms studying conscious interpretation of the already consciously perceived objects with other types of experimental paradigms. We review previous and recent studies investigating this interpretative aspect of consciousness and propose future directions. We put forward the hypothesis that there are types of stimuli with a hierarchy of interpretations for which the rule applies: conscious experience is drawn towards higher-level interpretation and reverting back to the lower level of interpretation is impossible. We discuss how theories of consciousness might incorporate knowledge and constraints arising from the characteristics of conscious interpretation.

Effects of Natural Scene Inversion on Visual-evoked Brain Potentials and Pupillary Responses: A Matter of Effortful Processing of Unfamiliar Configurations

The inversion of a picture of a face hampers the accuracy and speed at which observers can perceptually process it. Event-related potentials and pupillary responses, successfully used as biomarkers of face inversion in the past, suggest that the perception of visual features, that are organized in an unfamiliar manner, recruits demanding additional processes. However, it remains unclear whether such inversion effects generalize beyond face stimuli and whether indeed more mental effort is needed to process inverted images. Here we aimed to study the effects of natural scene inversion on visual evoked potentials and pupil dilations. We simultaneously measured responses of 47 human participants to presentations of images showing upright or inverted natural scenes. For inverted scenes, we observed relatively stronger occipito-temporo-parietal N1 peak amplitudes and larger pupil dilations (on top of an initial orienting response) than for upright scenes. This study revealed neural and physiological markers of natural scene inversion that are in line with inversion effects of other stimulus types and demonstrates the robustness and generalizability of the phenomenon that unfamiliar configurations of visual content require increased processing effort.

The functions of consciousness in visual processing

Conscious experiences form a relatively diverse class of psychological phenomena, supported by a range of distinct neurobiological mechanisms. This diversity suggests that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species; a position I call functional pluralism. In this paper, I begin to tease out some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) visual processing. Consolidating research from across the cognitive sciences, I discuss semantic and spatiotemporal processing as specific points of comparison between the functional capabilities of the visual system in the presence and absence of conscious awareness. I argue that consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing; facilitating, among other things, (i) increased capacities for semantically processing informationally complex visual stimuli, (ii) increased spatiotemporal precision, and (iii) increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This sort of analysis should ultimately yield a plurality of functional markers that can be used to guide future research in the philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by popular theoretical frameworks like global workspace theory and information integration theory.

InFoRM (Indicate-Follow-Replay-Me): A novel method to measure perceptual multistability dynamics using continuous data tracking and validated estimates of visual introspection

Perceptual multistability, e.g. Binocular Rivalry, has been intensively used as a tool to study visual consciousness. Current methods to assess multistability do not capture all potentially occurring perceptual states, provide no estimate of introspection, and lack continuous, high-temporal resolution to resolve perceptual changes between states and within mixed perceptual states. We introduce InFoRM (Indicate-Follow-Replay-Me), a four-phase method that (1) trains a participant to self-generate estimates of perceptual introspection-maps that are (2) validated during a physical mimic task, (3) gathers perceptual multistability data, and (4) confirms their validity during a physical replay. 28 condition-blinded adults performed InFoRM while experiencing binocular rivalry evoked with orthogonal sinusoidal gratings. A 60 Hz joystick (3600 data samples/minute) was used to indicate continuously changes across six perceptual states within each 1 min trial. A polarized monitor system was used to present the stimuli dichoptically. Three contrast conditions were investigated: low vs low, high vs high, and low vs high. InFoRM replicates standard outcome measures, i.e. alternation rate, mean and relative proportions of perception, and distribution of exclusive percepts that are well fitted with gamma functions. Furthermore, InFoRM generates novel outcomes that deliver new insights in visual cognition via estimates of introspection maps, in ocular dominance via perceptual-state-specific dominance scores, in transitory dynamics between and within perceptual states, via techniques adopted from eye-tracking, and in rivalry-zone-size estimates utilizing InFoRM's ability to simulate piecemeal perception. The replay phase (physical replay of perceptual rivalry) confirmed good overall agreement (73% ±5 standard deviation). InFoRM can be applied to other multistable paradigms and can be used to study visual consciousness in typical and neuro-atypical populations.

Human visual consciousness involves large scale cortical and subcortical networks independent of task report and eye movement activity

The full neural circuits of conscious perception remain unknown. Using a visual perception task, we directly recorded a subcortical thalamic awareness potential (TAP). We also developed a unique paradigm to classify perceived versus not perceived stimuli using eye measurements to remove confounding signals related to reporting on conscious experiences. Using fMRI, we discovered three major brain networks driving conscious visual perception independent of report: first, increases in signal detection regions in visual, fusiform cortex, and frontal eye fields; and in arousal/salience networks involving midbrain, thalamus, nucleus accumbens, anterior cingulate, and anterior insula; second, increases in frontoparietal attention and executive control networks and in the cerebellum; finally, decreases in the default mode network. These results were largely maintained after excluding eye movement-based fMRI changes. Our findings provide evidence that the neurophysiology of consciousness is complex even without overt report, involving multiple cortical and subcortical networks overlapping in space and time.

Intrinsic brain dynamics in the Default Mode Network predict involuntary fluctuations of visual awareness

Brain activity is intrinsically organised into spatiotemporal patterns, but it is still not clear whether these intrinsic patterns are functional or epiphenomenal. Using a simultaneous fMRI-EEG implementation of a well-known bistable visual task, we showed that the latent transient states in the intrinsic EEG oscillations can predict upcoming involuntarily perceptual transitions. The critical state predicting a dominant perceptual transition was characterised by the phase coupling between the precuneus (PCU), a key node of the Default Mode Network (DMN), and the primary visual cortex (V1). The interaction between the lifetime of this state and the PCU- > V1 Granger-causal effect is correlated with the perceptual fluctuation rate. Our study suggests that the brain's endogenous dynamics are phenomenologically relevant, as they can elicit a diversion between potential visual processing pathways, while external stimuli remain the same. In this sense, the intrinsic DMN dynamics pre-empt the content of consciousness.

Task requirements affect the neural correlates of consciousness

In the search for the neural correlates of consciousness, it is often assumed that there is a stable set within the relevant sensory modality. Within the visual modality, the debate has centred upon whether frontal or occipital activations are the best predictors of perceptual awareness. Although not accepted by all as definitive evidence, no-report and decoding studies have indicated that occipital activity is the most consistently correlated with perceptual awareness whereas frontal activity might be closely related to aspects of cognition typically related to reports. However, perception is rarely just passive perception of something, but more or less always perception for something. That is, the task at hand for the perceiver may influence what is being perceived. This suggests an alternative view: that consciousness is not one specific 'function' that can be localized consistently to one area or event-related component and that the specific attributes of the neural correlates of consciousness depend on the task at hand. To investigate whether and how tasks may influence the neural correlates of consciousness, we here contrasted two tasks, a perceptual task and a conceptual task, using identical stimuli in both tasks. Using magnetoencephalography, we found that the perceptual task recruited more occipital resources than the conceptual task. Furthermore, we found that between the two conditions, the amount of frontal resources recruited differed between different gradations of perceptual awareness partly in an unexpected manner. These findings support a view of task affecting the neural correlates of consciousness.

Perceptual Awareness and Its Relationship with Consciousness: Hints from Perceptual Multistability

Many interesting theories of consciousness have been proposed, but so far, there is no “unified” theory capable of encompassing all aspects of this phenomenon. We are all aware of what it feels like to be conscious and what happens if there is an absence of consciousness. We are becoming more and more skilled in measuring consciousness states; nevertheless, we still “don’t get it” in its deeper essence. How does all the processed information converge from different brain areas and structures to a common unity, giving us this very private “feeling of being conscious”, despite the constantly changing flow of information between internal and external states? “Multistability” refers to a class of perceptual phenomena where subjective awareness spontaneously and continuously alternates between different percepts, although the objective stimuli do not change, supporting the idea that the brain “interprets” sensorial input in a “constructive” way. In this perspective paper, multistability and perceptual awareness are discussed as a methodological window for understanding the “local” states of consciousness, a privileged position from which it is possible to observe the brain dynamics and mechanisms producing the subjective phenomena of perceptual awareness in the very moment they are happening.

Decoding perceptual awareness across the brain with a no-report fMRI masking paradigm

Does perceptual awareness arise within the sensory regions of the brain or within higher-level regions (e.g., the frontal lobe)? To answer this question, researchers traditionally compare neural activity when observers report being aware versus being unaware of a stimulus. However, it is unclear whether the resulting activations are associated with the conscious perception of the stimulus or the post-perceptual processes associated with reporting that stimulus. To address this limitation, we used both report and no-report conditions in a visual masking paradigm while participants were scanned using functional MRI (fMRI). We found that the overall univariate response to visible stimuli in the frontal lobe was robust in the report condition but disappeared in the no-report condition. However, using multivariate patterns, we could still decode in both conditions whether a stimulus reached conscious awareness across the brain, including in the frontal lobe. These results help reconcile key discrepancies in the recent literature and provide a path forward for identifying the neural mechanisms associated with perceptual awareness.

Building a decoder of perceptual decisions from microsaccades and pupil size

Many studies have reported neural correlates of visual awareness across several brain regions, including the sensory, parietal, and frontal areas. In most of these studies, participants were instructed to explicitly report their perceptual experience through a button press or verbal report. It is conceivable, however, that explicit reporting itself may trigger specific neural responses that can confound the direct examination of the neural correlates of visual awareness. This suggests the need to assess visual awareness without explicit reporting. One way to achieve this is to develop a technique to predict the visual awareness of participants based on their peripheral responses. Here, we used eye movements and pupil sizes to decode trial-by-trial changes in the awareness of a stimulus whose visibility was deteriorated due to adaptation-induced blindness (AIB). In the experiment, participants judged whether they perceived a target stimulus and rated the confidence they had in their perceptual judgment, while their eye movements and pupil sizes were recorded. We found that not only perceptual decision but also perceptual confidence can be separately decoded from the eye movement and pupil size. We discuss the potential of this technique with regard to assessing visual awareness in future neuroimaging experiments.

A Systematic Review of Individual Differences in Perception, Action, and Decision Making: Implications for Dance Education

This systematic bibliometric review summarizes recent neurocognitive research highlighting inter-individual differences in perception, action, and decision making that may have implications for dance education. First, the relevance of individual differences in cognitive functioning for dance education is illustrated by describing how a person's preferred reliance on certain perceptual, motor, or (meta) cognitive skills may be exploited in dance training. Subsequently, we describe the findings of a literature search conducted to identify cognitive neuroscientific publications between 2010 and 2021 that highlight individual differences in cognitive functions that were also found to be supported by structural or functional-connectivity differences in the central nervous system. To cluster the findings of the literature search, we propose a simplified, six-category information processing model. Finally, for each model category, we summarize recent representative findings on salient individual differences and tentatively formulate testable implications for dance education practice with regard to pedagogical and curricula adaptations. Finally, the review also delineates an agenda for lines of research of which the results hopefully will assist dance instructors in the future.

The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?

In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms.

Neural and computational processes of accelerated perceptual awareness and decisions: A 7T fMRI study

Rapidly detecting salient information in our environments is critical for survival. Visual processing in subcortical areas like the pulvinar and amygdala has been shown to facilitate unconscious processing of salient stimuli. It is unknown, however, if and how these areas might interact with cortical regions to facilitate faster conscious perception of salient stimuli. Here we investigated these neural processes using 7T functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in concert with computational modelling while participants (n = 33) engaged in a breaking continuous flash suppression paradigm (bCFS) in which fearful and neutral faces are initially suppressed from conscious perception but then eventually ‘breakthrough’ into awareness. Participants reported faster breakthrough times for fearful faces compared with neutral faces. Drift‐diffusion modelling suggested that perceptual evidence was accumulated at a faster rate for fearful faces compared with neutral faces. For both neutral and fearful faces, faster response times were associated with greater activity in the amygdala (specifically within its subregions, including superficial, basolateral and amygdalo‐striatal transition area) and the insula. Faster rates of evidence accumulation coincided with greater activity in frontoparietal regions and occipital lobe, as well as the amygdala. A lower decision‐boundary correlated with activity in the insula and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), but not with the amygdala. Overall, our findings suggest that hastened perceptual awareness of salient stimuli recruits the amygdala and, more specifically, is driven by accelerated evidence accumulation in fronto‐parietal and visual areas. In sum, we have mapped distinct neural computations that accelerate perceptual awareness of visually suppressed faces.

Is Higher-Order Misrepresentation Empirically Plausible? An Argument From Corruption

I present an empirically based argument for the plausibility of misrepresentation as posited by some higher-order theories of consciousness. The argument relies on the assumption that conscious states are generated by processes in the brain. The underlying idea is that if the brain generates conscious states then misrepresentation may occur. The reason for this is that brain states can be corrupted and, accordingly, a conscious state that is at least partly caused by a corrupted brain state may be a misrepresentation. Our body of knowledge from cognitive and behavioral neuroscience lends support to the idea that corruption of neural states is both possible and relatively frequent. If this is the case, I argue, it is plausible that occasionally such corruption may result in misrepresentation. I support this claim by arguing that the most prevalent theoretical alternative to the occurrence of misrepresentation—the so-called no-consciousness reply—seems less supported by our current knowledge in the domain of consciousness and cognition. This way of arguing for misrepresentation is different from other empirically based arguments in the debate because it is a meta-level argument resting on a general premise that most participants in the debate can accept.

Decoding internally generated transitions of conscious contents in the prefrontal cortex without subjective reports

A major debate about the neural correlates of conscious perception concerns its cortical organization, namely, whether it includes the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which mediates executive functions, or it is constrained within posterior cortices. It has been suggested that PFC activity during paradigms investigating conscious perception is conflated with post-perceptual processes associated with reporting the contents of consciousness or feedforward signals originating from exogenous stimulus manipulations and relayed via posterior cortical areas. We addressed this debate by simultaneously probing neuronal populations in the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta) PFC during a no-report paradigm, capable of instigating internally generated transitions in conscious perception, without changes in visual stimulation. We find that feature-selective prefrontal neurons are modulated concomitantly with subjective perception and perceptual suppression of their preferred stimulus during both externally induced and internally generated changes in conscious perception. Importantly, this enables reliable single-trial, population decoding of conscious contents. Control experiments confirm significant decoding of stimulus contents, even when oculomotor responses, used for inferring perception, are suppressed. These findings suggest that internally generated changes in the contents of conscious visual perception are reliably reflected within the activity of prefrontal populations in the absence of volitional reports or changes in sensory input.

The role of the prefrontal cortex in conscious perception is debated because of its involvement in task relevant behaviour, such as subjective perceptual reports. Here, the authors show that prefrontal activity in rhesus macaques correlates with subjective perception and the contents of consciousness can be decoded from prefrontal population activity even without reports.

Indicators and criteria of consciousness: ethical implications for the care of behaviourally unresponsive patients

BACKGROUND

Assessing consciousness in other subjects, particularly in non-verbal and behaviourally disabled subjects (e.g., patients with disorders of consciousness), is notoriously challenging but increasingly urgent. The high rate of misdiagnosis among disorders of consciousness raises the need for new perspectives in order to inspire new technical and clinical approaches.

MAIN BODY

We take as a starting point a recently introduced list of operational indicators of consciousness that facilitates its recognition in challenging cases like non-human animals and Artificial Intelligence to explore their relevance to disorders of consciousness and their potential ethical impact on the diagnosis and healthcare of relevant patients. Indicators of consciousness mean particular capacities that can be deduced from observing the behaviour or cognitive performance of the subject in question (or from neural correlates of such performance) and that do not define a hard threshold in deciding about the presence of consciousness, but can be used to infer a graded measure based on the consistency amongst the different indicators. The indicators of consciousness under consideration offer a potential useful strategy for identifying and assessing residual consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness, setting the theoretical stage for an operationalization and quantification of relevant brain activity.

CONCLUSIONS

Our heuristic analysis supports the conclusion that the application of the identified indicators of consciousness to its disorders will likely inspire new strategies for assessing three very urgent issues: the misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness; the need for a gold standard in detecting consciousness and diagnosing its disorders; and the need for a refined taxonomy of disorders of consciousness.

Decoding rapidly presented visual stimuli from prefrontal ensembles without report nor post-perceptual processing

The role of the primate prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception is debated. The global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness predicts that PFC neurons should contain a detailed code of the current conscious contents. Previous research showed that PFC is indeed activated in paradigms of conscious visual perception, including no-report paradigms where no voluntary behavioral report of the percept is given, thus avoiding a conflation of signals related to visual consciousness with signals related to the report. Still, it has been argued that prefrontal modulation could reflect post-perceptual processes that may be present even in the absence of report, such as thinking about the perceived stimulus, therefore reflecting a consequence rather than a direct correlate of conscious experience. Here, we investigate these issues by recording neuronal ensemble activity from the macaque ventrolateral PFC during briefly presented visual stimuli, either in isolated trials in which stimuli were clearly perceived or in sequences of rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) in which perception and post-perceptual processing were challenged. We report that the identity of each stimulus could be decoded from PFC population activity even in the RSVP condition. The first visual signals could be detected at 60 ms after stimulus onset and information was maximal at 150 ms. However, in the RSVP condition, 200 ms after the onset of a stimulus, the decoding accuracy quickly dropped to chance level and the next stimulus started to be decodable. Interestingly, decoding in the ventrolateral PFC was stronger compared to posterior parietal cortex for both isolated and RSVP stimuli. These results indicate that neuronal populations in the macaque PFC reliably encode visual stimuli even under conditions that have been shown to challenge conscious perception and/or substantially reduce the probability of post-perceptual processing in humans. We discuss whether the observed activation reflects conscious access, phenomenal consciousness, or merely a preconscious bottom-up wave.

P3b Does Not Reflect Perceived Contrasts

It has been shown that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness per se but is instead more closely associated with postperceptual processing (Cohen et al., 2020). Here, we seek to investigate whether human participants’ attentional states are different in the report and the no-report conditions. This difference in attentional states, if exists, may lead to degraded consciousness of the stimuli in the no-report condition, and it therefore remains unknown whether the disappearance of P3b is because of a lack of reportability or degraded consciousness. Results of our experiment 1 showed that participants did experience degraded contents of consciousness in the no-report condition. However, results of experiment 2 showed that the degraded contents of consciousness did not influence the amplitude of P3b. These findings strengthen the claim that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness but is associated with postperceptual processing.

Thalamo-Prefrontal Connectivity Correlates With Early Command-Following After Severe Traumatic Brain Injury

Recovery of consciousness after traumatic brain injury (TBI) is heterogeneous and difficult to predict. Structures such as the thalamus and prefrontal cortex are thought to be important in facilitating consciousness. We sought to investigate whether the integrity of thalamo-prefrontal circuits, assessed via diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), was associated with the return of goal-directed behavior after severe TBI. We classified a cohort of severe TBI patients (N = 25, 20 males) into Early and Late/Never outcome groups based on their ability to follow commands within 30 days post-injury. We assessed connectivity between whole thalamus, and mediodorsal thalamus (MD), to prefrontal cortex (PFC) subregions including dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC), medial PFC (mPFC), anterior cingulate (ACC), and orbitofrontal (OFC) cortices. We found that the integrity of thalamic projections to PFC subregions (L OFC, L and R ACC, and R mPFC) was significantly associated with Early command-following. This association persisted when the analysis was restricted to prefrontal-mediodorsal (MD) thalamus connectivity. In contrast, dlPFC connectivity to thalamus was not significantly associated with command-following. Using the integrity of thalamo-prefrontal connections, we created a linear regression model that demonstrated 72% accuracy in predicting command-following after a leave-one-out analysis. Together, these data support a role for thalamo-prefrontal connectivity in the return of goal-directed behavior following TBI.