Prevalence and Risk Factors for H1N1 and H3N2 Influenza A Virus Infections in Minnesota Turkey Premises

Vaccination of Poultry Against Influenza

The complexity of influenza A virus (IAV) infections in avian hosts leads to equally complex scenarios for the vaccination of poultry. Vaccination against avian influenza strains can be used to prevent infections from sources with a single strain of IAV. It has been used as a part of outbreak control strategies as well as a way to maintain production for both low and high pathogenicity outbreaks. Unlike other viral pathogens of birds, avian influenza vaccination when used against highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, is tied to international trade and thus is not freely available for use without specific permission.

Detection of influenza A virus in aerosols of vaccinated and non-vaccinated pigs in a warm environment

The 2009 influenza pandemic, the variant H3N2v viruses in agricultural fairs and the zoonotic poultry H5N9 infections in China have highlighted the constant threat that influenza A viruses (IAV) present to people and animals. In this study we evaluated the effect of IAV vaccination on aerosol shedding in pigs housed in warm environmental conditions. Thirty-six, three-week old weaned pigs were obtained from an IAV negative herd and were randomly allocated to one of 4 groups: 1) a homologous vaccine group, 2) a heterologous multivalent vaccine group, 3) a heterologous monovalent group and, 4) a non-vaccinated group. After vaccination pigs were challenged with the triple reassortant A/Sw/IA/00239/04 H1N1 virus. Environmental temperature and relative humidity were recorded throughout the study. Nasal swabs, oral fluids and air samples were collected daily. All samples were tested by RRT-PCR and virus isolation was attempted on positive samples. Average temperature and relative humidity throughout the study were 27°C (80°F) and 53%, respectively. A significantly higher proportion of infected pigs was detected in the non-vaccinated than in the vaccinated group. Lower levels of nasal virus shedding were found in vaccinated groups compared to non-vaccinated group and IAV was not detected in air samples of any of the vaccinated groups. In contrast, positive air samples were detected in the non-vaccinated group at 1, 2 and 3 days post infection although the overall levels were considered low most likely due to the elevated environmental temperature. In conclusion, both the decrease in shedding and the increase in environmental temperature may have contributed to the inability to detect airborne IAV in vaccinated pigs.

Airborne Detection of H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Genome in Poultry Farms, France

In southwestern France, during the winter of 2016-2017, the rapid spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 outbreaks despite the implementation of routine control measures, raised the question about the potential role of airborne transmission in viral spread. As a first step to investigate the plausibility of that transmission, air samples were collected inside, outside and downwind from infected duck and chicken facilities. H5 avian influenza virus RNA was detected in all samples collected inside poultry houses, at external exhaust fans and at 5 m distance from poultry houses. For three of the five flocks studied, in the sample collected at 50-110 m distance, viral genomic RNA was detected. The measured viral air concentrations ranged between 4.3 and 6.4 log₁₀ RNA copies per m³, and their geometric mean decreased from external exhaust fans to the downwind measurement point. These findings are in accordance with the possibility of airborne transmission and question the procedures for outbreak depopulation.

Complete Genome Sequencing of Influenza A Viruses within Swine Farrow-to-Wean Farms Reveals the Emergence, Persistence, and Subsidence of Diverse Viral Genotypes

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) are endemic in swine and represent a public health risk. However, there is limited information on the genetic diversity of swine IAVs within farrow-to-wean farms, which is where most pigs are born. In this longitudinal study, we sampled 5 farrow-to-wean farms for a year and collected 4,190 individual nasal swabs from three distinct pig subpopulations. Of these, 207 (4.9%) samples tested PCR positive for IAV, and 124 IAVs were isolated. We sequenced the complete genomes of 123 IAV isolates and found 31 H1N1, 26 H1N2, 63 H3N2, and 3 mixed IAVs. Based on the IAV hemagglutinin, seven different influenza A viral groups (VGs) were identified. Most of the remaining IAV gene segments allowed us to differentiate the same VGs, although an additional viral group was identified for gene segment 3 (PA). Moreover, the codetection of more than one IAV VG was documented at different levels (farm, subpopulation, and individual pigs), highlighting the environment for potential IAV reassortment. Additionally, 3 out of 5 farms contained IAV isolates (n = 5) with gene segments from more than one VG, and 79% of all the IAVs sequenced contained a signature mutation (S31N) in the matrix gene that has been associated with resistance to the antiviral amantadine. Within farms, some IAVs were detected only once, while others were detected for 283 days. Our results illustrate the maintenance and subsidence of different IAVs within swine farrow-to-wean farms over time, demonstrating that pig subpopulation dynamics are important to better understand the diversity and epidemiology of swine IAVs.

IMPORTANCE On a global scale, swine are one of the main reservoir species for influenza A viruses (IAVs) and play a key role in the transmission of IAVs between species. Additionally, the 2009 IAV pandemics highlighted the role of pigs in the emergence of IAVs with pandemic potential. However, limited information is available regarding the diversity and distribution of swine IAVs on farrow-to-wean farms, where novel IAVs can emerge. In this study, we studied 5 swine farrow-to-wean farms for a year and characterized the genetic diversity of IAVs among three different pig subpopulations commonly housed on this type of farm. Using next-generation-sequencing technologies, we demonstrated the complex distribution and diversity of IAVs among the pig subpopulations studied. Our results demonstrated the dynamic evolution of IAVs within farrow-to-wean farms, which is crucial to improve health interventions to reduce the risk of transmission between pigs and from pigs to people.

Multiple amino acid substitutions involved in the virulence enhancement of an H3N2 avian influenza A virus isolated from wild waterfowl in mice

Frequent emergence of low pathogenic avian influenza H3N2 viruses in the wild birds has caused concern for human health. Here, we generated mouse-adapted strains of a wild waterfowl-origin low pathogenic avian influenza H3N2 virus to identify adaptive mutations that confer enhanced virulence in mammals. The mouse lethal doses (MLD₅₀) of the adapted strains were reduced >562-fold compared to the parental virus. Mouse-adapted strains displayed enhanced replication in vitro and in vivo, and acquired the ability to replicate in extrapulmonary tissues. These observations suggest that enhanced growth characteristics and modified cell tropism may increase the virulence of H3N2 AIVs in mice. Genomic analysis revealed mutations in the PB2 (E192K and D701N), PB1 (F269S, I475V, and L598P), HA (V242E), NA (G170R), and M1 (M192V) proteins. Our results suggest that these amino acid substitutions collaboratively enhance the ability of H3N2 avian influenza A virus to replicate and cause severe disease in mammals.

Historical and Recent Cases of H3 Influenza A Virus in Turkeys in Minnesota

Subtype H3 influenza A viruses (IAVs) are abundant in wild waterfowl and also infect humans, pigs, horses, dogs, and seals. In Minnesota, turkeys are important and frequent hosts of IAV from wild waterfowl and from pigs. Over 48 yr of surveillance history, 11 hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes of IAV from waterfowl, as well as two HA subtypes from swine, H1 and H3, have infected turkeys in Minnesota. However, there have only been two cases of avian-origin H3 IAV infections in turkeys during this 48-yr period. The first avian-origin IAV infection was detected in seven breeder and commercial flocks in 1982 and was caused by a mixed H3H4/N2 infection. In 2013, an avian-origin H3H9/N2 outbreak occurred in five flocks of turkeys between 15 and 56 wk of age. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA gene segment from the 2013 isolate indicated that the virus was related to a wild bird lineage H3 IAV. A meta-analysis of historical H3 infections in domesticated poultry demonstrated that avian-origin H3 infections have occurred in chickens and ducks but were rare in turkeys. H9N2 virus was subsequently selected during the egg cultivation of the 2013 H3H9/N2 mixed virus. A growth curve analysis suggested that passage 3 of A/Turkey/Minnesota/13-20710-2/2013(mixed) had a slightly lower replication rate than a similar avian-origin H3N2. The challenge studies indicated that the infectious dose of avian-origin H3N2 for turkey poults was greater than 10(6) 50% egg infective dose. Considered together, these data suggest that avian-origin H3 introductions to turkeys are rare events.

Wild bird surveillance for highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 in North America

It is unknown how the current Asian origin highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 viruses arrived, but these viruses are now poised to become endemic in North America. Wild birds harbor these viruses and have dispersed them at regional scales. What is unclear is how the viruses may be moving from the wild bird reservoir into poultry holdings. Active surveillance of live wild birds is likely the best way to determine the true distribution of these viruses. We also suggest that sampling be focused on regions with the greatest risk for poultry losses and attempt to define the mechanisms of transfer to enhance biosecurity. Responding to the recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in North America requires an efficient plan with clear objectives and potential management outcomes.

Airborne detection and quantification of swine influenza a virus in air samples collected inside, outside and downwind from swine barns

Airborne transmission of influenza A virus (IAV) in swine is speculated to be an important route of virus dissemination, but data are scarce. This study attempted to detect and quantify airborne IAV by virus isolation and RRT-PCR in air samples collected under field conditions. This was accomplished by collecting air samples from four acutely infected pig farms and locating air samplers inside the barns, at the external exhaust fans and downwind from the farms at distances up to 2.1 km. IAV was detected in air samples collected in 3 out of 4 farms included in the study. Isolation of IAV was possible from air samples collected inside the barn at two of the farms and in one farm from the exhausted air. Between 13% and 100% of samples collected inside the barns tested RRT-PCR positive with an average viral load of 3.20E+05 IAV RNA copies/m³ of air. Percentage of exhaust positive air samples also ranged between 13% and 100% with an average viral load of 1.79E+04 RNA copies/m³ of air. Influenza virus RNA was detected in air samples collected between 1.5 and 2.1 Km away from the farms with viral levels significantly lower at 4.65E+03 RNA copies/m³. H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 subtypes were detected in the air samples and the hemagglutinin gene sequences identified in the swine samples matched those in aerosols providing evidence that the viruses detected in the aerosols originated from the pigs in the farms under study. Overall our results indicate that pigs can be a source of IAV infectious aerosols and that these aerosols can be exhausted from pig barns and be transported downwind. The results from this study provide evidence of the risk of aerosol transmission in pigs under field conditions.