Why Are General Moral Values Poor Predictors of Concrete Moral Behavior in Everyday Life? A Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Study

Modular morals: Mapping the organization of the moral brain

Is morality the product of multiple domain-specific psychological mechanisms, or one domain-general mechanism? Previous research suggests that morality consists of a range of solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. This theory of 'morality as cooperation' suggests that there are (at least) seven specific moral domains: family values, group loyalty, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness and property rights. However, it is unclear how these types of morality are implemented at the neuroanatomical level. The possibilities are that morality is (1) the product of multiple distinct domain-specific adaptations for cooperation, (2) the product of a single domain-general adaptation which learns a range of moral rules, or (3) the product of some combination of domain-specific and domain-general adaptations. To distinguish between these possibilities, we first conducted an anatomical likelihood estimation meta-analysis of previous studies investigating the relationship between these seven moral domains and neuroanatomy. This meta-analysis provided evidence for a combination of specific and general adaptations. Next, we investigated the relationship between the seven types of morality - as measured by the Morality as Cooperation Questionnaire (Relevance) - and grey matter volume in a large neuroimaging (n = 607) sample. No associations between moral values and grey matter volume survived whole-brain exploratory testing. We conclude that whatever combination of mechanisms are responsible for morality, either they are not neuroanatomically localised, or else their localisation is not manifested in grey matter volume. Future research should employ phylogenetically informed a priori predictions, as well as alternative measures of morality and of brain function.

Digital interventions to support morality: A scoping review

BACKGROUND

Morality and moral reasoning develop over the course of life, but such development may encounter obstacles. Psycho-educational interventions could be designed to improve moral reasoning and attitude towards prosociality. In the last decades, many interventions employed digital technologies ranging from multicomponent online platforms to serious games and virtual reality, making use of interactivity and immersive properties that could make moral stimuli more engaging.

AIMS

This study aimed at reviewing the literature on digital interventions to support morality and moral reasoning, carried out with subjects of all age groups.

METHODS AND RESULTS

Two electronic databases were searched with a systematic approach, and retrieved publications were scanned by authors against inclusion criteria. Twenty-three articles were reviewed. In general, the literature describes encouraging results of digital interventions to support morality. Moreover, a huge variety of morality conceptualizations emerged across various contexts (e.g., professional, school and sports) as well as various outcome measurements (e.g., change in attitudes and change in behaviour).

CONCLUSIONS

Effectiveness of digital interventions may relate to immersive and interactive simulations in particular, in that they allow participants not only to learn about moral rules and principles but also to actively exercise their own morality to make decisions. Future research may build on the present scoping review to analyse specific types of interventions' effectiveness with a meta-analytical approach.

Moral foundations, moral emotions, and moral distress in NICU nurses

Background: Moral distress is common in neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) nurses. Purpose: The purpose of this study was to evaluate the relationships between NICU nurses' moral foundations, moral emotions, and moral distress. Research design and method: This is an observational cross-sectional self-report questionnaire study. Participants and research context: One hundred and forty-two (24%) of 585 Level 3-4 NICU nurses completed pen-and-paper self-report measures of moral foundations (harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity) (Moral Foundations Questionnaire-20), proneness to self-conscious moral emotions (guilt and shame) (modified Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2), and moral distress (futile care, compromised care, and untruthful care) (modified Revised Moral Distress Scale). Ethical considerations: Participation was voluntary and anonymous. The ethics committees of the participating hospitals approved the study protocol (HREC Reference: LNR/18/SCHN/316). Results: Non-parametric statistical analyses showed medium to large correlations between moral foundations and moral emotions. Moral foundations and moral emotions had trivial to small correlations with moral distress. Using a liberal p-value of <.10 for statistical significance because of the small sample size, harm (rs = 0.22) and fairness (rs = 0.16) predicted futile care, ingroup predicted compromised care (rs = 0.19) and untruthful care (rs = 0.15), and purity predicted untruthful care (rs = 0.15). Guilt-proneness predicted futile care (rs = 0.15). Shame-proneness did not predict moral distress. Conclusion: The correlations between moral foundations and moral emotions were significant. Moral foundations and guilt-proneness predicted one or more dimensions of moral distress. The smaller than expected effect sizes may have been owing to how moral foundations, moral emotions, and moral distress were conceptualized and measured, or to moral disengagement, including NICU nurses' possible reluctance to countenance aversive but morally warranted feelings of guilt and especially shame. Understanding the nature of these relationships may complement the efforts of NICU administrators, educators, counsellors, and nurses themselves to mitigate moral distress.

When Future Leads to a Moral Present: Future Self-Relatedness Predicts Moral Judgments and Behavior in Everyday Life

Future self-perceptions seem to promote far-sighted decisions in intertemporal choices. Previous work suggested that future self-relatedness, the extent to which we feel similar and connected to our future self, is associated with moral concerns. We aimed to extend these findings to everyday moral judgments and behavior using experience sampling methods. In addition, we assessed how moral foundation concerns mediate the relationship between future self-relatedness and moral behavior. Participants (N = 151) reported their state-levels of future self-relatedness, individualizing, and binding moral foundations and answered whether they performed a moral action five times a day for seven days. Within- and between-participants future self-relatedness predicted daily fluctuations in individualizing and binding moral foundations concerns. On the behavioral level, only within-participants future self-relatedness predicted individualizing moral actions with individualizing moral foundations mediating this effect. Our findings suggest that within- and between-person changes in future self-relatedness might be used to predict everyday moral concerns and behavior.

Moral foundations theory and the narrative self: towards an improved concept of moral selfhood for the empirical study of morality

Within the empirical study of moral decision making, people's morality is often identified by measuring general moral values through a questionnaire, such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire provided by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). However, the success of these moral values in predicting people's behaviour has been disappointing. The general and context-free manner in which such approaches measure moral values and people's moral identity seems crucial in this respect. Yet, little research has been done into the underlying notion of self. This article aims to fill this gap. Taking a phenomenological approach and focusing on MFT, we examine the concept of moral self that MFT assumes and present an improved concept of moral self for the empirical study of morality. First, we show that MFT adopts an essentialist concept of moral self, consisting of stable moral traits. Then, we argue that such a notion is unable to grasp the dynamical and context sensitive aspects of the moral self. We submit that Ricoeur's narrative notion of identity, a self that reinterprets itself in every decision situation through self-narrative, is a viable alternative since it is able to incorporate context sensitivity and change, while maintaining a persisting moral identity. Finally, we argue that this narrative concept of moral self implies measuring people's morality in a more exploratory fashion within a delineated context.