Evolutionary Game on Government Regulation and Green Supply Chain Decision-Making

Pricing Policies of Green Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns and Altruistic Preferences Based on Consumers' Environmental Awareness and Channel Preference

Taking into consideration fairness concerns and altruistic preferences of manufacturers, this paper aims to propose a green dual-channel supply chain that incorporates consumers' environmental awareness (CEA) and channel preference. The purpose of this work is to explore and further compare the optimal outcomes in a green dual-channel supply chain in three scenarios, which are the fairness-neutrality scenario (Model N), the manufacturer is concerned with fairness scenario (Model F), and the manufacturer has altruistic preference (Model A), respectively. The game-theoretical models with different fairness preferences, comparative, and numerical analyses are used to put forward the impacts of consumers' channel preference and CEA on pricing, profits, and utilities, and to identify the differences in decisional outcomes between the three models. The results indicate that CEA always contributes to developing the green market while adversely affecting common products. Moreover, consumers' channel preferences might enable the manufacturer and retailer to enhance profitability under certain conditions. The findings also reveal that manufacturer's fairness concerns can possibly increase the demand for green products but impair the overall performance of the supply chain in general. Moreover, while the manufacturer's altruistic preference benefits the retailer's profits, it has a detrimental effect on the performance of the green supply chain. The practical implications of this research come to promote green consumption and increasing consumer awareness of environmental protection are effective ways to develop a green supply chain. It is also important to note that in order to maintain the durability and stability of the sup-ply chain, the manufacturer must maintain a moderate level of fairness preference behaviors so that downstream retailers will remain enthusiastic about establishing long-term relationships.

Role of Enterprise Alliance in Carbon Emission Reduction Mechanism: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

This study constructs the enterprise alliance game party, designs the mechanism for which the alliance and the government are jointly responsible for enterprise carbon emission reduction work, and explores the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of the government, enterprises, and enterprise alliance under the policy of carbon tax and carbon trading with numerical simulations. The results show that: (1) the ESSs of the enterprise alliance are always to give technical support to enterprises; (2) the carbon trading price below the critical value can mobilize the enthusiasm of enterprises for honest emission reduction; (3) the carbon tax rate has a negative correlation with enterprise emission reduction behavior; (4) when the underreported carbon emissions of enterprises exceed the critical value, the enterprise will evolve into dishonest emission reduction. The high carbon emissions underreported by enterprises will mobilize the enthusiasm of the government to choose supervision. This study may be of certain reference significance to optimize the existing carbon emission reduction mechanism and achieve win-win cooperation between enterprises and government in the carbon trading market.

Pricing-decision analysis of green supply chain with two competitive manufacturers considering horizontal and vertical fairness concerns

A pricing-decision analysis is a critical aspect of supply chain management since it directly affects manufacturers' and retailers' profits. The members of a supply chain all want to be treated properly during the pricing process, which means that they pay attention to the fairness of the profit distribution. Additionally, consumers are increasingly gravitating to green products as their awareness of green consumption grows. Thus, incorporating consumers' green preferences into a supply chain, this paper investigates pricing decisions with two competitive manufacturers under horizontal and vertical fairness concerns and seeks the optimal degrees of product greenness, prices, profits, and utilities. The game-theoretical models with and without bidirectional fairness concerns are constructed and analyzed to identify the implications on pricing, profits, and utilities of competing manufacturers' bidirectional fairness concerns and consumers' green preferences. Then, we determine the decisional differences between the two designs using comparative analysis and numerical simulation. Finally, propositions, corollaries, and policy implications are derived. The results indicate that consumers' green preferences and competition between manufacturers contribute to increasing the optimal pricing and retailer's profit while harming manufacturers' utilities and the supply chain's profits under some conditions. The findings also demonstrate that horizontal and vertical fairness concerns generate different impacts on the product's greenness degree and pricing. Still, they are detrimental to manufacturers' utilities and supply chain profit while possessing negligible effects on retailer's profit.

A tripartite evolutionary game study on green governance in China's coating industry

As a polluting industry, the green transformation of coatings is highly concerned by the Chinese government. In order to explore the role of government in the process of green transformation of coating industry, this paper constructs a green governance evolutionary game model of "government-manufacturing companies-application companies," and the complex interaction mechanism among the three parties is studied. Then, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the asymptotic stability conditions and evolutionary stability strategies of the equilibrium point of the tripartite game in the three stages of green governance in the coating industry (traditional technology-green transformation-collaborative governance). Finally, the model was verified by numerical simulation, and the influence of the changes of subjective parameters on the evolutionary game was discussed. The results show that (1) the intensity of government governance is related to the frequency of spot checks and punishment coefficients, and the evolution tends to be balanced when the intensity of governance is moderate. (2) The evolutionary trend of the game's main players' strategy selection also depends on the government's punishment. There is greater probability of green transition of manufacturing companies under punishment. (3) The green subsidy coefficient and the green degree of the product also have a greater impact on the strategic choice of the game player.

Green Transformation of Anti-Epidemic Supplies in the Post-Pandemic Era: An Evolutionary Approach

Post-pandemic, the use of medical supplies, such as masks, for epidemic prevention remains high. The explosive growth of medical waste during the COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant environmental problems. To alleviate this, environment-friendly epidemic prevention measures should be developed, used, and promoted. However, contradictions exist between governments, production enterprises, and medical institutions regarding the green transformation of anti-epidemic supplies. Consequently, this study aimed to investigate how to effectively guide the green transformation. Concerning masks, a tripartite evolutionary game model, consisting of governments, mask enterprises, and medical institutions, was established for the supervision of mask production and use, boundary conditions of evolutionary stabilization strategies and government regulations were analyzed, and a dynamic system model was used for the simulation analysis. This analysis revealed that the only tripartite evolutionary stability strategy is for governments to deregulate mask production, enterprises to increase eco-friendly mask production, and medical institutions to use these masks. From the comprehensive analysis, a few important findings are obtained. First, government regulation can promote the green transformation process of anti-epidemic supplies. Government should realize the green transformation of anti-epidemic supplies immediately in order to avoid severe reputation damage. Second, external parameter changes can significantly impact the strategy selection process of all players. Interestingly, it is further found that the cost benefit for using environmentally friendly masks has a great influence on whether green transformation can be achieved. Consequently, the government should establish a favorable marketplace for, and promote the development of, inexpensive, high-quality, and effective environmentally friendly masks in order to achieve the ultimate goal of green transformation of anti-epidemic supplies in the post-pandemic era.

Construct and Priority Ranking of Factors Affecting Crowdfunding for Green Products

This article aims to target the key factors that could positively affect crowdfunding success for green products in order to promote crowdfunding efficiency and green supply chain management. Methods: Data were collected through expert interviews and questionnaires and then processed through analytic hierarchy process (AHP) analysis. Statistical tool: This study used Expert Choice as the software for AHP analysis. Sampling: There were 20 participants (20 effective) in pretesting and 30 (23 effective) in formal testing. Participants were followers of green products in Taiwan. Results: (1) Twenty-four factors were abstracted to form the final construct; (2) the 24 key factors could be divided into 2 hierarchies, with 5 primary factors and 19 secondary factors; (3) among the 5 primary factors, “green diversified context” was the most influential; (4) among the 19 secondary factors, “product material is safe and non-toxic” was the most important. Conclusions: Funders would be likely to finance green products on crowdfunding platforms if these products fit the 24 key factors in orders. Implications: This research contributes to product life cycle theory and crowdfunding theory and practically improves the sustainability of green products.

Could China Declare a “Coal Phase-Out”? An Evolutionary Game and Empirical Analysis Involving the Government, Enterprises, and the Public

There is a global move toward being “carbon neutral”. Reducing the use of coal to generate power has become an inevitable choice for many countries when transforming their energy structures. Many countries have proposed phasing out coal. China is a major energy producing and consuming country and intends to reach a carbon peak by 2030 and become carbon neutral by 2060. China has repeatedly emphasized coal reduction, but has not explicitly proposed phasing out coal, due to the influence of local governments, coal-related enterprises, and the public. This paper explores whether China could declare a “coal phase-out”, and the possible reasons for doing so, by constructing an evolutionary game model with two correlations. MATLAB was used to simulate the model results to determine the effectiveness of the fractal results of the model, and the entropy method was used to calculate the development level of “coal phase-out” related indicators in China and Germany. The results show that: (1) The government can phase out coal only when coal-related enterprises and the public can benefit from reducing coal production and consumption. In addition, these benefits are needed to ensure stable economic and social development without affecting people’s daily lives; (2) The development level of relevant indicators of “coal retreat” in China is lower than that in Germany. Based on these results, it is concluded that it is difficult for China to announce a “coal phase-out” at present. Faced with this reality, China should improve the efficiency of coal use, install carbon capture and storage facilities, vigorously develop renewable energy and reduce the share of coal in the energy system.

Behavior Strategy Analysis Based on the Multi-Stakeholder Game under the Plastic Straw Ban in China

Since 1 January 2021, China has banned nondegradable disposable straws in the catering industry. To promote the enforcement of the ban of plastic straws and improve the relationship between economic development and environmental protection, based on the evolutionary game method, this paper constructs the game model from the supply side and the demand side, respectively. Subsequently, through the dynamic equation, stable system evolution strategy is obtained. Furthermore, simulation is conducted to test the influence of the main parameters in the model on the evolution of system strategy. The results show that (1) the change of the government strategy mainly depends on its regulation costs and revenue, while the production strategy of a company is affected by the government and consumer strategies. (2) From the perspective of enterprise supply, government subsidies can promote technological innovation and develop new plastic straw substitutes. However, government penalties have little effect on violating enterprises. In addition, from the perspective of enterprise demand, with the collaboration of enterprises and consumers, it is easier for enterprises to carry out technological innovation. (3) Consumer acceptance of the substitutes for disposable plastic straws as well as online comments have a decisive influence on the enterprises’ selections for research and development (R&D) strategies.

Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game of Rumor-Affected Enterprises under Demand Disruption

Rumors regarding food, medicine, epidemic diseases, and public emergencies greatly impact consumers’ purchase intention, disrupt market demand, affect enterprises’ operating strategies, and eventually increase the risk of market chaos. Governments must play an active role with limited resources under the situation of rumor spreading and demand disruption to maintain stable and sustainable market development. To identify the optimal evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of both small and large enterprises when facing rumors, this paper investigates the following two choices of enterprises: reasonable and unreasonable pricing. The results reveal that government supervision priority should be set based on the rumor severity, collusion in markup and the endogeneity of the enterprises. From an exogenous perspective, rumor spreading induces enterprises to overcharge, and government supervision has the opposite effect. However, the demand disruption ratio is proven to motivate enterprises to implement reasonable pricing. The profit and loss ratio and homoplasy are two endogenous factors affecting enterprise decisions. Small enterprises are more likely to take advantage of public panic and overcharge, while large enterprises are inclined to choose reasonable pricing in consideration of their corporate image. In addition, the evidence indicates that the ESS of large firms has a stronger impact on small firms.

Government regulation and enterprise decision in China remanufacturing industry: evidence from evolutionary game theory

Currently, the large-scale industrial production has made mountains of scrapped products and inevitably exerts irreversible damage to the nature resource and environment. Under this real situation, remanufacturing industry is able to provide a new path for government and enterprises to deal with the scrapped products and find the new growth point of ecological economy. So, the problem that how to push forward the development of remanufacturing via the regulations of government has become the focus to the scholars and practitioners of enterprises. In this paper, the evolutionary game model was established in order to analyze the optimal strategies for both the government and the enterprises. Based on the obtained results from evolutionary game model, it shows that when the revenues gotten from supervision activities surpass the costs, government will supervise enterprises' production pattern positively. Meanwhile, if the profits earned by polluted production are higher than it in remanufacturing production, enterprises will keep their patter of production, although they may face the penalties of government. Then, a case study based on the long-term perspective was introduced in order to verify the rationality of the game model in math. The result of this paper shows that the regulation of government will exert the significant influences to firms' decision about remanufacturing. During the different periods of remanufacturing industry development, government regulations will make different influences.