Electrodermal responses to sources of dual-task interference

Inter-Individual Differences in Executive Functions Predict Multitasking Performance - Implications for the Central Attentional Bottleneck

Human multitasking suffers from a central attentional bottleneck preventing parallel performance of central mental operations, leading to profound deferments in task performance. While previous research assumed that the deferment is caused by a mere waiting time (refractory period), we show that the bottleneck requires executive functions (EF; active scheduling account) accounting for a profound part of the deferment. Three participant groups with EF impairments (dyslexics, highly neurotics, deprived smokers) showed worse multitasking performance than respective control groups. Three further groups with EF improvements (video-gamers, bilinguals, coffee consumers) showed improved multitasking. Finally, three groups performed a dual-task and different measures of EF (reading span, rotation span, symmetry span) and showed significant correlations between multitasking performance and working memory capacity. Demands on EF during multitasking may cause more errors, mental fatigue and stress, with parts of the population being considerably more prone to this.

Reward sensitivity and electrodermal responses to actions and outcomes in a go/no-go task

Skin conductance response (SCR) is used in psychophysiological research to measure the reactions of the autonomic nervous system to reward and punishment. While there is consistent evidence that SCR increases to both aversive and appetitive stimuli, it remains unclear whether SCR simply represents a general index of arousal to motivationally significant outcomes or may also differentiate action or inhibition of action that lead to such outcomes. Furthermore, individual differences in trait sensitivity to reward and punishment can influence physiological arousal during approach and avoidance behaviors. Yet, their inter-relationships have not been examined. To address these gaps, we employed a reward go/no-go task with ⅔ go and ⅓ no-go trials and an individually titrated go response window. Correct go and no-go responses were rewarded while incorrect responses were penalized. We examined whether SCR varied with outcome (win vs. loss), action (go vs. no-go), and individual differences in reward sensitivity (SR) and sex. The results showed greater SCRs to loss vs. win, to go vs. no-go success, and to go success in positive correlation with SR. Further, SCR mediated the relationship between SR and go success rate. In sex differences, men exhibited greater SCR which was more predictive of go success rate relative to women. In contrast, SCR was more predictive of no-go success rate in women. Thus, SCR varies according to behavioral contingency, outcome, sex, and reward sensitivity. These findings add to the literature by characterizing the individual and behavioral factors that may influence physiological arousal in response to salient events.

Autonomic Nervous System Reactivity During Speech Repetition Tasks: Heart Rate Variability and Skin Conductance

Cognitive and emotional challenges may elicit a physiological stress response that can include arousal of the sympathetic nervous system (fight or flight response) and withdrawal of the parasympathetic nervous system (responsible for recovery and rest). This article reviews studies that have used measures of electrodermal activity (skin conductance) and heart rate variability (HRV) to index sympathetic and parasympathetic activity during auditory tasks. In addition, the authors present results from a new study with normal-hearing listeners examining the effects of speaking rate on changes in skin conductance and high-frequency HRV (HF-HRV). Sentence repetition accuracy for normal and fast speaking rates was measured in noise using signal to noise ratios that were adjusted to approximate 80% accuracy (+3 dB fast rate; 0 dB normal rate) while monitoring skin conductance and HF-HRV activity. A significant increase in skin conductance level (reflecting sympathetic nervous system arousal) and a decrease in HF-HRV (reflecting parasympathetic nervous system withdrawal) were observed with an increase in speaking rate indicating sensitivity of both measures to increased task demand. Changes in psychophysiological reactivity with increased auditory task demand may reflect differences in listening effort, but other person-related factors such as motivation and stress may also play a role. Further research is needed to understand how psychophysiological activity during listening tasks is influenced by the acoustic characteristics of stimuli, task demands, and by the characteristics and emotional responses of the individual.

Are participants' reports of their own reaction times reliable? Re-examining introspective limitations in active and passive dual-task paradigms

There is a known introspective limitation in the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm - people underestimate the dual-task costs on their second reaction time. The prevailing explanation for this is that conscious awareness of the second stimulus is delayed in time until the first task has been centrally processed. Here, we examined this effect in more detail, by comparing reaction time estimates after processing a PRP task, and after passively experiencing 'replays' of PRP trials. Even when participants had no dual-task processing demands, they did not accurately report the reaction time intervals using a visual analogue scale (the original reporting method of most introspective PRP experiments), but they did when placing markers that represent each event on a timeline. Thus, the timeline seems to better represent participants' introspective representation of the trial. Importantly, introspection limitations still existed when participants processed the PRP task and then recreated it on a timeline.

The paradox of fiction: Emotional response toward fiction and the modulatory role of self-relevance

For over forty years, philosophers have struggled with the "paradox of fiction", which is the issue of how we can get emotionally involved with fictional characters and events. The few neuroscientific studies investigating the distinction between the processing of real and fictional entities have evidenced that midline cortical structures and lateral fronto-parietal regions are more engaged for real and fictional entities, respectively. Interestingly, the former network is engaged in autobiographical memory retrieval and self-reference, processes that are known to boost emotional reactivity, while the latter underpins emotion regulation. Thus, a possible modulation of the emotional response according to the nature (real or fictional) of the stimulus is conceivable. To test this hypothesis, we presented short emotional (negative and positive) and neutral video as fictional or real. For negative material, we found that subjective emotional experience, but not physiological arousal measured by electrodermal activity, was reduced in the fictional condition. Moreover, the amount of personal memories linked to the scenes counteracted this effect boosting the subjective emotional response. On the contrary, personal memories elicited by the scenes, but not fiction, modulate the emotional response for positive material. These results suggest that when a stimulus triggers a personal memory, the emotional response is less prone to be modulated by contextual factors, and suggest that personal engagement could be responsible for emotional reaction toward fiction. We discuss these results in the emotion regulation framework and underline their implications in informing theoretical accounts of emotion in the neuroscientific domain and the philosophical debate on the paradox of emotional response to fiction.

On the importance of Task 1 and error performance measures in PRP dual-task studies

The psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm is a dominant research tool in the literature on dual-task performance. In this paradigm a first and second component task (i.e., Task 1 and Task 2) are presented with variable stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) and priority to perform Task 1. The main indicator of dual-task impairment in PRP situations is an increasing Task 2-RT with decreasing SOAs. This impairment is typically explained with some task components being processed strictly sequentially in the context of the prominent central bottleneck theory. This assumption could implicitly suggest that processes of Task 1 are unaffected by Task 2 and bottleneck processing, i.e., decreasing SOAs do not increase reaction times (RTs) and error rates of the first task. The aim of the present review is to assess whether PRP dual-task studies included both RT and error data presentations and statistical analyses and whether studies including both data types (i.e., RTs and error rates) show data consistent with this assumption (i.e., decreasing SOAs and unaffected RTs and/or error rates in Task 1). This review demonstrates that, in contrast to RT presentations and analyses, error data is underrepresented in a substantial number of studies. Furthermore, a substantial number of studies with RT and error data showed a statistically significant impairment of Task 1 performance with decreasing SOA. Thus, these studies produced data that is not primarily consistent with the strong assumption that processes of Task 1 are unaffected by Task 2 and bottleneck processing in the context of PRP dual-task situations; this calls for a more careful report and analysis of Task 1 performance in PRP studies and for a more careful consideration of theories proposing additions to the bottleneck assumption, which are sufficiently general to explain Task 1 and Task 2 effects.

Introspective reports of reaction times in dual-tasks reflect experienced difficulty rather than timing of cognitive processes

Reports of introspective reaction times (iRTs) have been used to investigate conscious awareness during dual-task situations. Previous studies showed that dual-task costs in RTs (the psychological refractory period, PRP, effect) are not reflected in participants' introspective reports. This finding has been attributed to conscious awareness of Task 2 being delayed while Task 1 is centrally processed. Here, we test this Temporal model and compare it to an alternative that assumes participants base their iRTs on experienced difficulty. We collected iRTs and difficulty estimates after each trial of a PRP paradigm in which the perceptual difficulty of either Task 2 (Experiment 1) or Task 1 (Experiment 2) was manipulated. Our results largely support the difficulty-based account, suggesting that in a dual-task situation, iRTs do not reflect timing of cognitive processes but are strongly influenced by the experience of difficulty.