Temporal windows of unconscious processing cannot easily be disrupted

Conscious perception is preceded by long periods of unconscious processing. These periods are crucial for analyzing temporal information and for solving the many ill-posed problems of vision. An important question is what starts and ends these windows and how they may be interrupted. Most experimental paradigms do not offer the methodology required for such investigation. Here, we used the sequential metacontrast paradigm, in which two streams of lines, expanding from the center to the periphery, are presented, and participants are asked to attend to one of the motion streams. If several lines in the attended motion stream are offset, the offsets are known to integrate mandatorily and unconsciously, even if separated by up to 450 ms. Using this paradigm, we here found that external visual objects, such as an annulus, presented during the motion stream, do not disrupt mandatory temporal integration. Thus, if a window is started once, it appears to remain open even in the presence of disruptions that are known to interrupt visual processes normally. Further, we found that interrupting the motion stream with a gap disrupts temporal integration but does not terminate the overall unconscious processing window. Thus, while temporal integration is key to unconscious processing, not all stimuli in the same processing window are integrated together. These results strengthen the case for unconscious processing taking place in windows of sensemaking, during which temporal integration occurs in a flexible and perceptually meaningful manner.

Weak correlations between visual abilities in healthy older adults, despite long-term performance stability

Using batteries of visual tests, most studies have found that there are only weak correlations between the performance levels of the tests. Factor analysis has confirmed these results. This means that a participant excelling in one test may rank low in another test. Hence, there is very little evidence for a common factor in vision. In visual aging research, cross-sectional studies have repeatedly found that healthy older adults' performance is strongly deteriorated in most visual tests compared to young adults. However, also within the healthy older population, there is no evidence for a visual common factor. To investigate whether the weak between-tests correlations are due to fluctuations in individual performance throughout time, we conducted a longitudinal study. Healthy older adults performed a battery of eight visual tests, with two re-tests after approximately four and seven years. Pearson's, Spearman's and intraclass correlations of most visual tests were significant across the three testing, indicating that the tests are reliable and individual differences are stable across years. Yet, we found low between-tests correlations at each visit, which is consistent with previous studies finding no evidence for a visual common factor. Our results exclude the possibility that the weak correlations between tests are due to high within-individual variance across time.

Pre-stimulus alpha activity modulates long-lasting unconscious feature integration

Pre-stimulus alpha (α) activity can influence perception of shortly presented, low-contrast stimuli. The underlying mechanisms are often thought to affect perception exactly at the time of presentation. In addition, it is suggested that α cycles determine temporal windows of integration. However, in everyday situations, stimuli are usually presented for periods longer than ∼100 ms and perception is often an integration of information across space and time. Moving objects are just one example. Hence, the question is whether α activity plays a role also in temporal integration, especially when stimuli are integrated over several α cycles. Using electroencephalography (EEG), we investigated the relationship between pre-stimulus brain activity and long-lasting integration in the sequential metacontrast paradigm (SQM), where two opposite vernier offsets, embedded in a stream of lines, are unconsciously integrated into a single percept. We show that increases in α power, even 300 ms before the stimulus, affected the probability of reporting the first offset, shown at the very beginning of the SQM. This effect was mediated by the systematic slowing of the α rhythm that followed the peak in α power. No phase effects were found. Together, our results demonstrate a cascade of neural changes, following spontaneous bursts of α activity and extending beyond a single moment, which influences the sensory representation of visual features for hundreds of milliseconds. Crucially, as feature integration in the SQM occurs before a conscious percept is elicited, this also provides evidence that α activity is linked to mechanisms regulating unconscious processing.

Processing load, and not stimulus evidence, determines the duration of unconscious visual feature integration

Integration across space and time is essential for the analysis of motion, low contrast, and many more stimuli. A crucial question is what determines the duration of integration. Based on classical models of decision-making, one might expect that integration terminates as soon as sufficient evidence about a stimulus is accumulated and a threshold is crossed. However, there is very little research on this question as most experimental paradigms cannot monitor processing following stimulus presentation. In particular, it is difficult to determine when processing terminates. Here, using the sequential metacontrast paradigm (SQM), in which information is mandatorily integrated along motion trajectories, we show that the processing load determines the extent of integration but that evidence accumulation does not. Further, the extent of integration is determined by absolute time instead of the number of elements presented. These results have important implications for understanding the time course and mechanisms of temporal integration.

Do we really measure what we think we are measuring?

Tests used in the empirical sciences are often (implicitly) assumed to be representative of a given research question in the sense that similar tests should lead to similar results. Here, we show that this assumption is not always valid. We illustrate our argument with the example of resting-state electroencephalogram (EEG). We used multiple analysis methods, contrary to typical EEG studies where one analysis method is used. We found, first, that many EEG features correlated significantly with cognitive tasks. However, these EEG features correlated weakly with each other. Similarly, in a second analysis, we found that many EEG features were significantly different in older compared to younger participants. When we compared these EEG features pairwise, we did not find strong correlations. In addition, EEG features predicted cognitive tasks poorly as shown by cross-validated regression analysis. We discuss several explanations of these results.

Intact and deficient contextual processing in schizophrenia patients

Schizophrenia patients are known to have deficits in contextual vision. However, results are often very mixed. In some paradigms, patients do not take the context into account and, hence, perform more veridically than healthy controls. In other paradigms, context deteriorates performance much more strongly in patients compared to healthy controls. These mixed results may be explained by differences in the paradigms as well as by small or biased samples, given the large heterogeneity of patients' deficits. Here, we show that mixed results may also come from idiosyncrasies of the stimuli used because in variants of the same visual paradigm, tested with the same participants, we found intact and deficient processing.

The EEG multiverse of schizophrenia

Research on schizophrenia typically focuses on one paradigm for which clear-cut differences between patients and controls are established. Great efforts are made to understand the underlying genetical, neurophysiological, and cognitive mechanisms, which eventually may explain the clinical outcome. One tacit assumption of these "deep rooting" approaches is that paradigms tap into common and representative aspects of the disorder. Here, we analyzed the resting-state electroencephalogram (EEG) of 121 schizophrenia patients and 75 controls. Using multiple signal processing methods, we extracted 194 EEG features. Sixty-nine out of the 194 EEG features showed a significant difference between patients and controls, indicating that these features detect an important aspect of schizophrenia. Surprisingly, the correlations between these features were very low. We discuss several explanations to our results and propose that complementing "deep" with "shallow" rooting approaches might help in understanding the underlying mechanisms of the disorder.

No Common Factor Underlying Decline of Visual Abilities in Mild Cognitive Impairment

INTRODUCTION

Recent work has shown an association between cognitive and visual impairments and two main theories were advanced, namely the sensory deprivation and the common cause theories. Most studies considered only basic visual functions such as visual acuity or visual field size and evaluated the association with dementia.

OBJECTIVES

To reconcile between these theories and to test the link between visual and cognitive decline in mildly cognitive impaired people.

METHODS

We employed a battery of 19 visual tasks on 39 older adults with mild cognitive impairment and 91 without any evidence of cognitive decline, as measured by the Montreal Cognitive Assessment.

RESULTS

Our results show a strong association between visual impairment and mild cognitive impairment. In agreement with previous results with younger and healthy older adults, we found also only weak correlations between most tests in older adults with mild cognitive impairment.

CONCLUSION

Our results suggest that visual and cognitive abilities decline simultaneously, but they do so independently across visual and cognitive functions and across participants.

The Irreducibility of Vision: Gestalt, Crowding and the Fundamentals of Vision

What is fundamental in vision has been discussed for millennia. For philosophical realists and the physiological approach to vision, the objects of the outer world are truly given, and failures to perceive objects properly, such as in illusions, are just sporadic misperceptions. The goal is to replace the subjectivity of the mind by careful physiological analyses. Continental philosophy and the Gestaltists are rather skeptical or ignorant about external objects. The percepts themselves are their starting point, because it is hard to deny the truth of one own′s percepts. I will show that, whereas both approaches can well explain many visual phenomena with classic visual stimuli, they both have trouble when stimuli become slightly more complex. I suggest that these failures have a deeper conceptual reason, namely that their foundations (objects, percepts) do not hold true. I propose that only physical states exist in a mind independent manner and that everyday objects, such as bottles and trees, are perceived in a mind-dependent way. The fundamental processing units to process objects are extended windows of unconscious processing, followed by short, discrete conscious percepts.

Embedded figures in schizophrenia: A main deficit but no specificity

Visual deficits are core deficits of schizophrenia. Classically, deficits are determined with demanding psychophysical tasks requiring fine-grained spatial or temporal resolution. Less is known about holistic processing. Here, we employed the Leuven Embedded Figures Test (L-EFT) measuring classic aspects of Gestalt processing. A target shape is embedded in a context and observers have to detect as quickly as possible in which display the target is embedded. Targets vary in closure, symmetry, complexity, and good continuation. In all conditions, schizophrenia patients had longer RTs compared to controls and depressive patients and to a lesser extent compared to their siblings. There was no interaction suggesting that, once the main deficit of schizophrenia patients is discarded, there are no further deficits in Gestalt perception between the groups. This result is in line with a growing line of research showing that when schizophrenia patients are given sufficient time to accomplish the task, they perform as well as controls.

First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument

We recently put forward an argument, the Unfolding Argument (UA), that integrated information theory (IIT) and other causal structure theories are either already falsified or unfalsifiable, which provoked significant criticism. It seems that we and the critics agree that the main question in this debate is whether first-person experience, independent of third-person data, is a sufficient foundation for theories of consciousness. Here, we argue that pure first-person experience cannot be a scientific foundation for IIT because science relies on taking measurements, and pure first-person experience is not measurable except through reports, brain activity, and the relationship between them. We also argue that pure first-person experience cannot be taken as ground truth because science is about backing up theories with data, not about asserting that we have ground truth independent of data. Lastly, we explain why no experiment based on third-person data can test IIT as a theory of consciousness. IIT may be a good theory of something, but not of consciousness. We conclude by exposing a deeper reason for the above conclusions: IIT's consciousness is by construction fully dissociated from any measurable thing and, for this reason, IIT implies that both the level and content of consciousness are epiphenomenal, with no causal power. IIT and other causal structure theories end up in a form of dissociative epiphenomenalism, in which we cannot even trust reports about first-person experiences. But reports about first-person experiences are taken as ground truth and the foundation for IIT's axioms. Therefore, accepting IIT leads to rejecting its own axioms. We also respond to several other criticisms against the UA.

Information Integration and Information Storage in Retinotopic and Non-Retinotopic Sensory Memory

The first stage of the Atkinson–Shiffrin model of human memory is a sensory memory (SM). The visual component of the SM was shown to operate within a retinotopic reference frame. However, a retinotopic SM (rSM) is unable to account for vision under natural viewing conditions because, for example, motion information needs to be analyzed across space and time. For this reason, the SM store of the Atkinson–Shiffrin model has been extended to include a non-retinotopic component (nrSM). In this paper, we analyze findings from two experimental paradigms and show drastically different properties of rSM and nrSM. We show that nrSM involves complex processes such as motion-based reference frames and Gestalt grouping, which establish object identities across space and time. We also describe a quantitative model for nrSM and show drastic differences between the spatio-temporal properties of rSM and nrSM. Since the reference-frame of the latter is non-retinotopic and motion-stream based, we suggest that the spatiotemporal properties of the nrSM are in accordance with the spatiotemporal properties of the motion system. Overall, these findings indicate that, unlike the traditional rSM, which is a relatively passive store, nrSM exhibits sophisticated processing properties to manage the complexities of ecological perception.

Features integrate along a motion trajectory when object integrity is preserved

Information about a moving object is usually poor at each retinotopic location because photoreceptor activation is short, noisy, and affected by shadows, reflections of other objects, and so on. Integration across the motion trajectory may yield a much better estimate about the objects’ features. Using the sequential metacontrast paradigm, we have shown previously that features, indeed, integrate along a motion trajectory in a long-lasting window of unconscious processing. In the sequential metacontrast paradigm, a percept of two diverging streams is elicited by the presentation of a central line followed by a sequence of flanking pairs of lines. When several lines are spatially offset, the offsets integrate mandatorily for several hundreds of milliseconds along the motion trajectory of the streams. We propose that, within these long-lasting windows, stimuli are first grouped based on Gestalt principles of grouping. These processes establish reference frames that are used to attribute features. Features are then integrated following their respective reference frame. Here using occlusion and bouncing effects, we show that indeed such grouping operations are in place. We found that features integrate only when the spatiotemporal integrity of the object is preserved. Moreover, when several moving objects are present, only features belonging to the same object integrate. Overall, our results show that feature integration is a deliberate strategy of the brain and long-lasting windows of processing can be seen as periods of sense making.

Global and high-level effects in crowding cannot be predicted by either high-dimensional pooling or target cueing

In visual crowding, the perception of a target deteriorates in the presence of nearby flankers. Traditionally, target-flanker interactions have been considered as local, mostly deleterious, low-level, and feature specific, occurring when information is pooled along the visual processing hierarchy. Recently, a vast literature of high-level effects in crowding (grouping effects and face-holistic crowding in particular) led to a different understanding of crowding, as a global, complex, and multilevel phenomenon that cannot be captured or explained by simple pooling models. It was recently argued that these high-level effects may still be captured by more sophisticated pooling models, such as the Texture Tiling model (TTM). Unlike simple pooling models, the high-dimensional pooling stage of the TTM preserves rich information about a crowded stimulus and, in principle, this information may be sufficient to drive high-level and global aspects of crowding. In addition, it was proposed that grouping effects in crowding may be explained by post-perceptual target cueing. Here, we extensively tested the predictions of the TTM on the results of six different studies that highlighted high-level effects in crowding. Our results show that the TTM cannot explain any of these high-level effects, and that the behavior of the model is equivalent to a simple pooling model. In addition, we show that grouping effects in crowding cannot be predicted by post-perceptual factors, such as target cueing. Taken together, these results reinforce once more the idea that complex target-flanker interactions determine crowding and that crowding occurs at multiple levels of the visual hierarchy.