Detecting Potential Overbilling in Medicare Reimbursement via Hours Worked

We propose a novel and easy-to-implement approach to detect potential overbilling based on the hours worked implied by the service codes which physicians submit to Medicare. Using the Medicare Part B Fee- for-Service (FFS) Physician Utilization and Payment Data in 2012 and 2013 released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, we construct estimates for physicians' hours spent on Medicare beneficiaries. We find that about 2,300 physicians, representing about 3 percent of those with 20 or more hours of Medicare Part B FFS services, have billed Medicare over 100 hours per week. We consider these implausibly long hours.

Medicare Program; Advancing Care Coordination Through Episode Payment Models (EPMs); Cardiac Rehabilitation Incentive Payment Model; and Changes to the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model (CJR). Final rule

This final rule implements three new Medicare Parts A and B episode payment models, a Cardiac Rehabilitation (CR) Incentive Payment model and modifications to the existing Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement model under section 1115A of the Social Security Act. Acute care hospitals in certain selected geographic areas will participate in retrospective episode payment models targeting care for Medicare fee-forservice beneficiaries receiving services during acute myocardial infarction, coronary artery bypass graft, and surgical hip/femur fracture treatment episodes. All related care within 90 days of hospital discharge will be included in the episode of care. We believe these models will further our goals of improving the efficiency and quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries receiving care for these common clinical conditions and procedures.

Damage caps and defensive medicine, revisited

Does tort reform reduce defensive medicine and thus healthcare spending? Several (though not all) prior studies, using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, find lower Medicare spending for hospital care after states adopt caps on non-economic or total damages ("damage caps"), during the "second" reform wave of the mid-1980s. We re-examine this issue in several ways. We study the nine states that adopted caps during the "third reform wave," from 2002 to 2005. We find that damage caps have no significant impact on Medicare Part A spending, but predict roughly 4% higher Medicare Part B spending. We then revisit the 1980s caps, and find no evidence of a post-adoption drop (or rise) in spending for these caps.

Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2017; Medicare Advantage Bid Pricing Data Release; Medicare Advantage and Part D Medical Loss Ratio Data Release; Medicare Advantage Provider Network Requirements; Expansion of Medicare Diabetes Prevention Program Model; Medicare Shared Savings Program Requirements. Final rule

This major final rule addresses changes to the physician fee schedule and other Medicare Part B payment policies, such as changes to the Value Modifier, to ensure that our payment systems are updated to reflect changes in medical practice and the relative value of services, as well as changes in the statute. This final rule also includes changes related to the Medicare Shared Savings Program, requirements for Medicare Advantage Provider Networks, and provides for the release of certain pricing data from Medicare Advantage bids and of data from medical loss ratio reports submitted by Medicare health and drug plans. In addition, this final rule expands the Medicare Diabetes Prevention Program model.

CMS proposal on Part B drugs deserves support

Medicare's first step in reining in the skyrocketing cost of specialty drugs deserves support--something it has not received from hospitals, doctors, politicians or, of course, the pharmaceutical industry, which benefits the most from the status quo.

Medicare Program; Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Payment Model for Acute Care Hospitals Furnishing Lower Extremity Joint Replacement Services. Final rule

This final rule implements a new Medicare Part A and B payment model under section 1115A of the Social Security Act, called the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model, in which acute care hospitals in certain selected geographic areas will receive retrospective bundled payments for episodes of care for lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR) or reattachment of a lower extremity. All related care within 90 days of hospital discharge from the joint replacement procedure will be included in the episode of care. We believe this model will further our goals in improving the efficiency and quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries with these common medical procedures.

Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2016. Final rule with comment period

This major final rule with comment period addresses changes to the physician fee schedule, and other Medicare Part B payment policies to ensure that our payment systems are updated to reflect changes in medical practice and the relative value of services, as well as changes in the statute.

Patient financial responsibility for observation care

BACKGROUND

As observation care grows, Medicare beneficiaries are increasingly likely to revisit observation care instead of being readmitted. This trend has potential financial implications for Medicare beneficiaries because observation care-although typically hospital based-is classified as an outpatient service. Beneficiaries who are readmitted pay the inpatient deductible only once per benefit period. In contrast, beneficiaries who have multiple care episodes under observations status are subject to coinsurance at every stay and could accrue higher cumulative costs.

OBJECTIVES

We were interested in answering the question: Do Medicare beneficiaries who revisit observation care pay more than they would have had they been readmitted?

DESIGN

We used a 20% sample of the Medicare Outpatient Standard Analytic File (2010-2012) to determine the total cumulative financial liability for Medicare beneficiaries who revisit observation care multiple times within a 60-day period.

PARTICIPANTS

Participants were fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries who had Part A and Part B coverage for a full calendar year (or until death) during the study period.

MEASUREMENTS

Our primary measure was beneficiary financial responsibility for facilities fees.

RESULTS

On average, beneficiaries with multiple observation stays in a 60-day period had a cumulative financial liability of $947.40 (803.62), which is significantly lower than the $1100 inpatient deductible (P < 0.01). However, 26.6% of these beneficiaries had a cumulative financial liability that exceeded the inpatient deductible.

CONCLUSIONS

More than a quarter of Medicare beneficiaries with multiple observation stays in a 60-day time period have a higher financial liability than they would have had under Part A benefits.

Physician Payment after the SGR--The New Meritocracy

With the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, Medicare shifts from payment based on macroeconomic indicators to relying on physician- or group-level indicators of cost and quality--and could create a large fee differential between high- and low-performing physicians.

Leap of Faith--Medicare's New Physician Payment System

Medicare's new payment system reflects the movement toward value-based payment, which is built on the view that we can contain costs only by eliminating fee-for-service payment. But there are important problems with this belief and the reforms it inspires.

Medicare Part B Intensity and Volume Offset

Under Medicare Part B, adjustments to the fee schedule are made under the assumption that physicians and hospitals make up for fee reductions through increased service provision called 'volume offsetting'. While historically, researchers have found evidence of volume offsetting, more recent studies have called into question its magnitude and existence. This study is the first to propose and empirically evaluate an alternative hypothesis of offsetting, namely the alteration of billed or provided services as a means of 'intensity offsetting'. Evaluating both forms of offsetting, it finds strong evidence of intensity offsetting and little to no evidence of volume offsetting. Simulating a 10% reduction in the Medicare fee schedule, this study estimates that across different procedures between 22% and 59% of a fee reduction will be offset through alterations in service intensity.

Patient cost sharing and receipt of erythropoiesis-stimulating agents through medicare part D

PURPOSE

Medicare Part D prescription benefits cover injected medications, normally covered under Part B, when administered outside of physician offices. Erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs) used for chronic anemia management in patients with myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) are commonly injected in a physician office but can be administered safely at home. In this study, we explored out-of-pocket (OOP) costs and receipt of Part D-covered ESAs in Medicare beneficiaries with MDS.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Patients with MDS enrolled in Medicare Parts A, B, and D were identified using diagnosis codes from 100% claims from 2006 to 2008. OOP costs for the mean erythropoietin alfa claim were compared for Parts B and D. Multivariable models examined the effect of low-income subsidy (LIS) and other Part D cost sharing on receipt of any ESA and any Part D-covered ESA.

RESULTS

A total of 13,117 (62.9%) of 20,848 patients received ESAs, but only 1,436 (6.9%) had any Part D claim. OOP payment was $348 under Part D versus $161 under Part B. Among patients with ESA use, those with LIS were 4× more likely to receive Part D ESAs (P < .01).

CONCLUSION

Few patients with MDS received ESAs through Part D. OOP payments required under Part D were substantially higher than under Part B. Cost sharing, as reflected by LIS receipt, likely affected decisions to prescribe ESAs outside of the physician office. Improved coordination between Part B and D benefits regarding issues of home injection of medications may create incentives that improve patient access and convenience and reduce costs associated with administration.

Total cost of care lower among Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries receiving care from patient-centered medical homes

OBJECTIVE

To compare health care utilization and payments between NCQA-recognized patient-centered medical home (PCMH) practices and practices without such recognition.

DATA SOURCES

Medicare Part A and B claims files from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2010, 2009 Census, 2007 Health Resources and Services Administration and CMS Utilization file, Medicare's Enrollment Data Base, and the 2005 American Medical Association Physician Workforce file.

STUDY DESIGN

This study used a longitudinal, nonexperimental design. Three annual observations (July 1, 2008-June 30, 2010) were available for each practice. We compared selected outcomes between practices with and those without NCQA PCMH recognition.

DATA COLLECTION METHODS

Individual Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries and their claims and utilization data were assigned to PCMH or comparison practices based on where they received the plurality of evaluation and management services between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Relative to the comparison group, total Medicare payments, acute care payments, and the number of emergency room visits declined after practices received NCQA PCMH recognition. The decline was larger for practices with sicker than average patients, primary care practices, and solo practices.

CONCLUSIONS

This study provides additional evidence about the potential of the PCMH model for reducing health care utilization and the cost of care.

Cost-sharing, physician utilization, and adverse selection among Medicare beneficiaries with chronic health conditions

Pooled data from the 2007, 2009, and 2011/2012 California Health Interview Surveys were used to compare the number of self-reported annual physician visits among 36,808 Medicare beneficiaries ≥65 in insurance groups with differential cost-sharing. Adjusted for adverse selection and a set of health covariates, Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) only beneficiaries had similar physician utilization compared with HMO enrollees but fewer visits compared with those with supplemental (1.04, p = .001) and Medicaid (1.55, p = .003) coverage. FFS only beneficiaries in very good or excellent health had fewer visits compared with those of similar health status with supplemental (1.30, p = .001) or Medicaid coverage (2.15, p = .002). For subpopulations with several chronic conditions, FFS only beneficiaries also had fewer visits compared with beneficiaries with supplemental or Medicaid coverage. Observed differences in utilization may reflect efficient and necessary physician utilization among those with chronic health needs.