Can lies be detected unconsciously?

People are typically poor at telling apart truthful and deceptive statements. Based on the Unconscious Thought Theory, it has been suggested that poor lie detection arises from the intrinsic limitations of conscious thinking and can be improved by facilitating the contribution of unconscious thought (UT). In support of this hypothesis, Reinhard et al. (2013) observed improved lie detection among participants engaging in UT. The present study aimed to replicate this UT advantage using a similar experimental procedure but with an important improvement in a key control condition. Specifically, participants judged the truthfulness of eight video recordings in three thinking modes: immediately after watching them or after a period of unconscious or conscious deliberation. Results from two experiments (combined N = 226) failed to reveal a significant difference in lie detection accuracy between the thinking modes, even after efforts were made to facilitate the occurrence of an UT advantage in Experiment 2. The results imply that the UT advantage in deception detection is not a robust phenomenon.

A critical review and meta-analysis of the unconscious thought effect in medical decision making

Based on research on the increasingly popular unconscious thought effect (UTE), it has been suggested that physicians might make better diagnostic decisions after a period of distraction than after an equivalent amount of time of conscious deliberation. However, published attempts to demonstrate the UTE in medical decision making have yielded inconsistent results. In the present study, we report the results of a meta-analysis of all the available evidence on the UTE in medical decisions made by expert and novice clinicians. The meta-analysis failed to find a significant contribution of unconscious thought (UT) to the accuracy of medical decisions. This result cannot be easily attributed to any of the potential moderators of the UTE that have been discussed in the literature. Furthermore, a Bayes factor analysis shows that most experimental conditions provide positive support for the null hypothesis, suggesting that these null results do not reflect a simple lack of statistical power. We suggest ways in which new studies could usefully provide further evidence on the UTE. Unless future research shows otherwise, the recommendation of using UT to improve medical decisions lacks empirical support.

Don't bet on it! Wagering as a measure of awareness in decision making under uncertainty

Can our decisions be guided by unconscious or implicit influences? According to the somatic marker hypothesis, emotion-based signals can guide our decisions in uncertain environments outside awareness. Postdecision wagering, in which participants make wagers on the outcomes of their decisions, has been recently proposed as an objective and sensitive measure of conscious content. In 5 experiments we employed variations of a classic decision-making assessment, the Iowa Gambling Task, in combination with wagering in order to investigate the role played by unconscious influences. We examined the validity of postdecision wagering by comparing it with alternative measures of conscious knowledge, specifically confidence ratings and quantitative questions. Consistent with a putative role for unconscious influences, in Experiments 2 and 3 we observed a lag between choice accuracy and the onset of advantageous wagering. However, the lag was eliminated by a change in the wagering payoff matrix (Experiment 2) and by a switch from a binary wager response to either a binary or a 4-point confidence response (Experiment 3), and wagering underestimated awareness compared to explicit quantitative questions (Experiments 1 and 4). Our results demonstrate the insensitivity of postdecision wagering as a direct measure of conscious knowledge and challenge the claim that implicit processes influence decision making under uncertainty.

Pre-exposure of repeated search configurations facilitates subsequent contextual cuing of visual search

Contextual cuing is the enhancement of visual search when the configuration of distractors has been experienced previously. It has been suggested that contextual cuing relies on associative learning between the distractor locations and the target position. Four experiments examined the effect of pre-exposing configurations of consistent distractors on subsequent contextual cuing. The findings demonstrate a facilitation of subsequent cuing for pre-exposed configurations compared to novel configurations that have not been pre-exposed. This facilitation suggests that learning of repeated visual search patterns involves acquisition of not just distractor-target associations but also associations between distractors within the search context, an effect that is not captured by the Brady and Chun (2007) connectionist model of contextual cuing. We propose a new connectionist model of contextual cuing that learns associations between repeated distractor stimuli, enabling it to predict an effect of pre-exposure on contextual cuing.

Age effects on explicit and implicit memory

It is well-documented that explicit memory (e.g., recognition) declines with age. In contrast, many argue that implicit memory (e.g., priming) is preserved in healthy aging. For example, priming on tasks such as perceptual identification is often not statistically different in groups of young and older adults. Such observations are commonly taken as evidence for distinct explicit and implicit learning/memory systems. In this article we discuss several lines of evidence that challenge this view. We describe how patterns of differential age-related decline may arise from differences in the ways in which the two forms of memory are commonly measured, and review recent research suggesting that under improved measurement methods, implicit memory is not age-invariant. Formal computational models are of considerable utility in revealing the nature of underlying systems. We report the results of applying single and multiple-systems models to data on age effects in implicit and explicit memory. Model comparison clearly favors the single-system view. Implications for the memory systems debate are discussed.

Instance memorization and category influence: Challenging the evidence for multiple systems in category learning

A class of dual-system theories of categorization assumes a categorization system based on actively formed prototypes in addition to a separate instance memory system. It has been suggested that, because they have used poorly differentiated category structures (such as the influential “5-4” structure), studies supporting the alternative exemplar theory reveal little about the properties of the categorization system. Dual-system theories assume that the instance memory system only influences categorization behaviour via similarity to single isolated instances, without generalization across instances. However, we present the results of two experiments employing the 5-4 structure to argue against this. Experiment 1 contrasted learning in the standard 5-4 structure with learning in an even more poorly differentiated 5-4 structure. In Experiment 2, participants memorized the 5-4 structure based on a five minute simultaneous presentation of all nine category instances. Both experiments revealed category influences as reflected by differences in instance learnability and generalization, at variance with the dual-system prediction. These results have implications for the exemplars versus prototypes debate and the nature of human categorization mechanisms.

Priming intelligent behavior: an elusive phenomenon

Can behavior be unconsciously primed via the activation of attitudes, stereotypes, or other concepts? A number of studies have suggested that such priming effects can occur, and a prominent illustration is the claim that individuals' accuracy in answering general knowledge questions can be influenced by activating intelligence-related concepts such as professor or soccer hooligan. In 9 experiments with 475 participants we employed the procedures used in these studies, as well as a number of variants of those procedures, in an attempt to obtain this intelligence priming effect. None of the experiments obtained the effect, although financial incentives did boost performance. A Bayesian analysis reveals considerable evidential support for the null hypothesis. The results conform to the pattern typically obtained in word priming experiments in which priming is very narrow in its generalization and unconscious (subliminal) influences, if they occur at all, are extremely short-lived. We encourage others to explore the circumstances in which this phenomenon might be obtained.

An effect of age on implicit memory that is not due to explicit contamination: implications for single and multiple-systems theories

Recognition memory is typically weaker in healthy older relative to young adults, while performance on implicit tests (e.g., repetition priming) is often comparable between groups. Such observations are commonly taken as evidence for independent explicit and implicit memory systems. On a picture version of the continuous identification with recognition (CID-R) task, we found a reliable age-related reduction in recognition memory, while the age effect on priming did not reach statistical significance (Experiment 1). This pattern was consistent with the predictions of a formal single-system model. Experiment 2 replicated these observations using separate priming (continuous identification; CID) and recognition phases, while a combined data analysis revealed a significant effect of age on priming. In Experiment 3, we provide evidence that priming in this task is unaffected by explicit processing, and we conclude that the age difference in priming is unlikely to have been driven by differences in explicit processing between groups of young and older adults ("explicit contamination"). The results support the view that explicit and implicit expressions of memory are driven by a single underlying memory system.

Are there multiple memory systems? Tests of models of implicit and explicit memory

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This article reviews recent work aimed at developing a new framework, based on signal detection theory, for understanding the relationship between explicit (e.g., recognition) and implicit (e.g., priming) memory. Within this framework, different assumptions about sources of memorial evidence can be framed. Application to experimental results provides robust evidence for a single-system model in preference to multiple-systems models. This evidence comes from several sources including studies of the effects of amnesia and ageing on explicit and implicit memory. The framework allows a range of concepts in current memory research, such as familiarity, recollection, fluency, and source memory, to be linked to implicit memory. More generally, this work emphasizes the value of modern computational modelling techniques in the study of learning and memory.

Can testing immunize memories against interference?

Testing typically enhances subsequent recall of tested material. In contrast, it has been proposed that consolidated memories can be destabilized when reactivated and then need to be reconsolidated in order to persist. Learning new material immediately after reactivation may disrupt reconsolidation. We investigated whether the well-known benefits of testing are counterbalanced by a tendency for retrieval to make memory more susceptible to interference. Participants learned 20 English-Swahili word pairs (List 1) on Day 1. On Day 2 one group of participants took a reminder test of List 1 immediately before learning 20 English-Finnish word pairs sharing the same cues (List 2). A second group learned List 2 without taking the reminder test of List 1, a third took the reminder test alone, and a fourth group did nothing on Day 2. On Day 3 all participants took a final test. The reminder test, far from impairing List 1 memory, enhanced it, revealing a testing effect. Furthermore, List 2 learning disrupted List 1 memory when there was no reminder test, but reminder testing immunized the memory against interference.

Investigating cue competition in contextual cuing of visual search

A fundamental principle of learning is that predictive cues or signals compete with each other to gain control over behavior. Associative and propositional reasoning theories of learning provide radically different accounts of cue competition. Propositional accounts predict that under conditions that do not afford or warrant the use of higher order reasoning processes, cue competition should not be observed. We tested this prediction in 2 contextual cuing experiments, using a visual search task in which patterns of distractor elements predict the location of a target object. Blocking designs were used in which 2 sets of predictive distractors were trained in compound, with 1 set trained independently. There was no evidence of cue competition in either experiment. In fact, in Experiment 2, we found evidence for augmentation of learning. The findings are contrasted with the predictions of an error-driven associative model of contextual cuing (Brady & Chun, 2007).

Aging and implicit learning: explorations in contextual cuing

In contextual cuing, faster responses are made to repeated displays containing context-target associations than to novel displays without such covariances. We report that healthy older adults showed learning impairments in contextual cuing when compared with younger adults. The display properties in the task were altered to artificially increase younger adults' response times to match those of older adults and to produce faster responses in older participants; however, younger participants' learning remained intact, whereas older participants continued to show impairments under these conditions. These results suggest that older adults have intrinsic deficits in contextual cuing that cannot be attributed to their slower overall response speed.

Can "pure" implicit memory be isolated? A test of a single-system model of recognition and repetition priming

Implicit memory is widely regarded as an unconscious form of memory. However, evidence for what is arguably a defining characteristic of implicit memory-that its contents are not accessible to awareness-has remained elusive. Such a finding of "pure" implicit memory would constitute evidence against a single-system model of recognition and priming that predicts that priming will not occur in the (true) absence of recognition. In three experiments, using a rapid serial visual presentation procedure at encoding, we tested this prediction by attempting to replicate some previous studies that claimed to obtain pure implicit memory. We found no evidence of priming in the absence of recognition; instead, priming and recognition were associated across experiments: when priming was absent, recognition was also absent (Experiments 1 and 2), and when priming was reliably greater than chance, recognition was similarly greater than chance (Experiment 3). The results are consistent with the prediction of a single-system model, which was fit to the data from all the experiments. The results are also consistent with the notion that the memory driving priming is accessible to awareness.

Rapid induction of false memory for pictures

Recognition of pictures is typically extremely accurate, and it is thus unclear whether the reconstructive nature of memory can yield substantial false recognition of highly individuated stimuli. A procedure for the rapid induction of false memories for distinctive colour photographs is proposed. Participants studied a set of object pictures followed by a list of words naming those objects, but embedded in the list were names of unseen objects. When subsequently shown full colour pictures of these unseen objects, participants consistently claimed that they had seen them, while discriminating with high accuracy between studied pictures and new pictures whose names did not appear in the misleading word list. These false memories can be reported with high confidence as well as the feeling of recollection. This new procedure allows the investigation of factors that influence false memory reports with ecologically valid stimuli and of the similarities and differences between true and false memories.

Learning: from association to cognition

Since the very earliest experimental investigations of learning, tension has existed between association-based and cognitive theories. Associationism accounts for the phenomena of both conditioning and "higher" forms of learning via concepts such as excitation, inhibition, and reinforcement, whereas cognitive theories assume that learning depends on hypothesis testing, cognitive models, and propositional reasoning. Cognitive theories have received considerable impetus in regard to both human and animal learning from recent research suggesting that the key illustration of cue selection in learning, blocking, often arises from inferential reasoning. At the same time, a dichotomous view that separates noncognitive, unconscious (implicit) learning from cognitive, conscious (explicit) learning has gained favor. This review selectively describes key findings from this research, evaluates evidence for and against associative and cognitive explanatory constructs, and critically examines both the dichotomous view of learning as well as the claim that learning can occur unconsciously.

The Effectiveness of Feedback in Multiple-Cue Probability Learning

How effective are different types of feedback in helping us to learn multiple contingencies? This article attempts to resolve a paradox whereby, in comparison to simple outcome feedback, additional feedback either fails to enhance or is actually detrimental to performance in nonmetric multiple-cue probability learning (MCPL), while in contrast the majority of studies of metric MCPL reveal improvements at least with some forms of feedback. In three experiments we demonstrate that if feedback assists participants to infer cue polarity then it can in fact be effective in nonmetric MCPL. Participants appeared to use cue polarity information to adopt a linear judgement strategy, even though the environment was nonlinear. The results reconcile the paradoxical contrast between metric and nonmetric MCPL and support previous findings of people's tendency to assume linearity and additivity in probabilistic cue learning.

A unitary signal-detection model of implicit and explicit memory

Do dissociations imply independent systems? In the memory field, the view that there are independent implicit and explicit memory systems has been predominantly supported by dissociation evidence. Here, we argue that many of these dissociations do not necessarily imply distinct memory systems. We review recent work with a single-system computational model that extends signal-detection theory (SDT) to implicit memory. SDT has had a major influence on research in a variety of domains. The current work shows that it can be broadened even further in its range of application. Indeed, the single-system model that we present does surprisingly well in accounting for some key dissociations that have been taken as evidence for independent implicit and explicit memory systems.