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Eckert J, Rakoczy H, Call J. Are great apes able to reason from multi-item samples to populations of food items? Am J Primatol 2017; 79. [PMID: 28877364 DOI: 10.1002/ajp.22693] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/28/2017] [Revised: 07/17/2017] [Accepted: 08/13/2017] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Inductive learning from limited observations is a cognitive capacity of fundamental importance. In humans, it is underwritten by our intuitive statistics, the ability to draw systematic inferences from populations to randomly drawn samples and vice versa. According to recent research in cognitive development, human intuitive statistics develops early in infancy. Recent work in comparative psychology has produced first evidence for analogous cognitive capacities in great apes who flexibly drew inferences from populations to samples. In the present study, we investigated whether great apes (Pongo abelii, Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla) also draw inductive inferences in the opposite direction, from samples to populations. In two experiments, apes saw an experimenter randomly drawing one multi-item sample from each of two populations of food items. The populations differed in their proportion of preferred to neutral items (24:6 vs. 6:24) but apes saw only the distribution of food items in the samples that reflected the distribution of the respective populations (e.g., 4:1 vs. 1:4). Based on this observation they were then allowed to choose between the two populations. Results show that apes seemed to make inferences from samples to populations and thus chose the population from which the more favorable (4:1) sample was drawn in Experiment 1. In this experiment, the more attractive sample not only contained proportionally but also absolutely more preferred food items than the less attractive sample. Experiment 2, however, revealed that when absolute and relative frequencies were disentangled, apes performed at chance level. Whether these limitations in apes' performance reflect true limits of cognitive competence or merely performance limitations due to accessory task demands is still an open question.
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Oktay-Gür N, Rakoczy H. Children's difficulty with true belief tasks: Competence deficit or performance problem? Cognition 2017; 166:28-41. [PMID: 28554083 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/04/2016] [Revised: 04/24/2017] [Accepted: 05/01/2017] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
According to the standard picture of explicit theory of mind (ToM) development, children begin to (explicitly) ascribe beliefs to others and themselves from around age 4. The empirical basis of this picture comes from numerous studies consistently showing that children master verbal false belief (FB) tasks from around age 4 while children much younger have no difficulty in mastering structurally analogous true belief (TB) tasks. The standard picture, though, has come under serious attack from recent studies using TB tasks with wider age ranges. These studies have found that, paradoxically, children begin to fail TB tasks once they master FB tasks. Such findings cast doubt on the standard picture and suggest, instead, that FB tasks may be solved by much simpler strategies than proper belief reasoning. In the present study, we tested for the development of FB and TB performance in comprehensive and systematic ways. In particular, we tested the competing predictions of competence accounts (according to which TB failure reflects lack of conceptual competence) versus performance limitation accounts (according to which the standard picture is true yet children from around age 4 fail TB tasks due to performance factors). Studies 1 and 2 showed that performance in a variety of novel TB tasks showed a clear U-shaped curve, with children until age 3 and from age 10 performing competently and children in between failing, with strong negative correlations between TB and FB. Crucially, these patterns were found for various kinds of TB tasks, including those for which existing competence limitation accounts would not even predict any difficulty. Study 3, therefore, directly tested performance limitation accounts in terms of pragmatic and related factors and found that these patterns (failure in TB and negative TB-FB correlations) disappear once the relevant performance factors have been removed from the TB tasks. Taken together, these findings suggest that previous TB findings constitute false negatives, clearly speak for performance limitation accounts and thus corroborate the standard picture of the development of explicit theory of mind.
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Rakoczy H, Wandt R, Thomas S, Nowak J, Kunzmann U. Theory of mind and wisdom: The development of different forms of perspective-taking in late adulthood. Br J Psychol 2017; 109:6-24. [DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12246] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2016] [Revised: 01/07/2017] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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54
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Hermes J, Behne T, Bich AE, Thielert C, Rakoczy H. Children's selective trust decisions: rational competence and limiting performance factors. Dev Sci 2017; 21. [DOI: 10.1111/desc.12527] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2015] [Accepted: 10/06/2016] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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Hermes J, Behne T, Studte K, Zeyen AM, Gräfenhain M, Rakoczy H. Selective Cooperation in Early Childhood - How to Choose Models and Partners. PLoS One 2016; 11:e0160881. [PMID: 27505043 PMCID: PMC4978381 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0160881] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/29/2016] [Accepted: 06/21/2016] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperation is essential for human society, and children engage in cooperation from early on. It is unclear, however, how children select their partners for cooperation. We know that children choose selectively whom to learn from (e.g. preferring reliable over unreliable models) on a rational basis. The present study investigated whether children (and adults) also choose their cooperative partners selectively and what model characteristics they regard as important for cooperative partners and for informants about novel words. Three- and four-year-old children (N = 64) and adults (N = 14) saw contrasting pairs of models differing either in physical strength or in accuracy (in labeling known objects). Participants then performed different tasks (cooperative problem solving and word learning) requiring the choice of a partner or informant. Both children and adults chose their cooperative partners selectively. Moreover they showed the same pattern of selective model choice, regarding a wide range of model characteristics as important for cooperation (preferring both the strong and the accurate model for a strength-requiring cooperation tasks), but only prior knowledge as important for word learning (preferring the knowledgeable but not the strong model for word learning tasks). Young children's selective model choice thus reveals an early rational competence: They infer characteristics from past behavior and flexibly consider what characteristics are relevant for certain tasks.
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Josephs M, Rakoczy H. Young children think you can opt out of social-conventional but not moral practices. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2016. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.07.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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57
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Low J, Apperly IA, Butterfill SA, Rakoczy H. Cognitive Architecture of Belief Reasoning in Children and Adults: A Primer on the Two-Systems Account. CHILD DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES 2016. [DOI: 10.1111/cdep.12183] [Citation(s) in RCA: 58] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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58
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Schmidt MFH, Rakoczy H, Mietzsch T, Tomasello M. Young Children Understand the Role of Agreement in Establishing Arbitrary Norms-But Unanimity Is Key. Child Dev 2016; 87:612-26. [PMID: 26990417 DOI: 10.1111/cdev.12510] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
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59
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Josephs M, Kushnir T, Gräfenhain M, Rakoczy H. Children protest moral and conventional violations more when they believe actions are freely chosen. J Exp Child Psychol 2016; 141:247-55. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2015.08.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2014] [Revised: 08/10/2015] [Accepted: 08/10/2015] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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60
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Samland J, Josephs M, Waldmann MR, Rakoczy H. The role of prescriptive norms and knowledge in children’s and adults’ causal selection. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2016; 145:125-30. [DOI: 10.1037/xge0000138] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
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61
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Rakoczy H, Behne T, Clüver A, Dallmann S, Weidner S, Waldmann MR. The Side-Effect Effect in Children Is Robust and Not Specific to the Moral Status of Action Effects. PLoS One 2015. [PMID: 26218422 PMCID: PMC4517779 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0132933] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Adults’ intentionality judgments regarding an action are influenced by their moral evaluation of this action. This is clearly indicated in the so-called side-effect effect: when told about an action (e.g. implementing a business plan) with an intended primary effect (e.g. raise profits) and a foreseen side effect (e.g. harming/helping the environment), subjects tend to interpret the bringing about of the side effect more often as intentional when it is negative (harming the environment) than when it is positive (helping the environment). From a cognitive point of view, it is unclear whether the side-effect effect is driven by the moral status of the side effects specifically, or rather more generally by its normative status. And from a developmental point of view, little is known about the ontogenetic origins of the effect. The present study therefore explored the cognitive foundations and the ontogenetic origins of the side-effect effect by testing 4-to 5-year-old children with scenarios in which a side effect was in accordance with/violated a norm. Crucially, the status of the norm was varied to be conventional or moral. Children rated the bringing about of side-effects as more intentional when it broke a norm than when it accorded with a norm irrespective of the type of norm. The side-effect effect is thus an early-developing, more general and pervasive phenomenon, not restricted to morally relevant side effects.
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Lohse K, Kalitschke T, Ruthmann K, Rakoczy H. The development of reasoning about the temporal and causal relations among past, present, and future events. J Exp Child Psychol 2015; 138:54-70. [PMID: 26037402 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2015.04.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/20/2014] [Revised: 04/27/2015] [Accepted: 04/27/2015] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Children's capacity to reason about temporal and causal relations among past, present, and future events was investigated. In two studies, 4- and 6-year-olds (N=160) received structurally analogous search and planning tasks that required retrospective or prospective temporal-causal reasoning, respectively. The search task was compared with a closely matched control task that did not require temporal-causal reasoning. Results revealed that (a) both age groups solved the control task, (b) 6-year-olds mastered both retrospective and prospective tasks, and (c) 4-year-olds showed limited competence in both retrospective and prospective tasks. The current study, thus, suggests that flexible temporal-causal reasoning develops in parallel for past- and future-directed reasoning, is qualitatively different from simpler forms of temporal cognition, and develops during the late preschool years.
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Rakoczy H, Ehrling C, Harris PL, Schultze T. Young children heed advice selectively. J Exp Child Psychol 2015; 138:71-87. [PMID: 26037403 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2015.04.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2014] [Revised: 04/24/2015] [Accepted: 04/26/2015] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
A rational strategy to update and revise one's uncertain beliefs is to take advice by other agents who are better informed. Adults routinely engage in such advice taking in systematic and selective ways depending on relevant characteristics such as reliability of advisors. The current study merged research in social and developmental psychology to examine whether children also adjust their initial judgment to varying degrees depending on the characteristics of their advisors. Participants aged 3 to 6 years played a game in which they made initial judgments, received advice, and subsequently made final judgments. They systematically revised their judgments in light of the advice, and they did so selectively as a function of advisor expertise. They made greater adjustments to their initial judgment when advised by an apparently knowledgeable informant. This suggests that the pattern of advice taking studied in social psychology has its roots in early development.
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Keupp S, Behne T, Zachow J, Kasbohm A, Rakoczy H. Over-imitation is not automatic: Context sensitivity in children’s overimitation and action interpretation of causally irrelevant actions. J Exp Child Psychol 2015; 130:163-75. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2014.10.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2014] [Revised: 10/08/2014] [Accepted: 10/09/2014] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
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65
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Hermes J, Behne T, Rakoczy H. The role of trait reasoning in young children’s selective trust. Dev Psychol 2015; 51:1574-87. [DOI: 10.1037/dev0000042] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
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66
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Rakoczy H, Bergfeld D, Schwarz I, Fizke E. Explicit theory of mind is even more unified than previously assumed: belief ascription and understanding aspectuality emerge together in development. Child Dev 2014; 86:486-502. [PMID: 25345545 DOI: 10.1111/cdev.12311] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Existing evidence suggests that children, when they first pass standard theory-of-mind tasks, still fail to understand the essential aspectuality of beliefs and other propositional attitudes: such attitudes refer to objects only under specific aspects. Oedipus, for example, believes Yocaste (his mother) is beautiful, but this does not imply that he believes his mother is beautiful. In three experiments, 3- to 6-year-olds' (N = 119) understanding of aspectuality was tested with a novel, radically simplified task. In contrast to all previous findings, this task was as difficult as and highly correlated with a standard false belief task. This suggests that a conceptual capacity more unified than previously assumed emerges around ages 4-5, a full-fledged metarepresentational scheme of propositional attitudes.
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67
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Tunçgenç B, Hohenberger A, Rakoczy H. Early Understanding of Normativity and Freedom to Act in Turkish Toddlers. JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT 2014. [DOI: 10.1080/15248372.2013.815622] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
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68
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Rakoczy H, Gräfenhain M, Clüver A, Dalhoff ACS, Sternkopf A. Young children's agent-neutral representations of action roles. J Exp Child Psychol 2014; 128:201-9. [PMID: 25074622 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2014.06.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2013] [Revised: 06/18/2014] [Accepted: 06/19/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Recent developmental research has shown that young children coordinate complementary action roles with others. But what do they understand about the logical structure of such roles? Do they have an agent-neutral conception of complementary action roles, grasping that such roles can be variably filled by any two agents or even by one agent over time? Accordingly, can they make use of such representations for planning both their own and others' actions? To address these questions, 3- and 4-year-olds were introduced to an activity comprising two action roles, A and B, by seeing either two agents performing A and B collaboratively or one agent performing A and B individually. Children's flexible inferences from these demonstrations were then tested by asking them later on to plan ahead for the fulfillment of one of the roles either by themselves or by someone else. The 4-year-olds competently drew inferences in all directions, from past individual and collaborative demonstrations, when planning how they or someone else would need to fulfill the roles in the future. The 3-year-olds, in contrast, showed more restricted competence; they were capable of such inferences only when planning in the immediate present. Taken together, these results suggest that children form and use agent-neutral representations of action roles by 3 years of age and flexibly use such representations for episodic memory and future deliberation in planning their own and others' actions by 4 years of age. The findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of understanding self-other equivalence and agent-neutral frames of references.
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69
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Rakoczy H. What are the relations of thinking about groups and theory of mind? BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2014; 32:255-6. [DOI: 10.1111/bjdp.12047] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/17/2014] [Revised: 04/17/2014] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
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70
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Rakoczy H, Clüver A, Saucke L, Stoffregen N, Gräbener A, Migura J, Call J. Apes are intuitive statisticians. Cognition 2014; 131:60-8. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 39] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2013] [Revised: 12/12/2013] [Accepted: 12/19/2013] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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71
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Fizke E, Barthel D, Peters T, Rakoczy H. Executive function plays a role in coordinating different perspectives, particularly when one’s own perspective is involved. Cognition 2014; 130:315-34. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/23/2012] [Revised: 09/18/2013] [Accepted: 11/22/2013] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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72
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Lohse K, Gräfenhain M, Behne T, Rakoczy H. Young children understand the normative implications of future-directed speech acts. PLoS One 2014; 9:e86958. [PMID: 24489815 PMCID: PMC3906105 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0086958] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/28/2013] [Accepted: 12/19/2013] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Much recent research has shown that the capacity for mental time travel and temporal reasoning emerges during the preschool years. Nothing is known so far, however, about young children's grasp of the normative dimension of future-directed thought and speech. The present study is the first to show that children from age 4 understand the normative outreach of such future-directed speech acts: subjects at time 1 witnessed a speaker make future-directed speech acts about/towards an actor A, either in imperative mode ("A, do X!") or as a prediction ("the actor A will do X"). When at time 2 the actor A performed an action that did not match the content of the speech act at time 1, children identified the speaker as the source of a mistake in the prediction case, and the actor as the source of the mistake in the imperative case and leveled criticism accordingly. These findings add to our knowledge about the emergence and development of temporal cognition in revealing an early sensitivity to the normative aspects of future-orientation.
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73
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Köymen B, Lieven E, Engemann DA, Rakoczy H, Warneken F, Tomasello M. Children's Norm Enforcement in Their Interactions With Peers. Child Dev 2013; 85:1108-1122. [DOI: 10.1111/cdev.12178] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
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74
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Wyman E, Rakoczy H, Tomasello M. Non-verbal communication enables children’s coordination in a “Stag Hunt” game. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2013. [DOI: 10.1080/17405629.2012.726469] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
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75
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Cacchione T, Schaub S, Rakoczy H. Fourteen-month-old infants infer the continuous identity of objects on the basis of nonvisible causal properties. Dev Psychol 2013; 49:1325-9. [DOI: 10.1037/a0029746] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
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