Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Scientific evidence versus outdated beliefs: A response to Brewin (2016)

We find Brewin's (2016) critiques of the narratives, power, and coherence measures in Rubin et al. (2016) without merit; his suggestions for a "revised formulation" (p. 1015) of coherence are contradicted by data readily available in the target article but ignored. We place Brewin's commentary in a historical context and show that it reiterates views of trauma memory fragmentation that are unsupported by data. We evaluate an earlier review of fragmentation of trauma memories (Brewin, 2014), which Brewin uses to support his position in the commentary. We show that it is contradicted by more comprehensive reviews and fails to include several studies that met Brewin's inclusion criteria but provided no support for his position, including 3 studies by the present authors (Rubin, 2011; Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011). In short, the commentary's position does not stand against scientific evidence; attempts to rescue it through arguments unsupported by data advance neither science nor clinical practice. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Potential for False Memories is Bigger than What Brewin and Andrews Suggest

Brewin and Andrews (2016) reviewed the literature on false memory propensity for childhood events. In this commentary, we critically evaluate their basic claim that proneness to false memories of childhood experiences is more limited than has been articulated in the literature. We show that Brewin and Andrews were selective in their inclusion of false memory studies, thereby ignoring relevant research related to autobiographical false memories. Equally important, and in contrast to what Brewin and Andrews claim, we show that implanted false memories elicited by misinformation are characterized by high confidence.

Misrepresentations and Flawed Logic About the Prevalence of False Memories

Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview, they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an "upper bound" on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Using a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and confidence in memory, we review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inflation, false feedback and memory implantation. Imagination inflation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution against accepting investigator‐based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants' self‐reports. Recommendations are made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.