51
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Singh M. Lightness constancy through transparency: internal consistency in layered surface representations. Vision Res 2004; 44:1827-42. [PMID: 15135997 DOI: 10.1016/j.visres.2004.02.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/02/2003] [Revised: 02/05/2004] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
Asymmetric lightness matching was employed to measure how the visual system assigns lightness to surface patches seen through partially-transmissive surfaces. Observers adjusted the luminance of a comparison patch seen through transparency, in order to match the lightness of a standard patch seen in plain view. Plots of matched-to-standard luminance were linear, and their slopes were consistent with Metelli's alpha. A control experiment confirmed that these matches were indeed transparency based. Consistent with recent results, however, when observers directly matched the transmittance of transparent surfaces, their matches deviated strongly and systematically from Metelli's alpha. Although the two sets of results appear to be contradictory, formal analysis reveals a deeper mutual consistency in the representation of the two layers. A ratio-of-contrasts model is shown to explain both the success of Metelli's model in predicting lightness through transparency, and its failure to predict perceived transmittance--and hence is seen to play the primary role in perceptual transparency.
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Affiliation(s)
- Manish Singh
- Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University-New Brunswick, 152 Frelinghuysen Road, Piscataway, NJ 08854-8020, USA.
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52
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Abstract
Visible surfaces in a natural environment often have multiple components of reflectance, including a diffuse component, by which light is scattered isotropically in all possible directions, and a specular component, by which light is reflected anisotropically within a limited range of directions. The research described in the present article was designed to investigate how these different components of reflectance influence the perception of lightness. Human observers were presented with shaded images of smoothly curved surfaces and asked to compare the relative lightness of different surface regions whose diffuse and specular components of luminance were independently manipulated. The results revealed that observers are able to discount the presence of specular highlights so that the relative lightness among different regions is determined almost entirely by the diffuse component of surface reflectance.
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53
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Abstract
AbstractReflectance and spectral power functions are poor predictors of color experiences. Only in completely relativized conditions (single observer, non-metameric set of stimuli, and single set of viewing conditions) is the relationship close. Variation in reflectance of Munsell chips experienced by color-normal observers as having a unique green hue encompasses approximately sixty percent of the complete range of hues falling under the category “green”; and in recent determinations of unique hues, ranges of yellow and green as well as green and blue unique hues overlap.
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54
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Abstract
AbstractWe make three points. First, the concept of productance value that the authors propose in their defense of color physicalism fails to do the work for which it is intended. Second, the authors fail to offer an adequate physicalist account of what they call the hue-magnitudes. Third, their answer to the problem of individual differences faces serious difficulties.
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55
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Abstract
AbstractAs demonstrated by several example displays, color illusions challenge color realism, because they involve a one-to-many reflectance-to-color mapping. Solving this problem by differentiating between veridical and illusory colors corresponding to the same reflectance is hampered because of the lack of an appropriate criterion. However, the difference between veridical and illusory color perception can still be maintained.
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56
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Abstract
AbstractI argue that Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) have not answered Hardin's objection to physicalism about color concerning the unitary-binary structure of the colors for two reasons. First, their account of unitary-binary structure seems unsatisfactory. Second, pace B&H, there are no physicalistically acceptable candidates to be the hue-magnitudes. I conclude with a question about the justification of physicalism about color.
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57
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Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03260015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractIn many cases of variation in color vision, there is no nonarbitrary way of choosing between variants. Byrne & Hilbert insist that there is an unknown standard for choosing, whereas eliminativists claim that all the variants are erroneous. A better response relativizes colors to perceivers, thereby providing a color realism that avoids the need to choose between variants.
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58
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Abstract
AbstractByrne & Hilbert (B&H) conceive of color perception as the representation of a physical property “out there.” In our view, their approach does not only have various internal problems, but is also apt to becloud both the intricate and still poorly understood role that “color” plays within perceptual architecture, and the complex coupling to the “external world” of the perceptual system as an entirety. We propose an alternative perspective, which avoids B&H's misleading dichotomy between a purely subjective and a realist conception of “color.”
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59
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Abstract
AbstractWhile color realism is endorsed, Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) case for it stretches the notion of “physical property” beyond acceptable bounds. It is argued that a satisfactory account of color should do much more to respond to antirealist intuitions that flow from the specificity of color experience, and a pointer to an approach that does so is provided.
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60
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Abstract
AbstractOur reply is in three parts. The first part concerns some foundational issues in the debate about color realism. The second part addresses the many objections to the version of physicalism about color (“productance physicalism”) defended in the target article. The third part discusses the leading alternative approaches and theories endorsed by the commentators.
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61
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Abstract
AbstractReflectance physicalism only provides a partial picture of the ontology of color. Byrne & Hilbert’ account is unsatisfactory because the replacement of reflectance functions by productance functions is ad hoc, unclear, and only leads to new problems. Furthermore, the effects of color contrast and differences in illumination are not really taken seriously: Too many “real” colors are tacitly dismissed as illusory, and this for arbitrary reasons. We claim that there cannot be an all-embracing ontology for color.
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62
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Abstract
AbstractByrne & Hilbert are right that it might be an objective fact that a particular tomato is unique red, but wrong that it cannot simultaneously be yellowish-red (not only objectively, but from somebody else's point of view). Sensory categorization varies among organisms, slightly among conspecifics, and sharply across taxa. There is no question of truth or falsity concerning choice of categories, only of utility and disutility. The appropriate framework for color categories is Nominalism and Pluralistic Realism.
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63
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Abstract
AbstractTo identify the set of reflectances that constitute redness, the authors must first determine which surfaces are red. They do this by relying on widespread agreement among us. However, arguments based on the possible ways in which humans would perceive colors show that mere widespread agreement among us is not a satisfactory way to determine which surfaces are red.
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64
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Parallels between hearing and seeing support physicalism. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03320011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Abstract
AbstractThere are 2,000 hair cells in the cochlea, but only three cones in the retina. This disparity can be understood in terms of the differences between the physical characteristics of the auditory signal (discrete excitations and resonances requiring many narrowly tuned receptors) and those of the visual signal (smooth daylight excitations and reflectances requiring only a few broadly tuned receptors). We argue that this match supports the physicalism of color and timbre.
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65
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Surreptitious substitution. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03490018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
AbstractIn this commentary I argue that Byrne & Hilbert commit a number of philosophical solecisms: They beg the question of “realism,” they take the phenomenon and the theoretical model to be the same thing, and they surreptitiously substitute data sets for the life-world.
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66
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Clarifying the problem of color realism. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03420013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
Abstract“The problem of color realism” as defined in the first section of the target article, is crucial to the argument laid out by Byrne & Hilbert. They claim that the problem of color realism “does not concern, at least in the first instance, color language or color concepts” (sect. 1.1). I argue that this claim is misconceived and that a different characterisation of the problem, and some of their preliminary assumptions makes their positive proposal less appealing.
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67
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Ecological considerations support color physicalism. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03250019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractWe argue that any theory of color physicalism must include consideration of ecological interactions. Ecological and sensorimotor contingencies resulting from relative surface motion and observer motion give rise to measurable effects on the spectrum of light reflecting from surfaces. These contingencies define invariant manifolds in a sensory-spatial space, which is the physical underpinning of all subjective color experiences.
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68
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Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03530011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractThe authors favor a “color realism” theory that considers colors to be physical properties residing in objects that reflect, emit, or transmit light. It is opposed to the theory that colors are sensations or visual experiences. This commentary suggests that both theories are correct, and that context usually indicates which of these dual aspects is being considered.
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69
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Abstract
AbstractThe colors we perceive are the outcome of an attempt to meaningfully order the spectral information from the environment. These colors are not the result of a straightforward mapping of a physical property to a sensation, but arise from an interaction between our environment and our visual system. Thus, although one may infer from a surface’ reflectance characteristics that it will be perceived as “colored,” true colors only arise by virtue of the interaction of the reflected light with the eye (and brain) of an observer.
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70
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Abstract
AbstractThose who identify colours with physical properties need to say how the content of colour experiences relate to their favoured identifications. This is because it is not plausible to hold that colour experiences represent things as having the physical properties in question. I sketch how physical realists about colour might tackle this item of unfinished business.
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71
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Abstract
AbstractByrne & Hilbert (B&H) assert that reflectances embody the reality of color, but metamerism smears the authors' “real” color categories into uselessness. B&H ignore this problem, possibly because they implicitly adopt a sort of subjectivism, whereby an object is defined by the percepts (or more generally by the measurements) it engenders. Subjectivism is unwieldy, and hence prone to such troubles.
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72
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Spatial position and perceived color of objects. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03450012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractVisual percepts are called veridical when a “real” object can be identified as their cause, and illusions otherwise. The perceived position and color of a flashed object may be called veridical or illusory depending on which viewpoint one adopts. Since “reality” is assumed to be fixed (independent of viewpoint) in the definition of veridicality (or illusion), this suggests that “perceived” position and color are not properties of “real” objects.
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73
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Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03480011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractIn visual science, color is usually regarded as a subjective phenomenon. The relationship between the specific color experiences that are evoked by a visual scene and the physical properties of the surfaces viewed in that scene are complex and highly dependent on spatial context. There is no simple correspondence between experienced color and a stable class of physical reflectances.
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74
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Abstract
AbstractBecause our only access to color qualities is through their appearance, Byrne & Hilbert's insistence on a strict distinction between apparent colors and real colors leaves them without a principled way of determining when, if ever, we see colors as they really are.
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75
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Abstract
AbstractThe reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
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76
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Abstract
AbstractByrne & Hilbert defend color realism, which assumes that: (a) colors are properties of objects; (b) these objects are physical; hence, (c) colors are physical properties. I accept (a), agree that in a certain sense (b) can be defended, but reject (c). Colors are properties of perceptual objects – which also have underlying physical properties – but they are not physical properties.
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77
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Color as a material, not an optical, property. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03390016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Abstract
AbstractFor all animals, color is an indicator of the substance and state of objects, for which purpose reflectance is just one among many relevant optical properties. This broader meaning of color is confirmed by linguistic evidence. Rather than reducing color to a simple physical property, it is more realistic to embrace its full phenomenology.
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78
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Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03290014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Abstract
AbstractThe problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productance physicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?
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79
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In favor of an ecological account of color. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03340014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
AbstractByrne & Hilbert understate the difficulties facing their version of color realism. We doubt that they can fix reflectance types and magnitudes in a way that does not invoke relations to perceivers. B&H's account, therefore, resembles the dispositional or ecological accounts that they dismiss. This is a good thing, for a dispositional account is promising if understood in an ecological framework.
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80
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Abstract
AbstractColor vision provides accurate measures of the phase and intensity of daylight, and also a means of discriminating between objects. Neither property implies that objects are colored.
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81
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Abstract
AbstractRevelation, the thesis that the full intrinsic nature of colors is revealed to us by color experiences, is false in Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) view, but in an interesting and nonobvious way. I show what would make Revelation true, given B&H's account of colors, and then show why that situation fails to obtain, and why that is interesting.
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82
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Surface color perception in constrained environments. Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03400010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
AbstractByrne & Hilbert propose that color can be identified with explicit properties of physical surfaces. I argue that this claim must be qualified to take into account constraints needed to make recovery of surface color information possible. When these constraints are satisfied, then a biological visual system can establish a correspondence between perceived surface color and specific surface properties.
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83
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Abstract
AbstractVision scientists are interested in three diverse entities: physical stimuli, neural states, and consciously perceived colors, and in the mapping rules among the three. In this worldview, the three kinds of entities have coequal status, and views that attribute color exclusively to one or another of them, such as color realism, have no appeal.
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84
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Do metamers matter? Behav Brain Sci 2003. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x03310015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractMetamerism is a rather common feature of objects. The authors see it as problematic because they are concerned with a special case: metamerism in standard conditions. Such metamerism does not, however, pose a problem for color realists. There is an apparent problem in cases of metameric light sources, but to see such metamers as problematic is to fail to answer Berkeley's challenge.
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85
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Abstract
AbstractByrne & Hilbert's thesis, that color be associated with reflectance-type, is questioned on the grounds that it is far from clear that the human visual system is able to determine a surface's reflectance-type with sufficient accuracy. In addition, a (friendly) suggestion is made as to how to amend the definition of reflectance-type in terms of CIE (Commission Internationale de l'Eclairage) coordinates under a canonical illuminant.
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86
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Abstract
Binocular disparity is an aspect of natural viewing. This research investigates whether disparity affects surface color perception. Achromatic settings were obtained and compared for two stereograms of a scene with specular reflections, one stereogram with binocular disparity and one without it (cyclopean view). Binocular disparity was found to improve color constancy. Next, the geometry of specular highlights, which is distorted without binocular disparity, was specifically examined. Measurements compared color constancy with specular reflections that were either normal (with stereo disparity) or distorted (cyclopean view of the specularities). No significant change in constancy was found due to the geometrical distortion of specular highlights that occurs without stereo disparity, suggesting that constancy depends on other features of the percept affected by disparity. The results are discussed in terms of illuminant estimation in surface color perception.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joong Nam Yang
- Department of Ophthalmology & Visual Science, University of Chicago, 940 E. 57th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA
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