Developmental explanation and the ontogeny of birdsong: Nature/nurture redux

Genes, interactions, and the development of behavior

Explaining how genes influence behavior is important to many branches of psychology, including development, behavior genetics, and evolutionary psychology. Presented here is a developmental model linking the immediate consequence of gene activity (transcription of messenger RNA molecules from DNA sequences) to behavior through multiple molecular, cellular, and physiological levels. The model provides a level of detail appropriate to theories of behavioral development that recognizes the molecular level of gene action, dispensing with the metaphorical use of such terms as blueprints, plans, or constraints that has obscured much previous discussion. Special attention is paid to the possible role of immediate-early genes in initiating developmental responses to experience, adding specificity to the claim that neither genes nor experience act alone to shape development.

Learning and memory

Memory is one of the most fundamental mental processes. Neuroscientists study this process by using extremely diverse strategies. Two different approaches aimed at understanding learning and memory were introduced in this symposium. The first focuses on the roles played by synaptic plasticity, especially in long-term depression in the cerebellum in motor learning, and its regulatory mechanism. The second approach uses an elegant chick-quail transplantation system on defined brain regions to study how neural populations interact in development to form behaviorally important neural circuits and to elucidate neurobiological correlates of perceptual and motor predispositions.

Counterevidence from psychopharmacology, psychopathology, and psychobiology

Davey's discussion of phobias is criticized because of the lack of distinctions between the various classes of phobias. Psychopharmacological evidence indicates differing pathophysiologies. Clinical psychopharmacological distinctions are not congruent with either a strict phylogenetic preparedness model or with cognitive biases. Davey's critique of the laboratory bred animal studies seems far fetched. His hypothesis concerning the importance of historical significance is clearly ad hoc rather than based on comparative data.

Heredity × environment or developmental interactions?

This commentary acknowledges the importance of Davey's biocognitive approach to the uneven distribution of fears on the basis of its contribution to a human model for understanding fear. An integrated heredity-environment and developmental transactional approach based on field/system theory is recommended in place of the mechanistic heredity × environment interactionism that Davey uses to explain behavioral ontogeny.

Nonlinear experiential influences on the development of fear reactions

Failure to find an obvious or linear relationship between a developmental experiential factor and a developmental outcome often leads investigators to posit concepts such as “biological preparedness” and “evolved predispositions” that allude to hypothetical geneticmechanisms that may not exist. However, experiential nonlinearities alone may explain the development of certain instinctive behaviors, as shown by studies on alarm call responsivity in mallard ducklings.

Rule-governed and contingency-governed fears

Behavioral research suggests that rule-governed behavior should be less sensitive to environmental changes and thus more resistant to extinction (disconfirmation) than contingency-governed behavior. The opposite is implied in Davey's discussion of ontogenetic and phylogenetic contributions to fear development. The generality of the behavioral findings and their apparent inconsistency with the present article should be further explored with more sensitive research paradigms.

The generalized expectancy bias: An explanatory enigma

According to Davey, generalized expectancy biases cause fearrelevant behavior and may complement Seligman's biological preparedness model. Expectancy biases do not explain the preparedness phenomenon, because such cognitive (or covert behavioral) processes are themselves controlled by social and other environmentally based contingencies. Davey's own examination of the importance of cross-cultural factors can show the relationship between FR stimuli and behavior without needing cognitive agency to explain the behavioral phenomenon.

Enhanced processing of threatening stimuli: The case of face recognition

Because of their evolutionary importance, threat-detection mechanisms are likely to exist at a variety of levels. A recent study of face recognition suggests that novel stimuli receive enhanced processing when presented as fear-related. This suggests the existence of a complex, context-dependent threat-detection mechanism that can adaptively respond to spatiotemporally varying and unique environmental features.

Why are phobias irrational?

We endorse Davey's view that expectancy processes are intimately involved in fear reactions, but question his model on three grounds. First, the mechanism for generating expectancy bias to both ontogenetic and phylogenetic stimuli is not spelled out. Second, the selective association component is unnecessary. Third, the model fails to provide a clear explanation for the irrationality of phobic reactions.

Biologically primed acquisition of aversions and association of expected stimulus pairs: Two different forms of learning

The present commentary emphasizes that the acquisition of fear always involves complex changes in several quasi-independent response systems. Stimulus-specific electrodermal response differentiation as well as the bias to overestimate the belongingness of certain stimulus pairs mainly indicates cognitive processes of selective orienting and attention. Emotion, however, also involves the activation of subcortical motivational circuits. Why certain stimuli acquire rapid access to these basic motivational systems is not explained by the expectancy bias model.

Associative learning: Stimulus arrangement and response consistency

Studies on associative learning in normals and patients need appropriate dependent measures which are sensitive enough to reflect stimulus-specific responses and also consider the context in which the conditioning takes place. Patient's fear responses, once acquired, seem to be maintained by specific cognitive biases such as individual belief systems and a tendency to stay consistent with their previous judgments.

What is the critical evidence favoring expectancy bias theory, and where is it?

Davey has failed to clarify the critical evidence that could corroborate the expectancy bias hypothesis and refute preparedness theory. Such a clarification is necessary because each theory could potentially allow for multiple distal and proximal influences on selective associations. Expectancies are not the only proximal mediators. Our recent findings indicate that affective response matching may be an additional factor promoting such associations.

A third source of developmental differences

An illustrative list is presented of human and animal studies which each point to the existence of a third source, in addition to genetic and environmental factors, underlying phenotypic differences in development. It is argued that this third source may consist of nonlinear epigenetic processes that can create variability at all phenotypical-somatic and behavioral-levels. In a quantitative genetic analysis with human subjects, these processes are confounded with within-family environmental influences. A preliminary model to quantify these influences is introduced.