Reliability of Children's Testimony in the Era of Developmental Reversals

A hoary assumption of the law is that children are more prone to false-memory reports than adults, and hence, their testimony is less reliable than adults'. Since the 1980s, that assumption has been buttressed by numerous studies that detected declines in false memory between early childhood and young adulthood under controlled conditions. Fuzzy-trace theory predicted reversals of this standard developmental pattern in circumstances that are directly relevant to testimony because they involve using the gist of experience to remember events. That prediction has been investigated during the past decade, and a large number of experiments have been published in which false memories have indeed been found to increase between early childhood and young adulthood. Further, experimentation has tied age increases in false memory to improvements in children's memory for semantic gist. According to current scientific evidence, the principle that children's testimony is necessarily more infected with false memories than adults' and that, other things being equal, juries should regard adult's testimony as necessarily more faithful to actual events is untenable.

Preschoolers acquire general knowledge by sharing in pretense

Children acquire general knowledge about many kinds of things, but there are few known means by which this knowledge is acquired. In this article, it is proposed that children acquire generic knowledge by sharing in pretend play. In Experiment 1, twenty-two 3- to 4-year-olds watched pretense in which a puppet represented a "nerp" (an unfamiliar kind of animal). For instance, in one scenario, the nerp ate and disliked a carrot. When subsequently asked generic questions about real nerps, children's responses suggested that they had learned general facts (e.g., nerps dislike carrots). In Experiment 2, thirty-two 4- to 5-year-olds learned from scenarios lacking pretend speech or sound effects. The findings reveal a long overlooked means by which children can acquire generic knowledge.

Priming correct information reduces the misinformation effect

The misinformation effect is a well-established phenomenon in the false memory literature, although the mechanisms that underlie it are debated. In the present study, we explored one aspect of the controversy, the fate of the original memory. We began from an activation-based view of memory, capitalizing on the well-understood processes of associative priming and spreading activation, to test the hypothesis that true and suggested information can coexist in memory. After exposure to misinformation, participants were unknowingly primed with associates of either the true or a suggested item. Misled participants who were primed for the true item performed better on a final memory test than did misled participants primed for neutral information. The results indicated that true and suggested information coexist and that retrieval is influenced by each concept's activation level at test. Implications for theories of the misinformation effect were discussed.

The role of repeated interviewing in children's responses to cross-examination-style questioning

The negative effect of cross-examination-style questioning on children's accuracy is likely to be due to the complex and credibility-challenging questions that characterize the interview. Given that cross-examination occurs after at least one prior interview, however, it is equally possible that repeated interviewing per se impairs children's accuracy, and that the questions asked have little bearing on children's responses. To examine this issue, 5- and 6-year-old children (n= 82) and 9- and 10-year-old children (n= 103) took part in a surprise event and were then interviewed using an analogue of direct examination. Either 1 week or 6 months later, half of the children were re-interviewed with an analogue of cross-examination designed to challenge their direct examination responses. Remaining children were re-interviewed with the same questions that were asked during direct examination. Children's accuracy decreased following their second interview, irrespective of age or delay; however, delay particularly impacted younger children's second interview performance. Children's accuracy was most impaired following a cross-examination-style interview. Overall, cross-examination-style questioning appears to be particularly detrimental to obtaining accurate event reports from children.

The role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect

Previous research using the Gudjonnson suggestibility scale has suggested a role for self-esteem in suggestibility, with participants low in self-esteem being more suggestible than participants high in self-esteem. Four experiments are presented examining the role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect and whether enhanced suggestibility effects in participants low in self-esteem reflect genuine memory impairment. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants completed a standard recognition test. In Experiment 2 participants completed the modified recognition test. In Experiment 3 participants completed a free recall test. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants low in self-esteem demonstrated greater misinformation effects than participants high in self-esteem. In Experiment 3 a 3-day retention interval was employed with the modified test and no differences were found between the two groups on the reporting of the new item. The findings suggest that participants low in self-esteem are particularly sensitive to demand characteristics and post-event suggestion but do not suffer from genuine memory impairment.

Trust in testimony about strangers: young children prefer reliable informants who make positive attributions

Young children have been described as critical consumers of information, particularly in the domain of language learning. Indeed, children are more likely to learn novel words from people with accurate histories of object labeling than with inaccurate ones. But what happens when informant testimony conflicts with a tendency to see the world in a particular way? In impression formation, children exhibit a positivity bias in personality judgments. This study examined whether 3- to 7-year-olds would accept reliable testimony about a stranger's personality that conflicted with a putative positivity bias (i.e., a negative trait attribution). Overall, participants accepted testimony from reliable informants more often than expected by chance, although they were significantly more likely to do so when the information was positive than when it was negative. These findings indicate that in addition to the reliability status of informants, information processing biases have a substantial impact on children's use of informant testimony to learn about the social world.

Children's event reports: factors affecting responses to repeated questions in vignette scenarios and event recall interviews

When adults repeat questions, children often give inconsistent answers. This study aimed to test the claim that these inconsistencies occur because children infer that their first answer was unsatisfactory, and that the adult expects them to change their answer. Children aged 4, 6, and 8 years (N= 134) were asked about vignettes in which an adult repeated a question, with manipulation of the adult's overt dissatisfaction (high vs. low pressure) and knowledge about the information sought. On a separate occasion, the children were given an unrelated event recall interview containing repeated questions. All age groups showed sensitivity to adult dissatisfaction, interpreting question repetition as an implicit request for answer change more frequently in the high than in the low-pressure vignettes. Overall, however, these 'change-expected' interpretations were least frequent in the younger children, who were the most prone to shifting. Also there was no evidence that these interpretations were associated with more frequent shifting in the recall interview. The results do not provide clear support for a simple conversational inference account of shifting, especially in younger children.

Peer influence on event reports among adolescents and young adults

When two or more people witness an event together, the event report from one person can influence others' reports. In the current study we examined the role of age and motivational factors on peer influence regarding event reports in adolescents and young adults. Participants (N=249) watched a short video of a robbery then answered questions with no co-witness information or with information believed to be from a co-witness. Public and private response conditions were included to explore motivations for peer influence. Co-witness information influenced participants' responses, although the effect was equally strong in the private and the public co-witness conditions. Peer influence on event reports was steady across a large age range (11- to 25-year-olds).

Theoretical and forensic implications of developmental studies of the DRM illusion

In the study of false memory, developmental research on the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) illusion has played a pivotal role in theory evaluation and forensic application. The extensive developmental DRM literature (55 experiments published in English-language journals) provided the first clear evidence that false memories can increase dramatically from early childhood onward, whereas traditional ideas about cognitive development predict steady declines. Similar increases have recently been reported in false memory for complex, realistic life events, using forensically oriented paradigms. Age improvements in the ability to connect meaning across words have been found to be necessary and sufficient for developmental increases in the DRM illusion. When the data of developmental DRM studies are combined with parallel findings from forensically oriented paradigms, the result is an existence proof that a principle used by the law to evaluate children's evidence is mistaken. According to that principle, children's versions of events are always more likely to be infected with false memories than those of adults, and hence, juries should give more weight to adults' versions of events.

Relative - not absolute - judgments of credibility affect susceptibility to misinformation conveyed during discussion

People remember different details about the same events, and when they discuss events they exchange new - and misleading - information. Discussion can change memory, especially when the source of new information is highly credible. But we do not know whether the effects of credibility are based on absolute judgments - judging a source's credibility independently from our own credibility - or relative judgments - judging a source's credibility only in relation to our own credibility. We addressed this question by manipulating subjects' expectations, leading them to believe that they either had the same, higher or lower "visual acuity" than their partner while they watched a movie together. To create ample opportunities for the pairs to mention misleading details to one another, each member unknowingly saw a different version of the movie. The pairs then discussed some of the critical differences, but not others. Later, everyone took an independent recognition test. Subjects' susceptibility to misinformation depended on their own credibility relative to their partner's, supporting the idea that susceptibility to misinformation depends on relative differences in credibility.

Dealing with conflicting information: young children's reliance on what they see versus what they are told

Children often learn about the world through direct observation. However, much of children's knowledge is acquired through the testimony of others. This research investigates how preschoolers weigh these two sources of information when they are in conflict. Children watched as an adult hid a toy in one location. Then the adult told children that the toy was in a different location (i.e. false testimony). When retrieving the toy, 4- and 5-year-olds relied on what they had seen and disregarded the adult's false testimony. However, most 3-year-olds deferred to the false testimony, despite what they had directly observed. Importantly, with a positive searching experience based on what they saw, or with a single prior experience with an adult as unreliable, 3-year-olds subsequently relied on their first-hand observation and disregarded the adult's false testimony. Thus, young children may initially be credulous toward others' false testimony that contradicts their direct observation, but skepticism can develop quickly through experience.

Script knowledge enhances the development of children's false memories

We examined whether script knowledge contributes to the development of children's false memories. Sixty 7-year-old and 60 11-year-old children listened to false narratives describing either a high-knowledge event (i.e., fingers being caught in a mousetrap) or a low-knowledge event (i.e., receiving a rectal enema) that were similar in terms of plausibility and pleasantness. Moreover, half of the children in each condition received additional suggestive details about the false events. Across two interviews, children had to report everything they remembered about the events. Script knowledge affected children's false memories in that both younger and older children developed more false memories for the high-knowledge event than for the low-knowledge event. Moreover, at the first interview, additional suggestive details inhibited the development of children's images into false memories.

Post-event information affects children's autobiographical memory after one year

In two experiments, we examined whether post-event information (PEI) about true and false events persisted in children's reports after approximately 1 year. In Experiment 1, 4- to 6-year-olds were given PEI and then were given memory tests 2 weeks and 15 months later. Although PEI appeared in free recall at the initial testing, it decreased substantially by the long-term test. In contrast, on recognition tasks the children showed facilitation and misinformation effects at initial and follow-up tests. Experiment 2 replicated lasting misinformation and facilitation effects in recognition memory among 4- to 9-year-olds who were tested after 1-week and 10-month delays. We conclude that true and false reminders about an experienced event continue to affect children's memory approximately 1 year later.

Who Knows Best? Preschoolers Sometimes Prefer Child Informants Over Adult Informants

Do preschoolers think adults know more about everything than children? Or do they recognize that there are some things that children might know more about than adults? Three-, four-, and five-year-olds (N = 65) were asked to decide whether an adult or child informant would better be able to answer a variety of questions about the nutritional value of foods and about toys. Children at all ages chose to direct the food questions to the adult and the toy questions to the child. Thus, there are some kinds of information for which preschoolers expect that a child would be a better informant than an adult.

The role of evidentiality in Bulgarian children's reliability judgments

Evidentials are grammatical source-of-knowledge markers. In Bulgarian they provide information about authorship--whether the speaker has personally acquired the information or not--and modality--whether perceptual or cognitive mechanisms were involved in the information's generation. In two experiments, Bulgarian kindergarteners and third-graders (ages 6 and 9, N=96) had to decide which one of two utterances containing different evidentials to believe. Experiment 1 showed that children draw on modality information in their decisions: Third-graders favored perceptual over cognitive and kindergartners cognitive over perceptual sources. Experiment 2 showed that third-graders can also draw on the authorship information carried by evidentials: they favored first- over second-hand information. The discussion focuses on understanding the development of children's use of evidentials.

Pediatric headache: an examination of process variables in treatment

The goal of this article is to provide a rational methodological review of studies addressing the treatment of childhood headache. In particular, the goal is to provide a review of process variables that may be associated with the efficacy of behavioral and psychological treatments for childhood headache. A search for studies that examined the efficacy of treatment for headache among children younger than 12 years of age was conducted using Medline from 1966 to 2005. A total of 9 studies were selected for the present systematic review. The findings from this study suggest that although research supports the use of behavioral treatments for headache among this patient population, process variables such as child demographics, as well as treatment characteristics such as time in treatment, may moderate treatment efficacy.

Unwarranted Assumptions about Children's Testimonial Accuracy

We examine eight unwarranted assumptions made by expert witnesses, forensic interviewers, and legal scholars about the reliability of children's eyewitness reports. The first four assumptions modify some central beliefs about the nature of suggestive interviews, age-related differences in resistance to suggestion, and thresholds necessary to produce tainted reports. The fifth unwarranted assumption involves the influence of both individual and interviewer factors in determining children's suggestibility. The sixth unwarranted assumption concerns the claim that suggested reports are detectable. The seventh unwarranted assumption concerns new findings about how children deny, disclose, and/or recant their abuse. Finally, we examine unwarranted statements about the value of science to the forensic arena. It is important not only for researchers but also expert witnesses and court-appointed psychologists to be aware of these unwarranted assumptions.

Development of the false-memory illusion

The counterintuitive developmental trend in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) illusion (that false-memory responses increase with age) was investigated in learning-disabled and nondisabled children from the 6- to 14-year-old age range. Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that because there are qualitative differences in how younger versus older children and disabled versus nondisabled children connect meaning information across the words on DRM lists, certain key effects that are observed in adult studies will be absent in young children and in learning-disabled children. Data on 6 such adult effects (list strength, recall inflation, delayed inflation, delayed stability, thematic intrusion, and true-false dissociation) were used to investigate this hypothesis, and the resulting data were consistent with prediction.

Global gist extraction in children and adults

The DRM paradigm was used to examine the role of global gist extraction in producing false memories in children and adults. First-graders, third-graders, and adults watched a videotape of a woman reading seven DRM lists, and then took a recognition memory test. Blocked (vs random) presentation and instructions to attend to the theme of lists were manipulated to enhance gist processing. In the first experiment, blocked presentation increased false recognition relative to random presentation in adults but not in first-graders or third-graders. In the second experiment, instructions to attend to list themes increased false recognition in third-graders and not in adults or first-graders. The results suggest a developmental pattern in which children become more adept at global gist extraction as they get older. These results are consistent with fuzzy trace theory's prediction of better gist processing as children grow older.

The development of the memorability-based strategy: Insight from a training study

We investigated whether the memorability-based strategy, a process supporting the rejection of nonexperienced event occurrence, could be promoted through training. The performance of children who received memorability-based training was compared with that of (a) children who received source-monitoring training and (b) children who did not receive any specific training but were instructed to be as accurate as possible. Participants (142 6- to 10-year-olds) enacted common and bizarre actions. Eighteen days later, participants received misinformation about the first session. Five days after being misinformed, children were questioned about the first session. Compared with children in the no training condition, those in both training conditions reported significantly more true events, but only older children who received the memorability-based training were more likely to reject bizarre suggested events. Age interacted with action type when metacognitive assessments about false event rejection were examined, consistent with the idea that the use of the memorability-based strategy develops late during the elementary school years.

Dissociated developmental trajectories for semantic and phonological false memories

False recognition following presentation of semantically related and phonologically related word lists was evaluated in 8-, 11-, and 13-year-olds. Children heard lists of words that were either semantic (e.g., bed, rest, wake ...) or phonological associates (e.g., pole, bowl, hole ...) of a critical unpresented word (e.g., sleep, roll), respectively. A semantic false memory was defined as false recognition of a semantically related but unpresented word. A phonological false memory was defined as false recognition of a phonologically related but unpresented word. False memories in the two tasks showed opposite developmental trends, increasing with age for semantic relatedness and decreasing with age for phonological relatedness.