Specificity and Coherence of Body Representations

Implicit body representations and the conscious body image

Recent studies have revealed that somatosensory processing relies on a class of implicit body representations showing large distortions of size and shape. The relation between these representations and the conscious body image remains unclear. Dissociations have been reported in the clinical literature on eating disorders between different body image measures, with larger and more consistent distortions found with depictive measures, in which participants compare their body to a visual depiction of a body, than metric measures, in which participants compare their body to some non-body standard. Here, we compared implicit body representations underlying position sense to the body image measured with both depictive and metric methods. The body image was measured using both a depictive method (template matching) in which participants judged whether their hand was wider or more slender than a shown hand picture, and a metric method (line length) in which participants judged whether different parts of their hand were shorter or longer than a presented line. Consistent with previous findings, characteristic distortions were found for the implicit body representation underlying position sense. These distortions were also found in attenuated form for metric - but not depictive - body image measures. While replicating the basic dissociation between implicit body representations and the conscious body image, these results demonstrate that this dissociation is not absolute and specific tasks may utilise both to varying degrees depending on task demands. Metric measures may not be pure measures of body image, but some combination of visual and somatosensory body representations.

What Is It Like to Have a Body?

Few issues in psychology are as fundamental or as elusive as the sense of one’s own body. Despite widespread recognition of the link between body and self, psychology has only recently developed methods for the scientific study of bodily awareness. Experimental manipulations of embodiment in healthy volunteers have allowed for important advances in knowledge. Synchronous multisensory inputs from different modalities play a fundamental role in producing body ownership: the feeling that my body is “mine.” Indeed, appropriate multisensory stimulation can induce a sense of ownership over external objects, virtual avatars, and even other people’s bodies. We argue that bodily experience is not monolithic, but rather has measurable internal structure and components that can be identified psychometrically and psychophysically, which suggests that the apparent phenomenal unity of self-consciousness may be illusory. We further review evidence that the sense of one’s own body is highly plastic, with representations of body structure and size particularly sensitive to multisensory influences.

Moving a Rubber Hand that Feels Like Your Own: A Dissociation of Ownership and Agency

During voluntary hand movement, we sense that we generate the movement and that the hand is a part of our body. These feelings of control over bodily actions, or the sense of agency, and the ownership of body parts are two fundamental aspects of the way we consciously experience our bodies. However, little is known about how these processes are functionally linked. Here, we introduce a version of the rubber hand illusion in which participants control the movements of the index finger of a model hand, which is in full view, by moving their own right index finger. We demonstrated that voluntary finger movements elicit a robust illusion of owning the rubber hand and that the senses of ownership and agency over the model hand can be dissociated. We systematically varied the relative timing of the finger movements (synchronous versus asynchronous), the mode of movement (active versus passive), and the position of the model hand (anatomically congruent versus incongruent positions). Importantly, asynchrony eliminated both ownership and agency, passive movements abolished the sense of agency but left ownership intact, and incongruent positioning of the model hand diminished ownership but did not eliminate agency. These findings provide evidence for a double dissociation of ownership and agency, suggesting that they represent distinct cognitive processes. Interestingly, we also noted that the sense of agency was stronger when the hand was perceived to be a part of the body, and only in this condition did we observe a significant correlation between the subjects' ratings of agency and ownership. We discuss this in the context of possible differences between agency over owned body parts and agency over actions that involve interactions with external objects. In summary, the results obtained in this study using a simple moving rubber hand illusion paradigm extend previous findings on the experience of ownership and agency and shed new light on their relationship.

Visuo-tactile Integration in Personal Space

Integration of information across sensory modalities is enhanced when stimuli in both modalities are in the same location. This “spatial rule” of multisensory integration has been primarily studied in humans by comparing stimuli located either in the same versus opposite side of the body midline or in peripersonal versus extrapersonal space, both of which involve large, categorical differences in spatial location. Here we used psychophysics and ERPs to investigate visuo-tactile integration in personal space (i.e., on the skin surface). We used the mirror box technique to manipulate the congruence of visual and tactile information about which finger on either the right or left hand had been touched. We observed clear compatibility effects for both visual and tactile judgments of which finger on the left hand had been touched. No such effects, however, were found for judgments about the right hand. ERP data showed a similar pattern. Amplitude of the vertex P200 potential was enhanced and that of the N2 was reduced for congruent visuo-tactile events on the left, but not the right, hand. Similarly, a later positivity over posterior parietal cortices (P300) showed contralateral enhancement for congruent visuo-tactile events on both the left and right hands. These results provide clear evidence for spatial constraints on visuo-tactile integration defined in personal space and also reveal clear lateralization of these effects. Furthermore, these results link these “ultraprecise” spatial constraints to processing in the right posterior parietal cortex.

Body integrity identity disorder: deranged body processing, right fronto-parietal dysfunction, and phenomenological experience of body incongruity

Body integrity identity disorder (BIID) is characterised by profound experience of incongruity between the biological and desired body structure. The condition manifests in "non-belonging" of body parts, and the subsequent desire to amputate, paralyse or disable a limb. Little is known about BIID; however, a neuropsychological model implicating right fronto-parietal and insular networks is emerging, with potential disruption to body representation. We argue that, as there is scant systematic research on BIID published to date and much of the research is methodologically weak, it is premature to assume that the only process underlying bodily experience that is compromised is body representation. The present review systematically investigates which aspects of neurological processing of the body, and sense of self, may be compromised in BIID. We argue that the disorder most likely reflects dysregulation in multiple levels of body processing. That is, the disunity between self and the body could arguably come about through congenital and/or developmental disruption of body representations, which, together with altered multisensory integration, may preclude the experience of self-attribution and embodiment of affected body parts. Ulimately, there is a need for official diagnostic criteria to facilitate epidemiological characterisation of BIID, and for further research to systematically investigate which aspects of body representation and processing are truly compromised in the disorder.

Relationship between bodily illusions and pain syndromes

SUMMARY Apart from their contribution to the overall knowledge of perception and related processes, sensory illusions have been used in recent years to treat and better understand pain disorders such as phantom limb pain or complex regional pain syndrome. With the help of modern imaging techniques, we can examine connections between basic processes of integrative perception and the occurrence of chronic pain. This article gives an overview of recent developments in the area of body illusions and pain, and provides suggestions on how they might lead to novel and effective treatments for chronic pain.

Viewing and feeling touch modulates hand position for reaching

Action requires knowledge of our body location in space. Here we asked if interactions with the external world prior to a reaching action influence how visual location information is used. We investigated if the temporal synchrony between viewing and feeling touch modulates the integration of visual and proprioceptive body location information for action. We manipulated the synchrony between viewing and feeling touch in the Rubber Hand Illusion paradigm prior to participants performing a ballistic reaching task to a visually specified target. When synchronous touch was given, reaching trajectories were significantly shifted compared to asynchronous touch. The direction of this shift suggests that touch influences the encoding of hand position for action. On the basis of this data and previous findings, we propose that the brain uses correlated cues from passive touch and vision to update its own position for action and experience of self-location.

Embodiment, ownership and disownership

There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and (ii) through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and only self-specific embodiment can lead to feelings of ownership. I address issues such as the functional role and the dynamics of embodiment, degrees and measures of ownership, and shared body representations between self and others. I then analyse the interaction between ownership and disownership. On the one hand, I show that there is no evidence that in the Rubber Hand Illusion, the rubber hand replaces the biological hand. On the other hand, I argue that the sense of disownership experienced by patients towards their body part cannot be reduced to the mere lack of ownership.

Cooling the thermal grill illusion through self-touch

Acute peripheral pain is reduced by multisensory interactions at the spinal level [1]. Central pain is reduced by reorganization of cortical body representations [2, 3]. We show here that acute pain can also be reduced by multisensory integration through self-touch, which provides proprioceptive, thermal, and tactile input forming a coherent body representation [4, 5]. We combined self-touch with the thermal grill illusion (TGI) [6]. In the traditional TGI, participants press their fingers on two warm objects surrounding one cool object. The warm surround unmasks pain pathways, which paradoxically causes the cool object to feel painfully hot. Here, we warmed the index and ring fingers of each hand while cooling the middle fingers. Immediately after, these three fingers of the right hand were touched against the same three fingers on the left hand. This self-touch caused a dramatic 64% reduction in perceived heat. We show that this paradoxical release from paradoxical heat cannot be explained by low-level touch-temperature interactions alone. To reduce pain, we often clutch a painful hand with the other hand. We show here that self-touch not only gates pain signals reaching the brain [7-9] but also, via multisensory integration, increases coherence of cognitive body representations to which pain afferents project [10].

An implicit body representation underlying human position sense

Knowing the body's location in external space is a fundamental perceptual task. Perceiving the location of body parts through proprioception requires that information about the angles of each joint (i.e., body posture) be combined with information about the size and shape of the body segments between joints. Although information about body posture is specified by on-line afferent signals, no sensory signals are directly informative about body size and shape. Thus, human position sense must refer to a stored body model of the body's metric properties, such as body part size and shape. The need for such a model has long been recognized; however, the properties of this model have never been systematically investigated. We developed a technique to isolate and measure this body model. Participants judged the location in external space of 10 landmarks on the hand. By analyzing the internal configuration of the locations of these points, we produced implicit maps of the mental representation of hand size and shape. We show that this part of the body model is massively distorted, in a reliable and characteristic fashion, featuring shortened fingers and broadened hands. Intriguingly, these distortions appear to retain several characteristics of primary somatosensory representations, such as the Penfield homunculus.

Virtual hand illusion induced by visuomotor correlations

Background

Our body schema gives the subjective impression of being highly stable. However, a number of easily-evoked illusions illustrate its remarkable malleability. In the rubber-hand illusion, illusory ownership of a rubber-hand is evoked by synchronous visual and tactile stimulation on a visible rubber arm and on the hidden real arm. Ownership is concurrent with a proprioceptive illusion of displacement of the arm position towards the fake arm. We have previously shown that this illusion of ownership plus the proprioceptive displacement also occurs towards a virtual 3D projection of an arm when the appropriate synchronous visuotactile stimulation is provided. Our objective here was to explore whether these illusions (ownership and proprioceptive displacement) can be induced by only synchronous visuomotor stimulation, in the absence of tactile stimulation.

Methodology/Principal Findings

To achieve this we used a data-glove that uses sensors transmitting the positions of fingers to a virtually projected hand in the synchronous but not in the asynchronous condition. The illusion of ownership was measured by means of questionnaires. Questions related to ownership gave significantly larger values for the synchronous than for the asynchronous condition. Proprioceptive displacement provided an objective measure of the illusion and had a median value of 3.5 cm difference between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. In addition, the correlation between the feeling of ownership of the virtual arm and the size of the drift was significant.

Conclusions/Significance

We conclude that synchrony between visual and proprioceptive information along with motor activity is able to induce an illusion of ownership over a virtual arm. This has implications regarding the brain mechanisms underlying body ownership as well as the use of virtual bodies in therapies and rehabilitation.

How many motoric body representations can we grasp?

At present there is a debate on the number of body representations in the brain. The most commonly used dichotomy is based on the body image, thought to underlie perception and proven to be susceptible to bodily illusions, versus the body schema, hypothesized to guide actions and so far proven to be robust against bodily illusions. In this rubber hand illusion study we investigated the susceptibility of the body schema by manipulating the amount of stimulation on the rubber hand and the participant's hand, adjusting the postural configuration of the hand, and investigating a grasping rather than a pointing response. Observed results showed for the first time altered grasping responses as a consequence of the grip aperture of the rubber hand. This illusion-sensitive motor response challenges one of the foundations on which the dichotomy is based, and addresses the importance of illusion induction versus type of response when investigating body representations.