Representational momentum when attention is divided

Spatial memory and explicit knowledge: an effect of instruction on representational momentum

Freyd (1987; Finke & Freyd, 1985) suggested that representational momentum (i.e., forward displacement in memory for the location of a moving target) is impervious to error feedback (i.e., is modular or cognitively impenetrable), but studies supporting this claim might not have allowed sufficient opportunity for learning to occur. In the experiment reported here, participants were (a) naive regarding representational momentum, (b) informed about representational momentum but not instructed to counteract it, or (c) informed about representational momentum and instructed to counteract it. All participants exhibited significant displacement. However, participants informed about representational momentum exhibited less forward displacement than did naive participants due to a greater tendency to respond same to probes behind the true--same position. Possible mechanisms of compensation and the notion that displacement reflects both modular (cognitively impenetrable) and nonmodular (cognitively penetrable) components are addressed.

Representational momentum in scenes: Learning spatial layout

In four experiments, we examined whether watching a scene from the perspective of a camera rotating across it allowed participants to recognize or identify the scene's spatial layout. Completing a representational momentum (RM) task, participants viewed a smoothly animated display and then indicated whether test probes were in the same position as they were in the final view of the animation. We found RM anticipations for the camera's movement across the scene, with larger distortions resulting from camera rotations that brought objects into the viewing frame compared with camera rotations that took objects out of the viewing frame. However, the RM task alone did not lead to successful recognition of the scene's map or identification of spatial relations between objects. Watching a scene from a rotating camera's perspective and making position judgments is not sufficient for learning spatial layout.

Measuring causal perception: connections to representational momentum?

In a collision between two objects, we can perceive not only low-level properties, such as color and motion, but also the seemingly high-level property of causality. It has proven difficult, however, to measure causal perception in a quantitatively rigorous way which goes beyond perceptual reports. Here we focus on the possibility of measuring perceived causality using the phenomenon of representational momentum (RM). Recent studies suggest a relationship between causal perception and RM, based on the fact that RM appears to be attenuated for causally 'launched' objects. This is explained by appeal to the visual expectation that a 'launched' object is inert and thus should eventually cease its movement after a collision, without a source of self-propulsion. We first replicated these demonstrations, and then evaluated this alleged connection by exploring RM for different types of displays, including the contrast between causal launching and non-causal 'passing'. These experiments suggest that the RM-attenuation effect is not a pure measure of causal perception, but rather may reflect lower-level spatiotemporal correlates of only some causal displays. We conclude by discussing the strengths and pitfalls of various methods of measuring causal perception.

Representational momentum and related displacements in spatial memory: A review of the findings

Memory for the final location of a moving target is often displaced in the direction of target motion, and this has been referred to as representational momentum. Characteristics of the target (e.g., velocity, size, direction, and identity), display (e.g., target format, retention interval, and response method), context (landmarks, expectations, and attribution of motion source), and observer (e.g., allocation of attention, eye movements, and psychopathology) that influence the direction and magnitude of displacement are reviewed. Specific conclusions regarding numerous variables that influence displacement (e.g., presence of landmarks or surrounding context), as well as broad-based conclusions regarding displacement in general (e.g., displacement does not reflect objective physical principles, may reflect aspects of naive physics, does not solely reflect eye movements, may involve some modular processing, and reflects high-level processes) are drawn. A possible computational theory of displacement is suggested in which displacement (1) helps bridge the gap between perception and action and (2) plays a critical part in localizing stimuli in the environment.

Illusory motion and representational momentum

When a moving target vanishes abruptly, participants judge its final position as being ahead of its actual final position, in the direction of motion (representational momentum; Freyd & Finke, 1984). In the present study, we presented illusory motion and examined whether or not forward displacement was affected by the perceived direction and speed of the target. Experiments 1A and 1B showed that an illusory direction of movement of a target was perceived, and Experiment 2 showed that an illusory speed of a moving target was observed. However, neither the direction nor the magnitude of forward displacement was affected by these illusions. Therefore, it was suggested that the mechanism underlying forward displacement (or some extrapolation processing) uses different motion signals than does the perceptual mechanism.

Attentional load modulates mislocalization of moving stimuli, but does not eliminate the error

Localization of the onset and offset of a moving target is subject to a number of errors that have to be attributed to events following or preceding the target event. Apparently, observers are unable to ignore the spatiotemporal context surrounding the target event. In two experiments, observers' attention was directed toward a single position along a trajectory, two positions along a single trajectory, or two positions along two different trajectories. In the latter condition, attention to details of a single trajectory was reduced. At the same time, motion type was manipulated by varying the temporal interval between successive target presentations. The localization error was not affected by attentional load; however, effects of motion type were eliminated when two trajectories had to be attended to. It may be sufficient to notice that the target has moved for localization errors to occur, while specifics of the trajectory are ignored.

The Case for Motor Involvement in Perceiving Conspecifics

Perceiving other people's behaviors activates imitative motor plans in the perceiver, but there is disagreement as to the function of this activation. In contrast to other recent proposals (e.g., that it subserves overt imitation, identification and understanding of actions, or working memory), here it is argued that imitative motor activation feeds back into the perceptual processing of conspecifics' behaviors, generating top-down expectations and predictions of the unfolding action. Furthermore, this account incorporates recent ideas about emulators in the brain-mental simulations that run in parallel to the external events they simulate-to provide a mechanism by which motoric involvement could contribute to perception. Evidence from a variety of literatures is brought to bear to support this account of perceiving human body movement.

Supporting the attentional momentum view of IOR: Is attention biased to go right?

Inhibition of return (IOR) refers to the finding that individuals are slower to respond to a target presented at a previously attended location than they are to respond to a target presented at a novel location (Posner & Cohen, 1984). The attentional momentum theory is a recent view of how attention moves around the environment, and it provides an account for the IOR effect that does not rely on an inhibitory mechanism (Pratt, Spalek, & Bradshaw, 1999). The present paper supports the attentional momentum viewpoint in two ways: first, by replicating the finding that reaction times to targets at the uncued locations are not all the same (Pratt et al., 1999) and second, by showing that responses made to all locations on the cued side of fixation, and not just to the locations that attention had previously traversed, are slower than are responses made to locations on the opposite side of fixation. We also demonstrate that there is a directional bias to the IOR effect that results in the effect's being larger when attention moves in a left-to-right manner.

A Clockwork Orange: Compensation opposing momentum in memory for location

Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl's (1983; Libet, 1985) influential work using a clock-watching task suggests that voluntary actions are initiated in motor cortex prior to the point where the participant claims to have initiated that action. Joordens, van Duijn, and Spalek (2002) showed that a bias exists in this task with respect to the participants' reports of initiation times. Joordens et al. assumed that this bias was primarily due to motion cues that are very much like those used to elicit phenomena such as representational momentum. In the present Experiment 1, it is demonstrated that this bias disappears when a mouse-click response is used in place of a temporal-order judgment. This finding, however, is actually more confusing than clarifying given that the procedural parallels with representational momentum are still present and should be supporting a bias. In the three subsequent experiments the view that a bias is indeed present, but that it is opposed by an opposite-acting compensation process, is proposed and tested. Implications for both representational momentum and for the general use of clock-watching tasks (e.g., Libet et al., 1983) are highlighted.

Attention maintains mental extrapolation of target position: irrelevant distractors eliminate forward displacement after implied motion

Observers' judgments of the final position of a moving target are typically shifted in the direction of implied motion ("representational momentum"). The role of attention is unclear: visual attention may be necessary to maintain or halt target displacement. When attention was captured by irrelevant distractors presented during the retention interval, forward displacement after implied target motion disappeared, suggesting that attention may be necessary to maintain mental extrapolation of target motion. In a further corroborative experiment, the deployment of attention was measured after a sequence of implied motion, and faster responses were observed to stimuli appearing in the direction of motion. Thus, attention may guide the mental extrapolation of target motion. Additionally, eye movements were measured during stimulus presentation and retention interval. The results showed that forward displacement with implied motion does not depend on eye movements. Differences between implied and smooth motion are discussed with respect to recent neurophysiological findings.