Distinguishing the Neural Correlates of Perceptual Awareness and Postperceptual Processing

Dissociating Perceptual Awareness and Postperceptual Processing: The P300 Is Not a Reliable Marker of Somatosensory Target Detection

A central challenge in the study of conscious perception lies in dissociating the neural correlates of perceptual awareness from those reflecting its precursors and consequences. No-report paradigms have been instrumental in this endeavor, demonstrating that the event-related potential P300, recorded from the human scalp, reflects reports rather than awareness. However, these paradigms cannot probe the degree to which stimuli are consciously processed from trial to trial and, thus, leave open the possibility that the P300 is a genuine correlate of conscious access enabling reports. Here, instead of removing report requirements, we took the opposite approach and equated postperceptual task demands across conscious and unconscious trials by orthogonalizing target detection and overt reports in a somatosensory detection task. We used Bayesian model selection to track the transformation from physical to perceptual processing stages in the EEG data of 24 male and female participants and show that the early P50 component scaled with physical stimulus intensity, whereas the N140 component was the first correlate of target detection. The late P300 component was elicited for both perceived and unperceived stimuli and was not substantially modulated by target detection. This was in stark contrast to a control experiment using a classical direct report task, which replicated the P50 and N140 effects but additionally showed a strong effect of target detection in the P300 time range. Our results demonstrate the task dependence of the P300 in the somatosensory modality and show that late cortical potentials dissociate from perceptual awareness even when stimuli are always reported.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The time it takes for sensory information to enter our conscious experience can be an indicator of the neural processing stages that lead to perceptual awareness. However, because many cognitive processes routinely correlate with perception, isolating those signals that uniquely reflect perceptual awareness is not a trivial task. Here, we show that late electroencephalography signals cease to correlate with somatosensory awareness when common task confounds are controlled. Importantly, by balancing report requirements instead of abolishing them, we show that the lack of late effects cannot be explained by a lack of conscious access. Instead, we propose that conscious access occurs earlier, at ∼150 ms, supporting the view that early activity in sensory cortices is a neural correlate of conscious perception.

Don't tell anyone: the importance of no-report paradigms in neuroscience of consciousness

The neural correlates of perceptual awareness are usually investigated by comparing experimental conditions in which subjects are aware or not aware of the delivered stimulus. This, however, implies that subjects report their experience, possibly biasing the neural responses with the postperceptual processes involved. This Neuro Forum article reviews evidence from an electroencephalography (EEG) study by Cohen and colleagues (Cohen M, Ortego K, Kyroudis A, Pitts M. J Neurosci 40: 4925-4935, 2020) addressing the importance of no-report paradigms in the neuroscience of consciousness. In particular, authors show that P3b, one of the proposed canonical "signatures" of the conscious processing, is strongly elicited only when subjects have to report their experience, proposing a reconsideration in the approach to the neuroscience of consciousness.

Bifurcation in brain dynamics reveals a signature of conscious processing independent of report

An outstanding challenge for consciousness research is to characterize the neural signature of conscious access independently of any decisional processes. Here we present a model-based approach that uses inter-trial variability to identify the brain dynamics associated with stimulus processing. We demonstrate that, even in the absence of any task or behavior, the electroencephalographic response to auditory stimuli shows bifurcation dynamics around 250–300 milliseconds post-stimulus. Namely, the same stimulus gives rise to late sustained activity on some trials, and not on others. This late neural activity is predictive of task-related reports, and also of reports of conscious contents that are randomly sampled during task-free listening. Source localization further suggests that task-free conscious access recruits the same neural networks as those associated with explicit report, except for frontal executive components. Studying brain dynamics through variability could thus play a key role for identifying the core signatures of conscious access, independent of report.

Current knowledge on the neural basis of consciousness mostly relies on situations where people report their perception. Here, the authors provide evidence for the idea that bifurcation in brain dynamics reflects conscious perception independent of report.

Expectations of reward and efficacy guide cognitive control allocation

The amount of mental effort we invest in a task is influenced by the reward we can expect if we perform that task well. However, some of the rewards that have the greatest potential for driving these efforts are partly determined by factors beyond one's control. In such cases, effort has more limited efficacy for obtaining rewards. According to the Expected Value of Control theory, people integrate information about the expected reward and efficacy of task performance to determine the expected value of control, and then adjust their control allocation (i.e., mental effort) accordingly. Here we test this theory's key behavioral and neural predictions. We show that participants invest more cognitive control when this control is more rewarding and more efficacious, and that these incentive components separately modulate EEG signatures of incentive evaluation and proactive control allocation. Our findings support the prediction that people combine expectations of reward and efficacy to determine how much effort to invest.

Growing evidence for separate neural mechanisms for attention and consciousness

Our conscious experience of the world seems to go in lockstep with our attentional focus: We tend to see, hear, taste, and feel what we attend to, and vice versa. This tight coupling between attention and consciousness has given rise to the idea that these two phenomena are indivisible. In the late 1950s, the honoree of this special issue, Charles Eriksen, was among a small group of early pioneers that sought to investigate whether a transient increase in overall level of attention (alertness) in response to a noxious stimulus can be decoupled from conscious perception using experimental techniques. Recent years saw a similar debate regarding whether attention and consciousness are two dissociable processes. Initial evidence that attention and consciousness are two separate processes primarily rested on behavioral data. However, the past couple of years witnessed an explosion of studies aimed at testing this conjecture using neuroscientific techniques. Here we provide an overview of these and related empirical studies on the distinction between the neuronal correlates of attention and consciousness, and detail how advancements in theory and technology can bring about a more detailed understanding of the two. We argue that the most promising approach will combine ever-evolving neurophysiological and interventionist tools with quantitative, empirically testable theories of consciousness that are grounded in a mathematically formalized understanding of phenomenology.

Representational dynamics preceding conscious access

Our senses are continuously bombarded with more information than our brain can process up to the level of awareness. The present study aimed to enhance understanding on how attentional selection shapes conscious access under conditions of rapidly changing input. Using an attention task, EEG, and multivariate decoding of individual target- and distractor-defining features, we specifically examined dynamic changes in the representation of targets and distractors as a function of conscious access and the task-relevance (target or distractor) of the preceding item in the RSVP stream. At the behavioral level, replicating previous work and suggestive of a flexible gating mechanism, we found a significant impairment in conscious access to targets (T2) that were preceded by a target (T1) followed by one or two distractors (i.e., the attentional blink), but striking facilitation of conscious access to targets shown directly after another target (i.e., lag-1 sparing and blink reversal). At the neural level, conscious access to T2 was associated with enhanced early- and late-stage T1 representations and enhanced late-stage D1 representations, and interestingly, could be predicted based on the pattern of EEG activation well before T1 was presented. Yet, across task conditions, we did not find convincing evidence for the notion that conscious access is affected by rapid top-down selection-related modulations of the strength of early sensory representations induced by the preceding visual event. These results cannot easily be explained by existing accounts of how attentional selection shapes conscious access under rapidly changing input conditions, and have important implications for theories of the attentional blink and consciousness more generally.

Auditory Event-Related "Global Effect" Predicts Recovery of Overt Consciousness

Objective: To explore whether the presence of an event-related potential (ERP) "global effect" (GE+)-that corresponds to a correlate of conscious processing in the local-global auditory task-predicts behaviorally overt consciousness recovery in a large cohort of patients suffering from disorders of consciousness (DOC). Methods: We conducted a prospective study on all DOC patients evaluated during the 2009-2018 period. Behavioral examination included Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) scores and bedside high-density EEG recordings. Consciousness recovery was evaluated at 6 months by a structured phone interview. The predictive value of a GE+ was calculated both on survivors and on all patients. Results: A total of 236 patients with a documented outcome and technically valid EEG recordings could be included. Among them, 66 patients had a GE+ status (28%). Presence of GE+ predicted behaviorally overt consciousness recovery in survivors with high specificity (Sp = 84%) and high positive predictive value (PPV = 80%) but with low sensitivity (Se = 35%) and low negative predictive value (NPV = 42%). Positive likelihood ratio (LR+) of GE+ was superior to LR+ of initial clinical status and of ERP effect indexing unconscious auditory processing [local effect (LE)]. Interpretation: Our results demonstrate that the presence of a bedside ERP GE+ is highly predictive of behaviorally overt consciousness recovery in DOC patients, regardless of the delay, of behavioral status, and of the etiology of brain dysfunction. However, the absence of this effect is not a reliable predictor of negative outcome. This study provides Class III evidence that the presence of an ERP "global effect" predicts consciousness recovery in DOC patients.

Neural changes in early visual processing after 6 months of mindfulness training in older adults

Mindfulness has been shown to improve attentional performance, which is known to decline in aging. Long-latency electroencephalographic (EEG) event-related potential (ERP) changes have been reported immediately after mindfulness training, however the enduring stability of these effects is unknown. Furthermore, the ability of mindfulness to impact earlier stages of information processing is unclear. We examined neural activation using high density EEG in older adults engaged in mindfulness training to examine the long-term stability of training effects. After 6 months of training, mindfulness practitioners displayed enhanced neural activation during sensory encoding and perceptual processing of a visual cue. Enhanced perceptual processing of a visual cue was associated with increased neural activation during post-perceptual processing of a subsequent target. Similar changes were not observed in a control group engaged in computer-based attention training over the same period. Neural changes following mindfulness training were accompanied by behavioural improvements in attentional performance. Our results are suggestive of increased efficiency of the neural pathways subserving bottom-up visual processing together with an enhanced ability to mobilise top-down attentional processes during perceptual and post-perceptual processing following mindfulness training. These results indicate that mindfulness may enhance neural processes known to deteriorate in normal aging and age-related neurodegenerative diseases.

Consciousness can overflow report: Novel evidence from attribute amnesia of a single stimulus

There is a long-standing debate on whether visual consciousness is confined to cognitive access measured by reportability, or whether it is rich and overflows reportability. Much of the debate in previous studies concentrated on whether information outside attentional focus could be consciously experienced and reportable. This study sought to address the debate from a new perspective, through testing whether fully attended supraliminal information is necessarily reportable with a variation of attribute amnesia. Participants were asked to judge the parity of a single number or whether a Chinese character referred to furniture. After several trials, they were unexpectedly asked to report the stimulus identity. The results consistently showed that participants could not correctly report the identity, indicating that fully attended information that was consciously perceived could sometimes overflow report. In addition to providing novel overflow evidence, these findings also have crucial implications in understanding the relationship between consciousness and working memory.