Neural correlates of theory-of-mind reasoning: an event-related potential study

Changes in reality monitoring and episodic memory in early childhood

The purposes of this research were to examine the developmental relation between reality monitoring and episodic memory, to link reality monitoring to autobiographical memory by using extended naturalistic events, and to examine prefrontal functioning as a potential contributor to development in reality monitoring and episodic memory. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were worse than 6- or 8-year-olds at reality monitoring after a week delay, despite the fact that they remembered more about real than imagined events and remembered different aspects of each. In Experiments 2 and 3, reality monitoring and episodic memory were evaluated for 4- and 6-year-olds immediately after the events occurred and, in Experiment 3, again after a week delay. Reality monitoring was at higher levels for both age groups, but age differences remained. These data suggest that preschoolers' difficulties with reality monitoring result from a combination of episodic memory deficits and strategic differences. In addition, correlation analyses more directly linked preschoolers' reality monitoring to episodic memory and supported the hypothesis that episodic memory development is related to prefrontal functioning.

Decoupling beliefs from reality in the brain: an ERP study of theory of mind

Theory of mind, attributing behaviors to mental states, is a cognitive ability central to human social interactions. To investigate the neural substrates of theory of mind reasoning, we recorded human event-related brain potentials (ERP) while participants made judgments about belief and judgments about reality. A late ERP component (peaking around 800 ms post-stimulus) with a left frontal scalp distribution, which was inconsistent with a source in the anterior paracingulate cortex and consistent with a source possibly in the left orbitofrontal cortex, differentiated judgments about belief and about reality. This late left frontal component is probably associated with the decoupling mechanism that distinguishes mental states from reality.

Annotation: the neural basis of social impairments in autism: the role of the dorsal medial-frontal cortex and anterior cingulate system

BACKGROUND

The fundamental social disturbance of autism is characterized, in part, by problems in the acquisition of joint attention skills in the first years of life, followed by impairments in the development of social cognition, as assessed on theory of mind (ToM) measures. Recently, studies have indicated that a system involving the dorsal medial-frontal cortex (DMFC), and the anterior cingulate (AC), may contribute to the development of the tendency to initiate joint attention in infancy. Similarly, research has implicated the DMFC/AC system in ToM performance in typical and atypical individuals. These data suggest it may be useful to consider the functions associated with this system in the developmental psychopathology of autism.

METHOD

A review of the studies of the connections between the DMFC/AC system, joint attention and ToM task performance.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

This review raises the hypothesis that the DMFC/AC may be involved in the basic disturbance in social orienting in autism. The DMFAC/AC may also play a role in the capacity to monitor proprioceptive information concerning self-action and integrate this self-related information with exteroceptive perceptual information about the behavior of other people. A disturbance in these functions of the DMFC/ AC may contribute to the atypical development of intersubjectivity, joint attention and social cognition that may impair the lives of people with autism. Thus, impairment in the development of this system may constitute a neural substrate for socio-cognitive deficits in autism.

Dressing the mind properly for the game

Game theory as a theoretical and empirical approach to interaction has spread from economics to psychology, political science, sociology and biology. Numerous social interactions-foraging, talking, trusting, coordinating, competing-can be formally represented in a game with specific rules and strategies. These same interactions seem to rely on an interweaving of mental selves, but an effective strategy need not depend on explicit strategizing and higher mental capabilities, as less sentient creatures or even lines of software can play similar games. Human players are distinct because we are less consistent and our choices respond to elements of the setting that appear to be strategically insignificant. Recent analyses of this variable response have yielded a number of insights into the mental approach of human players: we often mentalize, but not always; we are endowed with social preferences; we distinguish among various types of opponents; we manifest different personalities; we are often guided by security concerns; and our strategic sophistication is usually modest.

“I Know, you Know”: Epistemic Egocentrism in Children and Adults

This article reviews the evidence and theory pertaining to a form of perspective-taking failure—a difficulty in setting aside the privileged information that one knows to be unavailable to another party. The authors argue that this bias (epistemic egocentrism, or EE) is a general feature of human cognition and has been tapped by 2 independent and largely uncommunicating research traditions: the theory-of-mind tradition in developmental psychology and, with more sensitive probes, the “heuristics and biases” tradition in the psychology of human judgment. This article sets the stage for facilitating communication between these traditions as well as for the recognition of EE's breadth and potential interdisciplinary significance: The authors propose a life-span account and a tentative taxonomy of EE; and they highlight the interdisciplinary significance of EE by discussing its implications for normative ethics.

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.

A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange

Cooperation between individuals requires the ability to infer each other's mental states to form shared expectations over mutual gains and make cooperative choices that realize these gains. From evidence that the ability for mental state attribution involves the use of prefrontal cortex, we hypothesize that this area is involved in integrating theory-of-mind processing with cooperative actions. We report data from a functional MRI experiment designed to test this hypothesis. Subjects in a scanner played standard two-person "trust and reciprocity" games with both human and computer counterparts for cash rewards. Behavioral data shows that seven subjects consistently attempted cooperation with their human counterpart. Within this group prefrontal regions are more active when subjects are playing a human than when they are playing a computer following a fixed (and known) probabilistic strategy. Within the group of five noncooperators, there are no significant differences in prefrontal activation between computer and human conditions.

Executive attention and metacognitive regulation

Metacognition refers to any knowledge or cognitive process that monitors or controls cognition. We highlight similarities between metacognitive and executive control functions, and ask how these processes might be implemented in the human brain. A review of brain imaging studies reveals a circuitry of attentional networks involved in these control processes, with its source located in midfrontal areas. These areas are active during conflict resolution, error correction, and emotional regulation. A developmental approach to the organization of the anatomy involved in executive control provides an added perspective on how these mechanisms are influenced by maturation and learning, and how they relate to metacognitive activity.