Isolating neural correlates of conscious perception from neural correlates of reporting one's perception

Distinct Oscillatory Frequencies Underlie Excitability of Human Occipital and Parietal Cortex

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of human occipital and posterior parietal cortex can give rise to visual sensations called phosphenes. We used near-threshold TMS with concurrent EEG recordings to measure how oscillatory brain dynamics covary, on single trials, with the perception of phosphenes after occipital and parietal TMS. Prestimulus power and phase, predominantly in the alpha band (8-13 Hz), predicted occipital TMS phosphenes, whereas higher-frequency beta-band (13-20 Hz) power (but not phase) predicted parietal TMS phosphenes. TMS-evoked responses related to phosphene perception were similar across stimulation sites and were characterized by an early (200 ms) posterior negativity and a later (>300 ms) parietal positivity in the time domain and an increase in low-frequency (∼5-7 Hz) power followed by a broadband decrease in alpha/beta power in the time-frequency domain. These correlates of phosphene perception closely resemble known electrophysiological correlates of conscious perception of near-threshold visual stimuli. The regionally differential pattern of prestimulus predictors of phosphene perception suggests that distinct frequencies may reflect cortical excitability in occipital versus posterior parietal cortex, calling into question the broader assumption that the alpha rhythm may serve as a general index of cortical excitability.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Alpha-band oscillations are thought to reflect cortical excitability and are therefore ascribed an important role in gating information transmission across cortex. We probed cortical excitability directly in human occipital and parietal cortex and observed that, whereas alpha-band dynamics indeed reflect excitability of occipital areas, beta-band activity was most predictive of parietal cortex excitability. Differences in the state of cortical excitability predicted perceptual outcomes (phosphenes), which were manifest in both early and late patterns of evoked activity, revealing the time course of phosphene perception. Our findings prompt revision of the notion that alpha activity reflects excitability across all of cortex and suggest instead that excitability in different regions is reflected in distinct frequency bands.

Pain perception in patients with chronic disorders of consciousness: What can limbic system tell us?

OBJECTIVE

Although it is believed that patients with Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS) do not feel pain, recent neuroimaging and neurophysiologic studies have demonstrated some residual traces of nociceptive processing.

METHODS

To confirm this growing evidence, we evaluated 21 patients suffering from chronic disorders of consciousness (DOC) (both UWS, n=11, and Minimally Conscious State - MCS -, n=10), using an Event-Related Potential (ERP) Low-Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA) approach, based on nociceptive repeated laser stimulation (RLS). We delivered laser stimuli to the dorsum of both hands and analysed the γ-band LORETA activations and the ERP γ-power magnitude induced by laser stimulation, as well as the heart rate variability (HRV).

RESULTS

We found partially preserved cortical activations and ERP γ-power magnitude in all MCS and two UWS individuals. These effects were paralleled by a purposeful behaviour, and a reduced HRV concerning nociceptive stimulation, whereas the two UWS individuals showed no more than reflex behaviours, besides a strong limbic activation.

CONCLUSIONS

Some UWS patients may somehow perceive the affective components of nociceptive stimulation.

SIGNIFICANCE

The diagnosis of functional locked-in syndrome should be taken into account when dealing with DOC differential diagnosis.

Neural Correlates of Auditory Perceptual Awareness and Release from Informational Masking Recorded Directly from Human Cortex: A Case Study

In complex acoustic environments, even salient supra-threshold sounds sometimes go unperceived, a phenomenon known as informational masking. The neural basis of informational masking (and its release) has not been well-characterized, particularly outside auditory cortex. We combined electrocorticography in a neurosurgical patient undergoing invasive epilepsy monitoring with trial-by-trial perceptual reports of isochronous target-tone streams embedded in random multi-tone maskers. Awareness of such masker-embedded target streams was associated with a focal negativity between 100 and 200 ms and high-gamma activity (HGA) between 50 and 250 ms (both in auditory cortex on the posterolateral superior temporal gyrus) as well as a broad P3b-like potential (between ~300 and 600 ms) with generators in ventrolateral frontal and lateral temporal cortex. Unperceived target tones elicited drastically reduced versions of such responses, if at all. While it remains unclear whether these responses reflect conscious perception, itself, as opposed to pre- or post-perceptual processing, the results suggest that conscious perception of target sounds in complex listening environments may engage diverse neural mechanisms in distributed brain areas.

Do Rare Stimuli Evoke Large P3s by Being Unexpected? A Comparison of Oddball Effects Between Standard-Oddball and Prediction-Oddball Tasks

The P3 component of event-related potentials increases when stimuli are rarely presented. It has been assumed that this oddball effect (rare-frequent difference) reflects the unexpectedness of rare stimuli. The assumption of unexpectedness and its link to P3 amplitude were tested here. A standard- oddball task requiring alternative key-press responses to frequent and rare stimuli was compared with an oddball-prediction task where stimuli had to be first predicted and then confirmed by key-pressing. Oddball effects in the prediction task depended on whether the frequent or the rare stimulus had been predicted. Oddball effects on P3 amplitudes and error rates in the standard oddball task closely resembled effects after frequent predictions. This corroborates the notion that these effects occur because frequent stimuli are expected and rare stimuli are unexpected. However, a closer look at the prediction task put this notion into doubt because the modifications of oddball effects on P3 by expectancies were entirely due to effects on frequent stimuli, whereas the large P3 amplitudes evoked by rare stimuli were insensitive to predictions (unlike response times and error rates). Therefore, rare stimuli cannot be said to evoke large P3 amplitudes because they are unexpected. We discuss these diverging effects of frequency and expectancy, as well as general differences between tasks, with respect to concepts and hypotheses about P3b’s function and conclude that each discussed concept or hypothesis encounters some problems, with a conception in terms of subjective relevance assigned to stimuli offering the most consistent account of these basic effects.

Early Local Activity in Temporal Areas Reflects Graded Content of Visual Perception

In visual cognitive neuroscience the debate on consciousness is focused on two major topics: the search for the neural correlates of the different properties of visual awareness and the controversy on the graded versus dichotomous nature of visual conscious experience. The aim of this study is to search for the possible neural correlates of different grades of visual awareness investigating the Event Related Potentials to reduced contrast visual stimuli whose perceptual clarity was rated on the four-point Perceptual Awareness Scale. Results revealed a left centro-parietal negative deflection (Visual Awareness Negativity; VAN) peaking at 280–320 ms from stimulus onset, related to the perceptual content of the stimulus, followed by a bilateral positive deflection (Late Positivity; LP) peaking at 510–550 ms over almost all electrodes, reflecting post-perceptual processes performed on such content. Interestingly, the amplitude of both deflections gradually increased as a function of visual awareness. Moreover, the intracranial generators of the phenomenal content (VAN) were found to be located in the left temporal lobe. The present data thus seem to suggest (1) that visual conscious experience is characterized by a gradual increase of perceived clarity at both behavioral and neural level and (2) that the actual content of perceptual experiences emerges from early local activation in temporal areas, without the need of later widespread frontal engagement.

Neural dynamics of change detection in crowded acoustic scenes

Two key questions concerning change detection in crowded acoustic environments are the extent to which cortical processing is specialized for different forms of acoustic change and when in the time-course of cortical processing neural activity becomes predictive of behavioral outcomes. Here, we address these issues by using magnetoencephalography (MEG) to probe the cortical dynamics of change detection in ongoing acoustic scenes containing as many as ten concurrent sources. Each source was formed of a sequence of tone pips with a unique carrier frequency and temporal modulation pattern, designed to mimic the spectrotemporal structure of natural sounds. Our results show that listeners are more accurate and quicker to detect the appearance (than disappearance) of an auditory source in the ongoing scene. Underpinning this behavioral asymmetry are change-evoked responses differing not only in magnitude and latency, but also in their spatial patterns. We find that even the earliest (~50 ms) cortical response to change is predictive of behavioral outcomes (detection times), consistent with the hypothesized role of local neural transients in supporting change detection.

How a (sub)Cellular Coincidence Detection Mechanism Featuring Layer-5 Pyramidal Cells May Help Produce Various Visual Phenomena

Perceptual phenomena such as spatio-temporal illusions and masking are typically explained by psychological (cognitive) processing theories or large-scale neural theories involving inter-areal connectivity and neural circuits comprising of hundreds or more interconnected single cells. Subcellular mechanisms are hardly used for such purpose. Here, a mechanistic theoretical view is presented on how a subcellular brain mechanism of integration of presynaptic signals that arrive at different compartments of layer-5 pyramidal neurons could explain a couple of spatiotemporal visual-phenomenal effects unfolding along very brief time intervals within the range of the sub-second temporal scale.

Neural Signatures of Conscious Face Perception in an Inattentional Blindness Paradigm

Previous studies suggest that early stages of face-specific processing are performed preattentively and unconsciously, whereas conscious perception emerges with late-stage (>300 ms) neuronal activity. A conflicting view, however, posits that attention is necessary for face-specific processing and that early-to-mid latency neural responses (∼ 100-300 ms) correspond more closely with perceptual awareness. The current study capitalized on a recently developed method for manipulating attention and conscious perception during EEG recording (modified inattentional blindness paradigm) and used face stimuli that elicit a well known marker of early face processing, the N170 event-related potential (ERP). In Phase 1 of the experiment, subjects performed a demanding distracter task while line drawings of faces and matched control stimuli were presented in the center of their view. When queried, half of the subjects reported no awareness of the faces and were deemed inattentionally blind. In Phase 2, subjects performed the same distracter task, but now consciously perceived the face stimuli due to the intervening questioning. In Phase 3, subjects performed a discrimination task on the faces. Two primary contrasts were made: aware versus unaware (equally task irrelevant) and task-relevant versus task-irrelevant (equally aware). The N170 and a subsequent ERP component, the visual awareness negativity (∼ 260-300 ms), were absent during inattentional blindness and present in the aware conditions. The P3b (> 300 ms) was absent for task-irrelevant faces, even when consciously perceived, and present only when the faces were task relevant. These results inform contemporary theories of conscious face perception in particular and visual attention and perceptual awareness in general.

Are we ever aware of concepts? A critical question for the Global Neuronal Workspace, Integrated Information, and Attended Intermediate-Level Representation theories of consciousness

To locate consciousness in the flow of synaptic activity in the brain, we must first locate it in the flow of information processing in the mind. Two different positions have been debated for centuries. The liberal view maintains that the contents of experience include not only sensory, motor, and affective states, but also concepts and the thoughts they enter into. In contrast, the conservative view maintains that concepts have no intrinsic qualia of their own, and that the contents of experience are therefore restricted to sensory, motor, and affective states. Here I discuss how this long-standing controversy is relevant to several contemporary neuroscientific theories of consciousness. I do so, however, in a manner that is admittedly biased toward the conservative view, since I am among those who believe that it is more consistent than the liberal view with a number of key findings. I focus first on two of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness—namely, Stanislas Dehaene's Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory. I argue that because both of these approaches assume the liberal view, they are challenged in significant ways by data favoring the competing conservative view. I then turn to a third framework—namely, Jesse Prinz's Attended Intermediate-Level Representation Theory. I contend that because it explicitly endorses the conservative view, it has a unique advantage over the other two approaches. I also point out, however, that it has independent shortcomings that prevent it from achieving adequate explanatory coherence. I conclude by emphasizing that, if the conservative view is in fact correct, a central goal of future research should be to distinguish, at both psychological and neurobiological levels of analysis, between the following two kinds of information processing that often occur simultaneously: first, activation of the modality-specific sensory, motor, and affective representations that constitute the sole ingredients of conscious experiences; and second, activation of the conceptual representations that give those experiences meaning and that may even influence them in a top-down manner, but that never themselves reach awareness.

Distinct cortical codes and temporal dynamics for conscious and unconscious percepts

The neural correlates of consciousness are typically sought by comparing the overall brain responses to perceived and unperceived stimuli. However, this comparison may be contaminated by non-specific attention, alerting, performance, and reporting confounds. Here, we pursue a novel approach, tracking the neuronal coding of consciously and unconsciously perceived contents while keeping behavior identical (blindsight). EEG and MEG were recorded while participants reported the spatial location and visibility of a briefly presented target. Multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that considerable information about spatial location traverses the cortex on blindsight trials, but that starting ≈270 ms post-onset, information unique to consciously perceived stimuli, emerges in superior parietal and superior frontal regions. Conscious access appears characterized by the entry of the perceived stimulus into a series of additional brain processes, each restricted in time, while the failure of conscious access results in the breaking of this chain and a subsequent slow decay of the lingering unconscious activity.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.05652.001

Our senses constantly receive information from the world around us, but we consciously perceive only a small portion of it. Nonetheless, even stimuli that are not consciously perceived are registered in our brain and influence our behavior. This is known as unconscious perception.

Researchers disagree about how brain activity differs during conscious and unconscious perception. Some think that both consciously and unconsciously perceived objects are processed in the same way in the brain, but that the brain is more active during conscious perception. Others think that different neurons process the information in different types of perception.

Salti et al. have now investigated this issue. While recording participants' brain activity, a line was briefly presented in one of eight different possible locations on a screen. The line was masked so it would be consciously perceived in roughly half of the presentations. Participants had to report the location of the line and then say whether they had seen it or had merely guessed its location. Even when they reported that they were guessing, participants identified the location of the line better than by chance, indicating unconscious perception on ‘guess’ trials. This enabled Salti et al. to compare how the brain encodes consciously perceived and unconsciously perceived stimuli.

Unlike previous studies in which the brain activity associated with ‘seen’ and ‘unseen’ stimuli was compared, Salti et al. used a different approach to extract the neural activity underlying consciousness. A classifying algorithm was trained on a subset of the data to recognize from the recorded brain activity where on the screen a line had appeared. Applying this algorithm to the remaining data revealed the dynamics of stimulus encoding. Consciously and unconsciously perceived stimuli are encoded by the same neural responses for about a quater of a second. From this point on, consciously perceived stimuli benefit from a series of additional brain processes, each restricted in time. For unconsciously perceived stimuli, this chain of processing breaks and a slow decay of encoding is observed.

Salti et al., therefore, conclude that conscious perception is represented differently to unconscious perception in the brain and produces more extensive and structured brain activity. Future work will focus on understanding these differences in neural coding and their contribution to the interplay between conscious and unconscious perception.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.05652.002