The Australian Incident Monitoring Study: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. The pulse oximeter: applications and limitations--an analysis of 2000 incident reports

The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study were analysed with respect to the role of the pulse oximeter. Of these 184 (9%) were first detected by a pulse oximeter and there were a further 177 (9%) in which desaturation was recorded. Of the 1256 incidents which occurred in association with general anaesthesia 48% were "human detected" and 52% "monitor detected". The pulse oximeter was ranked first and detected 27% of these monitor detected incidents; this figure would have been over 40% if an oximeter had always been used and its more informative modulated pulse tone relied upon instead of that of the "bleep" of the ECG. The pulse oximeter is the "front-line" monitor for endobronchial intubation, the fourth most common incident in association with general anaesthesia (it detected 87% of the 76 cases in which it was in use). It also played an invaluable role as a "back-up" monitor in 40 life-threatening situations in which "front-line" monitors (e.g. oxygen analyser, low pressure alarm, capnograph) were either not in use, were being used incorrectly or failed. Other situations detected, in order of frequency of detection, were: circuit disconnection, circuit leak, desaturation (severe shunt), oesophageal intubation, aspiration and/or regurgitation, pulmonary oedema, endotracheal tube obstruction, severe hypotension, failure of oxygen delivery, hypoxic gas mixture, hypoventilation, anaphylaxis, air embolism, bronchospasm, malignant hyperthermia, and tension pneumothorax.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Cardiac arrest--an analysis of 2000 incident reports

Eighty-seven cases of cardiac arrest from the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study were reviewed. "Cardiac arrest" was taken to include patients who were either pulseless or had electrocardiographic asystole or ventricular fibrillation. Cases were grouped by primary cause--drug administration (19), vagal stimulation (16), hypoventilation (15), bleeding (13), anaphylaxis (6), direct cardiac stimulation (4) and miscellaneous (14). Overall, 20 patients died (23% of the 87 cases); all of these were in the hypoventilation, bleeding, or miscellaneous groups (4, 9 and 7 patients, respectively). Cardiac compression was performed in 66% of patients; 20% were defibrillated; adrenaline was given to 42% and bicarbonate to 3%. There was a clear anaesthetic cause for 46% of this series of arrests, and with hindsight, a preventable factor was present in over half (58%) of these. Preventative strategies regarding staffing, equipment, policy and procedures are suggested.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Errors, incidents and accidents in anaesthetic practice

Human error is a pervasive and normal part of everyday life and is of interest to the anaesthetist because errors may lead to accidents. Definitions of, and the relationships between, errors, incidents and accidents are provided as the basis to this introduction to the psychology of human error in the context of the work of the anaesthetist. Examples are drawn from the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). An argument is put forward for the use of contemporaneous incident reporting (eliciting relevant contextual information as well as details of use to cognitive psychologists), rather than the use of accident investigation after the event (with the inherent problems of scant information, altered perception and outcome bias). A classification of errors is provided. "Active" errors may be classified into knowledge-based, rule-based, skill-based and technical errors. Different strategies are required for the prevention of each type and it may now be useful to place more emphasis in anaesthetic practice on categories to which little attention has been directed in the past. "Latent" errors make an enormous contribution to problems in anaesthesia and several categories are discussed (e.g. environment, physiological state, equipment, work practices, personnel training, social and cultural factors). An approach is provided for the prevention and management of errors, incidents and accidents which allows clinical problems to be categorized, the relative importance of various contributing factors to be established, and appropriate preventative strategies to be devised and implemented on the basis of priorities determined from the AIMS data. Accidents cannot be abolished; however, an understanding of the factors underlying them can lead to the rational direction of resources and effort to prevent them and minimise their effects.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Blood pressure monitoring--applications and limitations: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

Of the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study, 1256 occurred in relation to general anaesthesia and 81 of the latter were first detected by blood pressure (BP) monitoring. A further 25 incidents not associated with general anaesthesia were first detected by blood pressure monitoring, giving a total of 106. In the monitor detection of incidents in relation to general anaesthesia, BP monitoring ranked fourth after oximetry, capnography and low pressure alarms. On the other hand, 38 incidents in which the problem was primarily one of significant change in BP were first detected by means other than the BP monitor (20 clinically, 12 by pulse oximetry and 6 by ECG). Early detection rates of hypotension were 60% for invasive methods, 40% for automated non-invasive (NIBP) devices and 30% for manual sphygmomanometry. There were 21 reports of BP monitor "failure"; the 11 of these which occurred with NIBPs involved unexplained false "low" or "high" readings and failure to detect profound hypotension, and led to considerable morbidity and at least one death. The 10 cases of invasive monitoring failure were predominantly due to mains power loss, hardware breakage or operator error. In a theoretical analysis of the 1256 GA incidents, it was considered that on its own, BP monitoring would have detected 919 (73%), but in the vast majority, by the time this detection has occurred, potential organ damage could not be excluded. It is recommended that BP be measured at regular intervals dictated by clinical requirements (usually at least every five minutes).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Air embolism--an analysis of 2000 incident reports

There were 19 cases of air embolism (1%) among the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study. No embolism-induced fatalities were reported. Serious acute systemic effects occurred in 14 incidents; one circulatory arrest required electrical counter-shock. The surgical field was the entry route for the air in 63% of the incidents; 47% of the cases occurred during head and neck surgery. Capnography was the most successful first detector (26%) and it confirmed the diagnosis in another 26%. Invasive blood pressure monitoring, the electrocardiograph and the pulse oximeter played a useful role in detecting and/or confirming air embolism. Doppler monitoring was not reported in this series. A successful first response for management included head-down posture, manual ventilation, 100% oxygen and control of the air entry site. Cerebral arterial gas embolism may induce vascular endothelial damage and possible delayed neurological sequelae; hyperbaric oxygen therapy should be considered.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Problems related to the endotracheal tube: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study were analysed with respect to problems with the endotracheal tube; 189 (9%) were reported. The most common problem was endobronchial intubation which accounted for 42% of these 189 reports; endobronchial intubation was the most common cause of arterial desaturation in the 2000 incidents. Obstructions and oesophageal intubation each accounted for 18% of the 189 problems with tubes. The remainder was made up of disconnections and leaks (7% each), misplacements other than endobronchial or oesophageal (4%), inappropriate choice of tube (3%), cuff herniation (1%), failure to deflate the cuff and foreign body in the tube (0.5% each). The pulse oximeter and capnograph first detected 58% of these incidents; a further 25% were detected clinically. The pulse oximeter is the "front-line" monitor for endobronchial intubation, and the capnograph the "front-line" monitor for oesophageal intubation, disconnection and obstruction. Recommendations are made for how to prevent problems and how to determine the nature of those that do occur.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Problems with ventilation: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

A review of the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study found 317 incidents which involved problems with ventilation. The major portion (47%) were disconnections; 61% of these were detected by a monitor. Monitor detection was by a low circuit pressure alarm in 37% but this alarm failed to warn of non-ventilation in 12 incidents (in 6 because it was not switched "on" and in 6 because of a failure to detect the disconnection). Failure of detection was usually with ventilator bellows descending in expiration. Complete failure to ventilate occurred in 143 incidents, most commonly because of a disconnection. Disconnection was associated, in one-third of the cases, with interference to the anaesthetic circuit by a third party and in nearly half with surgery on the head and neck. Leaks affected ventilation in 129 incidents, but in only 19 was ventilation totally lost; leaks associated with seal failure of the absorber were common. Misconnections occurred in 36 incidents, most commonly involving the scavenging system. The frequency of a complete failure to check an anaesthetic machine was greater when an induction room was involved than when only the operating theatre was the site of the incident. These incidents suggest that meticulous checking and monitoring for failure of ventilation, preferably using at least two separate, self-activating systems is highly desirable. The Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists' policy on low circuit pressure alarms, oximetry and capnography is vindicated by these reports.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Clinical anaphylaxis: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

There were 57 reports of possible allergic reactions in the perioperative period in the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study. These were examined and classified with respect to presentation, clinical course, agents implicated and management strategies employed. Reactions were graded as to probability of allergic aetiology and severity of systemic disturbance. Two deaths were reported. A method of determining an "allergy score" was devised as an indication of which reactions may be most deserving of further investigation.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Paediatric incidents in anaesthesia: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) were analysed to compare anaesthetic incidents in infants and children with those in adults. Of the 2000, 1790 (90%) involved adults, 151 (7%) children and 56 (3%) infants. Healthy children (ASA I) generated a greater proportion of incidents in this group than adults and infants, emphasizing the need for maintaining the same standards for children in this group as for infants and higher risk groups. The AIMS results are similar to those of the United States (US) paediatric "closed claims" studies; the paediatric subset in both the US study and AIMS made up 10% of the total. Also, in both studies, incidents involving the respiratory and breathing circuit systems accounted for nearly half the problems, and cardiovascular problems and problems with the anaesthetic machine each accounted for 10-14% of incidents. In the AIMS study procedures on the head and neck yielded proportionately more incidents in the infant/child group than in the adult group, as did incidents involving the respiratory and breathing circuit systems. Incidents in the child group were often detected clinically; however, there were no differences between the three age groups in the way monitors were used or performed; hence the same monitoring recommendations apply to all groups. Combined oximetry and capnography would have detected nearly 90% of all applicable problems in the AIMS study and could have prevented nearly 90% of the claims arising from inadequate ventilation in the US "closed claims" study.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Physical injuries and environmental safety in anaesthesia: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

Of the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study, 56 (3%) involved environmental hazards or injuries to patients or staff. There were 17 cases of oral trauma (14 of tooth loss or damage, in 7 of which poor dentition played a role), 10 incidents involving problems with the operating table, 6 cases of skin or eye damage and 6 cases in which an electrical hazard was identified. Five incidents occurred during transport, and there were 4 cases of monitor induced trauma, 4 "needlestick" injuries and 4 miscellaneous incidents. Recommendations are made for trying to avoid or reduce the incidence of some of these problems.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. The stethoscope: applications and limitations--an analysis of 2000 incident reports

The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) were analysed with respect to the role of the oesophageal or precordial stethoscope as a continuous monitor. There were 1099 of the 1256 incidents during general anaesthesia in which one might have been used in this way, but use was reported in only 65 cases (5%), predominantly during paediatric cases. In only one report, a cardiac arrest, was the stethoscope the first to detect the incident. In a theoretical analysis it was considered that the stethoscope, used on its own for continuous monitoring, could have detected 54% of the 1256 incidents (almost 25% before any potential for organ damage), had they been allowed to evolve. However, AIMS data suggest that the actual yield using a stethoscope as a continuous monitor may be much lower than this, and that even the use of a "mobile" stethoscope can not be relied upon to detect oesophageal or endobronchial intubation. These reports confirm that there is limited use of the stethoscope for continuous monitoring in current anaesthetic practice in Australia; it has been superseded by the sophisticated electronic monitors now available. However, in areas with limited resources continuous auscultation with a stethoscope remains a basic requirement.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Difficult intubation: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study were analysed with respect to the incidence and circumstances of problems with endotracheal intubation; 85 (4%) indicated difficulties with intubation. One third of these were emergency cases, one third involved an initially unassisted trainee and one fifth were outside normal working hours. Failure to predict a difficult intubation was reported in one third of the cases, with another quarter presenting serious difficulty despite preoperative prediction. Difficulties with ventilation were experienced in 1 in 7 of the 85 reports; there was one cardiac arrest, but no death. Endotracheal intubation was not achieved in one fifth of the cases. The commonest complications reported amongst the 85 incidents were oesophageal intubation (18 cases), arterial desaturation (15 cases), and reflux of gastric contents (7 cases). Emergency trans-tracheal airways were required in 5 cases. Obesity, limited neck mobility and mouth opening, and inadequate assistance together accounted for two thirds of all the contributing factors. The most successful intubation aid in this series was a gum elastic bougie. A capnograph contributed to management in 28% and a pulse oximeter in 12% of the cases in which they were used. The most serious desaturations were associated with accidental oesophageal intubation. These data suggest a lack of reliable preoperative assessment techniques and skills for the prediction of difficult intubations. They also suggest the need for a greater emphasis on ensuring that the necessary equipment is available, and on teaching and learning drills for difficult intubation and any associated difficulty with ventilation.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Human failure: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

Information of relevance to human failure was extracted from the first 2,000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). All reports were searched for human factors amongst the "factors contributing," "factors minimising", and "suggested corrective strategies" categories, and these were classified according to the type of human error with which they were associated. In 83% of the reports elements of human error were scored by reporters. "Knowledge-based errors" contributed directly to about one-quarter of incidents; the outcome of one third of incidents was thought to have been minimised by prior experience or awareness of the potential problems, and in one fifth some strategy to improve knowledge was suggested. Correction of "rule-based errors" or provision of protocols or algorithms were thought, together, to have a potential impact on nearly half of all incidents. Failure to check equipment or the patient contributed to nearly one-quarter of all incidents, and inadequate crisis management contributed to a further 1 in 8. "Skill-based errors" (slips and lapses) were directly responsible for 1 in 10 of all incidents, and were thought to make an indirect contribution in up to one quarter. "Technical errors" were responsible for about 1 in 8 incidents. Analysing the relative contribution of each type of error for each type of problem allows the development of rational preventative strategies.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Problems with regional anaesthesia: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

There were 160 incidents associated with regional anaesthesia amongst the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study. They were categorised into 6 groups; epidural anaesthesia (83), spinal anaesthesia (42), brachial plexus blocks (14), intravenous local anaesthesia (4), ocular blocks (3), and local infiltration (14). The largest single cause of incidents involved circulatory problems; these occurred in all the groups except brachial plexus block (30 cases of hypotension, 7 of arrhythmias, 3 of cardiac arrest, 2 of hypertension and 1 of myocardial ischaemia). There were 24 drug errors, of which 10 involved the "wrong drug" and 4 "inappropriate use". With the exception of these, all the remainder involved problems specific to regional anaesthesia: 26 inadvertent dural punctures; 19 failed or inadequate blocks; 14 dural puncture headaches (all cured by blood patches); 10 inadvertent total or high spinal blocks (of which 7 required artificial ventilation); 5 blocks on the wrong side or in the wrong patient; 3 late hypoxic incidents and a variety of miscellaneous problems. Three-quarters of all incidents occurred in the presence of an anaesthetist and over 90% in patients of ASA Groups I-III. Rapid recognition by the anaesthetist prevented many potentially life threatening events, and the only death was as a result of surgical bleeding.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Crisis management--validation of an algorithm by analysis of 2000 incident reports

Anaesthetists are called upon to manage complex life-threatening crises at a moment's notice. As there is evidence that this may require cognitive tasking beyond the information-processing capacity of the human brain, it was decided to try and develop a generic crisis management algorithm analogous to the "Phase I" immediate response routine used by airline pilots. Such an algorithm, based on the mnemonic "COVER ABCD, A SWIFT CHECK", was developed and refined over 3 meetings, each attended by 60-100 anaesthetists and aviation psychologists. It was validated against 1301 relevant incidents among the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study. It proved sufficiently robust and safe to recommend its general use as an initial response to any incident or crisis which occurs when a patient is breathing gas from an anesthetic machine. It requires a limited knowledge base and is easily learnt and rehearsed during the anaesthetist's working day. It will provide a functional diagnosis in over 99% of cases and will correct 62% of the problems in 40-60 seconds. In the remaining 37% it will allow the anaesthetist to proceed with a "sub-algorithm", confident in the knowledge that some important step has not been missed. In just over 30% of incidents this will be for a problem familiar to all anaesthetists (e.g. laryngospasm, bradycardia); in just over 6% it will be for a less common, more complex, but finite, set of problems (3% cardiac arrest, 1% air embolism, 1% anaphylaxis, 1% for the remaining desaturations); in less than 1% diagnosis and correction will require a more complex checklist (e.g. for malignant hyperthermia, pneumothorax). The next stage, the development of specific sub-algorithms and a structured team approach for ongoing problems, is in progress.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. The electrocardiograph: applications and limitations--an analysis of 2000 incident reports

The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) were analysed with respect to the role of the electrocardiograph (ECG). Of these, 138 (7%) were first detected by the ECG. Of the 1256 incidents which occurred in association with general anaesthesia (GA incidents) 48% were "human detected" and 52% "monitor detected", the ECG was ranked third and detected 121 (19%) of these monitor detected GA incidents. However over 98% of incidents first detected by the ECG were heart rate changes; they would also have been detected by a pulse meter or pulse oximeter which would have supplied additional information about the adequacy of peripheral perfusion. The ECG is a "first-line" monitor in situations with the potential for myocardial ischaemia, complex dysrhythmias or altered myocardial conduction and should be used in all critically ill patients as well as those at significant risk of these problems. The ECG frequently detects incidents involving minor physiological trespass, such as simple heart rate and rhythm changes associated with anaesthetic agents. These incidents are generally detected relatively early in their evolution. AIMS data has confirmed, however, that the ECG has such poor sensitivity for serious physiological changes such as hypoxia, hypercarbia and hypotension that it cannot even be regarded as a useful "back-up" monitor for these problems. Indeed a "normal" ECG in a dangerous situation may lead to a degree of complacency.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Equipment failure: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

Of the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study, 177 (9%) were due to "pure" equipment failure according to pre-defined criteria. Of these 107 (60%) involved anaesthetic equipment, 42 (24%) involved monitors, 17 (10%) other theatre equipment and 11 (6%) the gas or electricity supply. Ninety-seven (55% of the 177) were potentially life-threatening; of these two-thirds would be detected by the array of monitors recommended by the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists and all but 9 of the remainder would be handled by application of the crisis management algorithm recommended elsewhere in this symposium. Of the 9 remaining, 2 were electrical shock, 3 overheating of a humidifier or blood warmer, 2 the unavailability of a spare laryngoscope and 1 the consequence of a power failure. Meticulous adherence to the equipment checking and monitoring guidelines of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists and application of a suitable crisis management algorithm should protect the patient from potentially life-threatening equipment failure in virtually all cases except electric shock, power failure and overheating of warming devices.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. The capnograph: applications and limitations--an analysis of 2000 incident reports

The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study were analysed with respect to the role of the capnograph. One hundred and fifty-seven (8%) were first detected by a capnograph and there were a further 18 (1%) in which capnography was contributory. Of the 1256 incidents which occurred in association with general anaesthesia 48% were "human detected" and 52% "monitor detected". The capnograph was ranked second and detected 24% of these monitor detected incidents; this figure would have been nearly 30% if a correctly checked, calibrated capnograph had always been used. The capnograph is a "front-line" monitor for oesophageal intubation, failure of ventilation, anaesthetic circuit faults, gas embolism, sudden circulatory collapse and malignant hyperthermia. It is a valuable "back-up" monitor when other monitors (e.g. low pressure alarm, pulse oximeter) are not in use, are being used incorrectly or fail. Such situations, in order of frequency of detection were: circuit-leak, overpressure of the breathing circuit, bronchospasm, leak of ventilator-driving-gas into the patient circuit, aspiration and/or regurgitation and hypoventilation. There were 20 reports of "failure", over two-thirds of which would not have occurred with appropriate checking and calibration. Seven were due to gas sampling problems and 6 to apnoea alarm failure. Two circuit leaks and 2 faulty unidirectional valves were not detected; on 3 occasions problems occurred due to power failure, calibration problems, or misinterpretation of an alarm.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. System failure: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

Although 70-80% of problems have some component of human error, its overall contribution to many problems may be small; studies of complex systems have revealed that up to 85% are primarily due to deficiencies in the lay-out and processes of the system. The anaesthetist has to operate in a complex system; many problems originate from deficiencies in this system. Information of relevance to system failure was extracted from the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). A system-based deficiency directly contributed to one-quarter of problems (four-fifths if human factors are included), some aspect of the system minimized the adverse outcome in over half of all cases (four-fifths if human factors are included), and in two-thirds (three-quarters if human factors are included) a system-based strategy would have been helpful; the system was implicated in 90% of all incidents (97% if human factors are included). Regardless of whether or not all human error should be regarded as part of the "system", attempts to modify its incidence and nature have to emanate from the system. AIMS reporting pathways and the organizations involved in developing and implementing strategies to improve the system operate at four levels. Level I involves the use of AIMS reports by hospitals and group practices for audit at a local level. Level II involves AIMS participants sending forms to the AIMS central office; collated information is then sent back to contributors by newsletter. Level III involves interaction between AIMS and the major professional bodies and level IV interaction between AIMS, these bodies and a variety of national and international agencies. Over 100 topics were identified from the AIMS data for consideration at one or more of these levels. AIMS has the potential not only to play a vital practical role in the continued enhancement of the quality of anaesthetic practice, but also to provide a valuable resource for research at the increasingly important interface between human behaviour and complex systems.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Patient awareness during anaesthesia: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

Amongst the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study were 16 cases in which patient recall of perioperative events was consistent with awareness. Awareness that occurred in 3 of 10 cases during anaesthesia was attributed to low concentrations of volatile anaesthetic agent; the conduct of anaesthesia appeared to be unremarkable in the other 7. The remaining 6 cases involved the inadvertent paralysis of patients prior to induction of anaesthesia, most commonly by "syringe swap" when suxamethonium was given instead of fentanyl. Some of these patients were significantly distressed. These preliminary findings suggest that incident monitoring should be useful in the study of awareness associated with anaesthesia and the development of strategies to prevent it.

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Problems associated with vascular access: an analysis of 2000 incident reports

There were 65 incidents involving access to the vascular system amongst the first 2000 reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Thirty-three involved peripheral venous access (14 cases of extravascular extravasation, 8 of unintended arterial cannulation, 6 of disruptions to intravenous lines, and 5 of problems with infusion lines, taps, pumps and connectors). Eighteen cases involved central venous access (9 cases of arterial puncture with haematomas, 5 with morbidity and/or prolonged admission), 5 of catheter misplacement and pneumo- or hydro-thorax and 4 of problems arising from operator inexperience. Thirteen cases involved peripheral arterial access (5 involved equipment problems (3 with possible air embolism), 3 of mistaking an arterial for a venous line (drugs were injected in 2), 3 of losing arterial lines or signals, and 2 in which the presence of an arterial line placed the patient at risk). The anaesthetist should always question the continued integrity of any vascular access system, even when it has recently been shown to be functioning, and the possibility of later "migration" and misplacement should always be borne in mind. Whenever possible, correct placement of the tip should be checked (e.g. by visual inspection of the site, use of test doses, aspiration of blood, pressure measurement, X-rays). When there is more than one line, all lines and sites of access (e.g. 3-way taps) should be clearly labelled and checked before anything is injected or infused.