Neural correlates of face and object recognition in young children with autism spectrum disorder, developmental delay, and typical development

Cortical specialisation for face processing: face-sensitive event-related potential components in 3- and 12-month-old infants

The adult N170 is considered to be an electrophysiological marker of specialised mechanisms for face processing, but little is known about its developmental origin. Previous work has identified two face-sensitive infant ERP components (N290 and P400) (J. Cog. Neurosci. 14 (2002), 199). In the present study, we assessed the specificity (to upright human faces) of these infant components at 3 and 12 months. At 12 months the degree of specificity observed in both components was similar to that seen in the adult N170. In contrast, at 3 months of age the N290 and P400 did not show the same level of specificity for human faces as that observed at 12 months. Our findings suggest that (1) both face-sensitive components increase in their specificity for upright human faces during development, and (2) the adult N170 is not preceded by a single developmental precursor, but rather emerges as a consequence of the integration of two functionally and morphologically distinct components (N290 and P400).

Fear Recognition and the Neural Basis of Social Cognition

Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience and neurobiology emphasise the interface between our emotions, our feelings and our ability to interact appropriately in social situations. The neural basis of social cognition is subject to intensive research in both humans and non-human primates, research that is providing exciting, provocative and yet consistent findings. Centre stage is the role of efferent and afferent connectivity between the amygdala and neocortical brain regions, now believed to be critical for the processing of social information. Recent research suggests that a sub-cortical neural pathway, routed through the amygdala, may turn out to be a key player in the mystery of why humans are so prone to disorders of social cognition. This pathway responds to direct eye contact, one of many classes of potential threat. In humans, arousal evoked by this exquisitely social stimulus is modulated and controlled by a variety of specific cortical regions. Neural circuits that evolved for the purpose of fear detection in other's faces, an essentially threatening stimulus, are now associated with the acquisition of social skills and appropriate responsiveness in social encounters.

Age-related differences in neural correlates of face recognition during the toddler and preschool years

Research on the development of face recognition in infancy has shown that infants respond to faces as if they are special and recognize familiar faces early in development. Infants also show recognition and differential attachment to familiar people very early in development. We tested the hypothesis that infants' responses to familiar and unfamiliar faces differ at different ages. Specifically, we present data showing age-related changes in infants' brain responses to mother's face versus a stranger's face in children between 18 and 54 months of age. We propose that these changes are based on age-related differences in the perceived salience of the face of the primary caregiver versus strangers.

The enactive mind, or from actions to cognition: lessons from autism

Normative-IQ individuals with autism are capable of solving explicit social cognitive problems at a level that is not matched by their ability to meet the demands of everyday social situations. The magnitude of this discrepancy is now being documented through newer techniques such as eye tracking, which allows us to see and measure how individuals with autism search for meaning when presented with naturalistic social scenes. This paper offers an approach to social cognitive development intended to address the above discrepancy, which is considered a key element for any understanding of the pathophysiology of autism. This approach, called the enactive mind (EM), originates from the emerging work on 'embodied cognitive science', a neuroscience framework that views cognition as bodily experiences accrued as a result of an organism's adaptive actions upon salient aspects of the surrounding environment. The EM approach offers a developmental hypothesis of autism in which the process of acquisition of embodied social cognition is derailed early on, as a result of reduced salience of social stimuli and concomitant enactment of socially irrelevant aspects of the environment.