Economic Evaluation of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System for Ophthalmologists: Analysis of 2019 Quality Payment Program Data

Performance of Neurosurgeons Providing Safety-Net Care Under Medicare's Merit-Based Incentive Payment System

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Under the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), Medicare evaluates provider performance to determine payment adjustments. Studies examining the first year of MIPS (2017) showed that safety-net providers had lower MIPS scores, but the performance of safety-net physicians over time has not been studied. This study aimed to examine the performance of safety-net vs non-safety-net neurosurgeons in MIPS from 2017 to 2020.

METHODS

Safety-net neurosurgeons were defined as being in the top quartile according to proportion of dual-eligible beneficiaries and non-safety-net in the bottom quartile. Outcomes were total MIPS scores and dual-eligible proportion over time. In this descriptive study, we evaluated ordinary least squares regression models with SEs clustered at the physician level. Covariates of interest included safety-net status, year, and average Hierarchical Condition Category risk score of beneficiaries.

RESULTS

There were 2796-3322 physicians included each year between 2017 and 2020. Mean total MIPS scores were not significantly different for safety-net than non-safety-net physicians in 2017 but were greater for safety-net in 2018 (90.7 vs 84.5, P < .01), 2019 (86.4 vs 81.5, P < .01), and 2020 (90.9 vs 86.7, P < .01). Safety-net status (coefficient -9.11; 95% CI [-13.15, -5.07]; P < .01) and participation in MIPS as an individual (-9.89; [-12.66, -7.13]; P < .01) were associated with lower scores while year, the interaction between safety-net status and year, and participation in MIPS as a physician group or alternative payment model were associated with higher scores. Average Hierarchical Condition Category risk score of beneficiaries (-.011; [-.015, -.006]; P < .01) was associated with decreasing dual-eligible case mix, whereas average age of beneficiaries (.002; [.002, .003]; P < .01) was associated with increasing dual-eligible case mix.

CONCLUSION

Being a safety-net physician was associated with lower MIPS scores, but safety-net neurosurgeons demonstrated greater improvement in MIPS scores than non-safety-net neurosurgeons over time. Providers with higher-risk patients were more likely to decrease their dual-eligible case mix over time.

Trends in Ophthalmology Practice Consolidation: 2015-2022

PURPOSE

To quantify trends in ophthalmology practice consolidation in the United States.

DESIGN

A retrospective cross-sectional study.

PARTICIPANTS

Providers in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) National Downloadable File with a primary specialty designation of ophthalmology.

METHODS

We used the CMS database to determine national practice consolidation trends in ophthalmology on individual physician and group practice levels and analyzed by region, sex, and years spent in practice. We used the Cochran-Armitage test to determine the statistical significance of practice size differences between 2015 and 2022.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Temporal practice size trends for physicians and practices in ophthalmology and regional, sex-specific, and age-related trends.

RESULTS

Between 2015 and 2022, the number of ophthalmologists decreased from 17 656 to 17 615 (-0.2%), whereas the number of practices decreased from 7149 to 5890 (-18%). The percentage of ophthalmologists in practices of 1 to 2 members decreased from 35% to 28%, whereas those in groups of 50 or more increased from 7% to 11%. The percentage of practices with 1 to 2 members decreased from 75% to 71%, and those with 50 or more increased from 0.2% to 0.4%. Consolidation trends were significant on individual ophthalmologist (P < 0.001) and group practice (P < 0.001) levels. All regions, sexes, and subgroups of years spent in practice demonstrated consolidation (P < 0.001). The Northeast showed the greatest increase in groups of 50 or more physicians (+7%) between 2015 and 2022. Proportionally fewer female than male ophthalmologists were associated with practice sizes of 1 to 2 members in 2015 (29% and 36%, respectively) and 2022 (23% and 30%, respectively). Proportionally fewer ophthalmologists with 0 to 10 years of experience in practice were associated with practice sizes of 1 to 2 members than those with more than 30 years in practice in 2015 (18% and 48%, respectively) and 2022 (14% and 40%, respectively).

CONCLUSIONS

Ophthalmology has undergone practice consolidation from 2015 to 2022. A decrease in the proportion of physicians affiliated with smaller practice sizes seems to have occurred.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE(S)

Proprietary or commercial disclosure may be found in the Footnotes and Disclosures at the end of this article.

Incorporating Cost Measures Into the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: Implications for Oncologists

PURPOSE

The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is currently the only federally mandated value-based payment model for oncologists. The weight of cost measures in MIPS has increased from 0% in 2017 to 30% in 2022. Given that cost measures are specialty-agnostic, specialties with greater costs of care such as oncology may be unfairly affected. We investigated the implications of incorporating cost measures into MIPS on physician reimbursements for oncologists and other physicians.

METHODS

We evaluated physicians scored on cost and quality in the 2018 MIPS using the Doctors and Clinicians database. We used multivariable Tobit regression to identify physician-level factors associated with cost and quality scores. We simulated composite MIPS scores and payment adjustments by applying the 2022 cost-quality weights to the 2018 category scores and compared changes across specialties.

RESULTS

Of 168,098 identified MIPS-participating physicians, 5,942 (3.5%) were oncologists. Oncologists had the lowest cost scores compared with other specialties (adjusted mean score, 58.4 for oncologists v 71.0 for nononcologists; difference, -12.66 [95% CI, -13.34 to -11.99]), while quality scores were similar (82.9 v 84.2; difference, -1.31 [95% CI, -2.65 to 0.03]). After the 2022 cost-quality reweighting, oncologists would receive a 4.3-point (95% CI, 4.58 to 4.04) reduction in composite MIPS scores, corresponding to a four-fold increase in magnitude of physician penalties ($4,233.41 US dollars [USD] in 2018 v $18,531.06 USD in 2022) and greater reduction in exceptional payment bonuses compared with physicians in other specialties (-42.8% [95% CI, -44.1 to -41.5] for oncologists v -23.6% [95% CI, -23.8 to -23.4] for others).

CONCLUSION

Oncologists will likely be disproportionally penalized after the incorporation of cost measures into MIPS. Specialty-specific recalibration of cost measures is needed to ensure that policy efforts to promote value-based care do not compromise health care quality and outcomes.

Asymmetric Interoperability: Directional Analysis of Provider Group Health Information Exchange (Preprint)

BACKGROUND

High levels of seamless, bidirectional health information exchange continue to be broadly limited among provider groups despite the vast array of benefits that interoperability entails for patient care and the many persistent efforts across the health care ecosystem directed at advancing interoperability. As provider groups seek to act in their strategic best interests, they are often interoperable and exchange information in certain directions but not others, leading to the formation of asymmetries.

OBJECTIVE

We aimed to examine the correlation at the provider group level between the distinct directions of interoperability with regard to sending health information and receiving health information, to describe how this correlation varies across provider group types and provider group sizes, and to analyze the symmetries and asymmetries that arise in the exchange of patient health information across the health care ecosystem as a result.

METHODS

We used data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which included interoperability performance information for 2033 provider groups within the Quality Payment Program Merit-based Incentive Payment System and maintained distinct performance measures for sending health information and receiving health information. In addition to compiling descriptive statistics, we also conducted a cluster analysis to identify differences among provider groups-particularly with respect to symmetric versus asymmetric interoperability.

RESULTS

We found that the examined directions of interoperability-sending health information and receiving health information-have relatively low bivariate correlation (0.4147) with a significant number of observations exhibiting asymmetric interoperability (42.5%). Primary care providers are generally more likely to exchange information asymmetrically than specialty providers, being more inclined to receive health information than to send health information. Finally, we found that larger provider groups are significantly less likely to be bidirectionally interoperable than smaller groups, although both are asymmetrically interoperable at similar rates.

CONCLUSIONS

The adoption of interoperability by provider groups is more nuanced than traditionally considered and should not be seen as a binary determination (ie, to be interoperable or not). Asymmetric interoperability-and its pervasive presence among provider groups-reiterates how the manner in which provider groups exchange patient health information is a strategic choice and may pose similar implications and potential harms as the practice of information blocking has in the past. Differences in the operational paradigms among provider groups of varying types and sizes may explain their varying extents of health information exchange for sending and receiving health information. There continues to remain substantial room for improvement on the path to achieving a fully interoperable health care ecosystem, and future policy efforts directed at advancing interoperability should consider the practice of being asymmetrically interoperable among provider groups.