Payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings

BACKGROUND

Changes to the method of payment for healthcare providers, including pay-for-performance schemes, are increasingly being used by governments, health insurers, and employers to help align financial incentives with health system goals. In this review we focused on changes to the method and level of payment for all types of healthcare providers in outpatient healthcare settings. Outpatient healthcare settings, broadly defined as 'out of hospital' care including primary care, are important for health systems in reducing the use of more expensive hospital services.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the impact of different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings on the quantity and quality of health service provision, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, cost of service provision, and adverse effects.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase (searched 5 March 2019), and several other databases. In addition, we searched clinical trials platforms, grey literature, screened reference lists of included studies, did a cited reference search for included studies, and contacted study authors to identify additional studies. We screened records from an updated search in August 2020, with any potentially relevant studies categorised as awaiting classification.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient care settings.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the payment methods comparisons and outcomes, and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different outcome categories. Where feasible, we used meta-analysis to synthesise the effects of payment interventions under the same category. Where it was not possible to perform meta-analysis, we have reported means/medians and full ranges of the available point estimates. We have reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative difference (as per cent change or mean difference (MD)) for continuous outcomes.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 27 studies in the review: 12 randomised trials, 13 controlled before-and-after studies, one interrupted time series, and one repeated measure study. Most healthcare providers were primary care physicians. Most of the payment methods were implemented by health insurance schemes in high-income countries, with only one study from a low- or middle-income country. The included studies were categorised into four groups based on comparisons of different payment methods. (1) Pay for performance (P4P) plus existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings P4P incentives probably improve child immunisation status (RR 1.27, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.19 to 1.36; 3760 patients; moderate-certainty evidence) and may slightly increase the number of patients who are asked more detailed questions on their disease by their pharmacist (MD 1.24, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.54; 454 patients; low-certainty evidence). P4P may slightly improve primary care physicians' prescribing of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medicines compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.07, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.12; 362 patients; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effects of extra P4P incentives on mean blood pressure reduction for patients and costs for providing services compared with an existing payment method (very low-certainty evidence). Outcomes related to workload or other health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial found that compared to the control group, the performance of incentivised professionals was not sustained after the P4P intervention had ended. (2) Fee for service (FFS) compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings We are uncertain about the effect of FFS on the quantity of health services delivered (outpatient visits and hospitalisations), patient health outcomes, and total drugs cost compared to an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. The quality of service provision and health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial reported that physicians paid via FFS may see more well patients than salaried physicians (low-certainty evidence), possibly implying that more unnecessary services were delivered through FFS. (3) FFS mixed with existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings FFS mixed payment method may increase the quantity of health services provided compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effect of FFS mixed payment on quality of services provided, patient health outcomes, and health professional outcomes compared with an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. Cost outcomes and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. (4) Enhanced FFS compared with FFS for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings Enhanced FFS (higher FFS payment) probably increases child immunisation rates (RR 1.25, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48; moderate-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether higher FFS payment results in more primary care visits and about the effect of enhanced FFS on the net expenditure per year on covered children with regular FFS (very low-certainty evidence). Quality of service provision, patient outcomes, health professional outcomes, and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

For healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings, P4P or an increase in FFS payment level probably increases the quantity of health service provision (moderate-certainty evidence), and P4P may slightly improve the quality of service provision for targeted conditions (low-certainty evidence). The effects of changes in payment methods on health outcomes is uncertain due to very low-certainty evidence. Information to explore the influence of specific payment method design features, such as the size of incentives and type of performance measures, was insufficient. Furthermore, due to limited and very low-certainty evidence, it is uncertain if changing payment models without including additional funding for professionals would have similar effects. There is a need for further well-conducted research on payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries; more studies comparing the impacts of different designs of the same payment method; and studies that consider the unintended consequences of payment interventions.

Pay for performance for hospitals

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-Performance (P4P) is a payment model that rewards health care providers for meeting pre-defined targets for quality indicators or efficacy parameters to increase the quality or efficacy of care.

OBJECTIVES

Our objective was to assess the impact of P4P for in-hospital delivered health care on the quality of care, resource use and equity. Our objective was not only to answer the question whether P4P works in general (simple perspective) but to provide a comprehensive and detailed overview of P4P with a focus on analyzing the intervention components, the context factors and their interrelation (more complex perspective).

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, three other databases and two trial registers on 27 June 2018. In addition, we searched conference proceedings, gray literature and web pages of relevant health care institutions, contacted experts in the field, conducted cited reference searches and performed cross-checks of included references and systematic reviews on the same topic.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized trials, cluster randomized trials, non-randomized clustered trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series and repeated measures studies that analyzed hospitals, hospital units or groups of hospitals and that compared any kind of P4P to a basic payment scheme (e.g. capitation) without P4P. Studies had to analyze at least one of the following outcomes to be eligible: patient outcomes; quality of care; utilization, coverage or access; resource use, costs and cost shifting; healthcare provider outcomes; equity; adverse effects or harms.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two review authors independently screened all citations for inclusion, extracted study data and assessed risk of bias for each included study. Study characteristics were extracted by one reviewer and verified by a second.We did not perform meta-analysis because the included studies were too heterogenous regarding hospital characteristics, the design of the P4P programs and study design. Instead we present a structured narrative synthesis considering the complexity as well as the context/setting of the intervention. We assessed the certainty of evidence using the GRADE approach and present the results narratively in 'Summary of findings' tables.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 27 studies (20 CBA, 7 ITS) on six different P4P programs. Studies analyzed between 10 and 4267 centers. All P4P programs targeted acute or emergency physical conditions and compared a capitation-based payment scheme without P4P to the same capitation-based payment scheme combined with a P4P add-on. Two P4P program used rewards or penalties; one used first rewards and than penalties; two used penalties only and one used rewards only. Four P4P programs were established and evaluated in the USA, one in England and one in France.Most studies showed no difference or a very small effect in favor of the P4P program. The impact of each P4P program was as follows.Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration Program: It is uncertain whether this program, which used rewards for some hospitals and penalties for others, has an impact on mortality, adverse clinical events, quality of care, equity or resource use as the certainty of the evidence was very low.Value-Based Purchasing Program: It is uncertain whether this program, which used rewards for some hospitals and penalties for others, has an impact on mortality, adverse clinical events or quality of care as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in the studies, which evaluated this program.Non-payment for Hospital-Acquired Conditions Program: It is uncertain whether this penalty-based program has an impact on adverse clinical events as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Mortality, quality of care, equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in the studies, which evaluated this program.Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: None of the studies that examined this penalty-based program reported mortality, adverse clinical events, quality of care (process quality score), equity or resource use outcomes.Advancing Quality Program: It is uncertain whether this reward-/penalty-based program has an impact on mortality as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Adverse clinical events, quality of care, equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in any study.Financial Incentive to Quality Improvement Program: It is uncertain whether this reward-based program has an impact on quality of care, as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Mortality, adverse clinical events, equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in any study.Subgroup analysis (analysis of modifying design and context factors)Analysis of P4P design factors provides some hints that non-payments compared to additional payments and payments for quality attainment (e.g. falling below specified mortality threshold) compared to quality improvement (e.g. reduction of mortality by specified percent points within one year) may have a stronger impact on performance.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

It is uncertain whether P4P, compared to capitation-based payments without P4P for hospitals, has an impact on patient outcomes, quality of care, equity or resource use as the certainty of the evidence was very low (or we found no studies on the outcome) for all P4P programs. The effects on patient outcomes of P4P in hospitals were at most small, regardless of design factors and context/setting. It seems that with additional payments only small short-term but non-sustainable effects can be achieved. Non-payments seem to be slightly more effective than bonuses and payments for quality attainment seem to be slightly more effective than payments for quality improvement.

A Scoping Review of Components of Physician-induced Demand for Designing a Conceptual Framework

OBJECTIVES

The current study presents a new conceptual framework for physician-induced demand that comprises several influential components and their interactions.

METHODS

This framework was developed on the basis of the conceptual model proposed by Labelle. To identify the components that influenced induced demand and their interactions, a scoping review was conducted (from January 1980 to January 2017). Additionally, an expert panel was formed to formulate and expand the framework.

RESULTS

The developed framework comprises 2 main sets of components. First, the supply side includes 9 components: physicians' incentive for pecuniary profit or meeting their target income, physicians' current income, the physician/population ratio, service price (tariff), payment method, consultation time, type of employment of physicians, observable characteristics of the physician, and type and size of the hospital. Second, the demand side includes 3 components: patients' observable characteristics, patients' non-clinical characteristics, and insurance coverage.

CONCLUSIONS

A conceptual framework that can clearly describe interactions between the components that influence induced demand is a critical step in providing a scientific basis for understanding physicians' behavior, particularly in the field of health economics.

Financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries: an overview of systematic reviews

BACKGROUND

One target of the Sustainable Development Goals is to achieve "universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all". A fundamental concern of governments in striving for this goal is how to finance such a health system. This concern is very relevant for low-income countries.

OBJECTIVES

To provide an overview of the evidence from up-to-date systematic reviews about the effects of financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries. Secondary objectives include identifying needs and priorities for future evaluations and systematic reviews on financial arrangements, and informing refinements in the framework for financial arrangements presented in the overview.

METHODS

We searched Health Systems Evidence in November 2010 and PDQ-Evidence up to 17 December 2016 for systematic reviews. We did not apply any date, language, or publication status limitations in the searches. We included well-conducted systematic reviews of studies that assessed the effects of financial arrangements on patient outcomes (health and health behaviours), the quality or utilisation of healthcare services, resource use, healthcare provider outcomes (such as sick leave), or social outcomes (such as poverty, employment, or financial burden of patients, e.g. out-of-pocket payment, catastrophic disease expenditure) and that were published after April 2005. We excluded reviews with limitations important enough to compromise the reliability of the findings. Two overview authors independently screened reviews, extracted data, and assessed the certainty of evidence using GRADE. We prepared SUPPORT Summaries for eligible reviews, including key messages, 'Summary of findings' tables (using GRADE to assess the certainty of the evidence), and assessments of the relevance of findings to low-income countries.

MAIN RESULTS

We identified 7272 reviews and included 15 in this overview, on: collection of funds (2 reviews), insurance schemes (1 review), purchasing of services (1 review), recipient incentives (6 reviews), and provider incentives (5 reviews). The reviews were published between 2008 and 2015; focused on 13 subcategories; and reported results from 276 studies: 115 (42%) randomised trials, 11 (4%) non-randomised trials, 23 (8%) controlled before-after studies, 51 (19%) interrupted time series, 9 (3%) repeated measures, and 67 (24%) other non-randomised studies. Forty-three per cent (119/276) of the studies included in the reviews took place in low- and middle-income countries. Collection of funds: the effects of changes in user fees on utilisation and equity are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is also uncertain whether aid delivered under the Paris Principles (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability) improves health outcomes compared to aid delivered without conforming to those principles (very low-certainty evidence). Insurance schemes: community-based health insurance may increase service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is uncertain whether social health insurance improves utilisation of health services or health outcomes (very low-certainty evidence). Purchasing of services: it is uncertain whether increasing salaries of public sector healthcare workers improves the quantity or quality of their work (very low-certainty evidence). Recipient incentives: recipient incentives may improve adherence to long-term treatments (low-certainty evidence), but it is uncertain whether they improve patient outcomes. One-time recipient incentives probably improve patient return for start or continuation of treatment (moderate-certainty evidence) and may improve return for tuberculosis test readings (low-certainty evidence). However, incentives may not improve completion of tuberculosis prophylaxis, and it is uncertain whether they improve completion of treatment for active tuberculosis. Conditional cash transfer programmes probably lead to an increase in service utilisation (moderate-certainty evidence), but their effects on health outcomes are uncertain. Vouchers may improve health service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). Introducing a restrictive cap may decrease use of medicines for symptomatic conditions and overall use of medicines, may decrease insurers' expenditures on medicines (low-certainty evidence), and has uncertain effects on emergency department use, hospitalisations, and use of outpatient care (very low-certainty evidence). Reference pricing, maximum pricing, and index pricing for drugs have mixed effects on drug expenditures by patients and insurers as well as the use of brand and generic drugs. Provider incentives: the effects of provider incentives are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence), including: the effects of provider incentives on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians or outpatient referrals from primary to secondary care, incentives for recruiting and retaining health professionals to serve in remote areas, and the effects of pay-for-performance on provider performance, the utilisation of services, patient outcomes, or resource use in low-income countries.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Research based on sound systematic review methods has evaluated numerous financial arrangements relevant to low-income countries, targeting different levels of the health systems and assessing diverse outcomes. However, included reviews rarely reported social outcomes, resource use, equity impacts, or undesirable effects. We also identified gaps in primary research because of uncertainty about applicability of the evidence to low-income countries. Financial arrangements for which the effects are uncertain include external funding (aid), caps and co-payments, pay-for-performance, and provider incentives. Further studies evaluating the effects of these arrangements are needed in low-income countries. Systematic reviews should include all outcomes that are relevant to decision-makers and to people affected by changes in financial arrangements.

Payment methods for outpatient care facilities

BACKGROUND

Outpatient care facilities provide a variety of basic healthcare services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation, and are usually the patient's first contact. The provision of outpatient care contributes to immediate and large gains in health status, and a large portion of total health expenditure goes to outpatient healthcare services. Payment method is one of the most important incentive methods applied by purchasers to guide the performance of outpatient care providers.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the impact of different payment methods on the performance of outpatient care facilities and to analyse the differences in impact of payment methods in different settings.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), 2016, Issue 3, part of the Cochrane Library (searched 8 March 2016); MEDLINE, OvidSP (searched 8 March 2016); Embase, OvidSP (searched 24 April 2014); PubMed (NCBI) (searched 8 March 2016); Dissertations and Theses Database, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); Conference Proceedings Citation Index (ISI Web of Science) (searched 8 March 2016); IDEAS (searched 8 March 2016); EconLit, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); POPLINE, K4Health (searched 8 March 2016); China National Knowledge Infrastructure (searched 8 March 2016); Chinese Medicine Premier (searched 8 March 2016); OpenGrey (searched 8 March 2016); ClinicalTrials.gov, US National Institutes of Health (NIH) (searched 8 March 2016); World Health Organization (WHO) International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP) (searched 8 March 2016); and the website of the World Bank (searched 8 March 2016).In addition, we searched the reference lists of included studies and carried out a citation search for the included studies via ISI Web of Science to find other potentially relevant studies. We also contacted authors of the main included studies regarding any further published or unpublished work.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for outpatient health facilities. We defined outpatient care facilities in this review as facilities that provide health services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation. We only included methods used to transfer funds from the purchaser of healthcare services to health facilities (including groups of individual professionals). These include global budgets, line-item budgets, capitation, fee-for-service (fixed and unconstrained), pay for performance, and mixed payment. The primary outcomes were service provision outcomes, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, costs for providers, and any adverse effects.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

At least two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the risk of bias. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the comparisons and outcomes and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different categories of outcomes. We used a fixed-effect model for meta-analysis within a study if a study included more than one indicator in the same category of outcomes. We used a random-effects model for meta-analysis across studies. If the data for meta-analysis were not available in some studies, we calculated the median and interquartile range. We reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative change for continuous outcomes.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 21 studies from Afghanistan, Burundi, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States of health facilities providing primary health care and mental health care. There were three kinds of payment comparisons. 1) Pay for performance (P4P) combined with some existing payment method (capitation or different kinds of input-based payment) compared to the existing payment methodWe included 18 studies in this comparison, however we did not include five studies in the effects analysis due to high risk of bias. From the 13 studies, we found that the extra P4P incentives probably slightly improved the health professionals' use of some tests and treatments (adjusted RR median = 1.095, range 1.01 to 1.17; moderate-certainty evidence), and probably led to little or no difference in adherence to quality assurance criteria (adjusted percentage change median = -1.345%, range -8.49% to 5.8%; moderate-certainty evidence). We also found that P4P incentives may have led to little or no difference in patients' utilisation of health services (adjusted RR median = 1.01, range 0.96 to 1.15; low-certainty evidence) and may have led to little or no difference in the control of blood pressure or cholesterol (adjusted RR = 1.01, range 0.98 to 1.04; low-certainty evidence). 2) Capitation combined with P4P compared to fee-for-service (FFS)One study found that compared with FFS, a capitated budget combined with payment based on providers' performance on antibiotic prescriptions and patient satisfaction probably slightly reduced antibiotic prescriptions in primary health facilities (adjusted RR 0.84, 95% confidence interval 0.74 to 0.96; moderate-certainty evidence). 3) Capitation compared to FFSTwo studies compared capitation to FFS in mental health centres in the United States. Based on these studies, the effects of capitation compared to FFS on the utilisation and costs of services were uncertain (very low-certainty evidence).

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Our review found that if policymakers intend to apply P4P incentives to pay health facilities providing outpatient services, this intervention will probably lead to a slight improvement in health professionals' use of tests or treatments, particularly for chronic diseases. However, it may lead to little or no improvement in patients' utilisation of health services or health outcomes. When considering using P4P to improve the performance of health facilities, policymakers should carefully consider each component of their P4P design, including the choice of performance measures, the performance target, payment frequency, if there will be additional funding, whether the payment level is sufficient to change the behaviours of health providers, and whether the payment to facilities will be allocated to individual professionals. Unfortunately, the studies included in this review did not help to inform those considerations.Well-designed comparisons of different payment methods for outpatient health facilities in low- and middle-income countries and studies directly comparing different designs (e.g. different payment levels) of the same payment method (e.g. P4P or FFS) are needed.