How Do Viewers Synthesize Conflicting Information from Data Visualizations?

Scientific knowledge develops through cumulative discoveries that build on, contradict, contextualize, or correct prior findings. Scientists and journalists often communicate these incremental findings to lay people through visualizations and text (e.g., the positive and negative effects of caffeine intake). Consequently, readers need to integrate diverse and contrasting evidence from multiple sources to form opinions or make decisions. However, the underlying mechanism for synthesizing information from multiple visualizations remains under-explored. To address this knowledge gap, we conducted a series of four experiments ( N=1166) in which participants synthesized empirical evidence from a pair of line charts presented sequentially. In Experiment 1, we administered a baseline condition with charts depicting no specific context where participants held no strong belief. To test for the generalizability, we introduced real-world scenarios to our visualizations in Experiment 2 and added accompanying text descriptions similar to online news articles or blog posts in Experiment 3. In all three experiments, we varied the relative direction and magnitude of line slopes within the chart pairs. We found that participants tended to weigh the positive slope more when the two charts depicted relationships in the opposite direction (e.g., one positive slope and one negative slope). Participants tended to weigh the less steep slope more when the two charts depicted relationships in the same direction (e.g., both positive). Through these experiments, we characterize participants' synthesis behaviors depending on the relationship between the information they viewed, contribute to theories describing underlying cognitive mechanisms in information synthesis, and describe design implications for data storytelling.

When plausibility manipulations work: an examination of their role in the development of false beliefs and memories

In the current study we examined whether prevalence information and imagery encoding influence participants' general plausibility, personal plausibility, belief, and memory ratings for suggested childhood events. Results showed decreases in general and personal plausibility ratings for low prevalence events when encoding instructions were not elaborate; however, instructions to repeatedly imagine suggested events elicited personal plausibility increases for low-prevalence events, evidence that elaborate imagery negated the effect of our prevalence manipulation. We found no evidence of imagination inflation or false memory construction. We discuss critical differences in researchers' manipulations of plausibility and imagery that may influence results of false memory studies in the literature. In future research investigators should focus on the specific nature of encoding instructions when examining the development of false memories.

The effects of photographs and event plausibility in creating false beliefs

Recent studies have shown that using photographs as memory retrieval aids can significantly increase the likelihood of false memories. The current study further investigated this effect by examining the interactive effects of photographs and event plausibility in developing false beliefs. At Time 1 and two weeks later at Time 2, participants rated 20 events on the Life Events Inventory (LEI) as to whether each occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, participants were told that two target events were plausible and two were implausible. They then used event-related photographs to visualize one plausible and one implausible event. Occurrence ratings significantly increased from Time 1 to Time 2 for plausible events in the photo condition. These results suggest that the use of photographs as a memory enhancing technique is unlikely to cause false memories for events that are not perceived personally plausible.

Script knowledge enhances the development of children's false memories

We examined whether script knowledge contributes to the development of children's false memories. Sixty 7-year-old and 60 11-year-old children listened to false narratives describing either a high-knowledge event (i.e., fingers being caught in a mousetrap) or a low-knowledge event (i.e., receiving a rectal enema) that were similar in terms of plausibility and pleasantness. Moreover, half of the children in each condition received additional suggestive details about the false events. Across two interviews, children had to report everything they remembered about the events. Script knowledge affected children's false memories in that both younger and older children developed more false memories for the high-knowledge event than for the low-knowledge event. Moreover, at the first interview, additional suggestive details inhibited the development of children's images into false memories.

So that's why I don't remember: normalizing forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalizing the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the "forgetting rationale" substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.

"You and your best friend Suzy put slime in Ms. Smollett's desk": producing false memories with self-relevant details

Rates of false memory reports vary markedly in the published literature. In an effort to explain these differences, the present study investigated the effects of including different types of details in a false narrative upon subsequent false memory formation. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions in which the inclusion of self-relevant and/or specific details in a false event (putting a toy in a teacher's desk) was manipulated. Participants engaged in a standard memory recovery procedure over three interviews, involving recall for three true and one false event Upon completion, 68.2% of participants in self-relevant groups were judged as having created memories or images about the false event, as compared with 36.4% in non-self-relevant groups. Subjective ratings of memory intensity were higher for self-relevant groups, and self-relevant participants were less likely to correctly guess the false event. These findings indicate that including self-relevant details in suggested childhood events increases the likelihood that such events will be accepted as false memories.