Hugo who? G. F. Arnold's alternative early approach to psychology and law

Testing encoding specificity and the diagnostic feature-detection theory of eyewitness identification, with implications for showups, lineups, and partially disguised perpetrators

The diagnostic feature-detection theory (DFT) of eyewitness identification is based on facial information that is diagnostic versus non-diagnostic of suspect guilt. It primarily has been tested by discounting non-diagnostic information at retrieval, typically by surrounding a single suspect showup with good fillers to create a lineup. We tested additional DFT predictions by manipulating the presence of facial information (i.e., the exterior region of the face) at both encoding and retrieval with a large between-subjects factorial design (N = 19,414). In support of DFT and in replication of the literature, lineups yielded higher discriminability than showups. In support of encoding specificity, conditions that matched information between encoding and retrieval were generally superior to mismatch conditions. More importantly, we supported several DFT and encoding specificity predictions not previously tested, including that (a) adding non-diagnostic information will reduce discriminability for showups more so than lineups, and (b) removing diagnostic information will lower discriminability for both showups and lineups. These results have implications for police deciding whether to conduct a showup or a lineup, and when dealing with partially disguised perpetrators (e.g., wearing a hoodie).

You can't do that! Hugo Münsterberg and misapplied psychology

This article examines a false start in the application of psychology to the law. While there had been expert testimony from physicians in criminal and civil cases in America since the nineteenth century, forensic psychology first emerged in the early twentieth century. Following European traditions of experimental psychology, Hugo Münsterberg applied the nascent science of memory research to the assessment of witness credibility. A brilliant and popular Harvard professor, Münsterberg touted his technique of word-association to determine truth. Forensic psychology's development was stalled by resistance from within legal authorities, including John Henry Wigmore, the leading expert on evidence. However, Münsterberg was a sensation in popular media. In this article, the authors examine early attempts to import experimental psychology into the courtroom and the arguments against them. Not only were Münsterberg's findings premature, they touched on a forbidden domain for witnesses: fact finding. While sincere, he learned that the determination of truth lay within the province of juries and judges, not psychologists. Thus, the application of psychology to the law was delayed. The authors review the lessons from Münsterberg's false start and comment on developments in the admissibility of scientific testimony.