What's behindcrashing memories? Plausibility, belief and memory in reports of having seen non-existent images

False remembering in real life: James Ost's contributions to memory psychology

This special issue honours James Ost's (1973-2019) contributions to our understanding of false and distorted remembering. In our editorial, we introduce some of James' distinctive research themes including the experiences of people who retract "recovered" memories, social (e.g., co-witness and interviewer influence) and personality influences on false remembering, the nature of false remembering itself (e.g., different types of false memories; false memories vs. false beliefs), public understanding of (false) memory, and a historical link to the work of Frederic Bartlett. We illustrate these themes through a number of key publications. The unifying thread behind James' work is his core interest in false/distorted remembering in real-life (typically high-stake) situations, in line with his engagement with the British False Memory Society and his role as an expert witness in court trials. The articles included in this special issue elaborate on the research themes to which James devoted his career and his curiosity.

Suggested false memories of a non-existent film: forensically relevant individual differences in the crashing memories paradigm

There is ample evidence to suggest that posing leading questions is dangerous, in that it may elicit compliant responses that are not necessarily accurate. Further, suggestive questioning is considered to possibly result in the development of false memories, implied in the suggestion. [Crombag, H. F. M., Wagenaar, W. A., & van Koppen, P. J. (1996). Crashing memories and the problem of 'source monitoring'. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10(2), 95-104. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199604)10:2<95::AID-ACP366>3.0.CO;2-#] introduced a crashing memories paradigm in which participants are asked a single leading question about a non-existent film. The present research sought to replicate the false-memory-eliciting effect of the crashing memory induction. Further, we sought to explore associations with forensically relevant personality traits, particularly acquiescence, compliance, and suggestibility. In two studies, a significant minority of participants endorsed the leading question about the non-existent film (25.7%, and 38% respectively). We found no support for an association with acquiescence or compliance, but suggestibility was associated with the development of false memories.

Rich false memories of autobiographical events can be reversed

False memories of autobiographical events can create enormous problems in forensic settings (e.g., false accusations). While multiple studies succeeded in inducing false memories in interview settings, we present research trying to reverse this effect (and thereby reduce the potential damage) by means of two ecologically valid strategies. We first successfully implanted false memories for two plausible autobiographical events (suggested by the students' parents, alongside two true events). Over three repeated interviews, participants developed false memories (measured by state-of-the-art coding) of the suggested events under minimally suggestive conditions (27%) and even more so using massive suggestion (56%). We then used two techniques to reduce false memory endorsement, source sensitization (alerting interviewees to possible external sources of the memories, e.g., family narratives) and false memory sensitization (raising the possibility of false memories being inadvertently created in memory interviews, delivered by a new interviewer). This reversed the false memory build-up over the first three interviews, returning false memory rates in both suggestion conditions to the baseline levels of the first interview (i.e., to ∼15% and ∼25%, respectively). By comparison, true event memories were endorsed at a higher level overall and less affected by either the repeated interviews or the sensitization techniques. In a 1-y follow-up (after the original interviews and debriefing), false memory rates further dropped to 5%, and participants overwhelmingly rejected the false events. One strong practical implication is that false memories can be substantially reduced by easy-to-implement techniques without causing collateral damage to true memories.

How deception and believability feedback affect recall

While research suggests that telling lies can distort memory for the truth, the effects of receiving feedback about the believability about one's lies are not known. We hypothesised that participants who exaggerated the number of stolen items (vs. told the truth) in a mock insurance claim and then received feedback that their statement was believable (vs. not believable) would incorporate this lie into memory. In a two-phase between-subjects design, participants saw images of an office pre- and post-theft and were randomly assigned to report the number of stolen items accurately (truth-tellers) or exaggerate (liars). They were then randomly assigned to receive feedback that their statement was believable or not. Approximately two weeks later, participants' recall of the theft was measured. Liars and truth-tellers recalled a similar number of stolen items, but liars had less accurate recall for exactly which items were stolen. Liars (vs. truth-tellers) also made more omission errors. The majority of participants who fabricated additional stolen items (65.7%) incorporated one or more of these (false) items into their memory. Results suggest that source monitoring errors may lead fabricated details to be incorporated into memory. Although no effects of believability feedback were observed, recommendations for future researchers are discussed.

Dr James Ost's contributions to the work of the British false memory society

The British False Memory Society (BFMS) is a registered charity founded in 1993 in response to an epidemic of false claims of past childhood sexual abuse by adults in therapy. The accusers believe they have recovered unconscious memories of a hidden past, but scientific and other evidence raise the possibility of false memories or retrospective reappraisal. The BFMS aims to raise awareness about false memory and to reduce the impact of the resulting false accusations. Dr James Ost was an active member of the BFMS's Scientific and Professional Advisory Board. Three lines of his research were particularly relevant to the work of the BFMS. The first of these was his investigations of retractors. His insights provided a deeper understanding of processes involved in the formation and subsequent rejection of false memories and beliefs relating to such allegations. He also carried out experimental studies providing empirical proof that false memories can be implanted under well controlled conditions. Finally, he carried out, and produced reviews of, surveys of misconceptions about the nature of memory, thus highlighting issues that have major implications for the working of the legal system. Dr Ost also served as an expert defence witness on a number of occasions.

Eyewitness memory in the news can affect the strategic regulation of memory reporting

The public is increasingly exposed to news about eyewitness memory errors. This study draws from the strategic memory regulation framework [Goldsmith, M., Koriat, A., & Weinberg-Eliezer, A. (2002). Strategic regulation of grain size memory reporting. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131(1), 73-95. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.131.1.73] to make predictions about how eyewitness memory reporting is affected by exposure to such reports. In Experiment 1, participants (n = 226) viewed a mock crime, were exposed to a fictitious news report about eyewitness memory accuracy (memory is accurate, memory is inaccurate, or a control condition), and then recalled the mock crime. Participants who read that eyewitness memory is inaccurate were less confident in their memory accuracy and reported less information about the mock crime compared to those in the other conditions. The specificity and accuracy of recall did not vary across conditions, however. In Experiment 2, participants (n = 2,491) watched a mock crime and were asked to identify the perpetrator from a simultaneous lineup. Participants who read that eyewitness memory is inaccurate evaluated their memory for the mock crime as relatively poorer but their lineup decisions did not differ compared to other participants. This suggests that news about eyewitness memory inaccuracy affects how people evaluate their memory capability, and differentially affects memory output depending on the memory task.

The Potential for False Memories is Bigger than What Brewin and Andrews Suggest

Brewin and Andrews (2016) reviewed the literature on false memory propensity for childhood events. In this commentary, we critically evaluate their basic claim that proneness to false memories of childhood experiences is more limited than has been articulated in the literature. We show that Brewin and Andrews were selective in their inclusion of false memory studies, thereby ignoring relevant research related to autobiographical false memories. Equally important, and in contrast to what Brewin and Andrews claim, we show that implanted false memories elicited by misinformation are characterized by high confidence.

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Using a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and confidence in memory, we review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inflation, false feedback and memory implantation. Imagination inflation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution against accepting investigator‐based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants' self‐reports. Recommendations are made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Setting the Records Straight: Impossible Memories and the Persistence of Their Phenomenological Qualities

This article offers a new perspective on the study of “recollections” that feel like memories despite the fact that people come to believe they are based on events that could not possibly have happened. Indeed this feeling of remembering can persist long after people change their beliefs. This new perspective emerges from the integration of the work of memory scientists with that of literary writers and historians. Shedding light on assumptions about the strength of these persistence effects, the perspective serves as an effective heuristic for guiding the study of precipitating factors that may lead people to question their recollections in the first place. This integrative perspective also invites a broader consideration of the circumstances giving rise to changes in beliefs as well as resistance to such changes. In the process, this new perspective extends and sharpens theoretical discussions about memory reconstruction processes, highlighting the role of scene making and social interactions.

False memories in highly superior autobiographical memory individuals

The recent identification of highly superior autobiographical memory (HSAM) raised the possibility that there may be individuals who are immune to memory distortions. We measured HSAM participants' and age- and sex-matched controls' susceptibility to false memories using several research paradigms. HSAM participants and controls were both susceptible to false recognition of nonpresented critical lure words in an associative word-list task. In a misinformation task, HSAM participants showed higher overall false memory compared with that of controls for details in a photographic slideshow. HSAM participants were equally as likely as controls to mistakenly report they had seen nonexistent footage of a plane crash. Finding false memories in a superior-memory group suggests that malleable reconstructive mechanisms may be fundamental to episodic remembering. Paradoxically, HSAM individuals may retrieve abundant and accurate autobiographical memories using fallible reconstructive processes.