Lies, Damn Lies, and Expectations: How Base Rates Inform Lie-Truth Judgments

Examining gullibility with sentence verification judgments

Three experiments were conducted to examine gullibility as measured by people's bias to respond with a True response when performing sentence verification judgment task. The experiments manipulated the location of unfamiliar concepts such that some sentences contained unfamiliar concepts in the subject while other sentences contained unfamiliar concepts in the predicate, hence measuring the bias to judge an idea to be true when one cannot make the decision relying on background knowledge. The results indicated: 1) a higher frequency of True response when an unfamiliar concept is located in the subject compared to when it is in the predicate; and 2) the frequency of True response was lower than chance level even when unfamiliar information is located in the subject. The results were discussed in relation to gullibility and how the verification judgment is processed as a plausibility judgment.

Is It the Judge, the Sender, or Just the Individual Message? Disentangling Person and Message Effects on Variation in Lie-Detection Judgments

Research suggests that people differ more in their ability to lie than in their ability to detect lies. However, because studies have not treated senders and messages as separate entities, it is unclear whether some senders are generally more transparent than others or whether individual messages differ in their transparency of veracity regardless of senders. Variance attributable to judges, senders, and messages was estimated simultaneously using multiple messages from each sender (totaling more than 45,000 judgments). The claim that the accuracy of a veracity judgment depends on the sender was not supported. Messages differed in their detectability (21% explained variance), but senders did not. Message veracity accounted for most message variation (16.8% of the total variance), but other idiosyncratic message characteristics also contributed significantly. Consistent with the notion that a (mis)match between sender demeanor and veracity determines accuracy, lie and truth detectability differed individually within senders. Judges primarily determined variance in lie-versus-truth classifications (12%) and in confidence (46%) but played no role regarding judgment accuracy (< 0.01%). This work has substantial implications for the design and direction of future research and underscores the importance of separating senders and messages when developing theories and testing derived hypotheses.

Detecting children's true and false denials of wrongdoing: Effects of question type and base rate knowledge

One common and unfortunately overlooked obstacle to the detection of sexual abuse is non-disclosure by children. Non-disclosure in forensic interviews may be expressed via concealment in response to recall questions or via active denials in response to recognition (e.g., yes/no) questions. In two studies, we evaluated whether adults' ability to discern true and false denials of wrongdoing by children varied as a function of the types of interview question the children were asked. Results suggest that adults are not good at detecting deceptive denials of wrongdoing by children, even when the adults view children narrate their experiences in response to recall questions rather than provide one word answers to recognition questions. In Study 1, adults exhibited a consistent "truth bias," leading them toward believing children, regardless of whether the children's denials were true or false. In Study 2, adults were given base-rate information about the occurrence of true and false denials (50% of each). The information eliminated the adults' truth bias but did not improve their overall detection accuracy, which still hovered near chance. Adults did, however, perceive children's denials as slightly more credible when they emerged in response to recall rather than recognition questions, especially when children were honestly denying wrongdoing. Results suggest the need for caution when evaluating adults' judgments of children's veracity when the children fail to disclose abuse.

Can Emotional Awareness of Liars Influence Deception Detection Effectiveness?

Emotional awareness is defined as the ability to cognitively process emotional arousal and the expression thereof. When telling a lie, emotional awareness comes into play: the most important objective is to conceal one's true emotions and fabricate false ones; simultaneously, however, one must control for the affective state of those who are to believe the falsehood; via such efforts, one can assess the potential for success in the deceit. With this in mind, we hypothesized that emotional awareness may play a vital role in the process of creating a convincing lie. Study participants (Group A, N = 40) were asked to complete the Polish adaptation of the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) and record videos consisting of plotting some truth or lie, which were then rated as true or false by 400 volunteers (Group B). Both samples (Group A and Group B) were recruited among students attending Polish universities. The results allowed us to confirm correlational relationships between emotional awareness (general, self-awareness, and awareness of others' emotions) and the effectiveness of the deception. We were also able to confirm previous studies' results about the truth bias in detecting lies and gender differences in emotional awareness.

Effects of the putative confession instruction on perceptions of children's true and false statements

The putative confession (PC) instruction (i.e., "[suspect] told me everything that happened and wants you to tell the truth") during forensic interviews with children has been shown to increase the accuracy of children's statements, but it is unclear whether adults' perceptions are sensitive to this salutary effect. The present study examined how adults perceive children's true and false responses to the PC instruction. Participants (n = 299) watched videotaped interviews of children and rated the child's credibility and the truthfulness of his/her statements. When viewing children's responses to the PC instruction, true and false statements were rated as equally credible, and there was a decrease in accuracy for identifying false denials as lies. These findings suggest that participants viewed the PC instruction as truth-inducing. Implications for the forensic use of the PC instruction are discussed.

More evidence against the Spinozan model: Cognitive load diminishes memory for "true" feedback

We tested two competing models on the memory representation of truth-value information: the Spinozan model and the Cartesian model. Both models assume that truth-value information is represented with memory "tags," but the models differ in their coding scheme. According to the Cartesian model, true information is stored with a "true" tag, and false information is stored with a "false" tag. In contrast, the Spinozan model proposes that only false information receives "false" tags. All other (i.e., untagged) information is considered as true by default. Hence, in case of cognitive load during feedback encoding, the latter model predicts a load effect on memory for "false" feedback, but not on memory for "true" feedback. To test this prediction, participants studied trivia statements (Experiment 1) or nonsense statements that allegedly represented foreign-language translations (Experiment 2). After each statement, participants received feedback on the (alleged) truth value of the statement. Importantly, half of the participants experienced cognitive load during feedback processing. For the trivia statements of Experiment 1, we observed a load effect on memory for both "false" and "true" feedback. In contrast, for the nonsense statements of Experiment 2, we found a load effect on memory for "true" feedback only. Both findings clearly contradict the Spinozan model. However, our results are also only partially in line with the predictions of the Cartesian model. For this reason, we suggest a more flexible model that allows for an optional and context-dependent encoding of "true" tags and "false" tags.

How Gullible are We? A Review of the Evidence from Psychology and Social Science

A long tradition of scholarship, from ancient Greece to Marxism or some contemporary social psychology, portrays humans as strongly gullible—wont to accept harmful messages by being unduly deferent. However, if humans are reasonably well adapted, they should not be strongly gullible: they should be vigilant toward communicated information. Evidence from experimental psychology reveals that humans are equipped with well-functioning mechanisms of epistemic vigilance. They check the plausibility of messages against their background beliefs, calibrate their trust as a function of the source's competence and benevolence, and critically evaluate arguments offered to them. Even if humans are equipped with well-functioning mechanisms of epistemic vigilance, an adaptive lag might render them gullible in the face of new challenges, from clever marketing to omnipresent propaganda. I review evidence from different cultural domains often taken as proof of strong gullibility: religion, demagoguery, propaganda, political campaigns, advertising, erroneous medical beliefs, and rumors. Converging evidence reveals that communication is much less influential than often believed—that religious proselytizing, propaganda, advertising, and so forth are generally not very effective at changing people's minds. Beliefs that lead to costly behavior are even less likely to be accepted. Finally, it is also argued that most cases of acceptance of misguided communicated information do not stem from undue deference, but from a fit between the communicated information and the audience's preexisting beliefs.

Strategic Interviewing to Detect Deception: Cues to Deception across Repeated Interviews

Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after 1 week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).

Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias

There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can people engage in an effortful re-evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess they can rely on context information to make an informed judgement. The account predicts, and we found, that if people can explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because they are no longer required to guess. Thus, we conclude that belief formation can be better explained by an informed Cartesian account - an attempt to make an informed judgment under uncertainty.