Memory of Fictional Information: A Theoretical Framework

Much of the information people encounter in everyday life is not factual; it originates from fictional sources, such as movies, novels, and video games, and from direct experience such as pretense, role-playing, and everyday conversation. Despite the recent increase in research on fiction, there is no theoretical account of how memory of fictional information is related to other types of memory or of which mechanisms allow people to separate fact and fiction in memory. We present a theoretical framework that places memory of fiction in relation to other cognitive phenomena as a distinct construct and argue that it is an essential component for any general theory of human memory. We show how fictionality can be integrated in an existing memory model by extending Rubin's dimensional conceptual memory model. By this means, our model can account for explicit and implicit memory of fictional information of events, places, characters, and objects. Further, we propose a set of mechanisms involving various degrees of complexity and levels of conscious processing that mostly keep fact and fiction separated but also allow information from fiction to influence real-world attitudes and beliefs: content-based reasoning, source monitoring, and an associative link from the memory to the concept of fiction.

Age and Gender Differences in the Borrowing of Personal Stories

BACKGROUND

In prior research, about half of undergraduate students claimed to have "borrowed" a story, by telling someone else's autobiographical memory as if it was their own. Given that borrowing stories often involves intentional fabrication, and given that there are age-related declines in lying, we hypothesized that reports of intentionally borrowing stories should decline with age.

METHODS

We recruited participants who ranged in age from 18 to 86 and asked them to complete an online retrospective survey about borrowing stories.

RESULTS

Consistent with our hypothesis, older age was associated with lower reports of borrowing stories. Furthermore, among people who did report borrowing a story, older age was associated with less frequent story borrowing and less recent story borrowing.

CONCLUSION

These findings highlight the importance of using age-diverse samples when examining social memory phenomena. Findings based upon undergraduate students do not always replicate in other age groups.

Taking the unreal seriously: enriching cognitive science with the notion of fictionality

Fictionality and fictional experiences are ubiquitous in people's everyday lives in the forms of movies, novels, video games, pretense and role playing, and digital technology use. Despite this ubiquity, though, the field of cognitive science has traditionally been dominated by a focus on the real world. Based on the limited understanding from previous research on questions regarding fictional information and the cognitive processes for distinguishing reality from fiction, we argue for the need for a comprehensive and systematic account that reflects on related phenomena, such as narrative comprehension or imagination embedded into general theories of cognition. This is important as incorporating cognitive processing of fictional events into memory theory reshapes the conceptual map of human memory. In this paper, we highlight future challenges for the cognitive studies of fictionality on conceptual, neurological, and computational levels. Taking on these challenges requires an interdisciplinary approach between fields like developmental psychology, philosophy, and the study of narrative comprehension. Our aim is to build on such interdisciplinarity and provide conclusions on the ways in which new theoretical frameworks of fiction cognition can aid understanding human behaviors in a wide range of aspects of people's daily lives, media consumption habits, and digital encounters. Our account also has the potential to inform technological innovations related to training intelligent digital systems to distinguish fact and fiction in the source material.

Cognitive scripts and narrative identity are shaped by structures of power

Constructing a narrative identity involves developing an understanding of oneself as integrated through time and across contexts, a task critical to psychosocial development and functioning. However, research has primarily focused on the individual in isolation or in highly localized contexts. This is problematic because narrative identity is profoundly shaped by structures of power; thus, we cannot understand how individuals understand themselves through time, across contexts, and as a member of a particular community without attention to the structure of society. We propose a structural-psychological framework for the study of autobiographical memory, narrative, and context that examines how structures of power are maintained, and potentially changed, through the narration of autobiographical events, as guided by cognitive scripts, or master narratives.

Stealing and sharing memories: Source monitoring biases following collaborative remembering

People experience difficulties tracking the source of their memories following collaborative remembering. This results in a variety of source monitoring errors. Researchers have typically focused on one of these errors - instances of adopting information from external sources as one's own memories. They have failed to investigate the frequency of other possible source monitoring errors. Because of this, it is impossible to say whether observed instances of mistakenly adopting external information represent a true bias in remembering or whether these errors simply reflect one of many memory errors that have an equal likelihood of occurring. In two studies, we teased apart these two possibilities. Members of dyads individually studied pictures with some items appearing in both participants' pictures and some unique to each one's pictures. Participants then collaboratively recalled what items were present. After the collaborative recall, participants completed individual source monitoring tests. We found that participants displayed biases in their source monitoring errors for information discussed during collaborative remembering. They were more likely to adopt information from partners as their own memories than attribute their contributions to their partners. They also more often believed their memories (rather than their partner's) were shared, representing a false consensus. Importantly, these biases only occurred following collaborative remembering and not when individuals received comparable information in a non-social setting. These results illuminate the importance of investigating the relative, and not just absolute, frequency of source monitoring errors and provide insight into how collaborative remembering changes individual memories over time.

Hypnosis as performance autoethnography in qualitative sociological research

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to introduce to sociologists the concept of dissociative hypnosis and to demonstrate the potential that this discipline has for obtaining or deriving biographical narratives in ethnographic and autoethnographic studies.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper presents brief comparative histories of the development of hypnosis and of performance autoethnography to highlight the degree of consonance between these apparently, disparate modalities, in their struggle for acceptance and respectability. The intensely introspective, emotional and experiential nature of hypnosis and self-hypnosis narratives is then compared with the personal descriptions and applications of the autoethnographic process as depicted in the sociological literature, to illustrate the parallels between the two modalities. The paper concludes with a review of the potential problems and limitations inherent in using hypnosis as a memory recall modality in sociological research studies.

Findings

This paper argues that the exploratory and revelatory nature of information accrual during dissociative altered-state hypnosis closely resembles that during performance autoethnography, and that hypnosis could therefore be usefully employed as an additional and novel (ethno-) autobiographical tool in sociological and ethnographic research.

Originality/value

Performative autoethnography has now become a firmly established route to obtaining a valid and intensely personal autobiographical history of individuals or groups of individuals. However this is the first publication to propose hypnosis as an alternative approach to deriving ethnographic and autoethnographic biographical narratives.

Sub-types of nonbelieved memories reveal differential outcomes of challenges to memories

Nonbelieved memories (NBMs) highlight the independence between distinct metamemorial judgements that contribute to the experience of remembering. Initial definitions of NBMs portrayed them as involving the withdrawal of belief in occurrence despite sustained recollection. While people rate belief for their NBMs as weaker than recollection, the average difference is too small to support the idea that autobiographical belief is completely withdrawn in all cases. Furthermore, autobiographical belief and recollection ratings vary considerably across NBMs. In two studies, we reanalysed data from prior studies to examine whether NBM reports reflect a single category or multiple sub-categories using cluster analytic methods. In Study 1, we identified three sub-types of NBMs. In Study 2 we incorporated the concept of belief in accuracy, and found that two of the clusters from Study 1 split into two clusters apiece. All clusters were characterised by higher recollection than belief in occurrence ratings, and clusters were differentiated by the degree of difference between these variables. In both studies the clusters were discriminated by a number of memory characteristic ratings and by reasons reported as leading to the alteration of belief. Implications for understanding the remembering of past events and predicting the creation of NBMs are discussed.

Setting the Records Straight: Impossible Memories and the Persistence of Their Phenomenological Qualities

This article offers a new perspective on the study of “recollections” that feel like memories despite the fact that people come to believe they are based on events that could not possibly have happened. Indeed this feeling of remembering can persist long after people change their beliefs. This new perspective emerges from the integration of the work of memory scientists with that of literary writers and historians. Shedding light on assumptions about the strength of these persistence effects, the perspective serves as an effective heuristic for guiding the study of precipitating factors that may lead people to question their recollections in the first place. This integrative perspective also invites a broader consideration of the circumstances giving rise to changes in beliefs as well as resistance to such changes. In the process, this new perspective extends and sharpens theoretical discussions about memory reconstruction processes, highlighting the role of scene making and social interactions.