Stimuli in 3 Acts: A normative study on action-statements, action videos and object photos

The study of action observation and imagery, separately and combined, is expanding in diverse research areas (e.g., sports psychology, neurosciences), making clear the need for action-related stimuli (i.e., action statements, videos, and pictures). Although several databases of object and action pictures are available, norms on action videos are scarce. In this study, we validated a set of 60 object-related everyday actions in three different formats: action-statements, and corresponding dynamic (action videos) and static (object photos) stimuli. In Study 1, ratings of imageability, image agreement, action familiarity, action frequency, and action valence were collected from 161 participants. In Study 2, a different sample of 115 participants rated object familiarity, object valence, and object-action prototypicality. Most actions were rated as easy to imagine, familiar, and neutral or positive in valence. However, there was variation in the frequency with which participants perform these actions on a daily basis. High agreement between participants' mental image and action videos was also found, showing that the videos depict a conventional way of performing the actions. Objects were considered familiar and positive in valence. High ratings on object-action prototypicality indicate that the actions correspond to prototypical actions for most objects. 3ActStimuli is a comprehensive set of stimuli that can be useful in several research areas, allowing the combined study of action observation and imagery.

Is motor activity the key to the observation-inflation effect? The role of action simulation

Observing others performing an action can lead to false memories of self-performance - the observation-inflation effect. The action simulation hypothesis proposes that an action simulation caused by people's observation of an action is the key reason for this effect. Previous studies have inconsistent views of this hypothesis. In the present study, we re-examined the role of action simulation and discussed the key aspects of the mental processes associated with it. We examined the hypotheses that (a) the magnitude of the observation-inflation effect would decrease as the action simulation was impeded and (b) the magnitude of the observation-inflation effect would not be significantly different in conditions in which participants watched either a part of a video or a full video. The results are consistent with the hypotheses. This study provides strong evidence that action simulation influences the generation of observation-inflation effects and that the process is continuous and can refer to further action information.

Other-self confusions in action memory: The role of motor processes

People can come to falsely remember performing actions that they have not actually performed. Common accounts of such false action memories have invoked source confusion from the overlap of sensory features but largely ignored the role of motor processes. We addressed this lacuna with a paradigm in which participants first perform (vs. do not perform) actions and then observe another person performing some of the non-performed actions. In this paradigm, observation of videos showing another's actions can later induce false self-attributions of these actions, the observation-inflation effect. Contrary to a sensory-feature account but consistent with a motor-simulation account, we found the effect even with perceptually impoverished action videos in which the majority of sensory features is absent, but motion cues are preserved (Experiment 1). We then created conditions during action observation that should (vs. should not) impede motor simulation. As predicted we found that the effect of observation was reduced when participants executed movements that were incongruent (vs. congruent) with the observed actions (Experiment 2). We discuss the processes that can produce associations of self with observed others' actions and later affect observers' action memory.

Imagination inflation in the mirror: Can imagining others' actions induce false memories of self-performance?

Imagining oneself performing a simple action can trigger false memories of self-performance, a phenomenon called imagination inflation. However, people can, and often do, imagine others' behavior and actions. According to a visual-similarity account, imagining another person's actions should induce the same kind of memory error, a false memory of self-performance. We tested this account in three experiments, in which performance was followed by imagination. In the imagination phase, participants were asked to either imagine themselves or to imagine another person performing actions, some of which were not previously performed. Two weeks later, a surprise source-memory test was administered in which participants had to decide whether a depicted action had been performed or not performed. Results revealed that imagining another person can trigger false memories of self-performance. However, visual similarity between performance and imagination predicted the amount of false memories only for other-imagination but not for self-imagination. These findings are consistent with research suggesting that other- and self-imagination rely on different mechanisms: While other-imagination primarily involves visual imagery, self-imagination primarily involves motor imagery. Accordingly, false action memories from other-imagination may result from visual similarity, whereas false action memories from self-imagination may result from motor simulation.

Factors that influence the generation of autobiographical memory conjunction errors

The constructive nature of memory is generally adaptive, allowing us to efficiently store, process and learn from life events, and simulate future scenarios to prepare ourselves for what may come. However, the cost of a flexibly constructive memory system is the occasional conjunction error, whereby the components of an event are authentic, but the combination of those components is false. Using a novel recombination paradigm, it was demonstrated that details from one autobiographical memory (AM) may be incorrectly incorporated into another, forming AM conjunction errors that elude typical reality monitoring checks. The factors that contribute to the creation of these conjunction errors were examined across two experiments. Conjunction errors were more likely to occur when the corresponding details were partially rather than fully recombined, likely due to increased plausibility and ease of simulation of partially recombined scenarios. Brief periods of imagination increased conjunction error rates, in line with the imagination inflation effect. Subjective ratings suggest that this inflation is due to similarity of phenomenological experience between conjunction and authentic memories, consistent with a source monitoring perspective. Moreover, objective scoring of memory content indicates that increased perceptual detail may be particularly important for the formation of AM conjunction errors.

Disowned recollections: denying true experiences undermines belief in occurrence but not judgments of remembering

Recent research findings have illustrated that false memories induced in the laboratory can be dissociated from the beliefs that the events had in fact occurred. In this study we assessed whether this dissociability is a quality peculiar to false memory, or whether it represents a general characteristic of autobiographical memory. To this end we examined whether people can be induced to stop believing in memories for true experiences. Participants observed and performed simple actions, and were later falsely informed that they had not performed some of them--that false memories for these actions had been implanted through the use of fabricated evidence. Before and after receiving this misinformation, participants rated their belief in and memory of performing those actions, other actions that they had also performed, and actions that they had not performed. Whereas the misinformation substantially undermined participants' beliefs in the specific performed actions about which they had been misinformed, it had little effect on their endorsement of remembering those actions. The misinformation thus boosted the proportion of occasions in which participants rated their memories as stronger than their beliefs, and it weakened the correlation between belief and memory ratings. Thus, this study provides the first experimental demonstration of non-believed memories of true experiences. We discuss our findings with reference to the small literature concerning the use of socially-communicated misinformation to undermine event memories, and with reference to the structure of autobiographical memory.

False recognition of objects in visual scenes: findings from a combined direct and indirect memory test

We report an extension of the procedure devised by Weinstein and Shanks (Memory & Cognition 36:1415-1428, 2008) to study false recognition and priming of pictures. Participants viewed scenes with multiple embedded objects (seen items), then studied the names of these objects and the names of other objects (read items). Finally, participants completed a combined direct (recognition) and indirect (identification) memory test that included seen items, read items, and new items. In the direct test, participants recognized pictures of seen and read items more often than new pictures. In the indirect test, participants' speed at identifying those same pictures was improved for pictures that they had actually studied, and also for falsely recognized pictures whose names they had read. These data provide new evidence that a false-memory induction procedure can elicit memory-like representations that are difficult to distinguish from "true" memories of studied pictures.

True and false memory for colour names versus actual colours: Support for the visual distinctiveness heuristic in memory for colour information

In a colour variation of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm, participants studied lists of words critically related to a nonstudied colour name (e.g., “blood, cherry, scarlet, rouge … ”); they later showed false memory for the critical colour name (e.g., “red”). Two additional experiments suggest that participants generate colour imagery in response to such colour-related DRM lists. First, participants claim to experience colour imagery more often following colour-related than standard non-colour-related DRM lists; they also rate their colour imagery as more vivid following colour-related lists. Second, participants exhibit facilitative priming for critical colours in a dot selection task that follows words in the colour-related DRM list, suggesting that colour-related DRM lists prime participants for the actual critical colours themselves. Despite these findings, false memory for critical colour names does not extend to the actual colours themselves (font colours). Rather than leading to source confusion about which colours were self-generated and which were studied, presenting the study lists in varied font colours actually worked to reduce false memory overall. Results are interpreted within the framework of the visual distinctiveness hypothesis.

Source misattributions may increase the accuracy of source judgments

Misattribution of remembered information from one source to another is commonly associated with false memories, but we demonstrate that it also may underlie memories that accord with past events. Participants imagined drawings of objects in four different locations. For each, a drawing of a similarly shaped object was seen in the same location, a different location, or not seen. When tested on memory for objects' origin (seen/imagined) and location, more false "seen" responses, but also more correct location responses, were given to imagined objects if a similar object had been seen, versus not seen, in the same location. We argue that misattribution of feature information (e.g., shape, location) from seen objects to similar imagined ones increased false memories of seeing objects but also increased correct location memories, provided the misattributed location matched the imagined objects' location. Thus, consistent with the source-monitoring framework, imperfect source-attribution processes underlie false and true memories.

Imagination and memory: does imagining implausible events lead to false autobiographical memories?

Previous studies have reported that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories. This finding has been used to suggest that psychotherapists who have clients imagine suspected repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may, in fact, be inducing false memories for the imagined events. In this study, at Time 1 and then, 2 weeks later, at Time 2, 145 subjects rated each of 20 events on the Life Events Inventory as to whether each had occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, the subjects were told that 2 target events were plausible and 2 were implausible. They were then asked to imagine 1 plausible and 1 implausible target event. Plausibility and imagining interacted to affect occurrence ratings; whereas imagining plausible events increased the change in occurrence ratings, imagining implausible events had no effect on occurrence ratings.

Memory editing: Knowledge, criteria, and alignment

Within this article, a general organisational framework for this special issue of Memory is provided. The organising structure is based on a straightforward hypothesis that editing mechanisms are based on three independent constructs: knowledge, criteria, and alignment. Supporting evidence for this general framework taken from the literature generally, and this special issue of Memory specifically, is reviewed. In the concluding section, future directions for research in the area of memory editing are outlined.

Importing perceived features into false memories

False memories sometimes contain specific details, such as location or colour, about events that never occurred. Based on the source-monitoring framework, we investigated one process by which false memories acquire details: the reactivation and misattribution of feature information from memories of similar perceived events. In Experiments 1A and 1B, when imagined objects were falsely remembered as seen, participants often reported that the objects had appeared in locations where visually or conceptually similar objects, respectively, had actually appeared. Experiment 2 indicated that colour and shape features of seen objects were misattributed to false memories of imagined objects. Experiment 3 showed that perceived details were misattributed to false memories of objects that had not been explicitly imagined. False memories that imported perceived features, compared to those that presumably did not, were subjectively more like memories for perceived events. Thus, perception may be even more pernicious than imagination in contributing to false memories.

Effective cue utilization reduces memory errors in older adults

When compared with younger adults, older adults typically manifest poorer episodic memory. One hypothesis for the episodic memory deficit is that older adults may not encode contextual information as well as younger adults. Alternatively, older adults may use contextual information at retrieval less effectively when compared with younger adults. If older adults encode context less well than younger adults, then manipulations that affect context should have little effect on memory performance. To evaluate these 2 hypotheses, the authors used manipulations that promoted effective contextual cue utilization at retrieval. Retention interval and instructions at retrieval were manipulated within the imagination inflation paradigm. Results suggest that older adults encode contextual cues useful in improving memory performance but have difficulty accessing and using those cues.

Using source cues and familiarity cues to resist imagination inflation

To investigate whether people can resist imagination inflation--the imagination-induced increased confidence that fictitious childhood events really happened--we gave them different types of cues. In a three-stage procedure, participants: (1) rated their confidence that a list of childhood events had happened to them, (2) imagined some of these events, and (3) made confidence ratings a second time. Subjects received either no cues about the source of the imagined event, an additional source cue (perspective), an additional familiarity cue (a plausibility questionnaire), or both cues. Only subjects who had both types of cues resisted imagination inflation. These results suggest that additional cues can sometimes safeguard people from becoming more confident that fictitious events were genuine experiences.