Too good to be true? Psychological responses to uncommon options in risk–reward environments

People Reject Free Money and Cheap Deals Because They Infer Phantom Costs

If money is good, then shouldn't more money always be better? Perhaps not. Traditional economic theories suggest that money is an ever-increasing incentivizer. If someone will accept a job for US$20/hr, they should be more likely to accept the same job for US$30/hr and especially for US$250/hr. However, 10 preregistered, high-powered studies (N = 4,205, in the United States and Iran) reveal how increasing incentives can backfire. Overly generous offers lead people to infer "phantom costs" that make them less likely to accept high job wages, cheap plane fares, and free money. We present a theory for understanding when and why people imagine these hidden drawbacks and show how phantom costs drive judgments, impact behavior, and intersect with individual differences. Phantom costs change how we should think about "economic rationality." Economic exchanges are not merely about money, but instead are social interactions between people trying to perceive (and deceive) each others' minds.

Risky decisions are influenced by individual attributes as a function of risk preference

It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attributes or dimensions - such as probabilities and amounts of money to be earned during risky choices - are resolved by first combining the attributes of each option to form an overall expected value and then comparing the expected values of the alternative options, using a unique evidence accumulation process. A plausible alternative would be performing independent comparisons between the individual attributes and then integrating the results of the comparisons afterwards. Here, we devise a novel method to disambiguate between these types of models, by orthogonally manipulating the expected value of choice options and the relative salience of their attributes. Our results, based on behavioral measures and drift-diffusion models, provide evidence in favor of the framework where information about individual attributes independently impacts deliberation. This suggests that risky decisions are resolved by running in parallel multiple comparisons between the separate attributes - possibly alongside an additional comparison of expected value. This result stands in contrast with the assumption of standard economic theory that choices require a unique comparison of expected values and suggests that at the cognitive level, decision processes might be more distributed than commonly assumed. Beyond our planned analyses, we also discovered that attribute salience affects people of different risk preference type in different ways: risk-averse participants seem to focus more on probability, except when monetary amount is particularly high; risk-neutral/seeking participants, in contrast, seem to focus more on monetary amount, except when probability is particularly low.

The boomerang effect of zero pricing: when and why a zero price is less effective than a low price for enhancing consumer demand

Prior literature has demonstrated the power of zero pricing to boost consumer demand, but the current research shows a novel "boomerang effect": a zero (vs. low, nonzero) price can lower demand when the offer comes with high incidental costs (e.g., the time cost in commuting to an offline class; the physical risk of getting a new vaccine). Five studies show that zero pricing, relative to low pricing, has a boosting (boomerang) effect on demand when incidental costs are low (high). The diverging effects of zero pricing on demand are explained by a dual-process model with a positive affective pathway and negative scrutiny pathway. Zero pricing triggers both positive affect and cognitive scrutiny of incidental costs; when incidental costs are high, the scrutiny pathway overrides the affective pathway and decreases demand. The finding has managerial implications as incidental costs often vary widely between marketing channels and over a product's life cycle.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11747-022-00842-1.

Inference and preference in intertemporal choice

When choosing between immediate and future rewards, how do people deal with uncertainty about the value of the future outcome or the delay until its occurrence? Skylark et al. (2020) suggested that people employ a delay-reward heuristic: the inferred value of an ambiguous future reward is a function of the stated delay, and vice-versa. The present paper investigates the role of this heuristic in choice behaviour. In Studies 1a–2b, participants inferred the value of an ambiguous future reward or delay before the true value was revealed and a choice made. Preference for the future option was predicted by the discrepancy between the estimated and true values: the more pleasantly surprising the delayed option, the greater the willingness to choose it. Studies 3a–3c examined the association between inference and preference when the ambiguous values remained unknown. As predicted by the use of a delay-reward heuristic, inferred delays and rewards were positively related to stated rewards and delays, respectively. More importantly, choices were associated with inferred rewards and, in some circumstances, delays. Critically, estimates and choices were both order-dependent: when estimates preceded choices, estimates were more optimistic (people inferred smaller delays and larger rewards) and were subsequently more likely to choose the delayed option than when choices were made before estimates. These order effects argue against a simple model in which people deal with ambiguity by first estimating the unknown value and then using their estimate as the basis for decision. Rather, it seems that inferences are partly constructed from choices, and the role of inference in choice depends on whether an explicit estimate is made prior to choosing. Finally, we also find that inferences about ambiguous delays depend on whether the estimate has to be made in “days” or in a self-selected temporal unit, and replicate previous findings that older participants make more pessimistic inferences than younger ones. We discuss the implications and possible mechanisms for these findings.

The delay-reward heuristic: What do people expect in intertemporal choice tasks?

Recent research has shown that risk and reward are positively correlated in many environments, and that people have internalized this association as a “risk-reward heuristic”: when making choices based on incomplete information, people infer probabilities from payoffs and vice-versa, and these inferences shape their decisions. We extend this work by examining people’s expectations about another fundamental trade-off — that between monetary reward and delay. In 2 experiments (total N = 670), we adapted a paradigm previously used to demonstrate the risk-reward heuristic. We presented participants with intertemporal choice tasks in which either the delayed reward or the length of the delay was obscured. Participants inferred larger rewards for longer stated delays, and longer delays for larger stated rewards; these inferences also predicted people’s willingness to take the delayed option. In exploratory analyses, we found that older participants inferred longer delays and smaller rewards than did younger ones. All of these results replicated in 2 large-scale pre-registered studies with participants from a different population (total N = 2138). Our results suggest that people expect intertemporal choice tasks to offer a trade-off between delay and reward, and differ in their expectations about this trade-off. This “delay-reward heuristic” offers a new perspective on existing models of intertemporal choice and provides new insights into unexplained and systematic individual differences in the willingness to delay gratification.

The delay-reward heuristic: What do people expect in intertemporal choice tasks?

Recent research has shown that risk and reward are positively correlated in many environments, and that people have internalized this association as a "risk-reward heuristic": when making choices based on incomplete information, people infer probabilities from payoffs and vice-versa, and these inferences shape their decisions. We extend this work by examining people's expectations about another fundamental trade-off-that between monetary reward and delay. In 2 experiments (total N = 670), we adapted a paradigm previously used to demonstrate the risk-reward heuristic. We presented participants with intertemporal choice tasks in which either the delayed reward or the length of the delay was obscured. Participants inferred larger rewards for longer stated delays, and longer delays for larger stated rewards; these inferences also predicted people's willingness to take the delayed option. In exploratory analyses, we found that older participants inferred longer delays and smaller rewards than did younger ones. All of these results replicated in 2 large-scale pre-registered studies with participants from a different population (total N = 2138). Our results suggest that people expect intertemporal choice tasks to offer a trade-off between delay and reward, and differ in their expectations about this trade-off. This "delay-reward heuristic" offers a new perspective on existing models of intertemporal choice and provides new insights into unexplained and systematic individual differences in the willingness to delay gratification.