Is greed contagious? Four experimental studies

Greed: What Is It Good for?

What is greed good for? Greed is ubiquitous, suggesting that it must have some benefits, but it is also often condemned. In a representative sample of the Dutch population (N = 2,367, 51.3% female, Mage = 54.06, SD = 17.90), we examined two questions. First, inspired by Eriksson et al., we studied whether greedy people generate more personal and household income (economic outcomes), have more sexual partners, longer relationships, and more offspring (evolutionary outcomes), and are more satisfied in life (psychological outcomes). We found that greedy individuals had higher economic outcomes, mixed evolutionary outcomes, and lower psychological outcomes. Second, we compared greed and self-interest. We found that they differed in terms of economic outcomes, and partly in terms of evolutionary outcomes, but that they were similar in terms of psychological outcomes. This research provides insights into what greed is and does. Directions for further research are discussed.

The Detrimental Effects of No Trust: Active Decisions of No Trust Cause Stronger Affective and Behavioral Reactions Than Inactive Decisions

In two experimental studies, we investigated the affective (Studies 1 and 2) and behavioral (Study 2) effects of not being trusted. In an adapted version of the Trust Game paradigm, participants were all assigned the position of Person B, and learned that their opponent (Person A) had decided to not let them divide monetary outcomes. This had either been an inactive decision (Person A had not offered them the option to distribute outcomes) or an active decision (Person A had taken away their option to distribute outcomes). Results of both studies reveal that reactions to not being trusted were significantly affected by whether this decision was active or inactive. Active decisions evoked a more negative evaluation toward Person A, led participants to experience more negative emotions, and lowered their satisfaction with the final outcome, even though payoffs and final earnings were held constant between the conditions (Study 1). In addition, when the decision not to trust had been an active decision, participants subsequently behaved less altruistic, as evidenced by significant lower allocations in a subsequent Dictator Game (Study 2). Interestingly, this reduction in altruism was not restricted to encounters with Person A, but also extended to an uninvolved other (Person C).