Who feels happier right now?: The impact of temporal distance on children's judgements of emotional intensity

Do children consider temporal distance in their reasoning about the world? Using a novel method that relied minimally on verbal ability, we asked N = 106 3- to 6-year-olds to judge which of two characters felt more 'happy'/'sad' right now: one engaging in a pleasant/unpleasant activity tomorrow or another engaging in this same activity when they are a year older. That is, we examined whether children understood that the closer in time a future event, the more intense the currently felt emotion. Starting at age 4, children correctly judged which child was more 'happy'/'sad' right now. However, 4- to 6-year-olds tended not to explain their judgements by referring to temporal distance, per se. Results suggest that children are sensitive to temporal distance early in development, but do not yet verbally express this understanding. Implications for theories about children's future thinking and future areas of research are discussed.

The computational and neural substrates of individual differences in impulsivity under loss framework

Numerous neuroimaging studies have identified significant individual variability in intertemporal choice, often attributed to three neural mechanisms: (1) increased reward circuit activity, (2) decreased cognitive control, and (3) prospection ability. These mechanisms that explain impulsivity, however, have been primarily studied in the gain domain. This study extends this investigation to the loss domain. We employed a hierarchical Bayesian drift-diffusion model (DDM) and the inter-subject representational similarity approach (IS-RSA) to investigate the potential computational neural substrates underlying impulsivity in loss domain across two experiments (n = 155). These experiments utilized a revised intertemporal task that independently manipulated the amounts of immediate and delayed-loss options. Behavioral results demonstrated positive correlations between the drift rate, measured by the DDM, and the impulsivity index K in Exp. 1 (n = 97) and were replicated in Exp. 2 (n = 58). Imaging analyses further revealed that the drift rate significantly mediated the relations between brain properties (e.g., prefrontal cortex activations and gray matter volume in the orbitofrontal cortex and precuneus) and K in Exp. 1. IS-RSA analyses indicated that variability in the drift rate also mediated the associations between inter-subject variations in activation patterns and individual differences in K. These findings suggest that individuals with similar impulsivity levels are likely to exhibit similar value processing patterns, providing a potential explanation for individual differences in impulsivity within a loss framework.

The sign effect in temporal discounting does not require the hippocampus

When considering future outcomes, humans tend to discount gains more than losses. This phenomenon, referred to as the temporal discounting sign effect, is thought to result from the greater anticipated emotional impact of waiting for a negative outcome (dread) compared to waiting for a positive outcome (mixture of savoring and impatience). The impact of such anticipatory emotions has been proposed to rely on episodic future thinking. We evaluated this proposal by examining the presence and magnitude of a sign effect in the intertemporal decisions of individuals with hippocampal amnesia, who are severely impaired in their ability to engage in episodic mental simulation, and by comparing their patterns of choices to those of healthy controls. We also measured loss aversion, the tendency to assign greater value to losses compared to equivalent gains, to verify that any reduction in the sign effect in the hippocampal lesion group could not be explained by a group difference in loss aversion. Results showed that participants with hippocampal amnesia exhibited a sign effect, with less discounting of monetary losses compared to gains, that was similar in magnitude to that of controls. Loss aversion, albeit greater in the hippocampal compared to the control group, did not account for the sign effect. These results indicate that the sign effect does not depend on the integrity of hippocampally mediated episodic processes. They suggest instead that the impact of anticipatory emotions can be factored into decisions via semantic future thinking, drawing on non-contextual knowledge about oneself.

Neurobiological substrates of the dread of future losses

When anticipating future losses, people respond by exhibiting 1 of 2 starkly distinct behavioral decision patterns: the dread of future losses (DFL) and the preference of future losses (vs. immediate losses). Yet, how to accurately discriminate between those who exhibit dread vs. preference and uncover the potential neurobiological substrates underlying these 2 groups remain understudied. To address this, we designed a novel experimental task in which the DFL group was defined as selecting immediate-loss options >50% in the trials with approximate subjective value in immediate and delayed options (n = 16), otherwise coding as the preference of future losses (PFL). At the behavioral level, DFL exhibited higher weight for delayed losses than immediate losses via the logistic regression model. At the neural level, DFL manifested hypoactivations on subjective valuations of delayed losses, atypical brain pattern when choosing immediate-loss options, and decreased functional coupling between the valuation and choice-systems when making decisions related to immediate-loss alternatives compared with PFL. Moreover, both these brain activations subserving distinct decision processes and their interactions predicted individual decisions and behavioral preferences. Furthermore, morphological analysis also revealed decreased right precuneus volume in DFL compared with PFL, and brain activations related to valuation and choice process mediated the associations between this region volume and behavioral performances. Taken together, these findings help to clarify potential cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the DFL and provide a clear discrimination strategy.

The effect of incentives on intertemporal choice: Choice, confidence, and eye movements

Despite various studies examining intertemporal choice with hypothetical rewards due to problematic real reward delivery, there remains no substantial evidence on the effect of the incentives on the decision confidence and cognitive process in intertemporal choice and no comprehensive exploration on the loss domain. Hence, this study conducts an eye-tracking experiment to examine the effect of incentive approach and measure participants' decision confidence using a between-subject design in both gain and loss domains. Results replicated previous findings which show incentives do not affect intertemporal choice in the gain domain. In contrast, in the loss domain, participants in the incentivized group were more likely to choose the larger-later options than those in the non-incentivized group. Furthermore, the decision confidence and the mean fixation duration differed between the incentivized and non-incentivized groups in both gain and loss domains. These findings allow for a better understanding of the effect of incentives on intertemporal choice and provide valuable information for the design of incentives in future intertemporal experiments.

Waiting is painful: The impact of anticipated dread on negative discounting in the loss domain

According to the positive time-discounting assumption of intertemporal decision-making, people prefer to undergo negative events in the future rather than in the present. However, negative discounting has been identified in the intertemporal choice and loss domains, which refers to people’s preference to experience negative events earlier rather than later. Studies have validated and supported the "anticipated dread" as an explanation for negative discounting. This study again explored the effect of anticipated dread on intertemporal choice using content analysis; that is, having participants identify anticipated dread among reasons for negative discounting. This study also validated the effect of anticipated dread on negative discounting by manipulating anticipated dread. This study adds empirical and direct evidence for the role of anticipated dread in negative discounting.

Face Mask Reduces the Effect of Proposer's (Un)Trustworthiness on Intertemporal and Risky Choices

Previous literature suggested that individuals increase temporal and risk discounting at the presence of a proposer whose face is perceived as untrustworthy, suggesting the activation of protective choice patterns. By the way, the COVID-19 pandemic has substantially transformed the way we interact with other people, even bringing us into situations where the face of the person making a proposal is not fully visible, because of the mask. With the current study, we aimed at verifying if the effect of proposer's facial (un)trustworthiness on discounting behavior is modulated by mask wearing. In two different experiments, participants performed traditional delay and probability discounting tasks with masked proposers manipulated across trustworthiness levels. Results highlighted that, even after checking for subject-specific emotion recognition ability with masked faces, the presence of a masked untrustworthy proposer increases both delay and probability discounting parameters, although the effect is not statistically significant and smaller than the one detected at the presence of an untrustworthy proposer without a mask. These results suggest that the ability to perceive the proposer's (un)trustworthiness is affected by the mask, with a consequent less strong effect of proposer's (un)trustworthiness on choice behavior on both intertemporal and risky choices. Limits and possible implications are outlined and discussed.

Qualitative variations in delay discounting: A brief review and future directions

The discounting paradigm has been challenged by an increasing number of studies presenting qualitative variations in the individual discount function. Particularly, the subjective value of a loss does not necessarily systematically decrease with delay to the outcome. Qualitative variation refers to variations in shape rather than steepness of the discount function, such as positive discounting, zero discounting, unsystematic discounting, and negative discounting. Data from three previous studies were analysed in terms of qualitative variations observed in delay discounting patterns. Attention was also given to methods used and to the relationship between the results from the various levels of investigation. We found qualitative differences between discounting of monetary gains and losses on an individual level. While discounting of gains mainly took the form of conventional positive discounting, discounting of losses often took the form of zero discounting or unsystematic discounting. Further, there were more qualitative variations in discounting of both gains and losses among adolescents compared to adults. By examining verbal reports and single choices, we identified some of the rules and consequences involved in these delay discounting patterns. The different rules and consequences observed for the gain and loss scenarios, support that discounting of gains and losses may involve different combinations of reinforcing contingencies. These results point towards a possible way to explain the influences of qualitative variations in delay discounting.

Choice Bundling Increases Valuation of Delayed Losses More Than Gains in Cigarette Smokers

Choice bundling, in which a single choice produces a series of repeating consequences over time, increases valuation of delayed monetary and non-monetary gains. Interventions derived from this manipulation may be an effective method for mitigating the elevated delay discounting rates observed in cigarette smokers. No prior work, however, has investigated whether the effects of choice bundling generalize to reward losses. In the present study, an online panel of cigarette smokers (N = 302), recruited using survey firms Ipsos and InnovateMR, completed assessments for either monetary gains or losses (randomly assigned). In Step 1, participants completed a delay-discounting task to establish Effective Delay 50 (ED50), or the delay required for an outcome to lose half of its value. In Step 2, participants completed three conditions of an adjusting-amount task, choosing between a smaller, sooner (SS) adjusting amount and a larger, later (LL) fixed amount. The bundle size (i.e., number of consequences) was manipulated across conditions, where a single choice produced either 1 (control), 3, or 9 consequences over time (ascending/descending order counterbalanced). The delay to the first LL amount in each condition, as well as the intervals between all additional SS and LL amounts (where applicable), were set to individual participants’ ED50 values from Step 1 to control for differences in discounting of gains and losses. Results from Step 1 showed significantly higher ED50 values (i.e., less discounting) for losses compared to gains (p < 0.001). Results from Step 2 showed that choice bundling significantly increased valuation of both LL gains and losses (p < 0.001), although effects were significantly greater for losses (p < 0.01). Sensitivity analyses replicated these conclusions. Future research should examine the potential clinical utility of choice bundling, such as development of motivational interventions that emphasize both the bundled health gains associated with smoking cessation and the health losses associated with continued smoking.

Dreading the pain of others? Altruistic responses to others' pain underestimate dread

A dislike of waiting for pain, aptly termed 'dread', is so great that people will increase pain to avoid delaying it. However, despite many accounts of altruistic responses to pain in others, no previous studies have tested whether people take delay into account when attempting to ameliorate others' pain. We examined the impact of delay in 2 experiments where participants (total N = 130) specified the intensity and delay of pain either for themselves or another person. Participants were willing to increase the experimental pain of another participant to avoid delaying it, indicative of dread, though did so to a lesser extent than was the case for their own pain. We observed a similar attenuation in dread when participants chose the timing of a hypothetical painful medical treatment for a close friend or relative, but no such attenuation when participants chose for a more distant acquaintance. A model in which altruism is biased to privilege pain intensity over the dread of pain parsimoniously accounts for these findings. We refer to this underestimation of others' dread as a 'Dread Empathy Gap'.

Social discounting of pain

Impatience can be formalized as a delay discount rate, describing how the subjective value of reward decreases as it is delayed. By analogy, selfishness can be formalized as a social discount rate, representing how the subjective value of rewarding another person decreases with increasing social distance. Delay and social discount rates for reward are correlated across individuals. However no previous work has examined whether this relationship also holds for aversive outcomes. Neither has previous work described a functional form for social discounting of pain in humans. This is a pertinent question, since preferences over aversive outcomes formally diverge from those for reward. We addressed this issue in an experiment in which healthy adult participants (N = 67) chose the timing and intensity of hypothetical pain for themselves and others. In keeping with previous studies, participants showed a strong preference for immediate over delayed pain. Participants showed greater concern for pain in close others than for their own pain, though this hyperaltruism was steeply discounted with increasing social distance. Impatience for pain and social discounting of pain were weakly correlated across individuals. Our results extend a link between impatience and selfishness to the aversive domain.

Plea Bargaining: A Test of Dual Discounting Preferences for Non-Monetary Losses

Judgment and decision-making research on discounting suggests that when humans are thinking about gains, they tend to prefer certain and immediate outcomes to uncertain and delayed outcomes. However, discounting has been studied primarily using monetary commodities and, until recently, by testing one feature of the binary forced-choice task at a time: delay, probability, or amount of money received/lost. The present research is the first test of a dual discounting task that combines probability and delay into a single, binary forced-choice task in a non-monetary loss context. The key findings, based on three studies, suggest that delay and probability discounting play a significant role in decisions including non-monetary loss commodities like plea bargaining. Future work should explore the boundary conditions of dual discounting based not only on the nature of the binary choice (probability and delay) but also on the nature of the commodity (amount, valence, and quantifiability).

Choice patterns reveal qualitative individual differences among discounting of delayed gains, delayed losses, and probabilistic losses

A new probabilistic losses questionnaire as well as Kirby's delayed gains questionnaire and a previously developed delayed losses questionnaire were administered to a large online sample. Almost all participants showed the positive discounting choice pattern expected on the Kirby questionnaire, decreasing their choice of a delayed gain as time to its receipt increased. In contrast, approximately 15% of the participants showed negative discounting on the delayed losses questionnaire and/or the probabilistic losses questionnaire, decreasing their choice of an immediate loss as time to a delayed loss decreased and/or decreasing their choice of a certain loss as likelihood of the probabilistic loss increased. Mixture model analysis confirmed the existence of these negative discounting subgroups. The inconsistent findings observed in previous research involving delayed/probabilistic losses may be due to differences in the proportion of negative discounters who participated in previous studies. Further research is needed to determine how negative discounting of delayed and probabilistic losses manifests itself in everyday decisions. It should be noted that the presence of individuals who show atypical choice patterns when losses are involved may pose challenges for efforts to modify discounting in order to ameliorate behavioral problems, especially because many such problems concern choices that have negative consequences, often delayed and/or probabilistic.

The Sign Effect in Past and Future Discounting

We compared the extent to which people discounted positive and negative events in the future and in the past. We found that the tendency to discount gains more than losses (i.e., the sign effect) emerged more strongly for future than for past outcomes. We present evidence from six studies (total N = 1,077) that the effect of tense on discounting is tied to differences in the contemplation emotion of these events, which we assessed by measuring participants' emotions while they either anticipated or remembered the event. We ruled out loss aversion, uncertainty, utility curvature, thought frequency, and connection to the future and past self as explanations for this phenomenon, and we discuss why people experience a distinct mixture of emotions when contemplating upcoming events.

Modulating Activity in the Prefrontal Cortex Changes Intertemporal Choice for Loss: A Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Study

Intertemporal choice refers to decisions involving tradeoffs between costs and benefits occurring at different times. Studies have found that weighting the time and benefits during decision-making involves a complex neural network that includes the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). However, in contrast to literature regarding intertemporal choice for gains, studies have not provided causal evidence that the DLPFC is involved in intertemporal choice for losses. We examined whether bifrontal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) applied over the right and left prefrontal cortex can alter the balance of intertemporal preference in the loss condition. A total of 60 participants performed delay discounting tasks for losses while receiving either right anodal/left cathodal, left anodal/right cathodal, or sham stimulation. The results showed that participants tended to choose larger delayed losses after receiving left anodal/right cathodal tDCS. Left anodal/right cathodal tDCS significantly decreased the discounting rate compared with the sham stimulation. These findings confirm that DLPFC activity is critical during intertemporal decision-making for losses.

Cultural Differences in “Saving the Best for Last”

We examined cross-cultural differences in preferences for sequences of realistic stimuli. Prior research on predominantly European American (EA) samples has found that people typically show a preference for improving sequences (i.e., saving the most positive or least intense stimuli for last). Based on cultural differences in ideal affect, regulatory focus, and dialecticism, we predicted that East Asians/East Asian Americans (AA) would prefer more balanced sequences, and intersperse stimuli of different intensities. EA and AA students ( n = 170) were asked to select the order in which they wanted to experience a series of realistic stimuli (emotional pictures, aversive sounds, and physical effort) over the course of a short time interval. Compared with AAs, EAs showed a stronger preference for improving sequences and were more likely to group similar stimuli together. As hypothesized, sequence preferences were associated with affective goals, but we only found this effect among AAs and not among EAs. Regulatory focus and dialecticism were not associated with sequence preferences. Further research is required to examine the mechanisms behind cultural differences and their potential implications for time management and other real-life outcomes.

Worth the Wait? Leisure Can Be Just as Enjoyable With Work Left Undone

Four studies reveal that (a) people hold a robust intuition about the order of work and leisure and that (b) this intuition is sometimes mistaken. People prefer saving leisure for last, believing they would otherwise be distracted by looming work (Study 1). In controlled experiments, however, although subjects thought their enjoyment would be spoiled when they played a game before rather than after a laborious problem-solving task, got a massage before rather than after midterms, and consumed snacks and watched videos before rather than after a stressful performance, in reality these experiences were similarly enjoyable regardless of order (Studies 2 through 4). This misprediction was indeed mediated by anticipated distraction and was therefore attenuated after people were reminded of the absorbing nature of enjoyable activities (Studies 3 and 4). These studies highlight the power of hedonic experience within the moment of consumption, which has implications for managing (or mismanaging) everyday work and leisure. People might postpone leisure and overwork for future rewards that could be just as pleasurable in the present.

Current Emotion Research in Economics

Positive and negative feelings were central to the development of economics, especially in utility theory in classical economics. While neoclassical utility theory ignored feelings, behavioral economics more recently reintroduced feelings in utility theory. Beyond feelings, economic theorists use full-fledged specific emotions to explain behavior that otherwise could not be understood or they study emotions out of interest for the emotion itself. While some analyses display a strong overlap between psychological thinking and economic modelling, in most cases there is still a large gap between economic and psychological approaches to emotion research. Ways how to reduce this gap are discussed.

Delay and probability discounting by drug-dependent cocaine and marijuana users

RATIONALE

Steep discounting of delayed monetary rewards by substance-dependent individuals is well-established. Less is known, however, about discounting other kinds of outcomes, and very little is known about discounting by marijuana-dependent individuals.

OBJECTIVES

To determine how cocaine-dependent individuals and marijuana-dependent individuals discount various delayed and probabilistic outcomes, both positive and negative.

METHODS

Marijuana-dependent individuals, cocaine-dependent individuals, and controls performed delay and probability discounting tasks with various hypothetical outcomes.

RESULTS

The cocaine-dependent (but not the marijuana-dependent) group discounted delayed liquid rewards and monetary gains, but not delayed losses, more steeply than the control group. In contrast, the marijuana-dependent group (but not the cocaine-dependent group) discounted delayed monetary losses more steeply than controls. There were no group differences in discounting for any of the probabilistic outcomes. Factor analysis revealed a delayed gain factor, a probabilistic gain factor, and a delayed/probabilistic loss factor. The delayed gain factor scores for the cocaine-dependent group, but not the marijuana-dependent group, differed significantly from those of the control group. The groups did not differ in their probabilistic gain factor scores, and the marijuana-dependent group did not differ from the controls with respect to their loss factor scores.

CONCLUSIONS

These results are inconsistent with the idea that steep discounting of both gains and losses and both delayed and probabilistic outcomes reflects a general impulsivity trait, as well as with the idea that all drug-dependent individuals are steep discounters. Rather, differences in discounting appear to be related to both the type of outcome and the specific drug on which individuals are dependent.

Comparing time and risk preferences across three post-industrial UK cities

Time and risk preferences are known to vary considerably across individuals but less is known about the determinants of these individual differences. This paper examines whether preferences vary by geographical location. The motivation for examining geographic heterogeneity is the higher level of mortality experienced in Glasgow over and above that explained by deprivation, sometimes referred to as the 'Glasgow effect'. Data were collected from 3702 individuals across Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool between July and November 2011. The results show evidence of geographic preference heterogeneity. Contrary to our hypothesis, individuals in Glasgow have a lower rather than higher time preference rate. Individuals in Glasgow are on average more risk seeking compared to Liverpool and more likely to be at the tail end of the distribution (very risk seeking) compared to Manchester. Differences in risk preferences may help explain some of the differences in mortality associated with risky health behaviours such as drug and alcohol use. However, individuals in Glasgow were also more future oriented suggesting that they are less likely to engage in risky healthy behaviours. As the differences in time and risk preferences work in opposite directions in terms of health investments it less likely that these differences can help explain excess mortality in Glasgow.

Pain now or later: an outgrowth account of pain-minimization

The preference for immediate negative events contradicts the minimizing loss principle given that the value of a delayed negative event is discounted by the amount of time it is delayed. However, this preference is understandable if we assume that the value of a future outcome is not restricted to the discounted utility of the outcome per se but is complemented by an anticipated negative utility assigned to an unoffered dimension, which we termed the "outgrowth." We conducted three studies to establish the existence of the outgrowth and empirically investigated the mechanism underlying the preference for immediate negative outcomes. Study 1 used a content analysis method to examine whether the outgrowth was generated in accompaniment with the delayed negative events. The results revealed that the investigated outgrowth was composed of two elements. The first component is the anticipated negative emotions elicited by the delayed negative event, and the other is the anticipated rumination during the waiting process, in which one cannot stop thinking about the negative event. Study 2 used a follow-up investigation to examine whether people actually experienced the negative emotions they anticipated in a real situation of waiting for a delayed negative event. The results showed that the participants actually experienced a number of negative emotions when waiting for a negative event. Study 3 examined whether the existence of the outgrowth could make the minimizing loss principle work. The results showed that the difference in pain anticipation between the immediate event and the delayed event could significantly predict the timing preference of the negative event. Our findings suggest that people's preference for experiencing negative events sooner serves to minimize the overall negative utility, which is divided into two parts: the discounted utility of the outcome itself and an anticipated negative utility assigned to the outgrowth.

Medical resource use, disturbance of daily life and burden of hypoglycemia in insulin-treated patients with diabetes: results from a European online survey

Hypoglycemia is common in patients with diabetes, and any severe hypoglycemic event can increase the fear of future hypoglycemic events. To try to reduce hypoglycemic events, many patients with diabetes maintain their blood glucose levels with a 'safety margin' (i.e., at higher than recommended values) and maintain hyperglycemia. Following this strategy leads to raised glycated hemoglobin levels, which are, consequently, linked to an increased risk of diabetic complications and increased healthcare costs. In the present survey (n = 1848), conducted in Germany, France and the UK, approximately a third of the patients were very worried about hypoglycemia, and a similar proportion reported maintaining hyperglycemia. Overall, the mean number of emergency room visits and hospitalizations (excluding emergency room visits) per patient per 12 months was 0.65 and 0.47, respectively. In addition, 10% of the patients reported that they had taken days off work because of hypoglycemia during the previous 12 months. Furthermore, 80% of diabetics in the three countries said they would value a meter that tells them when their blood glucose level is getting high/low at a particular time of the day. Thus, the survey outlines the potential scale, in a real-world setting, of 'hidden' costs associated with hypoglycemia and fear of hypoglycemia; such costs are likely to have a major detrimental impact on the overall emotional and economic burden of diabetes, which may be reduced through broader use of blood-glucose monitors for self-monitoring of blood glucose.

How to measure time preferences: An experimental comparison of three methods

In two studies, time preferences for financial gains and losses at delays of up to 50 years were elicited using three different methods: matching, fixed-sequence choice titration, and a dynamic “staircase” choice method. Matching was found to create fewer demand characteristics and to produce better fits with the hyperbolic model of discounting. The choice-based measures better predicted real-world outcomes such as smoking and payment of credit card debt. No consistent advantages were found for the dynamic staircase method over fixed-sequence titration.