Intuitive decision making as a gradual process: investigating semantic intuition-based and priming-based decisions with fMRI

Semantic versus perceptual priming: dissecting their impact on intuitive judgments of semantic coherence

This research explores the mechanisms underlying the intuitive processing of semantic coherence, focusing on the effects of semantic and perceptual priming on semantic coherence detection. Two studies examined how these priming types influence individuals' abilities to discern semantic incoherence. In Study 1, we used solutions to semantically coherent triads as primes, finding that such priming significantly improves participants' accuracy and confidence in identifying incoherent elements within word tetrads. These results corroborate the hypothesis that intuitive judgments in linguistic tasks are closely tied to the processing fluency elicited by semantic connections. In Study 2, we show that perceptual priming does not significantly enhance accuracy, albeit it does increase the confidence with which individuals make their judgments. Distinct effects of semantic and perceptual priming on intuitive judgments highlight the complex interplay between processing fluency and affect in shaping intuitive judgments of semantic coherence. We discuss the nuanced roles of semantic and perceptual factors in influencing the accuracy and confidence of intuitive decisions.

Altered Postcentral Connectivity after Sleep Deprivation Correlates to Impaired Risk Perception: A Resting-State Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study

BACKGROUND

Previous studies revealed that sleep deprivation (SD) impairs risk perception and leads to poor decision-making efficiency. However, how risk perception is related to brain regions' communication after SD has not been elucidated. In this study, we investigated the neuropsychological mechanisms of SD-impaired risk perception.

METHODS

Nineteen healthy male adults were recruited and underwent resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging during a state of rested wakefulness and after nearly 36 h of total SD. They then completed the balloon analog risk task, which was used to measure the risk perception ability of risky decision-making. Regional homogeneity (ReHo) and voxel-wise functional connectivity were used to investigate neurobiological changes caused by SD. Correlation analysis was used to investigate the relationship between changes in ReHo, function, and risk perception.

RESULTS

At the behavioral level, risk perception decreased after 36 h of SD. At the neural level, SD induced a significant increase in ReHo in the right postcentral gyrus and was positively correlated with risk perception changes. The functional connectivity between the right postcentral gyrus, left medial temporal gyrus, and right inferior temporal gyrus was enhanced. Critically, increased right postcentral gyrus and right inferior temporal gyrus connectivity positively correlated with changes in risk perception.

CONCLUSIONS

SD impairs the risk perception associated with altered postcentral connectivity. The brain requires more energy to process and integrate sensory and perceptual information after SD, which may be one possible reason for decreased risk perception ability after SD.

Functional connectivity of brain networks during semantic processing in older adults

The neural systems underlying semantic processing have been characterized with functional neuroimaging in young adults. Whether the integrity of these systems degrade with advanced age remains unresolved. The current study examined functional connectivity during abstract and concrete word processing. Thirty-eight adults, aged 55–91, engaged in semantic association decision tasks during a mixed event-related block functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm. During the semantic trials, the task required participants to make a judgment as to whether pairs were semantically associated. During the rhyme trials, the task required participants to determine if non-word pairs rhymed. Seeds were placed in putative semantic hubs of the left anterior middle temporal gyrus (aMTG) and the angular gyrus (AG), and also in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), an area considered important for semantic control. Greater connectivity between aMTG, AG, and IFG and multiple cortical areas occurred during semantic processing. Connectivity from the three seeds differed during semantic processing: the left AG and aMTG were strongly connected with frontal, parietal, and occipital areas bilaterally, whereas the IFG was most strongly connected with other frontal cortical areas and the AG in the ipsilateral left hemisphere. Notably, the strength and extent of connectivity differed for abstract and concrete semantic processing; connectivity from the left aMTG and AG to bilateral cortical areas was greater during abstract processing, whereas IFG connectivity with left cortical areas was greater during concrete processing. With advanced age, greater connectivity occurred only between the left AG and supramarginal gyrus during the processing of concrete word-pairs, but not abstract word-pairs. Among older adults, robust functional connectivity of the aMTG, AG, and IFG to widely distributed bilateral cortical areas occurs during abstract and concrete semantic processing in a manner consistent with reports from past studies of young adults. There was not a significant degradation of functional connectivity during semantic processing between the ages of 55 and 85 years. As the study focused on semantic functioning in older adults, a comparison group of young adults was not included, limiting generalizability. Future longitudinal neuroimaging studies that compare functional connectivity of young and older adults under different semantic demands will be valuable.

Is intuition allied with jumping to conclusions in decision-making? An intensive longitudinal study in patients with delusions and in non-clinical individuals

Research suggests that a jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias, excessive intuition, and reduced analysis in information processing may favor suboptimal decision-making, both in non-clinical and mentally disordered individuals. The temporal relationship between processing modes and JTC bias, however, remains unexplored. Therefore, using an experience sampling methodology (ESM) approach, this study examines the temporal associations between intuitive/analytical information processing, JTC bias, and delusions in non-clinical individuals and patients with schizophrenia. Specifically, we examine whether a high use of intuitive and/or a low use of analytical processing predicts subsequent JTC bias and paranoid conviction. In a smartphone-based ESM study, participants will be prompted four times per day over three consecutive days to answer questionnaires designed to measure JTC bias, paranoid conviction, and preceding everyday-life intuition/analysis. Our hierarchical data will be analyzed using multilevel modelling for hypothesis testing. Results will further elucidate the role of aberrant human reasoning, particularly intuition, in (non-)clinical delusions and delusion-like experiences, and also inform general information processing models.

Continuity in intuition and insight: from real to naturalistic virtual environment

Intuition and insight can be deployed on the same continuum. Intuition is the unconscious ability to create links between information; insight is a process by which a sudden comprehension and resolution of a situation arises (i.e. euréka). In the present study, real and virtual environments were used to trigger intuition and insight. The study hypothesised that immersion in real primed environments would facilitate the emergence of intuition and insight in a virtual environment. Forty nine healthy participants were randomly assigned to two groups: “primed” and “non primed.” “Primed” participants were immersed in a real environment with olfactory and visual cues; “non primed” participants did not receive any cues. All participants were exposed to a 3D naturalistic virtual environment which represented a district in Paris via a Head Mounted Display (HMD). Locations presented in the virtual scene (i.e. café places) were related to both olfactory and visual primes (i.e. café) and were based on the continuity between real and virtual environments. Once immersed in the virtual environment, all participants were instructed to use their intuition to envision the selected locations during which Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs) and verbal declarations were recorded. When initiation (a) and immersion (b) phases in the virtual environment were considered, “primed” participants had higher SCRs during the immersion phase than the initiation phase in the virtual environment. They showed higher SRCs during the first part of the virtual immersion than “non primed” participants. During the phenomenological interview, “primed” participants reported a higher number of correct intuitive answers than “non primed” participants. Moreover, “primed” participants “with” insight had higher SCRs during real environment immersion than “primed” participants “without” insight. The findings are consistent with the idea that intuitive decisions in various tasks are based on the activation of pre-existing knowledge, which is unconsciously retrieved, but nevertheless can elicit an intuitive impression of coherence and can generate insight.

Reduced gray matter volume in the left prefrontal, occipital, and temporal regions as predictors for posttraumatic stress disorder: a voxel-based morphometric study

The concept of acute stress disorder (ASD) was introduced as a diagnostic entity to improve the identification of traumatized people who are likely to develop posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Neuroanatomical models suggest that changes in the prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus play a role in the development of PTSD. Using voxel-based morphometry, this study aimed to investigate the predictive power of gray matter volume (GMV) alterations for developing PTSD. The GMVs of ASD patients (n = 21) were compared to those of PTSD patients (n = 17) and healthy controls (n = 18) in whole-brain and region-of-interest analyses. The GMV alterations seen in ASD patients shortly after the traumatic event (T1) were also correlated with PTSD symptom severity and symptom clusters 4 weeks later (T2). Compared with healthy controls, the ASD patients had significantly reduced GMV in the left visual cortex shortly after the traumatic event (T1) and in the left occipital and prefrontal regions 4 weeks later (T2); no significant differences in GMV were seen between the ASD and PTSD patients. Furthermore, a significant negative association was found between the GMV reduction in the left lateral temporal regions seen after the traumatic event (T1) and PTSD hyperarousal symptoms 4 weeks later (T2). Neither amygdala nor hippocampus alterations were predictive for the development of PTSD. These data suggest that gray matter deficiencies in the left hemispheric occipital and temporal regions in ASD patients may predict a liability for developing PTSD.

Listening to your intuition in the face of distraction: Effects of taxing working memory on accuracy and bias of intuitive judgments of semantic coherence

People can intuitively estimate the semantic coherence of word triads, even when they are unable to state the triads' common denominator. The present research examines the role of working memory in such intuitive coherence judgments. Dual-process models of information processing suggest that intuition does not depend on working memory. Consistent with this, the authors predicted that taxing working memory capacity will not lower the accuracy of intuitive coherence judgments. Nevertheless, taxing working memory may impede metacognitive processing, which may lead people to become more conservative in judging triads as coherent. Two studies (combined N = 307) tested these predictions by asking participants to memorize letter-number combinations of varying lengths while providing intuitive coherence judgments. As expected, working memory load had no effect on the accuracy of intuitive coherence judgments (Studies 1 & 2). Effects on judgment bias were less consistent. In Study 1, participants became slightly more conservative in judging triads as coherent under moderate (compared to low) working memory load. In Study 2, which was preregistered, working memory load led to more conservative intuitive coherence judgments, but only when participants prioritized a highly demanding load task. Unexpectedly, when focusing on a moderate (compared to a low) working memory load, participants were more liberal in judging triads as coherent. Together, these findings indicate that taxing working memory may interfere with people's inclination to trust their intuition, even when it leaves the accuracy of people's intuition intact.

Subliminally and Supraliminally Acquired Long-Term Memories Jointly Bias Delayed Decisions

Common wisdom and scientific evidence suggest that good decisions require conscious deliberation. But growing evidence demonstrates that not only conscious but also unconscious thoughts influence decision-making. Here, we hypothesize that both consciously and unconsciously acquired memories guide decisions. Our experiment measured the influence of subliminally and supraliminally presented information on delayed (30-40 min) decision-making. Participants were presented with subliminal pairs of faces and written occupations for unconscious encoding. Following a delay of 20 min, participants consciously (re-)encoded the same faces now presented supraliminally along with either the same written occupations, occupations congruous to the subliminally presented occupations (same wage-category), or incongruous occupations (opposite wage-category). To measure decision-making, participants viewed the same faces again (with occupations absent) and decided on the putative income of each person: low, low-average, high-average, or high. Participants were encouraged to decide spontaneously and intuitively. Hence, the decision task was an implicit or indirect test of relational memory. If conscious thought alone guided decisions (= H₀), supraliminal information should determine decision outcomes independently of the encoded subliminal information. This was, however, not the case. Instead, both unconsciously and consciously encoded memories influenced decisions: identical unconscious and conscious memories exerted the strongest bias on income decisions, while both incongruous and congruous (i.e., non-identical) subliminally and supraliminally formed memories canceled each other out leaving no bias on decisions. Importantly, the increased decision bias following the formation of identical unconscious and conscious memories and the reduced decision bias following to the formation of non-identical memories were determined relative to a control condition, where conscious memory formation alone could influence decisions. In view of the much weaker representational strength of subliminally vs. supraliminally formed memories, their long-lasting impact on decision-making is noteworthy.

Scrutinizing the Emotional Nature of Intuitive Coherence Judgments

Dual‐system models propose that cognitive processing can occur either intuitively or deliberately. Unlike deliberate decision strategies, intuitive ones are assumed to have an emotional component attached to the decision process. We tested if intuitive decisions are indeed accompanied by an emotional response while deliberate decisions are not. Specifically, we conducted a psychophysiological study in which participants were instructed to decide either intuitively or deliberately if three simultaneously presented words were semantically coherent or incoherent (triad task). The degree of emotionality of these two decision strategies (intuitive vs. deliberate) was compared using changes in electrodermal activity (EDA) and the reaction time (RT) effect of an affective priming paradigm as primary measurements. Based on a valence‐arousal model, our results revealed that intuitive and deliberate judgments do not differ as to their emotional valence but that they do differ in emotional arousal. Most notably, sympathetic activation during intuitive judgments was significantly lower compared to sympathetic activation during deliberate judgments. Our results reflect that a relaxed state of mind—manifested in low sympathetic activity—could underlie the holistic processing that is assumed to facilitate the proliferation of semantic associations during coherence judgments. This suggests that coherence judgments made under an (instructed) intuitive decision mode have a specific psychophysiological signature and that arousal is the differentiating component between intuitive and deliberate decision strategies. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Intuition and metacognition: The effect of semantic coherence on judgments of learning

The idea that two distinct modes of thought affect human cognition and behavior has received considerable attention in psychology. In the domain of metacognition, it is assumed that metacognitive judgments are based on both nonanalytic, experience-based processes and analytic, theory-based processes. This study examined whether the experience-based process of intuition underlies people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs). In four experiments, people made JOLs and took a test on compound remote associates, that is, groups of 3 words that were either remote associates of a single solution word (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). Previous research has shown that increased fluency of processing coherent triads produces brief positive affects that may underlie judgments. In all experiments, JOLs were higher for coherent than for incoherent triads. The same was true for recognition memory and free recall performance. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that coherent triads were processed more fluently (i.e., read more quickly) than incoherent triads. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the effect of semantic coherence on JOLs occurred for participants who were aware and unaware of relations between all three triad words, but was more pronounced for aware participants. In sum, this study demonstrates that intuition impacts JOLs over and above theory-based processes.

The Role of Intuition in the Generation and Evaluation Stages of Creativity

Both intuition and creativity are associated with knowledge creation, yet a clear link between them has not been adequately established. First, the available empirical evidence for an underlying relationship between intuition and creativity is sparse in nature. Further, this evidence is arguable as the concepts are diversely operationalized and the measures adopted are often not validated sufficiently. Combined, these issues make the findings from various studies examining the link between intuition and creativity difficult to replicate. Nevertheless, the role of intuition in creativity should not be neglected as it is often reported to be a core component of the idea generation process, which in conjunction with idea evaluation are crucial phases of creative cognition. We review the prior research findings in respect of idea generation and idea evaluation from the view that intuition can be construed as the gradual accumulation of cues to coherence. Thus, we summarize the literature on what role intuitive processes play in the main stages of the creative problem-solving process and outline a conceptual framework of the interaction between intuition and creativity. Finally, we discuss the main challenges of measuring intuition as well as possible directions for future research.

Intuition and Insight: Two Processes That Build on Each Other or Fundamentally Differ?

Intuition and insight are intriguing phenomena of non-analytical mental functioning: whereas intuition denotes ideas that have been reached by sensing the solution without any explicit representation of it, insight has been understood as the sudden and unexpected apprehension of the solution by recombining the single elements of a problem. By face validity, the two processes appear similar; according to a lay perspective, it is assumed that intuition precedes insight. Yet, predominant scientific conceptualizations of intuition and insight consider the two processes to differ with regard to their (dis-)continuous unfolding. That is, intuition has been understood as an experience-based and gradual process, whereas insight is regarded as a genuinely discontinuous phenomenon. Unfortunately, both processes have been investigated differently and without much reference to each other. In this contribution, we therefore set out to fill this lacuna by examining the conceptualizations of the assumed underlying cognitive processes of both phenomena, and by also referring to the research traditions and paradigms of the respective field. Based on early work put forward by Bowers et al. (1990, 1995), we referred to semantic coherence tasks consisting of convergent word triads (i.e., the solution has the same meaning to all three clue words) and/or divergent word triads (i.e., the solution means something different with respect to each clue word) as an excellent kind of paradigm that may be used in the future to disentangle intuition and insight experimentally. By scrutinizing the underlying mechanisms of intuition and insight, with this theoretical contribution, we hope to launch lacking but needed experimental studies and to initiate scientific cooperation between the research fields of intuition and insight that are currently still separated from each other.

Intuitive Feelings of Warmth and Confidence in Insight and Noninsight Problem Solving of Magic Tricks

The focus of the current study is on intuitive feelings of insight during problem solving and the extent to which such feelings are predictive of successful problem solving. We report the results from an experiment (N = 51) that applied a procedure where the to-be-solved problems were 32 short (15 s) video recordings of magic tricks. The procedure included metacognitive ratings similar to the “warmth ratings” previously used by Metcalfe and colleagues, as well as confidence ratings. At regular intervals during problem solving, participants indicated the perceived closeness to the correct solution. Participants also indicated directly whether each problem was solved by insight or not. Problems that people claimed were solved by insight were characterized by higher accuracy and higher confidence than noninsight solutions. There was no difference between the two types of solution in warmth ratings, however. Confidence ratings were more strongly associated with solution accuracy for noninsight than insight trials. Moreover, for insight trials the participants were more likely to repeat their incorrect solutions on a subsequent recognition test. The results have implications for understanding people's metacognitive awareness of the cognitive processes involved in problem solving. They also have general implications for our understanding of how intuition and insight are related.

Losing Your Gut Feelings. Intuition in Depression

Whereas in basic research, intuition has become a topic of great interest, clinical research and depression research in specific have not applied to the topic of intuition, yet. This is astonishing because a well-known phenomenon during depression is that patients have difficulties to judge and decide. In contrast to healthy individuals who take most daily life decisions intuitively (Kahneman, 2011), depressed individuals seem to have difficulties to come to fast and adaptive decisions. The current article pursues three goals. First, our aim is to establish the hypothesis that intuition is impaired in depression against the background of influential theoretical accounts as well as empirical evidence from basic and clinical research. The second aim of the current paper is to provide explanations for recent findings on the depression-intuition interplay and to present directions for future research that may help to broaden our understanding of decision difficulties in depression. Third, we seek to propose ideas on how therapeutic interventions can support depressed individuals in taking better decisions. Even though our knowledge regarding this topic is still limited, we will tentatively launch the idea that an important first step may be to enhance patients' access to intuitions. Overall, this paper seeks to introduce the topic of intuition to clinical research on depression and to hereby set the stage for upcoming theory and practice.

Intuitive decision making as a gradual process: investigating semantic intuition-based and priming-based decisions with fMRI

INTRODUCTION

Intuition has been defined as the instantaneous, experience-based impression of coherence elicited by cues in the environment. In a context of discovery, intuitive decision-making processes can be conceptualized as occurring within two stages, the first of which comprises an implicit perception of coherence that is not (yet) verbalizable. Through a process of spreading activation, this initially non-conscious perception gradually crosses over a threshold of awareness and thereby becomes explicable. Because of its experiential basis, intuition shares conceptual similarities with implicit memory processes. Based on these, the study addresses two research questions: (1) Is the gradual nature of intuitive processes reflected on a neural level? (2) Do intuition-based decisions differ neurally from priming-based decisions?

METHODS

To answer these questions, we conducted an fMRI study using the triads task and presented participants with coherent word triads that converge on a common fourth concept, and incoherent word triads that do not converge on a common fourth concept. Participants had to perform semantic coherence judgments as well as to indicate whether they immediately knew the fourth concept. To enable investigating intuition-based and priming-based decisions within the same task and with the same participants, we implemented a conceptual priming procedure into the coherence judgment task. We realized this by priming participants with concepts associated with incoherent triads in separate priming blocks prior to the coherence judgments.

RESULTS

For intuition-based decisions, imaging results mainly revealed activity within the orbitofrontal cortex, within the inferior frontal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus. Activity suppression in the right temporo-occipital complex was observed for priming-based decisions.

CONCLUSIONS

With respect to research question 1, our data support a continuity model of intuition because the two intuitive stages show quantitatively distinct brain activation patterns. Regarding research question 2, we can draw the preliminary conclusion of a qualitative difference between intuition-based and priming-based decisions.

Timing matters! The neural signature of intuitive judgments differs according to the way information is presented

One can conceive of intuition as the preliminary perception of coherence. Since this requires holistic perception, it is hypothesized that underlying processing strategies are dependent on the possibility to obtain all relevant information at once. The present study used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to investigate neural mechanisms underlying intuitive coherence perception when semantic concepts are presented all together (simultaneously) or one after the other (sequentially). With simultaneous presentation, absolute activation increases in the left OFC when participants recognize coherence. With sequential presentation activation increases in the right OFC when participants conclude that there is no common associate between the words presented. Behavioral performance was similar in the two experiments. These results demonstrate that the way information is revealed over time changes the processing of intuitive coherence perception. We propose that such changes must be taken into account to disentangle the neural and behavioral mechanisms underlying different accounts of intuition and related phenomena.