The impact of local population genetic background on the spread of the selfish element Medea-1 in red flour beetles

Genetic pest management and the background genetics of release strains

Genetic pest management (GPM) methods involve releasing modified versions of a pest species to mate with wild pests in the target area. Proposed for a wide range of applications in public health, agriculture and conservation, most progress has been made with pest insects. Offspring of the released modified insects and wild pests carry the modification-which might be transgenes, artificially introduced Wolbachia or genetic damage from radiation, for example-but they also carry a complete haploid genome from their laboratory-reared parent, as well as one from their wild parent. Unless these F₁ hybrids are completely unable to reproduce, further mating will lead to introgression of DNA sequences from the release strain into the wild population. We discuss issues around strain selection and the potential consequences of such introgression. We conclude that such introgression is probably harmless in almost all circumstances, and could, in theory, provide specific additional benefits to the release programme. We outline population monitoring approaches that could be used, going forward, to determine how background genetics may affect GPM. This article is part of the theme issue 'Novel control strategies for mosquito-borne diseases'.

Adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives

Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC,ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.

The distribution and spread of naturally occurring Medea selfish genetic elements in the United States

Selfish genetic elements (SGEs) are DNA sequences that are transmitted to viable offspring in greater than Mendelian frequencies. Medea SGEs occur naturally in some populations of red flour beetle (Tribolium castaneum) and are expected to increase in frequency within populations and spread among populations. The large-scale U.S. distributions of Medea-4 (M4) had been mapped based on samples from 1993 to 1995. We sampled beetles in 2011-2014 and show that the distribution of M4 in the United States is dynamic and has shifted southward. By using a genetic marker of Medea-1 (M1), we found five unique geographic clusters with high and low M1 frequencies in a pattern not predicted by microsatellite-based analysis of population structure. Our results indicate the absence of rigid barriers to Medea spread in the United States, so assessment of what factors have limited its current distribution requires further investigation. There is great interest in using synthetic SGEs, including synthetic Medea, to alter or suppress pest populations, but there is concern about unpredicted spread of these SGEs and potential for populations to become resistant to them. The finding of patchy distributions of Medea elements suggests that released synthetic SGEs cannot always be expected to spread uniformly, especially in target species with limited dispersal.