Moral relevance varies due to Inter‐individual and Intra‐individual differences across big data technology domains

Uncertain Facts or Uncertain Values? Testing the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative Uncertainty in Moral Judgments

People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor-analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision-making, and folk metaethics.

Person-specific priorities in solitude

OBJECTIVE

People value solitude in varying degrees. Theories and studies suggest that people's appreciation of solitude varies considerably across persons (e.g., an introverted person may value solitude more than an extraverted person), and solitude experiences (i.e., on average, people may value some functions of solitude, e.g., privacy, more than other functions, e.g., self-discovery). What are the unique contributions of these two sources?

METHOD

We surveyed a quota-based sample of 501 US residents about their perceived importance of a diverse set of 22 solitude functions.

RESULTS

Variance component analysis reveals that both sources contributed to the variability of perceived importance of solitude (person: 22%; solitude function: 15%). Crucially, individual idiosyncratic preferences (person-by-solitude function interaction) had a substantial impact (46%). Further analyses explored the role of personality traits, showing that different functions of solitude hold varying importance for different people. For example, neurotic individuals prioritize emotion regulation, introverted individuals value relaxation, and conscientious individuals find solitude important for productivity.

CONCLUSIONS

People value solitude for idiosyncratic reasons. Scientific inquiries on solitude must consider the fit between a person's characteristics and the specific functions a solitary experience affords. This research suggests that crafting or enhancing positive solitude experiences requires a personalized approach.

Moral Frames Are Persuasive and Moralize Attitudes; Nonmoral Frames Are Persuasive and De-Moralize Attitudes

Moral framing and reframing strategies persuade people holding moralized attitudes (i.e., attitudes having a moral basis). However, these strategies may have unintended side effects: They have the potential to moralize people's attitudes further and as a consequence lower their willingness to compromise on issues. Across three experimental studies with adult U.S. participants (Study 1: N = 2,151, Study 2: N = 1,590, Study 3: N = 1,015), we used persuasion messages (moral, nonmoral, and control) that opposed new big-data technologies (crime-surveillance technologies and hiring algorithms). We consistently found that moral frames were persuasive and moralized people's attitudes, whereas nonmoral frames were persuasive and de-moralized people's attitudes. Moral frames also lowered people's willingness to compromise and reduced behavioral indicators of compromise. Exploratory analyses suggest that feelings of anger and disgust may drive moralization, whereas perceiving the technologies to be financially costly may drive de-moralization. The findings imply that use of moral frames can increase and entrench moral divides rather than bridge them.