Is It Fair to Kill One to Save Five? How Just World Beliefs Shape Sacrificial Moral Decision-making

Sacrificing a target to save a group violates deontological ethics against harm but upholds utilitarian ethics to maximize outcomes. Although theorists examine many factors that influence dilemma decisions, we examined justice concerns: We manipulated the moral character of sacrificial targets, then measured participants' dilemma responses and just world beliefs. Across four studies (N=1116), participants considering guilty versus innocent targets scored lower on harm-rejection (deontological) responding, but not outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) responding assessed via process dissociation. Just world beliefs (both personal and general) predicted lower utilitarian and somewhat lower deontological responding, but these effects disappeared when accounting for shared variance with psychopathy. Results suggest that dilemma decisions partly reflect the moral status of sacrificial targets and concerns about the fairness implications of sacrificing innocent targets to save innocent groups.

How do people experience innocent suffering?

Introduction

The paper examines the psychological facet of innocent suffering. One can find a description of this phenomenon in social psychology as a factor that affects the belief in a just world, but there is a lack of qualitative scientific data about related psychological features, processes, copings, and consequences on the personality level.

Methods

To study innocent suffering, semi-structured in-depth interview was conducted (31 respondents, ~223 minutes per respondent, 6,924 min in total) aimed to gather data about the experiences of innocent sufferings happened to participants. For the analysis of texts, a narrative and content analysis are used within the framework of grounded theory. The reliability of the results is based on expert assessment.

Results and discussion

As a result, six essential properties of innocent sufferings were identified: complexity, stability, distress, injustice, casual incoherence, and breaks of integrity of a life story. The most "popular" life domains, in which participants reported about innocent sufferings, are violence, abuse (physical and psychological), and quitting romantic relationships. It is proposed a scientific definition of innocent suffering and the prototype of the phenomenon.

Losing the lottery of life: Examining intuitions of desert toward the socially and genetically "unlucky" in criminal punishment contexts

This research presents three experiments that examine how natural "luck" (social and genetic luck) may affect lay intuitions toward desert-based criminal punishment. Study 1 examined if intuitions surrounding desert-based rewards in relation to good qualities/advantages ascribed to natural luck would extend to desert-based punishments in relation to bad qualities/disadvantages ascribed to natural luck. Study 2 examined how both social and genetic luck affect support for desert-based punishment across different criminal offenses and tests the relevance of immanent justice reasoning to such support. Study 3 examined whether findings in the prior studies are specific to desert-based punishment and immanent justice reasoning, or if natural luck elicits broader punishment judgments and types of justice reasoning. Results showed that known intuitions surrounding desert-based rewards do extend to desert-based punishments in instances of natural luck. Immanent justice reasoning was strongly associated with support for desert-based punishment in instances of both social and genetic luck. However, genetic luck, as compared to social luck, significantly increased support for desert-based punishment, with imminent justice reasoning mediating this increased support. Implications are discussed in relation to capital sentencing and better understanding lay intuitions toward the punishment of criminal offenders who may have qualities ascribed to the "natural lottery."

Are predictions and perceptions of post-traumatic growth a form of ultimate justice reasoning?

Researchers have questioned whether self-report questionnaires adequately assess post-traumatic growth as it was theorized (positive personality change after trauma), versus assessing a broader coping mechanism. Across four studies, we examine whether individuals report post-traumatic growth as a coping mechanism to restore a sense of justice. In Studies 1 and 2, participants predicted greater post-traumatic growth for a hypothetical victim after a severe accident that caused grave suffering (and disrupted one’s belief in a just world), compared to an accident that caused minimal suffering (and did not disrupt one’s belief in a just world). Both perceptions of deservingness of post-traumatic growth for the victim (a belief in a just world mechanism) and engagement in deliberative rumination (a post-traumatic growth mechanism) mediated the effect of suffering on the prediction of post-traumatic growth in Study 2. The same pattern of results held when participants considered their own imagined suffering (Study 3), and when participants reported post-traumatic growth from distressing events in their own lives (Study 4). As such, we conclude that following an episode of suffering, either occurring to another or to oneself, self-reports of post-traumatic growth on questionnaires can reflect two distinct motivations: (1) an attempt to cope with perceived injustices and (2) the will to search for meaning in one’s suffering.

Experimental evidence of subtle victim blame in the absence of explicit blame

We argue that people will often eschew explicit victim blame (e.g., claiming that “X is to blame”) because it is counternormative and socially undesirable, yet they might still engage in subtle victim blame by attributing victims’ suffering to behaviors the victims can control (i.e., “high control causes”). We found support for this argument in three online studies with US residents. In Studies 1 and 2, participants viewed a victim posing either a high threat to the need to believe in a just world, which should heighten the motivation to engage in victim blame, or a low threat. They then rated explicit blame items and attributions for the victim’s suffering. Explicit blame was low overall and not influenced by victim threat. However, participants attributed the high threat victim’s suffering, more than the low threat victim’s suffering, to high control causes, thus showing a subtle blame effect. In Study 2, explicit blame and subtle blame were less strongly associated (in the high threat condition) for individuals high in socially desirable responding. These results are consistent with our argument that explicit and subtle blame diverge in part due to social desirability concerns. In Study 3, most participants believed others viewed the explicit blame items, but not the attribution items, as assessing blame. Thus, attributions to high control causes can be seen as “subtle” in the sense that people believe others will view such statements as reflecting constructs other than blame. Our studies suggest a way of responding to innocent victims that could be particularly relevant in a modern context, given increasing social undesirability of various negative responses to disadvantaged and victimized individuals.

Getting "just deserts" or seeing the "silver lining": the relation between judgments of immanent and ultimate justice

People can perceive misfortunes as caused by previous bad deeds (immanent justice reasoning) or resulting in ultimate compensation (ultimate justice reasoning). Across two studies, we investigated the relation between these types of justice reasoning and identified the processes (perceptions of deservingness) that underlie them for both others (Study 1) and the self (Study 2). Study 1 demonstrated that observers engaged in more ultimate (vs. immanent) justice reasoning for a "good" victim and greater immanent (vs. ultimate) justice reasoning for a "bad" victim. In Study 2, participants' construals of their bad breaks varied as a function of their self-worth, with greater ultimate (immanent) justice reasoning for participants with higher (lower) self-esteem. Across both studies, perceived deservingness of bad breaks or perceived deservingness of ultimate compensation mediated immanent and ultimate justice reasoning respectively.

The use of cognitive reappraisal and humour as coping strategies for bullied nurses

This article explores the repercussions of workplace bullying on nurses and the health-care profession as a whole. I discuss the nature of workplace bullying and draw upon prior studies to explore some of the barriers that prevent witnesses to bullying from intervening, as well as barriers faced by targets in taking action to stop the bullying. As overt forms of resistance are often not feasible in situations where nurses occupy subordinate positions to their bullies, I propose that cognitive reappraisal can be an effective coping strategy, and situate this perspective within the research on humour, hope and optimism.