Toward a Humane Death with Dementia

Can an effective end-of-life intervention for advanced dementia be viewed as moral?

Many people dread prolonged dying with suffering in the terminal illness, advanced dementia. To successfully facilitate a timely dying, advance directives must be effective and acceptable. This article considers whether authorities, including treating physicians, can accept as moral, the effective intervention that ceases caregivers' assistance with oral feeding and hydrating. The article presents eight criticisms and "alternate views" regarding ceasing assisted feeding/hydrating. It draws on perspectives from clinical medicine, law, ethics, and religion. The conflict is between (A) people's core beliefs that reflect cultural norms and religious teachings regarding what is moral versus (B) patients' autonomous right of self-determination and claim right to avoid suffering. The article presents each side as strongly as possible. Accepting the intervention as moral could allow patients a peaceful and timely dying from patients' underlying disease. Confidence in future success can deter patients and their surrogates from considering a hastened dying in earlier stages of dementia.

Flaws in advance directives that request withdrawing assisted feeding in late-stage dementia may cause premature or prolonged dying

Background

The terminal illness of late-stage (advanced) Alzheimer’s and related dementias is progressively cruel, burdensome, and can last years if caregivers assist oral feeding and hydrating. Options to avoid prolonged dying are limited since advanced dementia patients cannot qualify for Medical Aid in Dying. Physicians and judges can insist on clear and convincing evidence that the patient wants to die—which many advance directives cannot provide. Proxies/agents’ substituted judgment may not be concordant with patients’ requests. While advance directives can be patients’ last resort to attain a peaceful and timely dying consistent with their lifelong values, success depends on their being effective and acceptable. A single flaw can provide opponents justification to refuse the directive’s requests to cease assisted feeding.

Aim

This article considers 24 common advance directive flaws in four categories. Process flaws focus on how patients express their end-of-life wishes. Content flaws reflect drafters’ selection of conditions and interventions, and how they are described. Inherent flaws can make advance directives unacceptable to authorities concerned about premature dying. Strategies are needed to compel physicians to write needed orders and to prevent third parties from sabotaging these orders after they are  implemented. The article includes excerpts from “dementia-specific” directives or supplements that exemplify each flaw—mostly from the US and Europe. No directive critiqued here included an effective strategy to resolve this long-debated bioethical conflict: the past directive requests “Cease assisted feeding” but the incapacitated patient apparently expresses the desire to “Continue assisted feeding.” Some opponents to the controversial request, cease assisted feeding, use this conflict as a conceptual wedge to practice hard paternalism. This article proposes a protocol to prevent this conflict from emerging. These strategies may prevent authorities from requiring patients to fulfill authorities’ additional clinical criteria as a prerequisite to honor the requests in patients directives.

Conclusion

This critique of flaws may serve as a guide to drafting and to selecting effective and acceptable advance directives for dementia. It also poses several bioethical and clinical questions to those in authority: Does your paternalistic refusal to honor patients’ wishes respect their self-determination? Protect vulnerable patients from harm? Force patients to endure prolonged suffering? Violate the principles of bioethics? Violate the very foundation of patient-centered care?

Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking: Conceptual, Personal, and Policy Questions

Although voluntarily stopping eating and drinking (VSED) as a way to hasten one's death is not yet a widely recognized practice in the United States, it has received increasing attention in the medical and bioethics literature in recent years. After a brief review of the broader context of human death and dying, this article poses and examines 11 conceptual, personal, and public policy questions about VSED. The article identifies essential features of VSED and discusses whether VSED is a type of suicide. It identifies reasons why people may or may not choose VSED, and it considers responses by family members and professional caregivers to people who have chosen VSED. It also considers how public policies may permit and regulate or restrict the practice of VSED. Examination of these questions is designed to increase understanding of VSED and to inform moral evaluation of this practice.

Advance Directive as Ulysses Contract: The Application of Stopping of Eating and Drinking by Advance Directive

Increased attention is being paid to "dementia directives," advance directives tailored to persons with dementia that outline what treatments an individual with dementia might wish to receive or forgo should they lose capacity. Particular focus has been placed on the request to have assisted oral feedings withheld, the so-called Stopping of Eating and Drinking by Advance Directive (SED by AD), the purpose of which is to hasten death. This article reviews the available literature regarding the practice of SED by AD and explores the clinical and ethical aspects as they present at the bedside. Our review aims to show that practical, clinically applicable ways to approach such requests must be developed in order to balance the fundamental principles at play.

Dementia, identity and the role of friends

Ronald Dworkin (1993) introduced the example of Margo, who was so severely demented that she could not recognise any family or friends, and could not remember anything of her life. At the same time, however, she seemed full of childish delight. Dworkin also imagines that, before her dementia, Margo signed an advance refusal of life-saving treatment. Now severely demented, she develops pneumonia, easy to treat, but lethal if untreated. Dworkin argues that the advance refusal ought to be heeded and Margo be allowed to die of that pneumonia, on the basis that the prior refusal expresses her true wishes (her 'critical interests'). In this paper I want to challenge Dworkin's understanding of identity and his conclusion about advance refusals, and I develop my argument in two directions. First, I argue that the demented Margo is not some 'lesser' version of the 'true' Margo, but instead that the present Margo's wishes should take precedence over those of the past Margo, on the grounds that all of us are entitled to change our minds. Second, I argue for a stronger role for friends and family members in sustaining the demented Margo's identity through her years of decline. Based on this, I argue for a presumption against the advance refusal, but I allow that in extreme cases (which I describe), a friend might have the authority to demand that it be heeded.

Acceptability of an Advance Directive That Limits Food and Liquids in Advanced Dementia

Some individuals fear living with advanced dementia and may even commit suicide if they receive dementia diagnosis. Living with advanced dementia could be prevented if a person who cannot feed himself or herself would not be fed by others. The purpose of the study was to find out how acceptable would be an advance directive that includes discontinuation of feeding at certain stage of dementia for relatives of persons who died with dementia. All participants of 2 focus groups would be willing to indicate at least 1 condition in which they would not want to be fed. Some of them would be willing to make a proxy decision to stop feeding in the absence of advance directives.