Were There "Additional Foreseeable Risks" in the SUPPORT Study? Lessons Not Learned from the ARDSnet Clinical Trials

Comparative effectiveness research: what to do when experts disagree about risks

BACKGROUND

Ethical issues related to comparative effectiveness research, or research that compares existing standards of care, have recently received considerable attention. In this paper we focus on how Ethics Review Committees (ERCs) should evaluate the risks of comparative effectiveness research.

MAIN TEXT

We discuss what has been a prominent focus in the debate about comparative effectiveness research, namely that it is justified when "nothing is known" about the comparative effectiveness of the available alternatives. We argue that this focus may be misleading. Rather, we should focus on the fact that some experts believe that the evidence points in favor of one intervention, whereas other experts believe that the evidence favors the alternative(s). We will then introduce a case that illustrates this point, and based on that, discuss how ERCs should deal with such cases of expert disagreement.

CONCLUSION

We argue that ERCs have a duty to assess the range of expert opinions and based on that assessment arrive at a risk judgment about the study under consideration. We also argue that assessment of expert disagreement is important for the assignment of risk level to a clinical trial: what is the basis for expert opinions, how strong is the evidence appealed to by various experts, and how can clinical trial monitoring affect the possible increased risk of clinical trial participation.

The ethics and regulatory landscape of including vulnerable populations in pragmatic clinical trials

Policies have been developed to protect vulnerable populations in clinical research, including the US federal research regulations (45 Code of Federal Regulations 46 Subparts B, C, and D). These policies generally recognize vulnerable populations to include pregnant women, fetuses, neonates, children, prisoners, persons with physical handicaps or mental disabilities, and disadvantaged persons. The aim has been to protect these populations from harm, often by creating regulatory and ethical checks that may limit their participation in many clinical trials. The recent increase in pragmatic clinical trials raises at least two questions about this approach. First, is exclusion itself a harm to vulnerable populations, as these groups may be denied access to understanding how health interventions work for them in clinical settings? Second, are groups considered vulnerable in traditional clinical trials also vulnerable in pragmatic clinical trials? We argue first that excluding vulnerable subjects from participation in pragmatic clinical trials can be harmful by preventing acquisition of data to meaningfully inform clinical decision-making in the future. Second, we argue that protections for vulnerable subjects in traditional clinical trial settings may not be translatable, feasible, or even ethical to apply in pragmatic clinical trials. We conclude by offering specific recommendations for appropriately protecting vulnerable research subjects in pragmatic clinical trials, focusing on pregnant women, fetuses, neonates, children, prisoners, persons with physical handicaps or mental disabilities, and disadvantaged persons.