Exploring the relationship between anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind in brain and behaviour

Differential relationships between autistic traits and anthropomorphic tendencies in adults and early adolescents

Anthropomorphism, the attribution of human-like qualities (e.g., mental states) to nonhuman entities, is a universal but variable psychological experience. Adults with professionally diagnosed autism or high levels of subclinical autistic traits consistently show greater tendencies to anthropomorphize, which has been hypothesized to reflect 1) a compensatory mechanism for lack of social connectedness and 2) a persistence of childhood anthropomorphism into adulthood. Here, we directly tested these hypotheses in a general population sample consisting of both adults (N=685, 17-58 years old) and early adolescents (N=145, 12-14 years old) using the refined 9-item Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (AnthQ9), which measures both present and childhood anthropomorphic tendencies. We found that adults with heightened autistic traits reported increased present anthropomorphism (e.g., tend more to perceive computers as having minds), which held even after controlling for social connectedness. In contrast, adolescents with heightened autistic traits did not show increased present anthropomorphism, but rather reported reduced childhood anthropomorphism (e.g., less likely to perceive toys as having feelings) after controlling for social connectedness. We also found evidence that the present and childhood subscales of the AnthQ9 may tap into fundamentally different aspects of anthropomorphism. The results suggest that increased anthropomorphic tendencies in adults with heightened autistic traits cannot be explained solely by increased sociality motivation, but may be due to delayed development of anthropomorphism, although alternative possibilities of measurement problems cannot be ruled out. Implications for the measurement of anthropomorphism and its relation with theory of mind were also discussed.

People with Autism Spectrum Disorder Could Interact More Easily with a Robot than with a Human: Reasons and Limits

Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder show deficits in communication and social interaction, as well as repetitive behaviors and restricted interests. Interacting with robots could bring benefits to this population, notably by fostering communication and social interaction. Studies even suggest that people with Autism Spectrum Disorder could interact more easily with a robot partner rather than a human partner. We will be looking at the benefits of robots and the reasons put forward to explain these results. The interest regarding robots would mainly be due to three of their characteristics: they can act as motivational tools, and they are simplified agents whose behavior is more predictable than that of a human. Nevertheless, there are still many challenges to be met in specifying the optimum conditions for using robots with individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

Domain-specific and domain-general neural network engagement during human-robot interactions

To what extent do domain-general and domain-specific neural network engagement generalize across interactions with human and artificial agents? In this exploratory study, we analysed a publicly available functional MRI (fMRI) data set (n = 22) to probe the similarities and dissimilarities in neural architecture while participants conversed with another person or a robot. Incorporating trial-by-trial dynamics of the interactions, listening and speaking, we used whole-brain, region-of-interest and functional connectivity analyses to test response profiles within and across social or non-social, domain-specific and domain-general networks, that is, the person perception, theory-of-mind, object-specific, language and multiple-demand networks. Listening to a robot compared to a human resulted in higher activation in the language network, especially in areas associated with listening comprehension, and in the person perception network. No differences in activity of the theory-of-mind network were found. Results from the functional connectivity analysis showed no difference between interactions with a human or robot in within- and between-network connectivity. Together, these results suggest that although largely similar regions are activated when speaking to a human and to a robot, activity profiles during listening point to a dissociation at a lower level or perceptual level, but not higher order cognitive level.

Exploring the relationship between anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind in brain and behaviour

The process of understanding the minds of other people, such as their emotions and intentions, is mimicked when individuals try to understand an artificial mind. The assumption is that anthropomorphism, attributing human‐like characteristics to non‐human agents and objects, is an analogue to theory‐of‐mind, the ability to infer mental states of other people. Here, we test to what extent these two constructs formally overlap. Specifically, using a multi‐method approach, we test if and how anthropomorphism is related to theory‐of‐mind using brain (Experiment 1) and behavioural (Experiment 2) measures. In a first exploratory experiment, we examine the relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity within the theory‐of‐mind brain network (n = 108). Results from a Bayesian regression analysis showed no consistent relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity in regions of the theory‐of‐mind network. In a follow‐up, pre‐registered experiment, we explored the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and situational and dispositional anthropomorphism in more depth. Participants (n = 311) watched a short movie while simultaneously completing situational anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind ratings, as well as measures of dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind. Only situational anthropomorphism predicted the ability to understand and predict the behaviour of the film's characters. No relationship between situational or dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind was observed. Together, these results suggest that while the constructs of anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind might overlap in certain situations, they remain separate and possibly unrelated at the personality level. These findings point to a possible dissociation between brain and behavioural measures when considering the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and anthropomorphism.