Resource scarcity and prioritization decisions in medical care: A lab experiment with heterogeneous patient types

Do physicians' attitudes toward prioritization predict poor-health patients' access to care?

Physicians often face tight resource constraints, meaning they have to make trade-offs between which patients they care for and the amount of care received. Studies show that patients requiring many resources disproportionately suffer a loss of care when resources are constrained. This study uncovers whether physicians' attitudes toward prioritization of healthcare predicts poor-health patients' access to care. We combine unique survey data on Danish GPs' preferred prioritization principle with register data on their patients' contacts in general practice. We consider different types of contacts as the required effort could impact the need for prioritization. Our results show variation in GPs' prioritization principles, where a majority prefers a principle that may lead to an unequal distribution of services. We further find that GPs' attitudes toward prioritization predict some poor-health patients' access to general practice. GPs who state they prefer the principle of prioritizing patients in the poorest health state when resources tightened provide more contacts to poor-health patients. The additional contacts are typically high-effort contacts such as annual status meetings and home visits, but also low-effort contacts such as emails. Our findings indicate inequity in poor-health patients' access to care across general practices.

Looking inside the lab: a systematic literature review of economic experiments in health service provision

Experimental economics is, nowadays, a well-established approach to investigate agents' behavior under economic incentives. In the last decade, a fast-growing number of studies have focused on the application of experimental methodology to health policy issues. The results of that stream of literature have been intriguing and strongly policy oriented. However, those findings are scattered between different health-related topics, making it difficult to grasp the overall state-of-the-art. Hence, to make the main contributions understandable at a glance, we conduct a systematic literature review of laboratory experiments on the supply of health services. Of the 1248 articles retrieved from 2011, 56 articles published in peer-review journals have met our inclusion criteria. Thus, we have described the experimental designs of each of the selected papers and we have classified them according to their main area of interest.

Effects of fee-for-service, diagnosis-related-group, and mixed payment systems on physicians’ medical service behavior: experimental evidence

Background

Healthcare reforms in many countries have shown a movement from pure payment systems to mixed payment systems. However, there remains an insufficient understanding of how to design better mixed payment systems and how such systems, especially Diagnosis-Related-Group (DRG)-based systems, benefit patients. We therefore designed a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate the effects of fee-for-service (FFS), DRG, and mixed payment systems on physicians’ service provision.

Methods

A total of 210 medical students were recruited from Capital Medical University as subjects. They, in the role of physicians, were randomly divided into seven groups and chose the quantity of medical services for different patient types under pure FFS, pure DRG, or mixed payment schemes that included two FFS-based mixed payment schemes and three DRG-based mixed payment schemes. There were five rounds of each group of experiments, and each subject made 18 decisions per round. The quantity of medical services provided by subjects were collected. And relevant statistics were computed and analyzed by nonparametric tests and random effects model.

Results

The results showed that the physicians’ overprovision (underprovision) of services under FFS (DRG) schemes decreased under mixed payment schemes, resulting in higher benefit to patients under mixed payment schemes. Patients’ health conditions also affected physicians’ behavior but in different directions. Higher disease severity was associated with higher deviation of physicians’ quantity choices from the optimal quantity under DRG and DRG-based mixed payment schemes, while the opposite was found for FFS and FFS-based mixed payment schemes.

Conclusions

Mixed payment systems are a better way to balance physicians’ profit and patients’ benefit. The design of mixed payment systems should be adjusted according to the patient’s health conditions. When patients are in lower disease severity and resource consumption is relatively small, prospective payments or mixed systems based on prospective payments are more suitable. While for patients in higher disease severity, retrospective payments or mixed systems based predominantly on retrospective payments are better.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12913-022-08218-5.