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Fooladi S, Rabiee N, Iravani S. Genetically engineered bacteria: a new frontier in targeted drug delivery. J Mater Chem B 2023; 11:10072-10087. [PMID: 37873584 DOI: 10.1039/d3tb01805a] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2023]
Abstract
Genetically engineered bacteria (GEB) have shown significant promise to revolutionize modern medicine. These engineered bacteria with unique properties such as enhanced targeting, versatility, biofilm disruption, reduced drug resistance, self-amplification capabilities, and biodegradability represent a highly promising approach for targeted drug delivery and cancer theranostics. This innovative approach involves modifying bacterial strains to function as drug carriers, capable of delivering therapeutic agents directly to specific cells or tissues. Unlike synthetic drug delivery systems, GEB are inherently biodegradable and can be naturally eliminated from the body, reducing potential long-term side effects or complications associated with residual foreign constituents. However, several pivotal challenges such as safety and controllability need to be addressed. Researchers have explored novel tactics to improve their capabilities and overcome existing challenges, including synthetic biology tools (e.g., clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) and bioinformatics-driven design), microbiome engineering, combination therapies, immune system interaction, and biocontainment strategies. Because of the remarkable advantages and tangible progress in this field, GEB may emerge as vital tools in personalized medicine, providing precise and controlled drug delivery for various diseases (especially cancer). In this context, future directions include the integration of nanotechnology with GEB, the focus on microbiota-targeted therapies, the incorporation of programmable behaviors, the enhancement in immunotherapy treatments, and the discovery of non-medical applications. In this way, careful ethical considerations and regulatory frameworks are necessary for developing GEB-based systems for targeted drug delivery. By addressing safety concerns, ensuring informed consent, promoting equitable access, understanding long-term effects, mitigating dual-use risks, and fostering public engagement, these engineered bacteria can be employed as promising delivery vehicles in bio- and nanomedicine. In this review, recent advances related to the application of GEB in targeted drug delivery and cancer therapy are discussed, covering crucial challenging issues and future perspectives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Saba Fooladi
- Yale Cardiovascular Research Center, Section of Cardiovascular Medicine, Department of Internal Medicine, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06511, USA
| | - Navid Rabiee
- Centre for Molecular Medicine and Innovative Therapeutics, Murdoch University, Perth, WA 6150, Australia.
- School of Engineering, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, 2109, Australia
| | - Siavash Iravani
- Independent Researcher, W Nazar ST, Boostan Ave, Isfahan, Iran.
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Combs MA, Golnar AJ, Overcash JM, Lloyd AL, Hayes KR, O'Brochta DA, Pepin KM. Leveraging eco-evolutionary models for gene drive risk assessment. Trends Genet 2023:S0168-9525(23)00090-2. [PMID: 37198063 DOI: 10.1016/j.tig.2023.04.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/26/2023] [Revised: 04/07/2023] [Accepted: 04/14/2023] [Indexed: 05/19/2023]
Abstract
Engineered gene drives create potential for both widespread benefits and irreversible harms to ecosystems. CRISPR-based systems of allelic conversion have rapidly accelerated gene drive research across diverse taxa, putting field trials and their necessary risk assessments on the horizon. Dynamic process-based models provide flexible quantitative platforms to predict gene drive outcomes in the context of system-specific ecological and evolutionary features. Here, we synthesize gene drive dynamic modeling studies to highlight research trends, knowledge gaps, and emergent principles, organized around their genetic, demographic, spatial, environmental, and implementation features. We identify the phenomena that most significantly influence model predictions, discuss limitations of biological complexity and uncertainty, and provide insights to promote responsible development and model-assisted risk assessment of gene drives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthew A Combs
- National Wildlife Research Center, United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services, Fort Collins, CO, 80521, USA.
| | - Andrew J Golnar
- National Wildlife Research Center, United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services, Fort Collins, CO, 80521, USA
| | - Justin M Overcash
- United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Biotechnology Regulatory Services, 20737, USA
| | - Alun L Lloyd
- North Carolina State University, Biomathematics Graduate Program and Department of Mathematics, Raleigh, NC, 27695, USA
| | - Keith R Hayes
- The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Data 61, Hobart, TAS, 7004, Australia
| | - David A O'Brochta
- Foundation for the National Institutes of Health, North Bethesda, MD, 20852, USA
| | - Kim M Pepin
- National Wildlife Research Center, United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services, Fort Collins, CO, 80521, USA
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3
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Devos Y, Mumford JD, Bonsall MB, Glandorf DCM, Quemada HD. Risk management recommendations for environmental releases of gene drive modified insects. Biotechnol Adv 2021; 54:107807. [PMID: 34314837 DOI: 10.1016/j.biotechadv.2021.107807] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/02/2021] [Revised: 07/01/2021] [Accepted: 07/21/2021] [Indexed: 12/18/2022]
Abstract
The ability to engineer gene drives (genetic elements that bias their own inheritance) has sparked enthusiasm and concerns. Engineered gene drives could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in the control of insect disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species. However, risk concerns and uncertainty associated with potential environmental release of gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have led some stakeholders to call for a global moratorium on such releases or the application of other strict precautionary measures to mitigate perceived risk assessment and risk management challenges. Instead, we provide recommendations that may help to improve the relevance of risk assessment and risk management frameworks for environmental releases of GDMIs. These recommendations include: (1) developing additional and more practical risk assessment guidance to ensure appropriate levels of safety; (2) making policy goals and regulatory decision-making criteria operational for use in risk assessment so that what constitutes harm is clearly defined; (3) ensuring a more dynamic interplay between risk assessment and risk management to manage uncertainty through closely interlinked pre-release modelling and post-release monitoring; (4) considering potential risks against potential benefits, and comparing them with those of alternative actions to account for a wider (management) context; and (5) implementing a modular, phased approach to authorisations for incremental acceptance and management of risks and uncertainty. Along with providing stakeholder engagement opportunities in the risk analysis process, the recommendations proposed may enable risk managers to make choices that are more proportionate and adaptive to potential risks, uncertainty and benefits of GDMI applications, and socially robust.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yann Devos
- Scientific Committee and Emerging Risk (SCER) Unit, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Parma, Italy.
| | - John D Mumford
- Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London, Ascot, United Kingdom
| | | | - Debora C M Glandorf
- National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, the Netherlands
| | - Hector D Quemada
- Department of Biological Sciences, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, United States
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Devos Y, Mumford JD, Bonsall MB, Camargo AM, Firbank LG, Glandorf DCM, Nogué F, Paraskevopoulos K, Wimmer EA. Potential use of gene drive modified insects against disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species poses new challenges for risk assessment. Crit Rev Biotechnol 2021; 42:254-270. [PMID: 34167401 DOI: 10.1080/07388551.2021.1933891] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/14/2022]
Abstract
Potential future application of engineered gene drives (GDs), which bias their own inheritance and can spread genetic modifications in wild target populations, has sparked both enthusiasm and concern. Engineered GDs in insects could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in control of disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species, and thus provide important public benefits. However, there are concerns that the deliberate environmental release of GD modified insects may pose different or new harms to animal and human health and the wider environment, and raise novel challenges for risk assessment. Risk assessors, risk managers, developers, potential applicants and other stakeholders at many levels are currently discussing whether there is a need to develop new or additional risk assessment guidance for the environmental release of GD modified organisms, including insects. Developing new or additional guidance that is useful and practical is a challenge, especially at an international level, as risk assessors, risk managers and many other stakeholders have different, often contrasting, opinions and perspectives toward the environmental release of GD modified organisms, and on the adequacy of current risk assessment frameworks for such organisms. Here, we offer recommendations to overcome some of the challenges associated with the potential future development of new or additional risk assessment guidance for GD modified insects and provide considerations on areas where further risk assessment guidance may be required.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yann Devos
- GMO Unit, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Parma, Italy
| | - John D Mumford
- Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London, Ascot, UK
| | | | - Ana M Camargo
- GMO Unit, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Parma, Italy
| | | | - Debora C M Glandorf
- National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, The Netherlands
| | - Fabien Nogué
- Institut Jean-Pierre Bourgin, INRAE, AgroParisTech, Université Paris-Saclay, Versailles, France
| | | | - Ernst A Wimmer
- Johann Friedrich Blumenbach Institute of Zoology and Anthropology, GZMB, Georg August University, Göttingen, Germany
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Naegeli H, Bresson J, Dalmay T, Dewhurst IC, Epstein MM, Guerche P, Hejatko J, Moreno FJ, Mullins E, Nogué F, Rostoks N, Sánchez Serrano JJ, Savoini G, Veromann E, Veronesi F, Bonsall MB, Mumford J, Wimmer EA, Devos Y, Paraskevopoulos K, Firbank LG. Adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives. EFSA J 2020; 18:e06297. [PMID: 33209154 PMCID: PMC7658669 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6297] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC,ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.
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