Cortical activity involved in perception and imagery of visual stimuli in a subject with aphantasia. An EEG case report

Aphantasia has been described as the inability to voluntarily evoke mental images using the "mind's eye." We studied a congenital aphantasic subject using neuropsychological testsand 64 channel EEG recordings, in order to studycortical activity involved in perception and imagery evaluating event-related potentials(N170, P200, N250). The subject is in the normal range of the neuropsychological tests performed, except for specific imagery tests. The EEG results show that when he evokes the same mental image, he starts the evoking process from left temporal instead of frontal areas, he does not activate occipital visual nor left anterior parietal areas.

Implicit Adaptation Processes Promoted by Immediate Offline Visual and Numeric Feedback

In adaptation learning, visual feedback impacts how adaptation proceeds. With concurrent feedback, a more implicit/feedforward process is thought to be engaged, compared to feedback after movement, which promotes more explicit processes. Due to discrepancies across studies, related to timing and type of visual feedback, we isolated these conditions here. Four groups (N = 52) practiced aiming under rotated feedback conditions; feedback was provided concurrently, immediately after movement (visually or numerically), or visually after a 3 s delay. All groups adapted and only delayed feedback attenuated implicit adaptation as evidenced by post-practice after-effects. Contrary to some suggestions, immediately presented offline and numeric feedback resulted in implicit after-effects, potentially due to comparisons between feedforward information and seen or imagined feedback.

Multiple Levels of Heuristic Reasoning Processes in Scientific Model Construction

Science historians have recognized the importance of heuristic reasoning strategies for constructing theories, but their extent and degree of organization are still poorly understood. This paper first consolidates a set of important heuristic strategies for constructing scientific models from three books, including studies in the history of genetics and electromagnetism, and an expert think-aloud study in the field of mechanics. The books focus on qualitative reasoning strategies (processes) involved in creative model construction, scientific breakthroughs, and conceptual change. Twenty four processes are examined, most of which are field-general, but all are heuristic in not being guaranteed to work. An organizing framework is then proposed as a four-level hierarchy of nested reasoning processes and subprocesses at different size and time scales, including: Level (L4) Several longer-time-scale Major Modeling Modes, such as Model Evolution and Model Competition; the former mode utilizes: (L3) Modeling Cycle Phases of Model Generation, Evaluation, and Modification under Constraints; which can utilize: (L2) Thirteen Tactical Heuristic Processes, e.g., Analogy, Infer new model feature (e.g., by running the model), etc.; many of which selectively utilize: (L1) Grounded Imagistic Processes, namely Mental Simulations and Structural Transformations. Incomplete serial ordering in the framework gives it an intermediate degree of organization that is neither anarchistic nor fully algorithmic. Its organizational structure is hypothesized to promote a difficult balance between divergent and convergent processes as it alternates between them in modeling cycles with increasingly constrained modifications. Videotaped think-aloud protocols that include depictive gestures and other imagery indicators indicate that the processes in L1 above can be imagistic. From neurological evidence that imagery uses many of the same brain regions as actual perception and action, it is argued that these expert reasoning processes are grounded in the sense of utilizing the perceptual and motor systems, and interconnections to and possible benefits for reasoning processes at higher levels are examined. The discussion examines whether this grounding and the various forms of organization in the framework may begin to explain how processes that are only sometimes useful and not guaranteed to work can combine successfully to achieve innovative scientific model construction.

Motor Imagery as a Function of Disease Severity in Multiple Sclerosis: An fMRI Study

Motor imagery (MI) is defined as mental execution without any actual movement. While healthy adults usually show temporal equivalence, i.e., isochrony, between the mental simulation of an action and its actual performance, neurological disorders are associated with anisochrony. Unlike in patients with stroke and Parkinson disease, only a few studies have investigated differences of MI ability in multiple sclerosis (MS). However, the relationship among disease severity, anisochrony and brain activation patterns during MI has not been investigated yet. Here, we propose to investigate MI in MS patients using fMRI during a behavioral task executed with dominant/non-dominant hand and to evaluate whether anisochrony is associated with disease severity. Thirty-seven right-handed MS patients, 17 with clinically isolated syndrome (CIS) suggestive of MS and 20 with relapsing-remitting MS (RR-MS) and 20 right-handed healthy controls (HC) underwent fMRI during a motor task consisting in the actual or imaged movement of squeezing a foam ball with the dominant and non-dominant hand. The same tasks were performed outside the MRI room to record the number of actual and imagined ball squeezes, and calculate an Index of performance (IP) based on the ratio between actual and imagined movements. IP showed that a progressive loss of ability in simulating actions (i.e., anisochrony) more pronounced for non-dominant hand, was found as function of the disease course. Moreover, anisochrony was associated with activation of occipito-parieto-frontal areas that were more extensive at the early stages of the disease, probably in order to counteract the changes due to MS. However, the neural engagement of compensatory brain areas becomes more difficult with more challenging tasks, i.e., dominant vs. non-dominant hand, with a consequent deficit in behavioral performance. These results show a strict association between MI performance and disease severity, suggesting that, at early stages of the disease, anisochrony in MI could be considered as surrogate behavioral marker of MS severity.

Neural correlates of maintaining generated images in visual working memory

How are images that have been assembled from their constituting elements maintained as a coherent representation in visual working memory (vWM)? Here, we compared two conditions of vWM maintenance that only differed in how vWM contents had been created. Participants maintained images that they either had to assemble from single features or that they had perceived as complete objects. Object complexity varied between two and four features. We analyzed electroencephalogram phase coupling as a measure of cortical connectivity in a time interval immediately before a probe stimulus appeared. We assumed that during this time both groups maintained essentially the same images, but that images constructed from their elements would require more neural coupling than images based on a complete percept. Increased coupling between frontal and parietal-to-occipital cortical sources was found for the maintenance of constructed in comparison to nonconstructed objects in the theta, alpha, beta, and gamma frequency bands. A similar pattern was found for an increase in vWM load (2 vs. 4 features) for nonconstructed objects. Under increased construction load (2 vs. 4 features for constructed images), the pattern was restricted to fronto-parietal couplings, suggesting that the fronto-parietal attention network is coping with the higher attentional demands involved in maintaining constructed images, but without increasing the communication with the occipital visual buffer in which the visual representations are assumed to be stored. We conclude from these findings that the maintenance of constructed images in vWM requires additional attentional processes to keep object elements together as a coherent representation. Hum Brain Mapp 37:4349-4362, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Visual image retention does not contribute to modulation of event-related potentials by mental rotation

Rotation of a visual image in mind is associated with a slow posterior negative deflection of the event-related potential (ERP), termed rotation-related negativity (RRN). Retention of a visual image in short-term memory is also associated with a slow posterior negative ERP, termed negative slow wave (NSW). We tested whether short-term memory retention, indexed by the NSW, contributes to the RRN. ERPs were recorded in the same subjects in two tasks, a mental rotation task, eliciting the RRN, and a visual short-term memory task, eliciting the NSW. Over both right and left parietal scalp, no association was found between the NSW and the RRN amplitudes. Furthermore, adjusting for the effect of the NSW had no influence on a significant association between the RRN amplitude and response time, an index of mental rotation performance. Our data indicate that the RRN reflects manipulation of a visual image but not its retention in short-term memory.

Electrophysiological potentials reveal cortical mechanisms for mental imagery, mental simulation, and grounded (embodied) cognition

Grounded cognition theory proposes that cognition, including meaning, is grounded in sensorimotor processing. The mechanism for grounding cognition is mental simulation, which is a type of mental imagery that re-enacts modal processing. To reveal top-down, cortical mechanisms for mental simulation of shape, event-related potentials were recorded to face and object pictures preceded by mental imagery. Mental imagery of the identical face or object picture (congruous condition) facilitated not only categorical perception (VPP/N170) but also later visual knowledge [N3(00) complex] and linguistic knowledge (N400) for faces more than objects, and strategic semantic analysis (late positive complex) between 200 and 700 ms. The later effects resembled semantic congruity effects with pictures. Mental imagery also facilitated category decisions, as a P3 peaked earlier for congruous than incongruous (other category) pictures, resembling the case when identical pictures repeat immediately. Thus mental imagery mimics semantic congruity and immediate repetition priming processes with pictures. Perception control results showed the opposite for faces and were in the same direction for objects: Perceptual repetition adapts (and so impairs) processing of perceived faces from categorical perception onward, but primes processing of objects during categorical perception, visual knowledge processes, and strategic semantic analysis. For both imagery and perception, differences between faces and objects support domain-specificity and indicate that cognition is grounded in modal processing. Altogether, this direct neural evidence reveals that top-down processes of mental imagery sustain an imagistic representation that mimics perception well enough to prime subsequent perception and cognition. Findings also suggest that automatic mental simulation of the visual shape of faces and objects operates between 200 and 400 ms, and strategic mental simulation operates between 400 and 700 ms.