Judgment: a cognitive processing perspective

From Bayes-optimal to heuristic decision-making in a two-alternative forced choice task with an information-theoretic bounded rationality model

Bayes optimal and heuristic decision-making schemes are often considered fundamentally opposed to each other as a framework for studying human choice behavior, although recently it has been proposed that bounded rationality may provide a natural bridge between the two when varying information-processing resources. Here, we investigate a two-alternative forced choice task with varying time constraints, where subjects have to assign multi-component symbolic patterns to one of two stimulus classes. As expected, we find that subjects' response behavior becomes more imprecise with more time pressure. However, we also see that their response behavior changes qualitatively. By regressing subjects' decision weights, we find that decisions allowing for plenty of decision time rely on weighing multiple stimulus features, whereas decisions under high time pressure are made mostly based on a single feature. While the first response pattern is in line with a Bayes-optimal decision strategy, the latter could be considered as an instantiation of heuristic decision-making with cue discounting. When fitting a bounded rational decision model with multiple feature channels and varying information-processing capacity to subjects' responses, we find that the model is able to capture subjects' behavioral change. The model successfully reflects the simplicity of heuristics as well as the efficiency of optimal decision making, thus acting as a bridge between the two approaches.

Spelling Errors and Shouting Capitalization Lead to Additive Penalties to Trustworthiness of Online Health Information: Randomized Experiment With Laypersons

BACKGROUND

The written format and literacy competence of screen-based texts can interfere with the perceived trustworthiness of health information in online forums, independent of the semantic content. Unlike in professional content, the format in unmoderated forums can regularly hint at incivility, perceived as deliberate rudeness or casual disregard toward the reader, for example, through spelling errors and unnecessary emphatic capitalization of whole words (online shouting).

OBJECTIVE

This study aimed to quantify the comparative effects of spelling errors and inappropriate capitalization on ratings of trustworthiness independently of lay insight and to determine whether these changes act synergistically or additively on the ratings.

METHODS

In web-based experiments, 301 UK-recruited participants rated 36 randomized short stimulus excerpts (in the format of information from an unmoderated health forum about multiple sclerosis) for trustworthiness using a semantic differential slider. A total of 9 control excerpts were compared with matching error-containing excerpts. Each matching error-containing excerpt included 5 instances of misspelling, or 5 instances of inappropriate capitalization (shouting), or a combination of 5 misspelling plus 5 inappropriate capitalization errors. Data were analyzed in a linear mixed effects model.

RESULTS

The mean trustworthiness ratings of the control excerpts ranged from 32.59 to 62.31 (rating scale 0-100). Compared with the control excerpts, excerpts containing only misspellings were rated as being 8.86 points less trustworthy, those containing inappropriate capitalization were rated as 6.41 points less trustworthy, and those containing the combination of misspelling and capitalization were rated as 14.33 points less trustworthy (P<.001 for all). Misspelling and inappropriate capitalization show an additive effect.

CONCLUSIONS

Distinct indicators of incivility independently and additively penalize the perceived trustworthiness of online text independently of lay insight, eliciting a medium effect size.

How to model the neurocognitive dynamics of decision making: A methodological primer with ACT-R

Higher cognitive functions are the product of a dynamic interplay of perceptual, mnemonic, and other cognitive processes. Modeling the interplay of these processes and generating predictions about both behavioral and neural data can be achieved with cognitive architectures. However, such architectures are still used relatively rarely, likely because working with them comes with high entry-level barriers. To lower these barriers, we provide a methodological primer for modeling higher cognitive functions and their constituent cognitive subprocesses with arguably the most developed cognitive architecture today-ACT-R. We showcase a principled method of generating individual response time predictions, and demonstrate how neural data can be used to refine ACT-R models. To illustrate our approach, we develop a fully specified neurocognitive model of a prominent strategy for memory-based decisions-the take-the-best heuristic-modeling decision making as a dynamic interplay of perceptual, motor, and memory processes. This implementation allows us to predict the dynamics of behavior and the temporal and spatial patterns of brain activity. Moreover, we show that comparing the predictions for brain activity to empirical BOLD data allows us to differentiate competing ACT-R implementations of take the best.

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.

Neural Signatures of Rational and Heuristic Choice Strategies: A Single Trial ERP Analysis

In multi-attribute choice, people use heuristics to simplify decision problems. We studied the use of heuristic and rational strategies and their electrophysiological correlates. Since previous work linked the P3 ERP component to attention and decision making, we were interested whether the amplitude of this component is associated with decision strategy use. To this end, we recorded EEG when participants performed a two-alternative choice task, where they could acquire decision cues in a sequential manner and use them to make choices. We classified participants’ choices as consistent with a rational Weighted Additive rule (WADD) or a simple heuristic Take The Best (TTB). Participants differed in their preference for WADD and TTB. Using a permutation-based single trial approach, we analyzed EEG responses to consecutive decision cues and their relation to the individual strategy preference. The preference for WADD over TTB was associated with overall higher signal amplitudes to decision cues in the P3 time window. Moreover, the preference for WADD was associated with similar P3 amplitudes to consecutive cues, whereas the preference for TTB was associated with substantial decreases in P3 amplitudes to consecutive cues. We also found that the preference for TTB was associated with enhanced N1 component to cues that discriminated decision alternatives, suggesting very early attention allocation to such cues by TTB users. Our results suggest that preference for either WADD or TTB has an early neural signature reflecting differences in attentional weighting of decision cues. In light of recent findings and hypotheses regarding P3, we interpret these results as indicating the involvement of catecholamine arousal systems in shaping predecisional information processing and strategy selection.

Inferring choice criteria with mixture IRT models: A demonstration using ad hoc and goal-derived categories

Whether it pertains to the foods to buy when one is on a diet, the items to take along to the beach on one’s day off or (perish the thought) the belongings to save from one’s burning house, choice is ubiquitous. We aim to determine from choices the criteria individuals use when they select objects from among a set of candidates. In order to do so we employ a mixture IRT (item-response theory) model that capitalizes on the insights that objects are chosen more often the better they meet the choice criteria and that the use of different criteria is reflected in inter-individual selection differences. The model is found to account for the inter-individual selection differences for 10 ad hoc and goal-derived categories. Its parameters can be related to selection criteria that are frequently thought of in the context of these categories. These results suggest that mixture IRT models allow one to infer from mere choice behavior the criteria individuals used to select/discard objects. Potential applications of mixture IRT models in other judgment and decision making contexts are discussed.

A lack of appetite for information and computation. Simple heuristics in food choice

The predominant, but largely untested, assumption in research on food choice is that people obey the classic commandments of rational behavior: they carefully look up every piece of relevant information, weight each piece according to subjective importance, and then combine them into a judgment or choice. In real world situations, however, the available time, motivation, and computational resources may simply not suffice to keep these commandments. Indeed, there is a large body of research suggesting that human choice is often better accommodated by heuristics-simple rules that enable decision making on the basis of a few, but important, pieces of information. We investigated the prevalence of such heuristics in a computerized experiment that engaged participants in a series of choices between two lunch dishes. Employing MouselabWeb, a process-tracing technique, we found that simple heuristics described an overwhelmingly large proportion of choices, whereas strategies traditionally deemed rational were barely apparent in our data. Replicating previous findings, we also observed that visual stimulus segments received a much larger proportion of attention than any nutritional values did. Our results suggest that, consistent with human behavior in other domains, people make their food choices on the basis of simple and informationally frugal heuristics.