Global disorders of consciousness

Modelling developments in consciousness within a multidimensional framework

A recent advancement in consciousness science has been the introduction of a multidimensional framework of consciousness. This framework has been applied to global states of consciousness, including psychedelic states and disorders of consciousness, and the consciousness of non-human animals. The multidimensional framework enables a finer parsing of both various states of consciousness and forms of animal consciousness, paving the way for new scientific investigations into consciousness. In this paper, the multidimensional model is expanded by constructing temporal profiles. This expansion allows for the modelling of changes in consciousness across the life cycles of organisms and the progression over time of disorders of consciousness. The result of this expansion is 2-fold: (i) it enables new modes of comparison, both across stages of development and across species; (ii) it proposes that more attention be given to the various types of fluctuations that occur in patients who are suffering from disorders of consciousness.

Evidences of emerging pain consciousness during prenatal development: a narrative review

BACKGROUND

The study of consciousness has always been considered a challenge for neonatologists, even more when considering the uterine period. Our review aimed to individuate at what gestational age the fetus, which later became a premature infant, can feel the perception of external stimuli. Therefore, the aim of our review was to study the onset of consciousness during the fetal life.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A literature search was performed in Medline-PubMed database. We included all papers found with the following MeSH words: "consciousness or cognition or awareness or comprehension or cognitive or consciousness of pain" in combination with "embryo or fetus or fetal life or newborn." Studies were selected if titles and/or abstracts suggested an association between formation of consciousness (the basics of neurodevelopment) and preterm infant or fetus. Titles and abstracts were first screened by three independent reviewers according to Cochrane Collaboration's recommendations.

RESULTS

From the literature review, we found only 8 papers describing the onset of consciousness in the transition period from fetus to premature newborn. Therefore, according to these papers, we temporally analyzed the formation of the thalamocortical connections that are the basis of consciousness.

CONCLUSIONS

We can conclude that from a neuroanatomical point of view, it is rather unlikely that the infant can be seen as a conscious human before 24 weeks of gestational age, thus before all the thalamocortical connections are established. Further literature data have to confirm this hypothesis.

Pain Perception in Disorder of Consciousness: A Scoping Review on Current Knowledge, Clinical Applications, and Future Perspective

Pain perception in individuals with prolonged disorders of consciousness (PDOC) is still a matter of debate. Advanced neuroimaging studies suggest some cortical activations even in patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) compared to those with a minimally conscious state (MCS). Therefore, pain perception has to be considered even in individuals with UWS. However, advanced neuroimaging assessment can be challenging to conduct, and its findings are sometimes difficult to be interpreted. Conversely, multichannel electroencephalography (EEG) and laser-evoked potentials (LEPs) can be carried out quickly and are more adaptable to the clinical needs. In this scoping review, we dealt with the neurophysiological basis underpinning pain in PDOC, pointing out how pain perception assessment in these individuals might help in reducing the misdiagnosis rate. The available literature data suggest that patients with UWS show a more severe functional connectivity breakdown among the pain-related brain areas compared to individuals in MCS, pointing out that pain perception increases with the level of consciousness. However, there are noteworthy exceptions, because some UWS patients show pain-related cortical activations that partially overlap those observed in MCS individuals. This suggests that some patients with UWS may have residual brain functional connectivity supporting the somatosensory, affective, and cognitive aspects of pain processing (i.e., a conscious experience of the unpleasantness of pain), rather than only being able to show autonomic responses to potentially harmful stimuli. Therefore, the significance of the neurophysiological approach to pain perception in PDOC seems to be clear, and despite some methodological caveats (including intensity of stimulation, multimodal paradigms, and active vs. passive stimulation protocols), remain to be solved. To summarize, an accurate clinical and neurophysiological assessment should always be performed for a better understanding of pain perception neurophysiological underpinnings, a more precise differential diagnosis at the level of individual cases as well as group comparisons, and patient-tailored management.

Consilience, clinical validation, and global disorders of consciousness

Behavioral diagnosis of global disorders of consciousness is difficult and errors in diagnosis occur often. Recent advances in neuroimaging may resolve this problem. However, clinical translation of neuroimaging requires clinical validation. Applying the orthodox approach of clinical validation to neuroimaging raises two critical questions: (i) What exactly is being validated? and (ii) what counts as a gold standard? I argue that confusion over these questions leads to systematic errors in the empirical literature. I propose an alternative approach to clinical validation motivated by reasoning by consilience. Consilience is a mode of reasoning that assigns a degree of plausibility to a hypothesis based on its fit with multiple pieces of evidence from independent sources. I argue that this approach resolves the questions raised by the orthodox approach and may be a useful framework for optimizing future clinical validation studies in the science of consciousness.

Risk, diagnostic error, and the clinical science of consciousness

In recent years, a number of new neuroimaging techniques have detected covert awareness in some patients previously thought to be in a vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome. This raises worries for patients, families, and physicians, as it indicates that the existing diagnostic error rate in this patient group is higher than assumed. Recent research on a subset of these techniques, called active paradigms, suggests that false positive and false negative findings may result from applying different statistical methods to patient data. Due to the nature of this research, these errors may be unavoidable, and may draw into question the use of active paradigms in the clinical setting. We argue that false positive and false negative findings carry particular moral risks, which may bear on investigators' decisions to use certain methods when independent means for estimating their clinical utility are absent. We review and critically analyze this methodological problem as it relates to both fMRI and EEG active paradigms. We conclude by drawing attention to three common clinical scenarios where the risk of diagnostic error may be most pronounced in this patient group.