The intersubjectivity of delusions

Blocking D2/D3 dopamine receptors in male participants increases volatility of beliefs when learning to trust others

The ability to learn about other people is crucial for human social functioning. Dopamine has been proposed to regulate the precision of beliefs, but direct behavioural evidence of this is lacking. In this study, we investigate how a high dose of the D2/D3 dopamine receptor antagonist sulpiride impacts learning about other people's prosocial attitudes in a repeated Trust game. Using a Bayesian model of belief updating, we show that in a sample of 76 male participants sulpiride increases the volatility of beliefs, which leads to higher precision weights on prediction errors. This effect is driven by participants with genetically conferred higher dopamine availability (Taq1a polymorphism) and remains even after controlling for working memory performance. Higher precision weights are reflected in higher reciprocal behaviour in the repeated Trust game but not in single-round Trust games. Our data provide evidence that the D2 receptors are pivotal in regulating prediction error-driven belief updating in a social context.

Social Perception Deficit as a Factor of Vulnerability to Psychosis: A Brief Proposal for a Definition

Disturbances in social cognition are a core feature of schizophrenia. While most research in the field has focused on emotion perception, social knowledge, theory of mind, and attribution styles, the domain of social perception has received little specific attention. In this paper, we suggest that this issue can be explained by the lack of a precise and unitary definition of the concept, this leads to the existence of different competing uses of the concept and their conflation with other domains of social cognition. Relying on resources coming from the ecological approach to psychology and the phenomenological tradition in psychiatry, we propose that the concept of Social Perception should be used to refer to low-level pre-reflective processes underlying the awareness of interpersonal interactions with and between others. Clinical data suggests that people with schizophrenia have problems perceiving social situations as opportunities for social engagement, so, in order to fulfil this explanatory need, we propose that the term should be used to capture this important-yet neglected-domain of social cognition. We conclude with the discussion of some future directions for research derived from our proposal.

We are not ready to abandon the current schizophrenia construct, but should be prepared to do so

The current schizophrenia construct as delineated in the latest editions of the DSM and the ICD has some strengths, but also many weaknesses. It improved the reliability of the diagnosis, made communication among clinicians, users and families less ambiguous, is useful for education and training, and for reimbursement and insurance purposes. However, many serious weaknesses should be considered. The term "Schizophrenia" does not recognize the heterogeneity of the disorder and might nourish the belief that schizophrenia represents a unitary disease. In addition, there is no agreement on the existence and nature of a "core aspect" of the disorder. Stable dimensions, in particular negative symptoms and cognitive impairment, which are key determinants of functioning, are not de facto regarded as core aspects. Finally, the construct is associated to the notion of a poor outcome, to a high level of stigma and has acquired a derogatory connotation. We are not ready but should be prepared to abandon the current schizophrenia construct. Clinicians and researchers should be encouraged to complement the ICD/DSM diagnosis with an in-depth characterization of the individual clinical picture, along with other variables, such as family history, comorbidities, vulnerability factors and personal trajectory. The "Primary Psychoses" construct, together with improved cross-sectional and longitudinal phenotypes from representative population and patient cohorts, and the availability of artificial intelligence methods, could lead to a new and more precise taxonomy of psychotic disorders, and increase the probability of identifying meaningful biomarkers to improve prevention, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment for people suffering from psychotic disorders.

Two Faces of a Coin? A Systematic Review of Source Monitoring and Its Relationship with Memory in Autism

The ability to discriminate the origin of stimuli, known as source monitoring, is crucial for self–other distinction and the integration of internally generated and externally generated experiences. Despite its valence, evidence on source monitoring in autism is yet scarce and unclear. We systematically reviewed literature concerning source monitoring in autism and its relationship with other constructs, such as memory type, encoding effects, social cognition, general intelligence, and clinical factors. Source-monitoring performance (operationalized as error or accuracy) was reduced in autistic participants in 9 of the 15 studies that met the inclusion criteria. When explicitly investigated, free-recall memory impairments in autism were shown to influence source monitoring deficits. General intelligence was another important factor linked to source-monitoring performance. Conversely, other memory types or encoding effects were not impaired in autism, and no univocal association could be found with source monitoring. Social cognition and clinical symptoms were rarely assessed in spite of their possible involvement in source monitoring. The heterogeneity of the task design, outcome measures and demographical factors limited study comparability. As a research framework on source monitoring as a construct of primary interest in autism is still lacking, we propose preliminary indications for future investigations based on the collected findings.

Delusions beyond beliefs: a critical overview of diagnostic, aetiological, and therapeutic schizophrenia research from a clinical-phenomenological perspective

Delusions are commonly conceived as false beliefs that are held with certainty and which cannot be corrected. This conception of delusion has been influential throughout the history of psychiatry and continues to inform how delusions are approached in clinical practice and in contemporary schizophrenia research. It is reflected in the full psychosis continuum model, guides psychological and neurocognitive accounts of the formation and maintenance of delusions, and it substantially determines how delusions are approached in cognitive-behavioural treatment. In this Review, we draw on a clinical-phenomenological framework to offer an alternative account of delusion that incorporates the experiential dimension of delusion, emphasising how specific alterations to self-consciousness and reality experience underlie delusions that are considered characteristic of schizophrenia. Against that backdrop, we critically reconsider the current research areas, highlighting empirical and conceptual issues in contemporary delusion research, which appear to largely derive from an insufficient consideration of the experiential dimension of delusions. Finally, we suggest how the alternative phenomenological approach towards delusion could offer new ways to advance current research and clinical practice.

Speech Prosody as a Bridge Between Psychopathology and Linguistics: The Case of the Schizophrenia Spectrum

Patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders experience severe difficulties in interpersonal communication, as described by traditional psychopathology and current research on social cognition. From a linguistic perspective, pragmatic abilities are crucial for successful communication. Empirical studies have shown that these abilities are significantly impaired in this group of patients. Prosody, the tone of voice with which words and sentences are pronounced, is one of the most important carriers of pragmatic meaning and can serve a range of functions from linguistic to emotional ones. Most of the existing literature on prosody of patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders focuses on the expression of emotion, generally showing significant impairments. By contrast, the use of non-emotional prosody in these patients is scarcely investigated. In this paper, we first present a linguistic model to classify prosodic functions. Second, we discuss existing studies on the use of non-emotional prosody in these patients, providing an overview of the state of the art. Third, we delineate possible future lines of research in this field, also taking into account some classical psychopathological assumptions, for both diagnostic and therapeutic purposes.

Potential Neural Mediators of Mom Power Parenting Intervention Effects on Maternal Intersubjectivity and Stress Resilience

Stress resilience in parenting depends on the parent's capacity to understand subjective experiences in self and child, namely intersubjectivity, which is intimately related to mimicking other's affective expressions (i. e., mirroring). Stress can worsen parenting by potentiating problems that can impair intersubjectivity, e.g., problems of "over-mentalizing" (misattribution of the child's behaviors) and "under-coupling" (inadequate child-oriented mirroring). Previously we have developed Mom Power (MP) parenting intervention to promote maternal intersubjectivity and reduce parenting stress. This study aimed to elucidate neural mechanisms underlying the effects of MP with a novel Child Face Mirroring Task (CFMT) in functional magnetic-resonance-imaging settings. In CFMT, the participants responded to own and other's child's facial pictures in three task conditions: (1) empathic mirroring (Join), (2) non-mirroring observing (Observe), and (3) voluntary responding (React). In each condition, each child's neutral, ambiguous, distressed, and joyful expressions were repeatedly displayed. We examined the CFMT-related neural responses in a sample of healthy mothers (n = 45) in Study 1, and MP effects on CFMT with a pre-intervention (T1) and post-intervention (T2) design in two groups, MP (n = 19) and Control (n = 17), in Study 2. We found that, from T1 to T2, MP (vs. Control) decreased parenting stress, decreased dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) during own-child-specific voluntary responding (React to Own vs. Other's Child), and increased activity in the frontoparietal cortices, midbrain, nucleus accumbens, and amygdala during own-child-specific empathic mirroring (Join vs. Observe of Own vs. Other's Child). We identified that MP effects on parenting stress were potentially mediated by T1-to-T2 changes in: (1) the left superior-temporal-gyrus differential responses in the contrast of Join vs. Observe of own (vs. other's) child, (2) the dmPFC-PAG (periaqueductal gray) differential functional connectivity in the same contrast, and (3) the left amygdala differential responses in the contrast of Join vs. Observe of own (vs. other's) child's joyful vs. distressed expressions. We discussed these results in support of the notion that MP reduces parenting stress via changing neural activities related to the problems of "over-mentalizing" and "under-coupling." Additionally, we discussed theoretical relationships between parenting stress and intersubjectivity in a novel dyadic active inference framework in a two-agent system to guide future research.

From Computation to the First-Person: Auditory-Verbal Hallucinations and Delusions of Thought Interference in Schizophrenia-Spectrum Psychoses

Schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses are highly complex and heterogeneous disorders that necessitate multiple lines of scientific inquiry and levels of explanation. In recent years, both computational and phenomenological approaches to the understanding of mental illness have received much interest, and significant progress has been made in both fields. However, there has been relatively little progress bridging investigations in these seemingly disparate fields. In this conceptual review and collaborative project from the 4th Meeting of the International Consortium on Hallucination Research, we aim to facilitate the beginning of such dialogue between fields and put forward the argument that computational psychiatry and phenomenology can in fact inform each other, rather than being viewed as isolated or even incompatible approaches. We begin with an overview of phenomenological observations on the interrelationships between auditory-verbal hallucinations (AVH) and delusional thoughts in general, before moving on to review several theoretical frameworks and empirical findings in the computational modeling of AVH. We then relate the computational models to the phenomenological accounts, with a special focus on AVH and delusions that involve the senses of agency and ownership of thought (delusions of thought interference). Finally, we offer some tentative directions for future research, emphasizing the importance of a mutual understanding between separate lines of inquiry.

Delusional Themes Across Affective and Non-Affective Psychoses

The current debate about the diagnostic significance of delusion revolves around two positions. The neurocognitive position conceives delusion as a non-specific, though polymorphic, symptom. The psychopathological position views features of delusion such as content and structure as having meaningful connections with diagnostic entities. This study aims at contributing to this debate by examining the association between delusional themes and diagnosis in a sample of 830 adult psychotic patients. All diagnoses were made by experienced psychiatrists according to DSM-IV or ICD-10 criteria, and in 348 patients were established with the SCID-I. All patients were administered the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS). In each patient, the presence of somatic delusions and delusions of guilt, grandiosity, and persecution was determined by examining the scores on relevant BPRS items. Delusions of guilt were almost pathognomonic for a psychotic depressive condition (psychotic major depression 40%; psychotic bipolar depression 30%; depressed schizoaffective disorder 8%; bipolar and schizoaffective mixed states 6 and 7%, respectively). Only 1% of patients with schizophrenia and no patient with delusional disorder or bipolar or schizoaffective manic state showed such delusions. The difference between unipolar and bipolar depression and the other diagnostic groups was highly significant. Delusions of grandiosity characterized mostly patients with manic symptoms (bipolar mania 20%; bipolar mixed states 19%; manic schizoaffective disorder 10%). They were observed significantly more often in bipolar mania than in schizophrenia (7%). Persecutory delusions were broadly distributed across diagnostic categories. However, they were significantly more frequent among patients with schizophrenia and delusional disorder compared with depressed and manic patients. Somatic delusions were also observed in all diagnostic groups, with no group standing out as distinct from the others in terms of an increased prevalence of somatic delusions. Our findings suggest a middle position in the debate between the neurocognitive and the psychopathological approaches. On the one hand, the widespread observation of persecutory delusions suggests the usefulness of searching for non-specific pathogenic mechanisms. On the other hand, the association between some delusional contents and psychiatric diagnosis suggests that a phenomenological analysis of the delusional experience may be a helpful tool for the clinician in the diagnostic process.

[Where is going philosophy of psychiatry ?]

This contribution provides a critical outline of the current trends in the field of "philosophy of psychiatry" by following their developments in the last decade. The first part of the paper focuses on the evolution of this field from a strictly conceptual approach to a perspective more attentive to the social, practical, and clinical dimension of psychiatry. The second part of the paper points out that the need of a mutual commitment of philosophy and psychiatry is perceived according to different ways by the countries involved in this research area. The paper deals especially with the case of France, where the enthusiasm for the "new philosophy of psychiatry" has not had the same impact on the philosophical scene as in the English speaking countries. In conclusion, the paper shows that the field of philosophy of psychiatry stands as a fertile ground for new forms of interaction between the analytic, and the continental philosophical traditions. This interaction takes place, more particularly, as regards such topics as normativity, language, and interpretation.