On subjective back-referral and how long it takes to become conscious of a stimulus: a reinterpretation of Libet's data

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Time marking in perception

Several authors have proposed that perceptual information carries labels that identify temporal features, including time of occurrence, ordinal temporal relations, and brief durations. These labels serve to locate and organise perceptual objects, features, and events in time. In some proposals time marking has local, specific functions such as synchronisation of different features in perceptual processing. In other proposals time marking has general significance and is responsible for rendering perceptual experience temporally coherent, just as various forms of spatial information render the visual environment spatially coherent. These proposals, which all concern time marking on the millisecond time scale, are reviewed. It is concluded that time marking is vital to the construction of a multisensory perceptual world in which things are orderly with respect to both space and time, but that much more research is needed to ascertain its functions in perception and its neurophysiological foundations.

It's time for attentional control: Temporal expectation in the attentional blink

The attentional blink (AB) reveals a limitation in conscious processing of sequential targets. Although it is widely held that the AB derives from a structural bottleneck of central capacity, how the central processing is constrained is still unclear. As the AB reflects the dilemma of deploying attentional resources in the time dimension, research on temporal allocation provides an important avenue for understanding the mechanism. Here we reviewed studies regarding the role of temporal expectation in modulating the AB performance primarily based on two temporal processing strategies: interval-based and rhythm-based timings. We showed that both temporal expectations can help to organize limited resources among multiple attentional episodes, thereby mitigating the AB effect. As it turns out, scrutinizing on the AB from a temporal perspective is a promising way to comprehend the mechanisms behind the AB and conscious cognition. We also highlighted some unresolved issues and discussed potential directions for future research.

Intentions matter: Avoidance intentions regulate anxiety via outcome expectancy

Intentions prospectively correlate with behaviour (e.g., Ajzen, 1991) but there is little research on whether they play a role in regulating emotion. Two experiments investigated whether avoidance intentions, mediated by expectancy, play a role in reducing anxiety. In Experiment 1, participants performed either an instrumental avoidance response that cancelled the shock signalled by a Pavlovian stimulus; a control response that had no effect on shock; or no response. Prior to this, they indicated their intention to respond or not respond on a form. Both shock expectancy and skin conductance level (SCL) were significantly lower on trials in which an avoidance response was intended compared to not intended, relative to control trials. Experiment 2 replicated these results when intention was retrospectively reported at the end of each trial, arguing against the possibility that the behavioural action of recording intentions in Experiment 1 became directly associated with the shock or no shock outcome. The results indicate that avoidance intentions reduce anxiety through the mediating effect of expectancy, suggesting that avoidance intentions may play an important role in shaping avoidance behaviours for people with anxiety.

Part 2-The firings of many neurons and their density; the neural network its connections and field of firings

This paper is concerned with the firing of many neurons and the synthesis of these firings to develop functions and their transforms which relate chemical and electrical phenomena to the physical world. The density of such functions in the most general spaces that we encounter allows us to use linear combinations of them to approximate arbitrarily close to any phenomenon we encounter, imagine or think about. Absence of the technology needed to represent all the senses and the mathematical difficulty of making geometric representations of functions of a complex and of more general division algebra variables make it difficult to validate the mathematical outcome of this approach to neural firings. But we think that this problem will be solved in the not-too-distant future when at least the senses of smell, taste and touch would have been so mathematized that it is possible to instill these qualities in robots in some fashion.

Consciousness and apparent motion: Paradox resolved

A perceptual phenomenon called apparent motion has been described as a paradox that challenges the notions of causality and temporal order. While the illusion has generated a passionate and often highly technical debate about the relationship between subjective experience and its objective description, no accounts so far have examined the possibility that the source of the paradox lies not in the mysterious workings of the brain but in the inadequacy of the reductionist explanation. Here, I suggest that the paradox is created by the deep estrangement between subjective and objective perspectives which has created two separate and conflicted worldviews. The illusion itself reflects a veridical perceptual experience, while its analytical explanation fails because it lacks the very qualities it is trying to account for. Although the proposed solution is controversial, it offers a simple and potentially far-reaching explanation for a long-standing problem in psychology and consciousness research.

Happiness in action: the impact of positive affect on the time of the conscious intention to act

The temporal relationship between our conscious intentions to act and the action itself has been widely investigated. Previous research consistently shows that the motor intention enters awareness a few 100 ms before movement onset. As research in other domains has shown that most behavior is affected by the emotional state people are in, it is remarkable that the role of emotional states on intention awareness has never been investigated. Here we tested the hypothesis that positive and negative affects have opposite effects on the temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and the action itself. A mood induction procedure that combined guided imagery and music listening was employed to induce positive, negative, or neutral affective states. After each mood induction session, participants were asked to execute voluntary self-paced movements and to report when they formed the intention to act. Exposure to pleasant material, as compared to exposure to unpleasant material, enhanced positive affect and dampened negative affect. Importantly, in the positive affect condition participants reported their intention to act earlier in time with respect to action onset, as compared to when they were in the negative or in the neutral affect conditions. Conversely the reported time of the intention to act when participants experienced negative affect did not differ significantly from the neutral condition. These findings suggest that the temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and the action itself is malleable to changes in affective states and may indicate that positive affect enhances intentional awareness.

The neuroscience of free will: implications for psychiatry

Belief in free will has been a mainstay in philosophy throughout history, grounded in large part in our intuitive sense that we consciously control our actions and could have done otherwise. However, psychology and psychiatry have long sought to uncover mechanistic explanations for human behavior that challenge the notion of free will. In recent years, neuroscientific discoveries have produced a model of volitional behavior that is at odds with the notion of contra-causal free will and our sense of conscious agency. Volitional behavior instead appears to have antecedents in unconscious brain activity that is localizable to specific neuroanatomical structures. Updating notions of free will in favor of a continuous model of volitional self-control provides a useful paradigm to conceptualize and study some forms of psychopathology such as addiction and impulse control disorders. Similarly, thinking of specific symptoms of schizophrenia as disorders of agency may help to elucidate mechanisms of psychosis. Beyond clinical understanding and etiological research, a neuroscientific model of volitional behavior has the potential to modernize forensic notions of responsibility and criminal punishment in order to inform public policy. Ultimately, moving away from the language of free will towards the language of volitional control may result in an enhanced understanding of the very nature of ourselves.

The Time of Perception and the Other Way Around

The world we perceive is delayed in relation to its flowing content, as well as the outcome of our actions on the world in relation to the moment we decide to act. This mosaic of different latencies permeating both perception and action has to be taken into account critically in order for us to cope with the temporal challenges constantly imposed by the environment. Fundamental notions, such as the sense of agency and causality, depend on the temporal relationship of events occurring in well-defined windows of time. Here, we offer a broad, yet abridged, historical view of some thought-provoking issues concerning the time of perception and action. From the pioneering work of Wundt, Titchener, and Libet to recent findings and ideas related to the employment of visual illusions as psychophysical probes (such as the flash-lag effect), we have tried to expose some problems inherent to the act of measuring the time of both perception and action, and devise possible solutions as well.

How quantum brain biology can rescue conscious free will

Conscious "free will" is problematic because (1) brain mechanisms causing consciousness are unknown, (2) measurable brain activity correlating with conscious perception apparently occurs too late for real-time conscious response, consciousness thus being considered "epiphenomenal illusion," and (3) determinism, i.e., our actions and the world around us seem algorithmic and inevitable. The Penrose-Hameroff theory of "orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR)" identifies discrete conscious moments with quantum computations in microtubules inside brain neurons, e.g., 40/s in concert with gamma synchrony EEG. Microtubules organize neuronal interiors and regulate synapses. In Orch OR, microtubule quantum computations occur in integration phases in dendrites and cell bodies of integrate-and-fire brain neurons connected and synchronized by gap junctions, allowing entanglement of microtubules among many neurons. Quantum computations in entangled microtubules terminate by Penrose "objective reduction (OR)," a proposal for quantum state reduction and conscious moments linked to fundamental spacetime geometry. Each OR reduction selects microtubule states which can trigger axonal firings, and control behavior. The quantum computations are "orchestrated" by synaptic inputs and memory (thus "Orch OR"). If correct, Orch OR can account for conscious causal agency, resolving problem 1. Regarding problem 2, Orch OR can cause temporal non-locality, sending quantum information backward in classical time, enabling conscious control of behavior. Three lines of evidence for brain backward time effects are presented. Regarding problem 3, Penrose OR (and Orch OR) invokes non-computable influences from information embedded in spacetime geometry, potentially avoiding algorithmic determinism. In summary, Orch OR can account for real-time conscious causal agency, avoiding the need for consciousness to be seen as epiphenomenal illusion. Orch OR can rescue conscious free will.

Functional neuroimaging of duration discrimination on two different time scales

Analyses of neural mechanisms of duration processing are essential for the understanding of psychological phenomena which evolve in time. Different mechanisms are presumably responsible for the processing of shorter (below 500 ms) and longer (above 500 ms) events but have not yet been a subject of an investigation with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In the present study, we show a greater involvement of several brain regions - including right-hemispheric midline structures and left-hemispheric lateral regions - in the processing of visual stimuli of shorter as compared to longer duration. We propose a greater involvement of lower-level cognitive mechanisms in the processing of shorter events as opposed to higher-level mechanisms of cognitive control involved in longer events.

The neural correlate of consciousness

I propose that we are only aware of changes in our underlying cognition. This hypothesis is based on four lines of evidence. (1) Without changes in visual input (including fixational eye movements), static images fade from awareness. (2) Consciousness appears to be continuous, but is actually broken up into discrete cycles of cognition. Without continuity, conscious awareness disintegrates into a series of isolated cycles. The simplest mechanism for creating continuity is to track the changes between the cycles. (3) While these conscious vectors are putative, they have a clear source: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The DLPFC is active during awareness of changes, and this awareness is disrupted by repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. (4) When the DLPFC and the orbital and inferior parietal cortices are deactivated during dreaming, conscious awareness is absent even though the rest of the brain is active. Moreover, Lau and Passingham showed that activation of the DLPFC, but no other brain region, correlates with awareness. In summary, if the DLPFC and conscious vectors are the neural correlate of consciousness, then we are only aware of changes in our underlying cognition. The glue that holds conscious awareness together is conscious awareness.

The cognitive and neural correlates of “tactile consciousness”: A multisensory perspective

People's awareness of tactile stimuli has been investigated in far less detail than their awareness of stimuli in other sensory modalities. In an attempt to fill this gap, we provide an overview of studies that are pertinent to the topic of tactile consciousness. We discuss the results of research that has investigated phenomena such as "change blindness", phantom limb sensations, and numerosity judgments in tactile perception, together with the results obtained from the study of patients affected by deficits that can adversely affect tactile perception such as neglect, extinction, and numbsense. The similarities as well as some of the important differences that have emerged when visual and tactile conscious information processing have been compared using similar experimental procedures are highlighted. We suggest that conscious information processing in the tactile modality cannot be separated completely from the more general processing of spatial information in the brain. Finally, the importance of considering tactile consciousness within the larger framework of multisensory information processing is also discussed.

The rotating spot method of timing subjective events

The rotating spot method of timing subjective events involves the subject's watching a rotating spot on a computer and reporting the position of the spot at the instant when the subjective event of interest occurs. We conducted an experiment to investigate factors that may impact on the results produced by this method, using the subject's perception of when they made a simple finger movement as the subjective event to be timed. Seven aspects of the rotating spot method were investigated, using a factorial experiment. Four of these aspects altered the physical characteristics of the computer generated spot or clock face and the remaining three altered the instructions given to the participant. We found compelling evidence that one factor, whether the subject was instructed to report the instant when the finger movement was initiated or the instant when it was completed, resulted in a systematic shift in the response. Evidence that three other factors affect the observed variability in the response was also found. In addition, we observed that there are substantial systematic differences in the responses made by different subjects. We discuss the implications of our findings and make recommendations about the optimal way of conducting future experiments using the rotating spot method. Our overall conclusion is that our results strongly validate the rotating spot method of timing at least the studied variety of subjective event.

Free will: reconciling German civil law with Libet's neurophysiological studies on the readiness potential

The free will debate widely exceeds the neuroscientific and philosophical fields due to profound implications for legislation, case law and psychiatric expert opinion. Data from Benjamin Libet's experiments on the readiness potential have been used as an argument against personal responsibility and for changes in the law. Due to the explicit use of the term "free will" in German civil law, the psychiatrist as an expert witness is confronted with this debate. In this article we outline the role of this crucial term in German civil law and we describe the neurophysiologic challenge in the form of Libet's experiments, which is led on three levels: the correctness of the data, the impact on the question of whether free will exists and possible consequences for the law. We conclude that the problem of free will cannot be debated on the basis of the data provided by Libet's experiments and that doubts about the existence of a free will must not lead to changes in the law or in psychiatric expert testimony. Therefore, advice for the psychiatrist as an expert witness is offered on the basis of a psychopathological approach that takes into account cognitive and motivational preconditions and the structure of values and personality.

Brain stimulation and conscious experience: Electrical stimulation of the cortical surface at a threshold current evokes sustained neuronal activity only after a prolonged latency

Libet demonstrated that a substantial duration (>0.5-1.0 s) of direct electrical stimulation of the surface of a sensory cortex at a threshold or liminal current is required before a subject can experience a percept. Libet and his co-workers originally proposed that the result could be due either to spatial and temporal facilitation of the underlying neurons or additionally to a prolonged central processing time. However, over the next four decades, Libet chose to attribute the prolonged latency for evoking conscious experience to a prolonged central processing time. In my view, Libet has not provided any convincing evidence, either on the basis of his own past work or in his critique of my paper, for his hypothesis of a central processing time exceeding 0.5s before conscious experience emerges following direct electrical threshold stimulation of the cortical surface. I stand by my original results and conclusion that such prolonged latencies are largely the consequence of a dynamically increasing cortical facilitatory process that begins hundreds of milliseconds before there is a sustained neuronal activation. In some cases, the facilitatory process must overcome an initial stimulus-induced inhibition before neuronal firing commences.

The timing of brain events: reply to the "Special Section" in this journal of September 2004, edited by Susan Pockett

In this "Reply" paper, the arguments and experimental findings by Pockett, Pollen, and Haggard et al. are analyzed. It had been shown () that a 0.5s duration of repetitive activations of sensory cortex is required to produce a threshold of sensation. The view that this is due to a facilitatory buildup in excitatory state to finally elicit neuronal firing is shown to be incompatible with several lines of evidence. Objections to the phenomenon of subjective referral backwards in time (for the delayed sensation) are also untenable. report that a self-initiated act can, under hypnotic suggestion, appear to the subject to be "involuntary." The act under hypnosis is better viewed as one initiated unconsciously, not as an act of conscious will.

The great subjective back-referral debate: do neural responses increase during a train of stimuli?

Evidence is summarised for and against the hypothesis that potentiation or facilitation of neural responses during a train of threshold-level stimuli occurred in the experiments reported by . It is concluded that such potentiation probably did occur. Since the main arguments for the existence of subjective backwards referral () take it as given that such potentiation did not occur, it is further concluded that the main arguments for the existence of subjective backwards referral fail.

Brain stimulation and conscious experience

Libet discovered that a substantial duration (> 0.5-1.0 s) of direct electrical stimulation of the surface of the somatosensory cortex at threshold currents is required before human subjects can report that a conscious somatosensory experience had occurred. Using a reaction time method we confirm that a similarly long stimulation duration at threshold currents is required for activation of elementary visual experiences (phosphenes) in human subjects following stimulation of the surface of the striate cortex. However, the reaction times for the subject to respond to the cessation of the visual experience after the end of electrical stimulation could be as brief as 225-242 ms. We also carried out extensive studies in cats under a variety of anesthetic conditions using the same electrodes and parameters of stimulation employed in the human studies to study the patterns of neuronal activity beneath the stimulating surface electrode. Whereas sufficiently strong currents can activate neurons within milliseconds, stimulating currents close to threshold activate sustained neural activity only after at least 350-500 ms. When currents are close to threshold, some neurons are inhibited for several hundreds of millisecond before the balance between inhibition and excitation shifts towards excitation. These results suggest that the prolonged latencies, i.e., latencies beyond 200-250 ms, for the emergence of conscious experience following direct cortical stimulation result from a delay in the sustained activation of underlying cortical neurons at threshold currents rather than being due to any unusually long duration in central processing time. Intracellular records from cortical neurological cells during repetitive electrical stimulation of the surface of the feline striate cortex demonstrate that such stimulation induces a profound depolarizing shift in membrane potential that may persist after each stimulus train. Such a depolarization is evidence that extracellular K+ concentrations have increased during electrical stimulation. Such an increase in extracellular K+ progressively increases cortical excitability until the threshold for sustained activation of cortical neurons is reached and then exceeded. Consequently, the long latency for threshold activation of cortical neurons depends upon a dynamically increasing cortical facilatory process that begins hundreds of milliseconds before there is sustained activation of such neurons. In some cases, this facilatory process must overcome an initial stimulus-induced inhibition before neuronal firing commences.

Consistent chronostasis effects across saccade categories imply a subcortical efferent trigger

Saccadic chronostasis refers to the subjective temporal lengthening of the first visual stimulus perceived after an eye movement, and is most commonly experienced as the "stopped clock" illusion. Other temporal illusions arising in the context of movement (e.g., "intentional binding") appear to depend upon the volitional nature of the preceding motor act. Here we assess chronostasis across different saccade types, ranging from highly volitional (self-timed saccades, antisaccades) to highly reflexive (peripherally cued saccades, express saccades). Chronostasis was similar in magnitude across all these conditions, despite wide variations in their neural bases. The illusion must therefore be triggered by a "lowest common denominator" signal common to all the conditions tested and their respective neural circuits. Specifically, it is suggested that chronostasis is triggered by a low-level signal arising in response to efferent signals generated in the superior colliculus.

Action, arousal, and subjective time

Saccadic chronostasis refers to the subjective temporal lengthening of the first visual stimulus perceived after an eye movement. It has been quantified using a duration discrimination task. Most models of human duration discrimination hypothesise an internal clock. These models could explain chronostasis as a transient increase in internal clock speed due to arousal following a saccade, leading to temporal overestimation. Two experiments are described which addressed this hypothesis by parametrically varying the duration of the stimuli that are being judged. Changes in internal clock speed predict chronostasis effects proportional to stimulus duration. No evidence for proportionality was found. Two further experiments assessed the appropriateness of the control conditions employed. Results indicated that the chronostasis effect is constant across a wide range of stimulus durations and does not reflect the pattern of visual stimulation experienced during a saccade, suggesting that arousal is not critical. Instead, alternative processes, such as one affecting the onset of timing (i.e., the time of internal clock switch closure) are implicated. Further research is required to select between these alternatives.

The sense of movement elicited by transcranial magnetic stimulation in humans is due to sensory feedback

It has been claimed that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the human motor cortex can produce a sense of movement of the contralateral hand, even when the hand is paralysed. The sense of movement was equated with a 'corollary discharge', a nulling mechanism originally posited for maintaining constancy of the visual field during eye movements. Our experiments were designed to test whether the sensation that accompanies TMS-evoked finger movements is generated centrally or whether it arises as a result of sensory feedback. Matched twitches of the left and right fingers were elicited either by bilateral electrical stimulation of forearm extensor muscles, or by a combination of TMS of left motor cortex (eliciting twitches of the right forefinger), and electrical stimulation of the left forearm muscles (eliciting twitches of the left forefinger). The time interval between stimuli activating left and right twitches was varied randomly (range +/- 90 ms) from trial to trial. Subjects reported whether they sensed that the left or the right movement occurred first, or if they could detect no difference. The left and right movements evoked by bilateral electrical stimulation of muscles were sensed as near simultaneous when there was zero delay between them. When TMS was applied in conjunction with unilateral muscle stimulation, the TMS-evoked movement was felt, on average, 20 ms after the movement evoked by muscle stimulation. Similar results were obtained when the skin under the cathodal electrodes was anaesthetized. Since the TMS-evoked movements were felt later rather than earlier than the electrically evoked movements, the results do not support the idea that the sensation of movement was elicited centrally by TMS. Rather, they favour sensory feedback as the source of the sense of movement. The earlier perception of electrically evoked versus TMS-evoked movements was probably due to earlier sensory responses in the periphery rather than a suppression of the excitability of somatosensory cortex.

Manual chronostasis: tactile perception precedes physical contact

When saccading to a silent clock, observers sometimes think that the second hand has paused momentarily. This effect has been termed chronostasis and occurs because observers overestimate the time that they have seen the object of an eye movement. They seem to extrapolate its appearance back to just prior to the onset of the saccade rather than the time that it is actually fixated on the retina. Here, we describe a similar effect following an arm movement: subjects overestimate the time that their hand has been in contact with a newly touched object. The illusion's magnitude suggests backward extrapolation of tactile perception to a moment during the preceding reach. The illusion does not occur if the arm movement triggers a change in a continuously visible visual target: the time of onset of the change is estimated correctly. We hypothesize that chronostasis-like effects occur when movement produces uncertainty about the onset of a sensory event. Under these circumstances, the time at which neurons with receptive fields that shift in the temporal vicinity of a movement change their mappings may be used as a time marker for the onset of perceptual properties that are only established later.

Where conscious sensation takes place

has drawn an alternative conclusion from the data of, and suggested that it takes 80 ms, rather than 500 ms, for the sensation evoked by a stimulus to enter awareness. Here, I suggest that our conscious sensation evolves over time, during the period from 80 to 500 ms after a stimulus, until the sensation is stably localized in space.

Libet's temporal anomalies: a reassessment of the data

Benjamin Libet compared the perceived time of direct brain stimulation to the perceived time of skin stimulation. His results are among the most controversial experiments at the interface between psychology and philosophy. The new element that I bring to this discussion is a reanalysis of Libet's raw data. Libet's original data were difficult to interpret because of the manner in which they were presented in tables. Plotting the data as psychometric functions shows that the observers have great uncertainty about the relative timing of events, as seen the shallow psychometric slopes. A second indication of uncertainty comes from Libet's use of three response categories, A first; B first; and A and B simultaneous. The large number of "perceptually simultaneous" responses provides a further measure of the difficulty of the judgment. There are thus a very broad range of stimulus delays in which the subject is unable to make an accurate ordering response. These points provide evidence that there is no compelling reason to invent exotic or ad hoc mechanisms to account for Libet's data since the uncertainty window is large enough to allow simple mechanism such as memory shifts. Libet argued that his data provide evidence for a backward referral in time. I argue that even though Libet's own data are weak, there are good arguments for a backward referral mechanism to help the subject make sense out of the tangled chaos of asynchronous information associated with experienced events.

The interpretation of Libet's results on the timing of conscious events: a commentary

A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality (PSE), calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. (1983), may be "corrected," taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are favored, but her explanation of peripheral-lemniscal couplings is found to be unconvincing. Trevena and Miller's article unsuccessfully tries to rescue a dualist interactionist view. Libet's method of timing intentions is thoroughly criticized.

Libet's research on the timing of conscious intention to act: a commentary

S. Pockett (Consciousness and Cognition, this issue) and G. Gomes (Consciousness and Cognition, this issue) discuss a possible bias in the method by which Libet's subjects estimated the time at which they became aware of their intent to move their hands. The bias, caused by sensory delay processing the clock information, would be sufficient to alter Trevena and Miller's (Consciousness and Cognition, this issue) conclusions regarding the timing of the lateralized readiness potential. I show that the flash-lag effect would compensate for that bias. In the last part of my commentary I note that the other target articles do not examine the most interesting aspect of Libet's unfashionable views on free will. I point out that Libet's views are less strange than they at first appear to be.

Two asymmetries governing neural and mental timing

Mental timing studies may be influenced by powerful cognitive illusions that can produce an asymmetry in their rate of progress relative to neuronal timing studies. Both types of timing research are also governed by a temporal asymmetry, expressed by the fact that the direction of causation must follow time's arrow. Here we refresh our earlier suggestion that the temporal asymmetry offers promise as a means of timing mental activities. We update our earlier analysis of Libet's data within this framework. Then we consider the surprises which often occur on those rare occasions when neural timing experiments parallel mental timing work exactly. Together, these surprises and asymmetries prescribe a relentlessly meticulous and fully transparent exposition of timing methods, terms, and concepts which shuns plausible narratives, even when buttressed by rigorous formal models, unless guided by opposite empirical evidence.

The timing of mental events: Libet's experimental findings and their implications

The major findings by Libet et al. are briefly summarized. The criticisms and alternative proposals by Trevena and Miller, Pockett, and Gomes (this issue) are analyzed and found to be largely unwarranted.

When timing the mind one should also mind the timing: biases in the measurement of voluntary actions

Trevena and Miller (2002, this issue) provide further evidence that readiness potentials occur in the brain prior to the time that participants claim to have initiated a voluntary movement, a contention originally forwarded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983). In their examination of this issue, though, aspects of their data lead them to question whether their measurement of the initiation of a voluntary movement was accurate. The current article addresses this concern by providing a direct analysis of biases in this task. This was done by asking participants to make subjective timing decisions regarding a stimulus that could be measured objectively. Our findings suggest that their timing task was indeed biased such that participants' tend to report events as happening approximately 70 ms later than they actually happened. Implications for the original Libet et al. claims are discussed.

Physical, neural, and mental timing

The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with colleagues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential (mental) timing. The nervous system does a sophisticated job of recombining and recoding messages from the sensorial surfaces and if these processes are slighted in a theory, it might become necessary to postulate weird operations, including subjective back-referral. Neuroscientifically inspired theories are of necessity still based on guesses, extrapolations, and philosophically dubious manners of speech. They often assume some neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) as a part of the nervous system that transforms neural activity in reportable experiences. The majority of neuroscientists appear to assume that the NCC can compare and bind activity patterns only if they arrive simultaneously at the NCC. This leads to a search for synchrony or to theories in terms of the compensation of differences in neural delays (latencies). This is the main dimension of the Libet discussion. Examples from vision research, such as "temporal-binding-by-synchrony" and the "flash-lag" effect, are then used to illustrate these reasoning patterns in more detail. Alternatively one could assume symbolic representations of time and space (symbolic "tags") that are not coded in their own dimension (not time in time and space in space). Unless such tags are multiplexed with the quality message (tickle, color, or motion), one gets a binding problem for tags. One of the hidden aspects of the discussion between Libet and opponents appears to be the following. Is the NCC smarter than the rest of the nervous system, so that it can solve the problems of local sign (e.g., "where is the event"?) and timing (e.g., "when did it occur?" and "how long did it last?") on its own, or are these pieces of information coded symbolically early on in the system? A supersmart NCC appears to be the assumption of Libet's camp (which includes Descartes, but also mystics). The wish to distribute the smartness evenly across all stages of processing in the nervous system (smart recodings) appears to motivate the opponents. I argue that there are reasons to side with the latter group.

The time of consciousness and vice versa

The temporal granularity of consciousness may be far less fine than the real-time information processing mechanisms that underlie our sensitivity to small temporal differences. It is suggested that conscious time perception, like space perception, is subject to errors that belie a unitary underlying representation. E. R. Clay's (The Alternative: A Study in Psychology, 1882) concept of the "specious present," an extended moment represented in consciousness, is suggested as an alternative to the more common notion of instantaneous experience that underlies much reasoning based on the "time of arrival" in consciousness.