The death of death

No substitute for human touch? Towards a critically posthumanist approach to dementia care

This paper develops a sociological critique of the pre-eminence of humanism in dementia care policy and practice. Throughout the centuries, humanism has served as something of a double-edged sword in relation to the care and treatment of people living with progressive neurocognitive conditions. On the one hand, humanism has provided an intellectual vehicle for recognising people with dementia as sentient beings with inalienable human rights. On the other hand, humanist approaches have relied upon and re-enforced normative understandings of what it means to be human; understandings that serve to position people with dementia as deficient. Two posthumanist approaches to dementia care policy and practice are explored in this paper: transhumanism and critical posthumanism. The former seeks, primarily, to use advances in 21st-century technologies to eradicate dementia. The latter seeks to de-centre anthropomorphic interpretations of what it means to be a person (with dementia), so as to create space for more diverse human–non-human relationships to emerge. The paper concludes with some tentative suggestions as to what a critically posthumanist approach to dementia care policy and practice might look like, as we move closer towards the middle of the 21st century.

Total Brain Death and the Integration of the Body Required of a Human Being

I develop and refine an argument for the total brain death criterion of death previously advanced by Germain Grisez and me: A human being is essentially a rational animal, and so must have a radical capacity for rational operations. For rational animals, conscious sensation is a pre-requisite for rational operation. But total brain death results in the loss of the radical capacity for conscious sensation, and so also for rational operations. Hence, total brain death constitutes a substantial change-the ceasing to be of the human being. Objections are considered, including the objection that total brain death need not result in the loss of capacity for sensation, and that damage to the brain less than total brain death can result in loss of capacity for rational operations.